removed for reasons

removed for reasons

removed for reasons

removed for reasons

removed for reasons

removed for reasons

Also, I'm very aware of the demand that exists from reviewing a draft like this. If it's too much, just track down and kill ( or summarize ) a part you believe I should re-define.

Intercepted wireless Russian messengers additionally played a vital role towards the outcome of Tannenberg. There were two extremely fortunate and important messages detained...

received. Detained is when you grab something and keep it.

... by the Germans on the early morning of August 25th. The first of those messages was sent by General Rennenkampf near 5:30 am with the destination...

delete. You say who it goes to.

...to the Russian Second Army in the south. And another was discovered

Use received or intercepted again. Or "eavesdropped on".

by German intelligence from general Samsonov to Rennenkampf an hour later. It was Rennenkampf’s message that contained his supposed marching orders for his Russian First Army on the next day of the 26th and his objectives. This note...

information. Or intelligence.

... suggested that he would be too far from Samsonov to assist him for a few days. It seemed...

wrong tense. Seems. It seems now.


that from this letter the German army commander Ludendoriff resolved to concentrate available forces to deal a quick and decisive blow to the new and emerging German threat, Samsonov; All with the confidence that Rennenkampf would remain behind at a far enough space and not attack him from the rear.
As a result of being influenced by such messages, the German overall commander Ludendoriff issued orders on the night of August 25th to attack Samsonov. The best strategy, they believed, for an affective demonstration would be the envelopment of the Russian First Army on a seventy-mile front. Their assumption would be that on August 26th, one corps would target the right and left flank while the centre offensive under Scholtz would be renewed with some much-needed supporting divisions. General Scholtz was then ...

Delete. Unnecessary.

... given support by a Landwehr division and General von Morgen’s 3rd reserve division. Ludendoriff also ordered August von Mackensen’s XVIIth corps, and later the Ist reserve corps, lead by Otto von Below...

Insert comma.

... to advance on Samsonov’s utmost right flank. And Samsonov’s left flank would be targeted by Herman von Francois, commander of the Ist corps.
Samsonov’s original campaign towards the north while against Scholtz turned awry in the beginning of the battle. It was during the early marching in the 26th that his central flanks had...

delete. Unnecessary.

... quickly advanced into a more westerly than northerly direction. This was in large part due to Samsonov’s incorrect reconnaissance reports suggesting that Scholtz was moving north. Yet, Scholtz was instead moving west. He ...

Unclear who he is. Samsonov.


...was forced to move his troops because of Scholtz’s own maneuvers. Unfortunately for the VIst corps, under general Blagovestchensky, they grew further isolated from the central flanks. They were originally positioned to go northeasterly to support the right flank. And they were only told to return when Blagovestchensky had managed to successfully reach his objective.

Its location, by chance, was near the emotional and legendary battle of Tannenberg in 1410.The first word should be "It's", the possessive form of "It." How can a battle be emotional? Battles don't have emotions. Also, the first Battle of of Tannenberg wasn't legendary. I would rewrite this as "It's location, by chance, was near where the Battle of Tannenberg was fought in 1410."

Those unfaithful reasons eventually blurred with the true reason for the failure at Tannenberg.Unfaithful is the wrong word. I suggest using "mistaken" or "incorrect."

Intercepted wireless Russian messengers...Should be "messages." Also, I recommend writing "Intercepted Russian wireless messages...," since "wireless" refers to the messages and not to the Russians.

By the night of August 25th and especially of the 26th, Samsonov recognized from reconnaissance through German rail and land movements that advancing reinforcements were emerging from Scholtz’s position. To make matters worse, there were additional reports detailing the emergence of a new enemy force under François invading slowly, yet progressively, to his left flank. Samsonov, recognizing the severity of the amassing opposition, sent an appeal to Zhilinsky and the Russian high command. This appeal suggested shifting plans by moving the army westward rather than continuing the obstructed northward campaign in an attempt to assault François. Yet there was a stark opposition for Samsonov’s appeal accusing him of cowardice ‘to see the enemy where he does not exist’ and continually ‘insisted upon Samsonov to take the offensive’ to take advantage of the ‘crippled’ German army. Their decision forced Samsonov to simply focus on Scholtz and ignore François; allowing him the opportunity of no opposition until ...

for, not until.

... two days. It was rather obvious that both Zhilinsky and high command were deeply influenced by Rennenkampf’s original interpretation and led Samsonov into a trap in

delete.

... which they could not have foreseen.
It is within the confusion of both objectives and an unsure resolve by Samsonov on the 26th that led to the right flank’s demise. While the central flanks had been advancing westerly, Samsonov had sent another message to the VIst corps to come back south to support the new offensive. But when Samsonov’s appeal had been rejected, he sent another message on the last minute in the morning to Blagovestchensky. It had directed him to abandon his previous objective and march back to his position in the north to protect from possible envelopment. They did not receive this message due to improper or desegregating connections....

Simplify. For some reason, they did not receive this message. Or blame it on the fog of war. "improper or desegregating conditions" sounds very pompous.

The downfall of the right flank began on the 26th of August possibly due to Russian assumption of superiority over a fledging enemy. Individual reconnaissance reports of the VIst corps received news of German ‘retreating’ forces six miles north of their position. Blagovestchensky, taking the initiative to protect the centre flank decided to press towards....

in this direction

Yet

delete.

, he was halted upon discovering that after a confrontation he was battling an advancing, and not retreating, offensive led by Mackensen. After about half a day of conflict, the VIst corps summoned their corresponding division that had been marching southward while Blagovestchensky had marched northward. Yet...

delete. Yet is like and at the beginning of a sentence. Only used for very special emphasis - doesn't really mean much.

, while marching back to support him, they came upon Below’s corps by

before (the end of the day)


the end of the day. Without their support, General Blagovestchensky suffered 5,000 casualties and a loss of sixteen field guns. It was a after a day of fighting on the 26th that he ordered his own retreat. It was through this hastily ordered retreat that the VIst corps became a disorganized shamble

shambles

by the morning of the 27th Samsonov’s right flank had been overturned as a result of extremely unfortunate ...

poor or bad, extreme or not. Fortune is luck. This wasn't luck. It was incompetency.

...planning and it was now under the will of his left flank to protect from a possible German envelopment on his center flanks.

heh, grammar was never truly my strongest suit. That helps a lot! Thanks, guys.

But what about the connection of the essay in general? Does it stick to the thesis? Or (dare I say) does it make sense? :)

Also, about the first battle being 'emotional'. It was emotional for both the Germans and Polish. After World War I, the german government built a monument there where pilgrims came until it was razed in World War II. The Polish government then built a monument in the same site for the Polish victory in the 15th century. Germans and Poles (the nationalist ones anyway) still argue between who won.

It appears to me that, while your English is good, it isn't your native language. All too often you don't use quite the right word. As Mark Twain wrote: "The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between the lightning and the lightning bug."

As for your essay, I would agree that you support your argument well.

Samsonov, on the exact same day, led his central flanks towards his own ‘retreating’ enemy when a conflict began. General Martos, in the center, was busy preoccupying himself with the new counter-offensive by Scholtz. It was on Martos’s right, that General Kliovev’s XIIIrd corps had successfully pushed its direction forward...

front line.

... to the town of Allenstein. But it was on Martos’s left, however, where Kendratovitch’s division of the XXXIIIrd corps had been pushed back.

Simplify. "But on Martos' left, Kendratovitch's division of the XXXIIIrd coprs had been pushed back." Note the Martos' bit - if there is an s before an apostrophe, don't add another s after the apostrophe.


As a result, Martos appealed for support from the neighboring XIIIrd corps. Kliovev had agreed and left from Allenstein being assured that the VIst corps, or their far left flank, would eventually arrive to protect the newly conquered position. The VIst corps, however, never came. Samsonov’s right flank would retreat and unintentionally leave

Wrong tense. Left not leave.

a path open to Allenstein for either Below or Mackensen

To do what with? to exploit.

. This meant that in order to prevent the complete envelopment feared by Samsonov, the majority of importance relied heavily...

importance? Who? How about "the majority of commanders relied TOO heavily


on their left flank.
By now, the affects ...

effects Noun not verb.

of the inaccurate Russian assumptions had emerged. The explanation for Rennenkampf’s utterly inaccurate prediction was because of witnessing the German retreat at Gumbinen. And while Rennenkampf’s belief addressed it as a trait for weakness, in reality they had only moved to the south to conflict...

Russians fighting Russians? How about fight alongside. Not sure about that bit.

with Samsonov’s Russian Second Army. Regardless, he made no true effort to follow or confirm anything via proper reconnaissance afterwards. This omission phased Zhilinsky little and accepted his assumption without little objection ...

with few objections. Or maybe "with few or no objections". You've used a double negative (no, no = yes).

On the eve of August 27th, Zhilinsky and...

insert "the rest of the"

high command had issued Rennenkampf with objectives preventing from him...

him from

... supporting Samsonov. The first of which was to pursue an enemy that they still had...

delete.

... assumed to be retreating. But his assistance would not come before organizing an effective siege around the heavily fortified city of Konigsberg, located near by. Originally, six reserve divisions positioned around Rennenkampf’s rear had been given this task. But they would fail to arrive in time. In response, Rennenkampf sent two of his corps to begin blockading Konigsberg until the divisions would arrive. Samsonov would then spend the 27th with the vague promise of assistance by Rennenkampf. His actions were influenced by this while both Rennenkampf and Zhilinsky still believed time was on their side.

Samsonov’s maneuvers on the 27th are continually...

still



... open to interpretation. There are some texts criticizing it as the product of his incompetence and some from a more generous perspective. Samsonov resolved, probably due to the possible promise of intervention by Rennenkampf and the horrendous thought of retreating, to continue northward. He had chosen a risky maneuver by emphasizing the bulk of his army into the center flanks. The strategy of this was meant to stall the German advance and implied that Rennenkampf would quickly arrive and jeopardize the German army with a back assault. It was the rational planning where he could both fulfill his objective and finish the German Eight Army. Because of this, emphasis on the left flank under general Artomonov had been stressed as an important factor. But, the left flank’s conditions to support a defensive...

action

... were less than enthusiastic. Artomonov’s defensive was plagued by starvation and low morale to begin with.
On the early morning of August 27th, Herman von François had entered within adequate range for Samsonov’s left flank. But instead of a frontal assault, a concentrated artillery bombardment began to fire ammunition onto Artomonov’s Ist corps. Realizing their dire situation, Artomonov abandoned their position and retreated eastward to combat François without his artillery support. The original clash between François and Artomonov’s Ist corps near the town of Usdau was won by artillery alone. However, François’s advance was halted when faced against increased opposition, east of Usdau. This is because he would have to wait for his artillery until the next day.
The next day, François continued his campaign eastward into the Ist corps. And despite the resistance encountered after Usdau; François managed to hold a productive momentum. Artillery guns managed once again to fire on Artomonov’s troops. However, their tactic did not produce the same results as the day before. Nevertheless, the German movements attacking the left flank shattered whatever illusion there was about a fledging enemy retreat.
On August 27th and 28th, neither Mackensen or Below advanced greatly to Samsonov’s newly exposed right or the retreating VIst corps. This is because both divisions were not where they were supposed to be due to improper communications with the German high command and insufficient road systems. Affective

Effective

orders had only made its made way...

made their way. Orders are plural. An order makes its way, orders make their way.

.. late in the afternoon of August 28th. When finally after much indecision, it was agreed upon...

simplify again. When it was finally agreed

...that Mackensen would pursue Blagovestchensky. Below’s division would then head for Samsonov’s newly exposed right at Allenstein. Interestingly enough, their two-day experience did not hinder or promote a Russian victory. This is probably because the emergence of Below’s troops coming near Samsonov would ultimately trigger his gradual retreat.

Rennenkampf’s last opportunity to assist Samsonov came once again at...

Delete, put "came on the night of..." instead. Last, final are ABSOLUTES.

... the night of August 27th. Zhilinsky had recognized that by now the Germans were not retreating. Yet, his directives still suggested that he believed time was on their...

his
... side. Since Rennenkampf had still been preoccupied with Koinsberg...

spell it consistently. Stick with one spelling.


..., Zhilinsky issued him...

issued him orders. Ordered for short

him only to cooperate and assist ‘by moving your [his] left flank as far forward as possible [towards Samsonov].’

A valiant attempt. Put the quote marks just around the bits he said; - 'by moving your', [his], 'left flask as far forward as possible' [towards Samsonov].

I could well be wrong on that. I'm not sure again.

Nevertheless, these orders proved too little, too late. After one day of marching, the left flank was only located twenty miles away from where Samsonov’s VIst corps was defeated earlier. And the movement during August 29th just proved to be deconstructive...

Unconstructive.
... This is because it moved ten miles farther west and no closer south. The left flank indeed moved as ‘far as possible’. But, at no point was Rennenkampf influenced to rapidly move his entire army. His choice in this battle was not his own.
On the night of the 28th, Samsonov had bitterly realized the situation. His center offensive did not break through

good place for a semi colon (;) or a dash (-)

Scholtz and François had continually been pushing eastwardly.

east

And to worsen matters, Below’s division had emerged as a new threat. The promise of relief by Rennenkampf now seemed far away. So, Samsonov then ordered the general retreat of his army. If Samsonov had not issued this retreat, the triple pronged attack would have surrounded Samsonov and denied him of food and supplies.
Samsonov’s retreat lasted from August 28th onto the 30th. The retreat, however, proved very unsuccessful when Below had reached Allenstein and obstructed essential escape routes

retreat routes. Or lines of retreat.

This, as a result made the army scramble through unfavourable terrains...

Clarify and simplify

This made the Russian army scramble through unfavourable terrain

...such as forested or marshy areas just to avoid conflict with the Germans. The battle of Tannenberg was officially over between the duration of these days. A multitude of men were taken prisoner, wounded, or killed.

The battle of Tannenberg lasted from August 26th onward until the 29th. Its outcome was not the result in the unwillingness to support a fellow general. Nor, was it the result of incompetent planning. Rather, staunchly inaccurate Russians predictions and fortunate intercepted Russian messengers were the culprits. Zhilinsky

Zhilinsky's.

distant control over deciding Russian actions also heavily contributed to the failure of Tannenberg.
As for the result, it sent jolts of pride over the German populace as the symbolic event of justification. The estimated number of soldiers taken prisoners peaked to 122,000 men, wounded or unwounded. An estimated number of 400 to 600 artillery guns were also captured. Out of anger, General Zhilinsky was dismissed due to his role in the battle. Rennenkampf, also, was placed under severe levels of scrutiny.
To reiterate, the true outcome had nothing to do with the alleged excuses like Samsonov’s ‘ignorant incompetence’ or Rennenkampf’s ‘unwillingness to assist the Russians’. It was rather the result of inaccurate Russian predictions in addition to extremely fortunate intercepted messages. And at no point did Samsonov do much outside the rationale. Zhilinsky’s orders additionally influenced Russian maneuvers to the demise of the Russian Second Army. It is within probability that the outcome and events occurred in

simplify. outcome of the

the battle were caused by those three factors.

I actually think that was pretty good, especially if English is not your first language. YNCS punctuation notes are valid too - I was concentrating more on the words than the fullstops, commas, apostrophes etc.

Also, I'm very aware of the demand that exists from reviewing a draft like this. If it's too much, just track down and kill ( or summarize ) a part you believe I should re-define.

Pah! I had 20 minutes to kill anyway. You were lucky on this one. After you've corrected it, it still won't be perfect.

But a 2nd draft is a lot easier to perfect than a first draft.

The first word should be "It's", the possessive form of "It."

ummmm, "Its" is the possessive form, "It's" is simply an abbreviation for "It is" or "It has"... :p

heh, grammar was never truly my strongest suit. That helps a lot! Thanks, guys.

But what about the connection of the essay in general? Does it stick to the thesis? Or (dare I say) does it make sense? :)



That's why I said it's good. You develop the ideas and give reasons.



Also, about the first battle being 'emotional'. It was emotional for both the Germans and Polish. After World War I, the german government built a monument there where pilgrims came until it was razed in World War II. The Polish government then built a monument in the same site for the Polish victory in the 15th century. Germans and Poles (the nationalist ones anyway) still argue between who won.

Maybe do that as an ending, so that people understand why there's still a lot of argument and confusion about it.

I didn't even know about the 1410 battle before your post - so you've helped inform and educate me a little bit.

Incidentally, a good English word processor like Word will highlight many of the mistakes I've listed. Of course, posting on forums doesn't give you that luxury.

As a German I will critizise not the grammar but only two words: Königsberg as the capital of East Prussia and Ludendorff.
Now to the context: There are indeed several errors. At first Ludendorff was never the commanding officer but Hindenburg. Also he was using the plan made by Col. Max Hoffmann. Hoffmann´s plan was only made because of ONE factor: the hatress of Samsonow and Rennenkampf. Both were ten years ago commanders of divisions in the war with Japan. Rennenkampf didn´t help Samsonow when Samsonow was in difficulties although he had the oreder to do so. When Samsonow met Rennenkampf he attacked him and both were fighting like school boys. The staff officers had difficulties to calm them down. Both wanted a duellbut the czar forbade that. One of the victims was a young German captain named Max Hoffmann. He knew his opponenents.
Hoffmann was staff officer at the 8th army in East Prussia when the war broke out. The Germans knew the status of the Russian army, bad equipped and not able to go into combat for a certain time. So only one army should protect East Prussia, Germany´s bigges grain store. Then the Russians attacked against all sense. The Germans were surprised.
After battle of Gumbinnen the commanding officer, von Prittwitz lost the nerves and wanted to retreat behind the Weichsel river giving up East Prussia. For the first and IIRC also only time in German military history, Hoffmann called in Koblenz the German army command informing them of the news to retreat behind the Weichsel. This could be a mutinity. Nevertheless von Moltke the younger was alarmed and dismissed von Prittwitz. He then chose Paul von Hindenburg, an old Feldmarschall who already fought in the Franco German war, as new commander, assisted by the Hero of Liége, Ludendorff. Hindenburg at once cancelled all orders given by Prittwitz. Hoffmann then told him of his plan. He said Rennenkampf would never assist Samsonow and so the German plan was that only three cavalry divisions should scout the Russian first army while the main part of the 8th army would trap the Russians in the Masurian Lakes.
The Russians here had difficulties to come further due to narrow ways and the supply broke down when they entered German territory due to the narrower railways of the German trains. Also a messenger was cought by German Lancers and a reconnaissance plane gave the news of the big distance of the both armies. So Hoffmann made his plan...
When the plan was executed the Russian First Army seemed to assist Samsonow crushing the German 8th Army. In this critical moment Ludendorff lost his nerves. All were clear it was dramatical if the Russian 1st Army would come. Hindenburg asked Hoffmann if he was really sure. Hoffmann told him the fight on the Railway station. Hindenburg then gave the order to continue risking the 8th army.
Rennenkampf never came. Samsonow was doomed. He never returned out of the Masurian lakes.
A few days after the battle Rennenkampf was attacked and beaten. East Prussia was saved by Max Hoffmann who was later nobled. This total victory was the turning point on the Eastern front. From now on Russia was in the defense. And the tales of the few survivors of Tannenberg who managed it to return to Russia were the first steps towards a revolution.
A good article nevertheless.

Adler

ummmm, "Its" is the possessive form, "It's" is simply an abbreviation for "It is" or "It has"... :pYou're right. My mistake. :(

I honestly neglected to mention Maximilian Hoffmann because it was Ludendorff who had taken the cerdit. That's an omission I had to live with, honestly. Otherwise I would have less room to write about my thesis. ya know?

Also, I'll admit I have not done a study about this battle spanning for over a year. But I did notice one thing, most texts that suggest that gurge were in the 1970's and before. And There's one very interesting historical article that I came upon from the Journal of Political and Military Sociology. (from online, of course) written only four years ago.

"The German generals propagated legends about their leadership and unity and about how the two Russian generals, Rennenkampf and Samsonov, had allowed their personal rivalry to sabotage their professionalims. As we can prove that this rivalry never existed, and because we also know..." p.283

Add maps showing the campaign and pictures of the main players.

A battle without a map is like a broken pencil, pointless ;)

But once again, thank you all very much. Now, I just need to add those improvements on the paper and start adding superscirpts for sources. Who knew a civilization world history could qualify as 'the test'?

Also, KittenofChaos, an illustration couldn't hurt. But I would have to ask my professor about that first.

PenName, you had to take Max Hoffmann in, because he was the planner and not Ludendorff. Also he was the guy who knew both enemy generals and acted so like he did. Successful. I don´t know why exactly Rennenkampf, who never gave a good explantion for his deeds, didn´t help Samsonow. Samsonow sent also a message to him the Russian 1st Army should come to his position, but Rennenkapmf answered he would attack Königsberg and Samsonow had to cope with the situation alone. There might be also Zhilinsky´s errors which had influence in this decisions, but I think it was Rennenkampf, who had good connections to the Court in St. Petersburg, who indeed hated Samsonow so much that he was not willing to help him. If he was able to do so or if he had also severe problems is not very relevant. Both hated each other. Nobody knows why but this is fact. Also if you have two generals which hates each other and there were difficulties between them in the service it is an idioty to use them in the same area.
Another reason for the defeat was that the Russians were badly equipped. Not many soldiers got boots, many had to run barefeet. Rifles were also not for all soldiers there. And after invading East Prussia, where the officers had nearly no maps of, the supply was coming only after big difficulties making the Russian soldiers plunder farms to find some food. Russia attacked too early.

Adler

When I cheated doing my school work, I did at least so not in a public forum. Even worse, it is for university.

When I cheated doing my school work, I did at least so not in a public forum. Even worse, it is for university.

:confused:

This is cheating? Asking for corrections so you can redraft a document?

If the guy had a decent word processor it would highlight all the mistakes and correct all the spelling anyway. That too might be called cheating... but the technology is there and few places of learning will prevent students from using the best tools available.

Times change. And if you cheated by other methods, I really don't understand what your complaint is.

Well, Longasc has a point, as I have seen several threads started
here that were blatant attempts on the part of the thread starters
to have us do their work for them. This one isn't quite that bad,
but I would personally err on the side of caution and not comment.

I am aware that people who are or were not at an university do not know that plagiarism has become an increasingly problematic issue over years.

Many blame modern communication methods, namely the internet. This is true, is it not tempting for a German student e.g. to ask a native speaker for corrections? Or as in this case, for new ideas, corrections, inspiration?

OK, this paper is probably for a lower grade, no references, citations... so it is really not that severe. I just wondered about this impudent display in a public forum.

Well I really don't see it. Thread starter could have just gone locally for help in identifying errors with the text, and having them pointed out.

Instead he posted here, and I pointed out the errors. It's up to that poster to actually do the work correcting them.

Do people ask for help with their educational work? Of course.

What's the difference here then? Scientists and academics all over the world have their work checked and proofed before publication. Ditto the media.

Why not students?

If someone is asking for help in things like grammar or content there is nothing to say against it. However he is not allowed to plagiate and has to give the sources of everything he found except his own conclusions and work. Also it is dangerous to ignore facts to "prove" an own thesis. Either you can prove the facts are wrong or implement them in your own theory. If not your theory is wrong. And if your theory is wrong let it be and do not follow it. The propability that your professor knows that is very high. So bad marks are most propable.
PenName, you have a good work but you made some critical errors I pointed out. You should read "The Hinge Factor" by Erik Durschmied, where also this battle is in. Add this and go away from the thesis that Samsonow and Rennenkampf were no fools as they acted so (much more Rennenkampf).

Adler