Neville Chamberlain is depicted as being a wishy-washy appeaser, closing his eyes to obvious Nazi aggression. In September 1938, he effectively surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler by signing the Munich Pact. There are even some people, like the historian A.J.P. Taylor, who have argued that had Britain and France stood up to Hitler, he would have backed down, or even been replaced by his own generals. Indeed, they continue, even if it had come to a fight, the democracies would have been strong enough to take on Germany in 1938.

In fact, quite the reverse is true. As unprepared as Britain and France were for war in late 1939, they were even more so a year earlier. Also, the Allied military position in 1938 was seriously flawed. The overall balance of ground forces, 68 German divisions to 82 British (7) and French (75) divisions, was on paper favorable to the Allies. But where Germany had five panzer divisions and six motorized divisions, the Allies had between them three light-armored and three motorized divisions. The air situation was even more imbalanced, for the Germans had about 2,850 combat aircraft while the Allies had only about 2,350 (900 British, 1,450 French). Moreover, virtually the entire French Air Force consisted of obsolete aircraft and the British had only about 400 modern planes, while the Germans had entirely first line equipment.

Despite appearances, Chamberlain was no fool. He was quite aware that Hitler's "No More Territorial Demands" speech just before Munich was a fraud. He was also quite aware of the poor state of British defenses. He had consulted his military chiefs and they had given him a precise assessment. When he asked what the chances were of defending England from an air assault in 1938, he was rightly told they were not good. It would be at least a year before the Hurricanes and Spitfires would be available in great numbers, and the new mystery weapon, Radio Direction Finding (aka radar), on hand. Weighing the odds, Chamberlain backed down. Hitler was no fool either. When Mussolini, who had worked particularly hard to bring about the Munich Pact, boasted of his accomplishment, Hitler slammed him. Hitler wanted a fight in 1938.

A year later, when Hitler wanted a piece of Poland, Chamberlain again went to his military leaders for an assessment on defending Britain. By then there were nearly 1,500 Hurricanes and Spitfires available, and the "Chain Home" radar net was in place. Chamberlain promptly issued an ultimatum and Britain was shortly at war.

Source: D. Cameron Watt. How War Came. New York: Pantheon, 1989.

Yes, you´re right concerning the figures- but you have to see also Germany was not able to lead a war. Sure Germany had more planes but also much of the newest equipment was still missing. Most German wings still had the He 51 biplane fighters, only few the Me 109. Also the German tanks were mostly Pzkw I and several Pzkw II, light tanks which had no real problems in fighting a small state like Poland but against France? Yes the Pz II was used extensively in the west but it was supported by the Pz III and IV. They were only in production or still only planned. On the sea Germany´s position was much worse than in 1939. Only the battleship Gneisenau was able to be commissioned in that time, although ready for combat she wasn´t.
All in all the German forces were also not really ready for a fight. That´s why German generals came to Chamberlain and said him they would make a coup d´etat if he did not appease Hitler. However he did not trust this and appeased. Nevertheless the resistance fighters tried to murder Hitler but this attempt was cancelled when suddenly Mussolini drove in Hitler´s car with him. And after that due to the appeasement the generals didn´t see the possibility for a coup. Not for the last time the British helped, mostly unwillingly, Hitler to stay as "Führer".
So finally I can´t concur with your conclusions.

Adler

Apart from military balance, the mental attitude of the populace of the Allied Countries must also be taken into account. Churchill, for long was considered a mad war monger and nobody seriously wanted a war in the Continent, remembering the horrors of the Great War.

The only one who wanted war was Hitler.

Adler

resistance fighters tried to murder Hitler but this attempt was cancelled when suddenly Mussolini drove in Hitler´s car with him.

what a shame, they could of noobed two birds with one connie

Actually I attribute it to the failure to form an stronger alliance.
It would have the best diplomatic solution.

A strong Alliance between, Britan, France, USA and Russia would have very likely prevented the outbreak of another world war

I think not...

Let's remember that Britain and France were terrified of Russia running amok in Europe and were willing to live with Hitler as long as he made the customary anti-commie rhetoric of the day.
The USA was still isolationist and there was absolutely NO support for "meddling" in European affairs among the public at large.

There was NO WAY these countries could have come together to form an alliance to contain Hitler.

In 1935 when Hitler announced his rearmament plan, a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, nothing was done. The German army of the time was offically numbered at 100K with supplement units expected to be drawn from private armies such as the friekorp.

When Germany moved into the Ruhr in 1936 the French could have easily stopped them. A point made by both the German General Staff of the time and Hitler. Hitler also belived that if the reoccupation of the Ruhr failed it would be the end of his goverment.

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia the German military and Hitler both believed that they had severely underestimated the strenght of the Czech fortifications. An attempt to invade would have taken much longer than originally planned and possibly eated up the cream of the German army while leaving western Germany open to attack by France and Britain.

When Germany moved against Poland in 1939 it left around 5 divisions in the west. Facing it were over 70 French divisions and 2 British divisions of the British Expeditionary Force.
The French make a limited move in the Saar, which can best be described as a recon in force, without making any serious attempt to breach the west wall. Whether the actual throw weight of the French would be enough to make any progress in the west is a point for debate given its equipment, training and defeatest leadership.

When Germany moved into the Ruhr in 1936 the French could have easily stopped them.
Only question is exactly how impopular such a French move would have been. Most nations aside from France thought it right and proper for Germany to have control over the Ruhrgebiet.
When Germany moved against Poland in 1939 it left around 5 divisions in the west. Facing it were over 70 French divisions and 2 British divisions of the British Expeditionary Force.
The French make a limited move in the Saar, which can best be described as a recon in force, without making any serious attempt to breach the west wall. Whether the actual throw weight of the French would be enough to make any progress in the west is a point for debate given its equipment, training and defeatest leadership.
Gamélin didn't believe in taking the offensive and only sent a token force of ten divisions across the border where they advanced a few kilometres very slowly. (the Germans took a few hundred casualties.) The force was mainly Foreign Legion and colonial troops according to Daladiers plan of 'saving French blood'. ('A dirty economy of blood' according to one French staff officer I've seen interviewed.)

It's possible a full scale offensive wouldn't have worked in any case, but the great lost opportunity of the French army was that it failed to try out its organisation, tactics, gear etc. in combat. Had they done so, even if unsuccessful in making a breakthrough, lots of deficiencies would have been detected and could have been fixed in time for the German campaign against France.
After all, the German campaign in Poland did show up plenty of things that didn't work as well as expected. The Germans had fixed these in time for taking on France.

Well that was another problem: Without the annexion of the Czech republic Hitler only claimed and gained legitime (so seen in many countries) claims: The rearmament of the Rhineland, the abolitioning of Versailles, even Austria and the Sudetenland as well as the Memel area and the introduction of heavy weapons. Everything was claimed long before and Hitler earned only the fame others did before him mostly Stresemann. So it was indeed very difficult. However as I said Hitler played with too low cards at Munich and if the British would have been hard and threatened with war Hitler would have been removed. But Chamberlain didn´t trust the German generals... THAT is the real tragedy.

Adler

Interesting post, however I'm not entirely sure of the statistics relating to the situation in 1938 as some sources I've read disagree with them or go into more detail on the German situation at the time and draw on that to come to a rather different conclusion.

The hardware in frontline service on both sides, during 1937/38, favoured Britain.

I think Chamberlain might have been trying to go down in history as a great leader. There were also political problems in Great Britain at the time, much of the population were displeased with and objected to imperialism.

Chamberlain resigned when Germany declared war. I think that is a clear indication that the PM wasn't just biding his time.

The hardware in frontline service on both sides, during 1937/38, favoured Britain.At the time of Munich, the RAF had one squadron of Spitfires and another squadron of Hurricanes. Most of Fighter Command was equipped with Gloster Gladiator biplanes

http://members.tripod.com/Air_Museum_ww2/0a49dc40.jpg

Yeah, but the Luftwaffe wasn't much better off and could hardly cross the channel. Any planes that could cross it would have ill suited to fighting the Hawker Hurricanes & Bristol Blenheims which entered service in 1936 and 1937 respectively.

The Blenheim was adapted to fighter role and was very succesful. Other planes were also a success and don't get noticed much in history. Few can compete with the legassy of Spitfire.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/e/eb/300px-Blenheim.550pix.jpg

The Bf-109D-1 went into active service in March 1937, and was the main Luftwaffe fighter in September 1938.

http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/img/techs/bf109d1.jpg
.

At the time of Munich, the RAF had one squadron of Spitfires and another squadron of Hurricanes. Most of Fighter Command was equipped with Gloster Gladiator biplanes



Germany had no aircraft capable of effective strategic attacks on Britain at the time from her bases in Germany, not to mention that these planes would have little to no fighter cover available. She also had barely 500 ME109s which had been in service for such a short time that the squadrons upgraded to it were crashing too frequently out of inexperience.

In other words, the theory that the RAF desperately needed time to enable itself to protect Britain against the Luftwaffe is a rather debateable one.

Germany had no aircraft capable of effective strategic attacks on Britain at the time from her bases in Germany, not to mention that these planes would have little to no fighter cover available. She also had barely 500 ME109s which had been in service for such a short time that the squadrons upgraded it were crashing too frequently out of inexperience.
That's fine and good, except for two niggling little points.

If the British Army sits in England and makes faces at the Germans, that doesn't affect the Germans in the least. A BEF has to land in France, which puts it in range of the Bf-109s that you (but not the RAF) seem to despise.

You're referring to the Bf (not ME) 109E, which was just coming into service. Its new engine, the DB600, had teething problems which caused a lot of the crashes. However, the bulk of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons were equipped with Bf-109Ds, which had been in service for 18 months and the bugs had been worked out.

Point is that the Luftwaffe had no way to attack Britain at the time in question. German navy was also a lot less potent at the time in question.

In contrast, the RAF could attack Germany! I can see no good reason for Chamberlain refusing to bomb German airfields & manufacturers, except the political objection to war.

From a logistics perspective, one has to remember that with the data Chamberlain had: Britain would have had use of airfields in England, Poland, France, Crete, and North Africa.

If the British Army sits in England and make faces at the Germans, that doesn't affect the Germans in the least. A BEF has to land in France, which puts it in range of the Bf-109s that you (but not the RAF) seem to despise.

I'm lost as to where do you get the concept that I despise the 109 from :confused:

I'd also suggest that if Germany did fight over Czechoslovakia the Luftwaffe would already have it's hands full there supporting the Wermacht before it began attacking the BEF or the French.

Also my sources suggest 5 Hurricane squadrons for the autumn of 1938, not one.

As for why I'd talk about attacking Britain, the answer is simple. Too often people seeking to defend appeasement* suggest what I said earlier, that the RAF needed the time to build up the defences of Britain against air raids. Unfortunately this is a falsehood, the Luftwaffe were nowhere near capable of a sustainable bombing campaign on Britain in 1938 and would not be capable of doing so until maybe 1939-40 depending on events in any war of 1938 of course.

* Which is not to say I am attacking appeasement because I'm rather neutral on the topic.

You're referring to the Bf (not ME) 109E, which was just coming into service. Its new engine, the DB600, had teething problems which caused a lot of the crashes. However, the bulk of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons were equipped with Bf-109Ds, which had been in service for 18 months and the bugs had been worked out

I tend to use ME due to it being a Messerschmitt plane, either way I'm sure you're aware of what I which plane I meant. However I was not referring to engine problems, but other problems associated with the transition from biplane to modern fighter. Not all of the squadrons using the plane would have recieved it 18 months prior to Autumn 1938, and from what I've read however long they'd had the plane, accident rates still ran higher than normal. I'd imagine to a degree the RAF squadrons then operating Hurricanes and Spitfires would have some similar issues as well.

stormbind
Retenta personam!

Chamberlain resigned when Germany declared war. I think that is a clear indication that the PM wasn't just biding his time.

Not quite. Chamberlain remained as prime minister for the first seven months of the war, including the fall of Poland, Denmark and Norway. He resigned on May 10, 1940 due to mounting opposition, right after Germany attacked the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and France but before they fell.

Some clarification on that :)

Following the debacle of the British expedition to Norway, Chamberlain found himself under siege in the House of Commons. During the Norway Debate of May 7, Leo Amery–who had been one of Chamberlain's personal friends–delivered a devastating indictment of Chamberlain's conduct of the war. In concluding his speech, he quoted the words of Oliver Cromwell to the Long Parliament: The Norway Debate was a famous debate in the British House of Commons that took place on May 7 and May 8, 1940.

"You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go".

When the vote came the next day over forty government supporters voted against the government and many more abstained. Although the government won the vote, it became clear that Chamberlain would have to meet the charges brought against him. He initially tried to bolster his government by offering to appoint some prominent Conservative rebels and sacrifice some unpopular ministers, but demands for an all-party coalition government grew louder. Chamberlain set about investigating whether or not he could persuade the Labour Party to serve under him and, if not, then who should succeed him.

Two obvious successors soon emerged: Lord Halifax, then Foreign Minister, and Winston Churchill. Halifax would have proved acceptable to almost everyone, but he was deeply reluctant to accept, arguing that it was impossible for a member of the House of Lords to lead an effective government. Over the next twenty-four hours, Chamberlain explored the situation further. That afternoon he met with Halifax, Churchill and Margesson, who determined that if Labour should decline to serve under Chamberlain then Churchill would have to try to form a government. Labour leaders Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood were unable to commit their party and agreed to put two questions to the next day's meeting of the National Executive Committee: Would they join an all-party government under Chamberlain? If not, would they join an all-party government under "someone else"?

The next day, Germany invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and France. At first, Chamberlain believed it was best for him to remain in office for the duration of the crisis, but opposition to his continued premiership was such that, at a meeting of the War Cabinet, Lord Privy Seal Sir Kingsley Wood told him clearly that it was time to form an all-party government. Soon afterwards, a response came from the Labour National Executive–they would not serve with Chamberlain, but they would with someone else. On the evening of May 10, 1940, Chamberlain tendered his resignation to the King and formally recommended Churchill as his successor.

It has always been my belief, true or not, that Chamberlain may have gone down in history as a great PM at any point of time in Britain except at the time he was actually PM, while Churchill would have been a terrible PM at any time except the time he was actually PM in Britain.
Whatever else may have been his other good qualities, Chamberlain was just not a war leader.

A word to the discussion Me 109 or Bf 109. Willy Messerschmidt owned the Bayerischen Flugzeugwerke. This company was producing the Bf 109. At about 1939 the company got a new name after her owner. So all plane variants built after that got a new name. So it was possibel that the Bf 109 D could exist while the Me 109 E was also produced. So it depends on the time what designation would have to be used. However this is only a very little fact, so IMO you can use both.

Adler

Neville Chamberlain is depicted as being a wishy-washy appeaser, closing his eyes to obvious Nazi aggression. In September 1938, he effectively surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler by signing the Munich Pact. There are even some people, like the historian A.J.P. Taylor, who have argued that had Britain and France stood up to Hitler, he would have backed down, or even been replaced by his own generals. Indeed, they continue, even if it had come to a fight, the democracies would have been strong enough to take on Germany in 1938.

In fact, quite the reverse is true. As unprepared as Britain and France were for war in late 1939, they were even more so a year earlier. Also, the Allied military position in 1938 was seriously flawed. The overall balance of ground forces, 68 German divisions to 82 British (7) and French (75) divisions, was on paper favorable to the Allies. But where Germany had five panzer divisions and six motorized divisions, the Allies had between them three light-armored and three motorized divisions. The air situation was even more imbalanced, for the Germans had about 2,850 combat aircraft while the Allies had only about 2,350 (900 British, 1,450 French). Moreover, virtually the entire French Air Force consisted of obsolete aircraft and the British had only about 400 modern planes, while the Germans had entirely first line equipment.

Despite appearances, Chamberlain was no fool. He was quite aware that Hitler's "No More Territorial Demands" speech just before Munich was a fraud. He was also quite aware of the poor state of British defenses. He had consulted his military chiefs and they had given him a precise assessment. When he asked what the chances were of defending England from an air assault in 1938, he was rightly told they were not good. It would be at least a year before the Hurricanes and Spitfires would be available in great numbers, and the new mystery weapon, Radio Direction Finding (aka radar), on hand. Weighing the odds, Chamberlain backed down. Hitler was no fool either. When Mussolini, who had worked particularly hard to bring about the Munich Pact, boasted of his accomplishment, Hitler slammed him. Hitler wanted a fight in 1938.

A year later, when Hitler wanted a piece of Poland, Chamberlain again went to his military leaders for an assessment on defending Britain. By then there were nearly 1,500 Hurricanes and Spitfires available, and the "Chain Home" radar net was in place. Chamberlain promptly issued an ultimatum and Britain was shortly at war.

Source: D. Cameron Watt. How War Came. New York: Pantheon, 1989.

I don't buy this argument. Chamberlain was under no obligation to even get involved in Munich. The issue was over Czechoslovak territory, not British. Chamberlain could've simply responded to Hitler that he should make his demands to the Czechs. Notably, the one nation not involved in Munich was Czechoslovakia.

I think not...

Let's remember that Britain and France were terrified of Russia running amok in Europe and were willing to live with Hitler as long as he made the customary anti-commie rhetoric of the day.
The USA was still isolationist and there was absolutely NO support for "meddling" in European affairs among the public at large.

There was NO WAY these countries could have come together to form an alliance to contain Hitler.

True enought

but now think of how unlikey the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was ?

stormbind
Retenta personam!

Chamberlain resigned when Germany declared war. I think that is a clear indication that the PM wasn't just biding his time.

Not quite. Chamberlain remained as prime minister for the first seven months of the war, including the fall of Poland, Denmark and Norway. He resigned on May 10, 1940 due to mounting opposition, right after Germany attacked the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and France but before they fell.
Fair enough, an honest man is entitled to (and prone to) making mistakes.

But what about Chamberlain's public announcement of war between Britain and Germany? He spells out his intentions in that.

Had Chamberlain been comparible to recent leaders, he would have ordered the RAF to bomb Hitler's airfields and assembly plants at the first sign of breaching any standing treaty.

I don't buy this argument. Chamberlain was under no obligation to even get involved in Munich. The issue was over Czechoslovak territory, not British. Chamberlain could've simply responded to Hitler that he should make his demands to the Czechs. Notably, the one nation not involved in Munich was Czechoslovakia.
In a way, Hitler did that.

Hitler summoned the Czech president, made him wait something like ten hours, and then informed him that German troops had invaded - so surrender now and lets save some lives. What was the old Czech president supposed to do under those conditions?

Had it been a proper, less deceitful invasion, then Germany would have been drawn into a real war - a war the French, Poles, and British could take advantage of.

I don't know why Chamberlain allowed that to happen. In my opinion, he collaborated with evil and that's the wost part of his premiership.

However as I said Hitler played with too low cards at Munich and if the British would have been hard and threatened with war Hitler would have been removed. But Chamberlain didn´t trust the German generals... THAT is the real tragedy.

Adler

No the real tragedy is your gullibility. How many times did the Generals talk and not act during Hitler's reign? Why didn't they remove him after he invaded Poland? Don't try and blame Chamberlain.

I don't know why Chamberlain allowed that to happen. In my opinion, he collaborated with evil and that's the wost part of his premiership.

Neville Chamberlain gets a bad wrap for the whole Munich thing. I can't blame him for not going into a world war over some far off young nation most Britons cared little for.

The British had NO guarentees to protect the Czechs. The French and Russians did and they did not act. If Any nation was in a military position to stop the Germans it was the French, who had one of the world's largest armies.

The Poles were probably the worst of the lot. Grabbing land off a defenceless nation when Hitler offered it to them. They soon got their just desserts!

..and the Russians didn't learn from the POles when land was offered to them:rolleyes:

rilnator, again I have to answer that it was a dictatorship and the resistance fighters tried at least 42 times to kill Hitler. An assasination has to be planned exactly. Also if you make a coup you have to be sure to take over the power. After Munich the killing of Hitler might be sure but the latter wasn´t until about 1941. Also we talk about murdering someone! That is in no way a decision to make just in a minute. There were many like Rommel or Canaris who wanted to put this guy to the courts instead of killing him. You do the very error like the Allies did in ww2: You underestimate and don´t trust the only resistance group what could end the war very quickly. That they were not successful is a tragedy you shouldn´t mock at.

Adler

The difference between us is that you see the majority of the German officer corps as a bunch of professional, mislead, well meaning heroes. Whereas I see them as a bunch of blind, gutless, ambition driven heroes. Strange how the assisination attemps only intensified once the Germans were losing.

Has it ever occured to you that perhaps a lot of them wanted war too? Many of them fought in WW1 and perhaps they were eager for revenge or to try out new weapons and tactics.

Please don't try and blame the British for not believing the resistance groups and therefore starting WW2. Don't even try to elaborate on the point. The reason that Hitler was in the position he was in was because the Wehrmacht and the German nation were willing to do his bidding.

Gamélin didn't believe in taking the offensive and only sent a token force of ten divisions across the border where they advanced a few kilometres very slowly. (the Germans took a few hundred casualties.) The force was mainly Foreign Legion and colonial troops according to Daladiers plan of 'saving French blood'. ('A dirty economy of blood' according to one French staff officer I've seen interviewed.)

It's possible a full scale offensive wouldn't have worked in any case, but the great lost opportunity of the French army was that it failed to try out its organisation, tactics, gear etc. in combat. Had they done so, even if unsuccessful in making a breakthrough, lots of deficiencies would have been detected and could have been fixed in time for the German campaign against France.
After all, the German campaign in Poland did show up plenty of things that didn't work as well as expected. The Germans had fixed these in time for taking on France.

...completely ignoring France's treaty obligations to Poland which stated that in the event of a German invasion of one signer, the other would immediately invade Germany "with the bulk of their forces". Gamelin went so far as to repeatedly lie to the Polish military leadership in the first two weeks of September 1939 (Rydz-Smigley in particular), either promising that the invasion would take place "imminently" or that it was already under way and would increase in force shortly. Rydz-Smigley authorized the ill-fated large-scale holding action at the Battle of the River Bzura on the night of 9. September in an effort to stall German advances towards Warsaw based on one of these lies from Gamelin, resulting in the destruction of the army group defending Warsaw prematurely.

This is the larger question not being addressed here; it's not just whether Chamberlain and Deladiers were correct in their assessment of their military strength or ability to "deal" with Hitler effectively, it is also about whether they had the right to bargain away a sovereign state (Czechoslovakia) and allow it to be carved up without consulting it. It might also be interesting to note that France was again tied to this state in a mutual-protection treaty via La petit Entente. No one in Paris, or the other signatory capitals for that matter (Belgrade, Bucharest) lifted a single finger of protest at this dismemberment of a country all were contractually bound to aid in just such a time.

Did Chamberlain and Deladiers have the right to be giving away countries or lands in Central Europe they didn't own? Did League of Nations membership, the fact that Czechoslovakia was a vibrant democracy or that it was strongly pro-Western have any meaning? Do only larger powers deserve real sovereignty, the rest of us being mere bargaining chips in their power games?

Neville Chamberlain gets a bad wrap for the whole Munich thing. I can't blame him for not going into a world war over some far off young nation most Britons cared little for.

And yet when World War came again, large numbers of the peoples from those far off young countries (some older than Britain, BTW) Britons cared little for came to Britain and fought for Britain and its interests, as well as France. Polish army units took part in the Norwegian campaign (especially Narvik) and remnants of the Polish navy helped patrol the Norwegian coast - months after the Polish defeat and conquest by the Wehrmacht. One-fifth of the pilots who fought on the British side in the Battle of Britain were either Polish or Czech ex-pat pilots. Polish and Czech army units and individual soldiers fought against the Germans in France in 1940,and also took part in the Normandy landings and subsequent liberation of France in 1944. The Enigma code, despite recent Hollywood films, was broken by Polish intelligence officers working for the British. Polish re-organized units fought with the British and Americans in North Africa and Italy. Visit Monte Cassino sometime and you'll see a large Polish military cemetary there; Polish and Indian units were the ones to finally break the German hold on the mountain abbey. Gee - what a bargain! Britain and France could help carve up or abandon treaties with "little, unknown peoples" in Eastern Central Europe to appease German militarism, then get their military and technical services for free during the ensuing war, and then abandon them again after the war! Weeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee! And decades later Britons can still boast in ignorance that they just didn't matter much to Britain anyway.

The Poles were probably the worst of the lot. Grabbing land off a defenceless nation when Hitler offered it to them. They soon got their just desserts!

In part, in this I can agree. Cieszyn/Tescen/Cesyn is one of four mountain passes through the Carpathians, and the particularly bad Polish political leadership in 1939 saw opportunity in Czech distress to seize this town "back". When Poland and Czechoslovakia had regained their independence in 1918 the Czech and Polish peoples of this town sat down and negotiated a fairly sane compromise that divided the town between the two countries - but both Prague and Warsaw rejected the agreement. The Czechs moved fastest and seized the town, and the League of Nations accepted the fait accompli by 1921. (It was already hurting from the idiotic handling of the Silesian polls.) In 1939, Poland was ruled by a rotating group of nationalistic colonels who saw an opportunity for revenge against the Czechs for 1918. Their excuse was that the mountain pass was militarily vital, but of course everyone knew any military invasion of Poland in 1939 was going to come from the west and north, not the south....

Still, by your logic - we had no treaties with the Czechs, and indeed we had a very bad relationship with Prague dating back to our mutually-exclusive nationalistic goals in the 1920s. Poland and Czechoslovakia mistrusted one another intensely in that period, both scuttling opportunities for mutual-aid treaties with the West involving Warsaw and Prague because of this mistrust. Still again, hey! The treaties were nevered honored by the West anyway, so what was the loss? ;)

As for "getting what it deserved"... So you suppose the Nazi murder of some 6 million Polish citizens and the destruction of most of Poland's pre-war economic base was justified for the bloodless (if foolish) Polish seizure of Cieszyn? Well let's see, what inglorious things has Britain done that might "justify" getting one-fourth of the British population murdered and a large chunk of its bulding stock destroyed - can you think of any? Empire maybe? India? Sudan? Culloden? Irish famine? Or are only the smaller, newer states of Eastern Wurope subject to this kind of morality, and therefore deserving of the 50 year post-war Soviet occupation as well as the horrors of the war. O, to be Western European and pure!

What do they teach in British schools nowadays?

Well that was another problem: Without the annexion of the Czech republic Hitler only claimed and gained legitime (so seen in many countries) claims: The rearmament of the Rhineland, the abolitioning of Versailles, even Austria and the Sudetenland as well as the Memel area and the introduction of heavy weapons. Everything was claimed long before and Hitler earned only the fame others did before him mostly Stresemann. So it was indeed very difficult. However as I said Hitler played with too low cards at Munich and if the British would have been hard and threatened with war Hitler would have been removed. But Chamberlain didn´t trust the German generals... THAT is the real tragedy.

There is a grain of truth here, but with a caveat - that to accept that Germany had a right to rule these peoples and territories would be to accept Nazi, or in the least, German nationalistic logic. Yes, these were territories Germany (or German states) had ruled prior to 1914 and there were German populations in these territories BUT a crucial point is that Germany (or prior German states) often acquired these territories through conquest, taking them from other states, and all of the above territories also had non-German populations. If we are to accept the logic that Germany (or any other state) deserved to rule every territory its former imperial manifestations did, or that Germany deserved to rule everywhere Germans lived (ignoring a lot of medieval history involving non-nationlistic German, among other European, migrations all over Europe) then we must accept both world wars as valid and we m ust accept the post-war chaos of Eastern Europe as valid because all the new states were trying to practice the same logic: "We deserve to rule every place where our previous medieval states once ruled, and we also deserve to rule wherever large numbers of our ethnic bretheren can be found". Milosevic used this exact logic in the 1990s in Yugoslavia.

Germans in Hitler's era had valid concerns and complaints but this does not automatically translate into Germany being allowed to re-assume rulership over all the former Reich's lands and peoples. Germany in 1914 was an empire, and like all empires it had expanded on conquest and ruled many lands and peoples against their will.

@rilnator: Why Hitler became the so called "Führer"? A big reason (not the only one) was Versailles! Germany thought it was a dictate and not a treaty (as it was indeed). Also the huge reparations, betrayels in plebiscites (Schleswig, Upper Silesia), annexions (Memel) and only having a ridiculous small army, which was not able to defend Germany, did not raise the trust in Versailles but the urge for revenge. That was common in all German parties, from the communists to the Nazis.
Hitler was appointed by Hindenburg. His antisemitism was seen as cruel and unjust, but even most German Jews never thought it could get much worse. The Shoah was not be able to be seen in 1933 or even 1939. In this time Hitler earned the fruits others have achieved. Despite these efforts Hitler was mistrusted in the Wehrmacht. Hitler was a man who was against the Prussian traditions, especially he was antisemitic and an Austrian Catholic. That´s why he was not very popular in the staff. He was also considered a danger to Germany the more a war became possible. So the first attempts were planned. But you had to be sure that the people is recognizing the coup as a just coup. That would have been so in Munich 1938. But after that Hitler was able to get the Sudetenland and other things as well as finally capturing Paris. Hitler was on the peak of his power and a successful coup much more unrealistic. Heck he was celebrated for this even by the German communists and Jews! This changed dramatically 1941 after invading the USSR... Only then a coup became much more realistic. To kill Hitler would have brought the end of the war quickly but not neccessarily the end of the Nazi rule as Göring, Goebbels and Himmler were still powerful. This danger had to be also eliminated.
rilnator, I never said Germany is not guilty in ww2. But you have to see also the guilt (in some way) of Britain and France.

@Varylakas: You´re right in some way. The areas east of the Oder were populated once by only Slavs. But stop! Before that they were populated by Germanic tribes. And therefore... Here was in that time a big problem. Germany had indeed areas where minorities were in the majority. And these areas should have given to the other nations. However there were Germans still living and also areas where Germans lived in majority had to be seized. THAT was seen as unjust. Memel was a German town around living Lithunians. It was never a question nor was there a plebiscite where the inhabitants wanted to live. Upper Silesia was asked as whole where they wanted to belong to. Then it was parted although even many Polish wanted to stay Germans! Western Prussia was similar to Memel with German towns and cities (Bromberg, Danzig, Thorn) but Polish villages. Here was a much bigger problem as it was seperating East Prussia from the other parts of the Reich. The Sudeten were mostly inhabited by Germans.
A just treaty would have made real peace but so wasn´t Versailles. So the Germans thought they had to revenge this unjust behaviour. That Hitler did this in the eyes of the German population is nothing the Germans can be blamed for.

Adler

Specifically, what brought Chamberlain down was the Norway
fiasco.

@Varylakas: You´re right in some way. The areas east of the Oder were populated once by only Slavs. But stop! Before that they were populated by Germanic tribes. And therefore... Here was in that time a big problem. Germany had indeed areas where minorities were in the majority. And these areas should have given to the other nations. However there were Germans still living and also areas where Germans lived in majority had to be seized. THAT was seen as unjust. Memel was a German town around living Lithunians. It was never a question nor was there a plebiscite where the inhabitants wanted to live. Upper Silesia was asked as whole where they wanted to belong to. Then it was parted although even many Polish wanted to stay Germans! Western Prussia was similar to Memel with German towns and cities (Bromberg, Danzig, Thorn) but Polish villages. Here was a much bigger problem as it was seperating East Prussia from the other parts of the Reich. The Sudeten were mostly inhabited by Germans.
A just treaty would have made real peace but so wasn´t Versailles. So the Germans thought they had to revenge this unjust behaviour. That Hitler did this in the eyes of the German population is nothing the Germans can be blamed for.

But again, this is the nationalist German argument. Modern Germans are not the only or the main descendants of the "Germanic" (Germanische) tribes, any more than the Manx, Scots or Irish could each claim to be "more Celtic" than the others. The English, Danes, Dutch, Swedes, etc. all have equal claim to deriving from the Germanic peoples with modern Germans, as indeed do the French. And of course, before either the Germanic peoples of the Slavs came the Celts, who left plenty of archaeological and toponymical evidence all across Central Europe of their past residence; does this mean that modern Ireland has a right to rule Central Europe because, well, their ancestors "were here first"? O but wait - they weren't here first! The northern Polish plains have much evidence of early Iranian occupation, in the form of the Sarmatians, Scythians and Iazygians - so Iran should rule Silesia! They were here first! And then there are the many prehistoric, pre-Neolithic peoples who lived in Central Europe about whom we know little, certainly not their ethnicity. The Basques are often thought to be derived from just such a group, as they have no linguistic or cultural affinity with any known European groups. Maybe they moved into Europe from the East at one point? Should we establish a new Basqueland in Pomerania just in case?

It is exceedingly foolish to play the "We were here first" game when discussing modern borders - it's exactly the game that the nationalists across Europe in 1918 did, and it resulted in lots of bloodshed over modern nationalists' dreams. Using this argument usually requires some very selective Historical memory, rather like the tripe you just offered up.

As for Silesia in 1921, it was indeed settled very badly by both sides and created a lot of resentment that would fuel nationalism in both Poland and Germany. However, as usual Herr Adler, you only offer the fairy-tale German nationalist view: You seem to have forgotten that Prussia had taken part in the partition of Poland in 1795 and, after several decades of relative peace, under Bismark the Prussians effectively shut down Polish-language education in Silesia, suppressed Polish publications, banned meetings, and under Wilhelm II began forcibly re-settling Silesian Poles into a kind of pale in southern ("Upper") Silesia, rather like the Jews in Russia. When the League of Nations ordered the plebiscite in Silesia, they left it to the local authorities (i.e., Germans) to administer it. So what do you suppose the result was? A stunningly overwhelming vote in favor of Germany...big surprise... :rolleyes: Even in Polish-majority areas the vote was majoritably for Germany - but the League also started receiving complaints from Poles who claimed they were barred from voting by the local urban (German) officials, that voting was only offered in German, that certain German identification had to be shown but was almost awlays declared a fake by German authorities, etc. In short - fraud. I am not proud of how Poles responded and the whole Silesian affair did little but damage Poland's image and security, particularly its already bad relations with Germany - but at least I am not foolish enough to believe the old Polish propaganda about those events. Silesia has a long history even just within the last thousand years of rule by Bohemia and Poland as well as the German (Austria, Prussia) powers and until the 20th century it had always had a strong mix of all three peoples. It amazes me that it seemingly doesn't even enter your mind that anyone else but Germany could rule such a polyglot region like Silesia. It seems as foolish to me as anyone insisting that Alsace-Lorraine could only be French, or could only be German.

First of all I was at first a bit misunderstanding: I also meant that the argument: We are the first is highly invalid. There we agree.
Concerning Silesia you are right in so far as the Polish population was suppressed but I hardly think it was equal to the Jews in Russia. IIRC the Poles had a relative strong fraction in the Reichstag... However Silesia was indeed a polyglot land. With the end of ww1 the French tried to hurt the Germans as much as they could. So a plebiscite was made in Silesia. To my sources nearly 2/3 of the population in Upper Silesia (780.000 to 400.000) wanted to stay in Germany. That there might have been irregulations (my sources do not say anything to that point, nevertheless it is likely) is clear but they couldn´t be so heavy because the French were supervising the plebiscite. And they were very pro Polish (also there were Polish militias in some areas preventing Germans from voting with force!).
All in all the plebiscite was clear: the majority wanted to stay in Germany, even many Poles. But despite Italian and British notes the French and Polish wanted to seize the parts in which the Polish were in majority to Poland. But that meant that some mostly German inhabited cities had to be given to Poland, like Königshütte (75% voting for Germany) or Kattowitz/Kattowice (55 %). This caused a massive uproar in Germany. The German position was that the whole area had decided and should stay in Germany. That this didn´t happen was seen as unjust.
At last: I only reported in my previous post how the Germans saw Versailles in the 1920s and 30s. As it is nearly common sense now that Hitler was (also) a cause of Versailles this fact is not able to be neglected. Polish and German natiolists did use this for their stupid aims, there we agree. Also propaganda lives much longer than the people who made it.
My personal opinion to the Causa Silesia, as a case closed by history: The population should decide in which country they want to live. But they should also know WHAT the plebiscite causes. Here a plebiscite was made asking to stay in Germany or to become Polish. That was answered. There were no partitions of plebiscites but only one. So from an objective point of view a whole are in toto was asked and not only parts of that. So it should have stayed German or it should have been organzied in another way, asking parts if they want to stay or not.
Lastly I never said the Germans are the only to rule Silesia!

Adler

@rilnator: Why Hitler became the so called "Führer"? A big reason (not the only one) was Versailles! Germany thought it was a dictate and not a treaty (as it was indeed). Also the huge reparations, betrayels in plebiscites (Schleswig, Upper Silesia), annexions (Memel) and only having a ridiculous small army, which was not able to defend Germany, did not raise the trust in Versailles but the urge for revenge. That was common in all German parties, from the communists to the Nazis.
rilnator, I never said Germany is not guilty in ww2. But you have to see also the guilt (in some way) of Britain and France.
Adler


IIRC Hitler took the heads of OKW for a cruise in the Baltic aboard one of his new battleships (The Deutschland?). On this little jaunt he asked them about support for him combining the titles of President and Chancellor and becoming 'The Fuhrer'. He guarenteed them he would get rid of the SA, restore the army to its rightful place and make sure they were the sole bearer of arms in Germany. The Generals agreed to this believing they could keep him under control.

They were wrong. Hitler (or more directly Himmler and Georing) got rid of the old school generals and replaced them with some who shared his beliefs or were easy to bully.

I'm not saying that the NSDAP was distinct in their aims and goals but I don't think any of their leaders could have had the success Hitler did. And Hitler couldn't have had that success without the support of the Heer.

As far as your last point goes, I think we should drop that coz we aint gunna see eye to eye on it. Ever.

Did Chamberlain and Deladiers have the right to be giving away countries or lands in Central Europe they didn't own? Did League of Nations membership, the fact that Czechoslovakia was a vibrant democracy or that it was strongly pro-Western have any meaning? Do only larger powers deserve real sovereignty, the rest of us being mere bargaining chips in their power games?


Its debatelable as to whether or not the Czechs would have been 'saved' if Chamberlain had have put his foot down. Hitler wasn't going to back down with his invasion, he made that clear to his generals. So there would have still been a war. It wouldn't have been easy going for the Germans but the outcome would have been inevitable. The Czechs would have suffered more probably. They didn't yeild to the Germans and this would have infuriated Hitler even more.

I understand at the time that the Poles and Soviets weren't getting along too well but a combined front east of the Elbe may have made Hitler think twice. The Soviets were bound by treaty to protect Czechoslovakia but could do little as the were not allowed to move through Polish or Romanian territory. So pointing the finger of blame soley at the British and French is unfair. Not all of the Eastern European countries were in the Nazi camp by 1938.

Also, what could have Churchill done to prevent Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe? Threaten her with another war? The Soviets pretty much smashed the Wehrmacht on their own. Eastern Europe was their spoils of war. I'm not saying its fair or right but thats what happened.

I understand you are pretty knowledgeable on Eastern European history, but your geographical skills are somewhat lacking- I am not British and live on the other side of the world.

First of all Hitler was thought to be a puppet, but soon this "puppet" became more independent they thought... However the Reichswehr/ Wehrmacht saw the danger in him and Hitler did never trust the Wehrmacht completely. The generals were quiete for some time until war was clear. They thought now it is enough. Then they agreed to kill Hitler. They failed. And the allies were never a big help...
However IF Chamberlain was strong in saying no Hitler would have been assasinated by the generals and no war would have occured. Germany would have become a democracy again and Hitler would have been in memory as a crazy man, a war mongerer and murderer but not more. Germany was simply not able to fight at two fronts, even the Czechs would have caused tremendous problems. Also Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine had much less and worse equippment than a year later. No battleship ready for combat, less modern planes and pilots. But Hitler had to risk this because he was bancrupt! There was no money to pay the huge amount on weapons being built. So if Hitler would have been away Germany would soon be a democracy and not able to launch any assault for the next years.
And what if the generals failed? The German army would have had severe problems in the Czech republic, would not have been able to defend in the west and on the sea the few Uboats could not do the damage they were able to do so a year later. And the few surface vessels would have had no chance. Over short or long (much more short) Hitler would have been replaced by somone to make peace.
All aspects and facts say that if Chamberlain would not have made Munich Hitler would have started perhaps only a small war with another German defeat. No ww2 and no Holocaust would have happened.

Adler