The purpose of this thread is to bring to light America's first true venture onto the world stage to other like-minded history buffs who like to explore lesser-known instances in history and also to shed some light on this topic as it is indeed never quite explained well enough in our history texts ;)

i hope to post excerpts from this large document that i actually wrote as an undergrad thesis. i spent a little more than 13 months researching it. i flicked through the old school microfiesh at the Natl Archives in DC, searched through numerous first-hand military records, translated captured Filipino administrative papers from Spanish to English, and even received loner books directly from the Philippines. iow, lots and lots of primary resources. my profs were giddy when they read my bibliography ;)

i have ommited the footnote sections from this portion but i will post them in the future when it is non-redundant.

anyway, below is the introduction from a prospectus i had drafted early on...(w/ pics linked in)

The American-Philippine War is a misunderstood entity. The history books have recorded the conflict as a sustained insurrection between an emerging international power and a fractured group of peoples seeking independence. There is, however, a larger picture that needs to be examined and that is to attempt to determine the causes of the breakdown that occurred between the Filipinos and the Americans.

http://www.sonoma.edu/pubs/release/2003/filipino.jpg
this was a famous image in late 1898 b/c it is reported that President McKinley could not even locate the Philippine Islands on a map :eek:

The American-Philippine War was a war between the armed forces of the United States and the Philippines from 1899-1913. The majority of the fighting occurred during the years 1899-1902. The conflict is also known as The Philippine Insurrection though in recent years, it has become more commonly referred to as the American-Philippine War. Escalations between the two began in February of 1898 after the U.S. had purchased the Philippines from Spain at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. The Filipinos, under Emilio Aguinaldo, had declared their formal independence from Spain in June of 1898. By August of that year, 11,000 additional American troops arrived to occupy the archipelago . This sets the stage for what most historians believe to be the first shots of the conflict when on February 4, 1899, an American soldier fired upon a Filipino soldier who was attempting to cross the bridge leading into the American occupied section of San Juan del Monte. The McKinley Administration declared that the incident was a product of a local insurgency and vowed to crush the opposition; an opposition that led by Emilio Aguinaldo.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Aguinaldo.JPG
Emilio Aguinaldo as a young man. he came from a wealthy land owning family in the town of Kawit which is south east of Manila. the Spanish feared him and he proved to be quite elusive to the Americans.

The raw data suggests that the United States lost 4,234 men and that another 2,818 were wounded in action during the American-Philippine War . Filipino casualty figures vary some but one source indicated that 20,000 military casualties occurred while an estimated 1,000,000 civilians lost their lives during the conflict . Zimmermann notes that at the highpoint of the conflict, three quarters of the entire American military was deployed in the Philippines . The numbers are staggering indeed yet one must ask them self: why had it come to this? Where did it all go wrong?

http://www.oldgloryprints.com/I_Would_Rather_Die_at_the_Front.jpg
painting by F. Reeves titled "I Would Rather Die at the Front" - it is a colourful depiction of Colonel J Franklin Bell's 36th Volunteer Infantry. it is interesting to note that the Volunteer army of the US at this time was nearly on par w/ the regular army. this was the case in the Philippines as well as in Cuba during the Spanish American War.

---TO BE CONT'D---

The American-Philippine War is an excellent case study in the history of American nation building. The history books have recorded the conflict as a sustained insurrection between an emerging international power and a fractured group of peoples seeking independence. There is, however, a larger picture that needs to be examined, it requires us to recognize the primary actors both militarily and politically and examine how the application of their methodology and ideologies had an effect on the fight for the Philippines, the subsequent American occupation, the ensuing insurrection and finally, the restoration of civic infrastructure. Thus the objective of this thesis is to determine what can be learned from the successes and failures of the American occupation of the Philippines.

The American-Philippine War was a war between the armed forces of the United States and the Philippines from 1899-1913. The majority of the fighting occurred during the years 1899-1902. I will confine the scope of my research to the first four years. The conflict is also known as The Philippine Insurrection though in recent years, it has become more commonly referred to as the American-Philippine War. Hostilities between the two began in February of 1899 after the U.S. had purchased the Philippines from Spain at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. The Filipinos, under Emilio Aguinaldo, had declared their formal independence from Spain in June of 1898. By August of that year, 11,000 additional American troops arrived to occupy the archipelago. This sets the stage for what most historians believe to be the first shots of the conflict when on February 4, 1899, an American sentry fired upon a Filipino soldier who was attempting to cross a bridge leading into the section of San Juan del Monte in the American-occupied city of Manila. The McKinley Administration declared that the incident was a product of a local insurgency and vowed to crush the opposition, an opposition that was led by Emilio Aguinaldo.

The raw data suggests that the United States lost 4,234 men and that another 2,818 were wounded in action during the American-Philippine War. Filipino casualty figures vary some but one source indicated that 20,000 military casualties occurred while an estimated 1,000,000 civilians lost their lives during the conflict. Zimmermann notes that at the highpoint of the conflict, three quarters of the entire American military was deployed in the Philippines. The numbers are staggering indeed yet one must ask him or herself: are there lessons to be learned from the American colonial experience in the Philippine Islands? What type of political issues did the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations deal with and more importantly, what was their response? Furthermore, what type of impact did the U.S. military have on the Islands and the overall pacification effort? Lastly, what was the identity of the enemy? What type of motives did they possess and finally, what does it mean to be unfit for self-government?

The foundation of my research will be extracted from a wide selection of secondary and primary sources. Most of these books, journal articles and other works are a general assessment of the American – Philippine War; that is the authors take a broad approach to their research. Most include a timeline of events as to the lead-up to the Spanish American War, the Cuban expedition, the Battle of Manila Bay and the subsequent Filipino insurrection against the American occupation. All of these general works, however, are able to raise a variety of important issues that deviate from the standard era analysis such as American imperialism, manifest destiny, Social Darwinism and TR’s charge up San Juan Hill. Another group of sources I’ve found particularly attractive is the political surveys of such figures as William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root and William Taft among others. Furthermore, I shall analyze President McKinley’s Peace Commission, Jacob Gould Schurman’s investigative commission, William Taft’s Second Philippine Commission, and the three prominent Supreme Court decisions of 1901. The bulk of my analysis will be an examination of U.S. military efforts of pacification in combination with their civic construction responsibilities. I have chosen to take a regionalized approach to examination for the reason that the results varied from one barrio or ciudad to the next. The final portion of the thesis consists primarily of Filipino scholarship which highlights issues such as the revolution against Spain, Philippine nationalism and most importantly, the motives and identity of Emilio Aguinaldo.

footnotes for the above paragraph (not numbered though)
~ McKinley appointed five commissioners to broker the Treaty of Paris which effectively ended the Spanish-American War and subsequently ceded the Philippines to the U.S.
~ Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002) 387. Schurman, of Cornell, is recommended by Admiral Dewey to undertake a non-partisan investigative committee regarding the civil and administrative progress of the American rebuilding effort on the archipelago. President McKinley obliged and this is generally regarded as the “First Philippines Commission”.
~ Zimmermann , 394. The author refers to these decisions as the “Insular Cases”. In them the Court found that the U.S. Constitution does not apply to any annexed territories and that these peoples weren’t afforded the rights of American citizens. Furthermore, it was officially established that it is the United States Congress’s authority to make such decisions.
~ The American military experiences throughout the Islands varied greatly in both pacification and civic construction. This will be followed up on further along in the essay. The words “barrio” and “ciudad” are Spanish for “town” or “neighborhood” and “city” respectively. This terminology is commonly used within the primary accounts of the American military.
~ See Richard Hofstadter, “Manifest Destiny and the Philippines.” In Daniel Aaron, ed., America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History, Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and the Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, and Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines.

http://www.cybercuba.com/tr.jpg
Lt Colonel Theodore Roosevelt on 1 July 1898. he is pictured along w/ his fellow 'Rough Riders'. note that this volunteer army Roosevelt was in charge of was composed of a wide swath of Americana. soldiers were drawn from states such as Arizona, New Mexico, Texas as well as Yale grads, New York and Philadelphia socialites, doctors, lawyers, farmers, and ranch hands. hence the name 'Rogh Riders'. Roosevelt actually resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy just to lead this unit. :eek: i read several accounts where those close to him thought TR had gone batty. however, one source in particular (written by none other than TR's sister, Corrine), attributed Teddy's apparent thirst for war with a gargantuan sense of guilt from his father's paying off the draft board in NYC during the US Civil War. it was said that TR was never able to reconcile this fact.

http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/portraits/1789-1898/mckinley.jpg
William McKinley, 25th President of the United States

http://www.ebooks-library.com/images/Authors/AERX.jpg
Statesman & Lawyer Elihu Root. he was the Secretary of War from 1899 until 1904. in 1905, he was Secretary of State. he also served 3 terms in Congress as a senator from NY (1909-1915).

http://www.authentichistory.com/audio/1900s/images/william_h_taft_02.jpg
William Howard Taft, Head of the Philippine Commission, 27th President of the United States, and US Supreme Court Justice. a neat bit of trivia: Taft is the only US President to ever have served on the Supreme Court. according to many sources, a Supreme Court nomination was always Taft's career goal and it was said that he despised the Presidency.

Warren Zimmermann’s First Great Triumph is the first of the secondary sources that I have immersed myself in. He takes a wide approach to the ascent of American power at the turn of the twentieth century. He analyzes the rise of Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Alfred M. Thayer and John Hay and how each contributed to the aggressive American foreign policy during the McKinley Administration. Zimmermann is also able to glean out the imperial impulses and initiatives of the aforementioned as well as the military and antagonistic influences of the era. He devotes an entire chapter to the Filipino Insurrection and seems to rely on the works of Hofstadter, Karnow and Linn for the foundation of his arguments which indicate that a breakdown existed between the politicians, civic administrators, military officers and the soldiers who were responsible for carrying out the civic reconstruction. As a result of this, a massive regionalized struggle ensued against the American efforts to rebuild the Filipino infrastructure.

America in Crisis is a compilation of essays in which Richard Hofstadter has contributed a discourse on the American expansionist impulses of the late nineteenth century. It is one of the first scholarly examinations of the influences of “public temper” and how it helped to play a critical role in McKinley’s presidential mandate. Moreover, Hofstadter surveys the unique unanimity that exists within McKinley’s administration and beyond; particularly, Roosevelt and Root and Senator Lodge. His sources range from letters and correspondence between Roosevelt, Root and Taft to magazine and newspaper articles and similar literature. He concludes in Manifest Destiny that the “jingoism” that existed among many Americans at the time was a bi-product of the “humanitarian and imperialistic sentiments” produced by the fluid political leadership and the “social reform idealism” generated out of the economic depression of the 1890s. However, the most significant message that Hofstadter sets forth is that this instance, the Americans in the Philippines, represented a colossal shift in American foreign policy.

The third secondary source of major importance is Stanley Karnow’s In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. It is a concise and specialized work in that in focuses entirely on the archipelago from the time of the Spanish discovery of the islands, through the governance and subsequent revolts in the 1890s and onto the American experiences on the Islands, through eventual independence in 1946 and even onto the electoral shenanigans of the late 1980s. Particular attention is paid to the regional differences among the Filipinos and the difficulties that Emilio Aguinaldo encountered in his attempts to sway the local favor. Karnow utilizes a variety of sources that include military papers, Schurman Commission and Second Philippines Commission papers as well as Filipino records. He also gives a scathing assessment of McKinley in that he was “weak” and “indecisive” with regard to the Philippines. His evidence suggests that the United States essentially failed in the Philippines; mainly because of the undercutting effects that the Insurrection had upon the reconstruction efforts by both Americans and Filipinos.

The analysis I wish to undertake would not be complete without a political survey of its primary actors. In the Days of McKinley by Margaret Leech is as good a place to start as any other. Her thesis is that behind the “warm, benign, but impersonal façade” of President McKinley, there is a bigger picture; specifically, his sensitive and humane approach to foreign policy as well as his desire to secure the mandate of the citizens. She uses a multitude of primary sources in support of her hypothesis. The works of C.S. Olcott are used extensively as are the speeches and state papers of McKinley. Leech also makes several references to a few different Library of Congress manuscripts. She is able to deduce from this evidence that McKinley was a “good, dull man” that relied entirely too much upon his cabinet members and more critically, that he lacked a “backbone”. Despite this scathing assessment, the author is able to extract McKinley’s ideology regarding America’s first venture into the arena of nation building.
The next American political figure I shall examine is Elihu Root. It will be shown how this man influenced and directed the U.S. military’s dual task of pacification and reconstruction in the Philippine Islands. As McKinley and Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Root was faced with the monumental endeavor of planting democracy in an area of the world where, up until that point, had never been planted. There are two particular resources I have chosen for this examination. The first is Zimmermann’s First Great Triumph and the second is a fascinating and definitive book written by Philip C. Jessup entitled Elihu Root 1845-1909. The latter author wrote the book in a style which incorporated Root’s exact quotes and remembrances and there are large sections of the text that are exclusively Root’s remarks in response to the author’s questions. There is no doubt that the information obtained from this piece will offer a great deal of knowledge regarding Root’s political ideologies and it shall also offer a true glimpse into the political thought processes of a true American political pioneer.

A review of Theodore Roosevelt’s political career is a necessity for a research project such as the one I plan to undertake. There is little doubt that the best place to start is with Edmund Morris’s Theodore Rex. It is a broad biographical essay that details Roosevelt’s rise into national politics. Morris devotes a significant portion of latter stages of the book to American imperialism and Roosevelt’s contributions to it. The author manages to use a huge range of sources to compile this extensive biography. Personal letters, articles and books penned by TR himself are all excruciatingly assessed. Edmund Morris is successful in depicting TR’s “fierce hunger for power”. Morris does not necessarily arrive at a particular conclusion in this biography but he does manage to portray Roosevelt’s commanding political presence. For that reason, I would venture to say that this piece is an indispensable resource for my research.

One feature of my research will most certainly deal with the military aspects of the American-Philippine War. The American mobilization for war, specific battles, tactics, firearms, psychological warfare and the morale among the troops and officers should be taken into account. The American military also had a significant impact on the reconstruction processes in the Philippines in that they were directly responsible for restoring the civic infrastructure of the occupied areas. Graham A. Cosmas declares in From Order to Chaos that the American mobilization for war in the Philippines was characterized by “mismanagement and confusion” and that the inefficiencies of the War Department played a crucial role on the archipelago. His sources are solid: official War Department papers and New York Times articles are sprinkled throughout the footnotes. However, despite these perceived shortcomings, the United States managed to safely transport their armed forces a half a world away. While there were internal struggles that may have had somewhat of a detrimental effect , the end result was that the United States military was clearly in un-chartered waters. I will attempt to flesh out both the successes and failures of the U.S. military’s role in the Philippines during 1899-1901.

footnotes for the above paragraph (not numbered though)
~ The U.S. Army was wholly responsible for installing and maintaining the state of the municipal and in some cases provincial infrastructures. Root’s directive to his generals and subordinates was to branch out to the provincial levels only after the municipalities were completely pacified and civil governance was firmly in place. This remained the Army’s directive until the Second Philippine Commission, under William H. Taft, was transferred the civic responsibilities on July 4, 1901. These points are elaborated on further along in the essay.
~ It is noted in several relative sources that friction between the Army and Navy existed from the beginning in the Philippines. Disputes over who was to land troops first, indiscriminate naval bombardments and officers refusing to acknowledge superior orders were among the litany of accusations. This will also be discussed in further detail in a later chapter.

Brian McAllister Linn takes sharp focus in Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901. It is a localized study of the regions of the northern island of Luzon and how the American military personnel dealt with the shift from the conventional to guerilla military tactics employed by the resistance. His authorities are stunning. Official dispatches from generals MacArthur and Young and even Emilio Aguinaldo are cited. Linn is able to conclude from his evidence that the American military’s transition from traditional to counter-insurgency measures was both innovative and experimental. Above all else, this analysis will certainly deliver a good portion of the evidence for this thesis.
The Philippine War 1899-1902 is a fantastic secondary source also written by Brian McAllister Linn. It is what the author describes as “a history of the military operations in the Philippine archipelago between 4 February 1899 and 4 July 1902.” Professor Linn takes an approach that suggests that the American military experiences in the Philippines during the prescribed time frame was a “far more complex and challenging phenomenon” than what had been earlier believed and discussed among historians. He does not, however, take a revisionist stance. Instead, he highlights the varying degrees of obstacles that the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy faced during the conflict. A regional approach is taken and the author uses an impressive array of primary sources to support his hypothesis. I will rely heavily on these accounts to formulate the examination of the Army’s efforts to pacify and reconstruct.

The second source I chose for my survey of the American military efforts in the Philippines is a wonderful primary source written by Brig. Gen. James Parker titled The Old Army Memories, 1872-1918. James “Galloping Jim” Parker was a Captain in Troop B of the 4th Cavalry of the United States Army at the time of the conflict. The book encompasses Parker’s entire military career that ranged from the Plains Wars with the Native Americans, the hunt for Geronimo, the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, his service as Adjutant Gen., and the outbreak of the Great War. It was in the Philippines that Parker distinguished himself as a master organizer and leader. Particular emphasis is paid to his own efforts of pacification and subsequent civil reconstruction. I consider this an invaluable resource because of this fact.

The final chapter of this essay will examine the composition of the Philippine resistance, most notably Emilio Aguinldo and the fledgling Philippine Republic. The goal is to explore the political, social and revolutionary identities of the Philippine peoples in their struggles versus Spanish colonial governance. The theme will be a brief study of Philippine nationalism in the late nineteenth century with a particular emphasis on Emilio Aguinaldo. The true goal will be to examine the identity of the Philippine insurrectos, resistors and those who demanded complete independence in order to better understand both sides of this story.

The first source in use is Karnow’s In Our Image. He devotes an entire chapter to the revolutionary movements in the Islands with specific emphasis put on the relations between a young Emilio Aguinaldo, the rebel General, Andrés Bonifacio and his formation of the clandestine and secret Filipino revolutionary group, the Katipunan. This group will be shown to have had a tremendous impact on not only the rebellion against Spain but against the United States as well. The next source is written by Carlos Quirino and it is titled The Young Aguinaldo From Kawit to Biyaak-na-bato. It is mainly a biographical account of Aguinaldo during the revolution against Spain. However, the author goes into great detail about the young Aguinaldo’s rise to national prominence and his political and nationalistic ideas are put forward. The next source under examination is Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896, A Documentary History by Pedro S. de Achútegui and Miguel A. Bernad. It is unique in the fact that the entire book is dedicated to an individual analysis of one hundred fifty-six primary sources relative to the revolution against Spain. These sources include items such as a blank form for an oath into the Katipunan, circulars posted by the Spanish officials in towns and cites throughout the Islands, and general correspondence transmitted between both the Filipino revolutionaries and the Spanish officials. Interestingly enough, many of the documents under review are copied and appear at the end of the book. In the Days of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo by Eufronio A. Alip is the next source used for this multi-source examination. The subtitle on the book is “A Study of the Life and Times of a Great Military Leader, Statesman, and Patriot Who Founded the First Republic in Asia.” Accordingly, it is a survey of Aguinaldo’s Republic and how they operated. The portion this section seeks to uncover is the diplomacy and constitutional composition of the Republic. The fifth source in use for this particular examination is The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States; A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II May 19, 1898 to July 4, 1902 by U.S. Army Capt. John R.M. Taylor. It is one in a series of seven books in which Taylor wrote under the orders of Gen. MacArthur. It is an interpretive analysis of the thousands of documents captured by American forces in the Islands from 1899 to 1906. Although it’s considered a “biased account” by Filipino standards, there are multitudes of government statistics for Aguinaldo’s fledgling Philippine Republic. It is reasonable to consider that a closer examination of these stats could provide a good indicator on the fledgling Republic’s capacity to govern.
Finally, I’ve once again chosen to look at another source written by Brian McAllister Linn in The U.S. Army and the Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. Linn examines the political questions that surrounded the Philippine-American War. He declares that the struggle between the U.S. Army and Emilio Aguinaldo’s forces weren’t necessarily one between militaries but one between governments. The author repeatedly refers to the Philippine independence of 1898 as the point of demarcation in his survey. It examines Aguinaldo’s government and Linn declares that the United States is engaged in the suppression of a formally declared state. Furthermore, he researches the demise of the Filipino army from a standing fighting force to its transformation into a less effective guerilla force. Among his multiple resources are the American military and administrative papers from four particular military districts on the island of Luzon and official Philippine Republic government documents. Linn concludes that his evidence suggests that the United States government failed to take into account the extent of the Filipino reluctance to assimilate with much of the blame falling on McKinley’s shoulders.

My research on the American-Philippine War will differ from prior scholarship in that I will seek to intertwine the political and military aspects of the conflict as well as the identities of the Filipino insurgents. Most, if not all, of the sources used for this project did not possess all of the same characteristics as those I wish to put forward; specifically, the three-pronged examination of the political, military and the social identities of the Filipino peoples. Another area that I believe sets my research apart from previous scholarship is an examination of the Filipino groups who opposed the Spanish just prior to the American intervention; groups such as Katipunan and La Liga Filipina. How did these opposition groups operate? What were their aims? To what extremes did they go to in order to attain their aims? I do not wish to form any significant portion of my theses with such an examination. I do, however, want to gain a foundation for the Filipino resistance.

The American evidence that I intend to put forth will not be anything that hasn’t already been scrutinized. It will contain the well-chronicled data regarding the principle American political actors during the American-Philippine War including McKinley, Roosevelt, Root, and Taft among others. The military side of things during the war will also be explored with a look into the Filipino experiences of Dewey, MacArthur, Chaffee, Bell, Otis, Smith and Funston. I will also take into account the independent commissions that operated in the Philippines during the Insurgency. Furthermore, I will attempt to determine the significances of the 1901 Supreme Court decisions which, from a judicial standpoint, helped form the base of American foreign policy at the turn of the twentieth century.

Thus the foundation of my research will revolve around three distinct features: the motives and inspiration of the principal American political actors between 1898-1902, the successes and failures of the U.S. military’s arduous, dual task of pacification and civic reconstruction and finally, the Philippine perspective; all in an effort to better understand what the costs of this ‘duty’ of nation building shall extract in American blood, treasure and political prestige. The answers to these questions are certainly not cut-and-dry yet they could potentially raise a multitude of issues that all Americans ought to be aware of as we forge ahead into the twenty-first century.

~ Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and the Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2000) 30. Linn uses the instance of the formal Filipino declaration of independence from Spain made on June 12, 1898 and the subsequent drafting of the Filipino Constitution on January 20, 1899 as the foundation of his arguments.
~ “Katipunan”: The Katipunan was a secret society founded in the Philippines by Andres Bonifacio aimed towards liberating the country from the Spanish colonizers. The name Katipunan is actually a shorter version of the official name, which is in Tagalog: Kataastaasang, Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (roughly translated as The Highest and Most Respected Society of the Sons and Daughters of the Land). La Liga Filipina was its predecessor.

---TO BE CONT'D---

El Justo, I seem to recall you making an excellent scenario in the way of this war/conflict/insurrection/thing. True?

I look foward to reading more of this, I need to brush up on my Phillipine American War history.

El Justo, I seem to recall you making an excellent scenario in the way of this war/conflict/insurrection/thing. True?

I look foward to reading more of this, I need to brush up on my Phillipine American War history.
yes, i did :)

this is a very intersting time in US history as it was the first real world stage for the Yanks. ;)

Eagerly awaiting the next installment. :clap:

I'm from the Philippines and thus very interested. Willing to help too if needed.

What happened there was initially very brutal it is true, but the Americans eventually did such a successful hearts and minds campaign that Filipinos (most of them at least) would 1) stay loyal during World War 2, and 2) feel no animosity towards the USA unlike other ertswhile colonies who demonize their former colonial masters.

Perhaps there could be some lessons learned that could apply to today's situation as well, foremost being that people today expect too much, too soon. Three years is far too short for any results. The American pacification and transformation of the Philippines took decades! But it worked!

honestly i was just first reading about this a couple of days ago and was surprised i never heard of it before..shucks:sad:

Great topic. I eagerly await your article. However if you have foot notes you should mark this in your text with (1), (2) or in another way.

Adler

Perhaps there could be some lessons learned that could apply to today's situation as well, foremost being that people today expect too much, too soon. Three years is far too short for any results. The American pacification and transformation of the Philippines took decades! But it worked!

It may have worked, but the real question is - what was the point in the first place, and was any of this justified? The US basically bought a subject people from another imperial power, ignoring the fact that the subject people were fed up being subject to foreigners at all; they then fought a brutal and aggressive war to impose their rule over them. How on earth did the US justify this at the time, and how do modern apologists for the history of US foreign policy justify it now?

How on earth did the US justify this at the time,

The same justification that the Europeans were using to brutally colonize Africa and other places. They were bringing civilization to poor backwards people.

"Civilize em with a Krag" was a popular saying during the Filipino-American War.

@ Dann - What is it they say about the history of the Philippines - Five hundred years of Spanish Catholicism and fifty years of Hollywood? There certainly is a very strong and warm bond between the two countries especially since so many Philippinos have ended up living here.

@ Plotinus - I don't think there are any modern historical apologists. All of the recent works on the subject I have read paint an unpleasant picture. With regard to more recent events, there seems to be mostly silence about American support for the brutal and corrupt Marcos regime.

@El J - Great article!

If I may point out one thing to your readers. The General MacArthur mentioned is General Arthur MacArthur. Arthur MacArthur was a Civil War veteran and the father of Douglas MacArthur, the general of World War II and Korean War fame.

Eagerly awaiting the next installment. :clap:

I'm from the Philippines and thus very interested. Willing to help too if needed.

What happened there was initially very brutal it is true, but the Americans eventually did such a successful hearts and minds campaign that Filipinos (most of them at least) would 1) stay loyal during World War 2, and 2) feel no animosity towards the USA unlike other ertswhile colonies who demonize their former colonial masters.

Perhaps there could be some lessons learned that could apply to today's situation as well, foremost being that people today expect too much, too soon. Three years is far too short for any results. The American pacification and transformation of the Philippines took decades! But it worked!
thank you Dann and eveyone else :)

i hope that i've been able to properly relay some of this info in a non-partisan fashion.

i will highlight specific pacification measures in later posts.

anyhow, few people outside of the P.I. realize that Emilio Aguinaldo and his band of revolutionaries (they were not insurrectionists imo b/c of the 'govt v. govt' theory i mentioned earlier on in one of the posts) were the frist Asians to form a nation (the short lived Republic of the Philippines). they were also the first Asian peoples to overthrow their colonial oppressors (the Spanish who were so paranoid of a Philippine repraisal during crack-downs that they begged the Americans to safeguard all Spanish and Church property in the early days of the American arrival )

as for why the US took possession of the islands? this will also be highlighted. however, it should be noted on the record that Root, Bell, Taft, and others took a page directly out of the British book of imperial conquest. TR and Root in particular who fond admirerers of the British Empire.

in a nutshell:
the US 'bought' the islands for a mere $20M. had the Yanks not purchased them, the Brits were no. 2 in line and the Germans were sniffing around as well. this is all according to my primary sources. again, i'll get into this w/ more specificity later on.

it should be clarified from the outset that the Philippine peoples [I]did not regard the Americans the same as they did other colonial powers of the time. the US Constitution and the democratic principles of the US were foundations for many of the short-lived Philippine Republic. the Filipinos absolutelt loathed the Spanish and the oprressive Catholic friars in the P.I. the latter was a land-owning giant in the islands. also note that prior to the escalation between the Filipinos and the Yanks, Aguinaldo received 'promises' --wink-- from upper level American officers & diplomats that the Philippine peoples would not be 'under the thumb' of the Americans. Admiral Dewey himself is said to have fostered cordial relations w/ Aguinaldo. however, in the end, Aguinaldo felt decieved once the true intentions of the Americans was revealed (and rightly so imo). this breakdown in the American chain of command would prove to be quite disaterous.

a great deal can be learned from the American experiences in the P.I; especially w/ what has happened in Iraq. specifically, armed resistance, pacification, hearts & minds, civic reconstruction, insurgencies, counter-insurgencies, US public backlash, and the age old question of "when are you leaving"?

one thing Dann:
i'm curious to know how Aguinaldo is regarded in the P.I today. is he considered a patriot? i would hope that he is b/c he definitely wasn't the scoundrel that the Yanks made him out to be at the time. :(

i'm curious to know how Aguinaldo is regarded in the P.I today. is he considered a patriot? i would hope that he is b/c he definitely wasn't the scoundrel that the Yanks made him out to be at the time. :(

Aguinaldo is regarded as a hero. They've placed him on the five peso banknote.

Not that there's anything inconsistent about being a patriot and a scoundrel (some of us would consider them much the same thing, but that's a discussion for another thread).

There was a thread recently in which someone was insisting - contrary to all counter-examples given by me and others - that the US' foreign policy has always and at all times been enlightened and concerned only with people's welfare, and that the US has never fought a war of aggression. I mentioned the war in the Philippines and the poster simply insisted that that, too, was neither aggressive nor brutal. I don't remember exactly what the reasoning was, but it was obviously spurious. Very strange - I can sort of understand why someone might be a religious fundamentalist, but a nationalist fundamentalist? A new one to me.

rightousness only goes so far i'm afraid :p

the US had definitely intertwined 'enlightenment' and 'civilization' into the Philippine conquest. our fat little squirrel friend duly noted that ;) however, the brutality in which it was undertaken is legendary i'm afraid. otoh, American brutality in the P.I. can be attributed to 2 main themes: retribution and racism

i'll get into that more when i am able to post additional passages.

also, Adler, i am unable to number the footnotes as per the original document. specifically, it does not transfer when i C&P it. anyhow, i list only the relevant footnotes. all the others are for specific citations while the ones i post here in the thread actually supplement or directly address any above referenced paragraph.

American brutality in the P.I. can be attributed to 2 main themes: retribution and racism
American troops in the P.I. were often the targets of sneak attacks, ambushes, and other sorts of treachery associated w/ guerilla warfare. considering this, it is not really out of line to suggest that retribution is a common human instinct. don't get me wrong though...the American attrocities are completely unexcusable. but one can sort of understand why they even occurred in the first place.

American racism is an awful black eye on my country's history and it unfortunately reared its ugly head in the P.I. even Taft himself referred to the Filipinos as "our little brown brothers". and soldiers were terribly brutal towards the Filipino peoples. i recall reading accounts of soldiers who said that they considered the indigenous peoples as "savages" and that they were even below African Americans :rolleyes: this was not a blanket stereotype though. some officers and soldiers were incredibly sympathetic. however, due to the era, Social Darwinism, and segregation in the US at the time, many US troops harboured a great amount of prejudice and they didn't hide it either.

El Justo, I found this thread fascinating and I am looking forward to your next instalment.

I was particularly struck by your comment about some of the key American players being inspired by the British Empire since we were also fighting a major colonial war at the time, against the descendants of Dutch colonists in South Africa. What similarities and differences do you see between the objectives and military strategies of the British in South Africa and the Americans in the Phillipines?

I have to add here that in this time the US were nearly at war with Germany. The so called Manila crise nearly lead to war. Is this chapter also included, El J?

Adler

El Justo, I found this thread fascinating and I am looking forward to your next instalment.

I was particularly struck by your comment about some of the key American players being inspired by the British Empire since we were also fighting a major colonial war at the time, against the descendants of Dutch colonists in South Africa. What similarities and differences do you see between the objectives and military strategies of the British in South Africa and the Americans in the Phillipines?
thank you Gallienus.

yes, the Second Boer War and the Philippine-American War were fought at around the same time. i am very much a novice w/ regard to the Boer Wars though. however, my first thought is that the Afrikaaners had much more of a military capacity than the Filipinos. i mean, Aguinaldo and his soldiers were constructing bamboo artillery pieces and sending men out to a deserted battlefield to retrieve empty shell casings! iirc, the Boers were able to push the Brits back a few times during that war. however, the turining point in the Philippine-American War came when the Filipinos were no longer able to engage the Yanks in conventional warfare and thus relied on guerilla tactics which proved to be much more successful (at least compared to the slaughter of open combat vs the Americans).

as for the objectives:
the Americans sought to extend their control over the entire archipelago. now, this seems simple enough. however, considering that there's over 7 thousand islands in the Philippine Archipelago, it is quite a daunting task to control it in its entirety. there were some regions which capitulated immeadiately (a few regions on the island of Negros). this was the exception rahter than the rule though. also, lots of people were jsut happy to get rid of the Spanish and the oppressive friars and as a result, they welcomed the Americans w/ open arms (until, of course, it became clear that independence was not in the offing).

the Filipinos (Aguinaldo primarily) sought to crystalize the government of the Philippine Republic. they tried desperately to get the population to side w/ them. the issue of taxation was huge for the fledling Republic. they had no cash...nothing really at all. as such, they attempted to set up administrative regions for the express purpose of levying taxes on the Filipinos. i devoted the entire final chapter to this and it'll go into great detail how this was executed (or more precisiely, how it wasn't). furthermore, Aguinaldo sort of force-fed a constitution in early 1899. he also sought to strengthen the executive branch of the government (far beyond what is generally accepted). i'll also highlight this feature as well.

thanks for the interest, too. i really enjoy posting this stuff. brings back some good memories (from school - that is) :)

I have to add here that in this time the US were nearly at war with Germany. The so called Manila crise nearly lead to war. Is this chapter also included, El J?

Adler
yes, i touch on this briefly. it is naval records and Peace Commission documents were i found that the US and Germany were at odds over who was to receive the islands at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War.

also, i should note that the Japanese were also sniffing around at this time as were the Russians as they highly desired a warm water port(s) w/ access to the Pacific.

@ Dann - What is it they say about the history of the Philippines - Five hundred years of Spanish Catholicism and fifty years of Hollywood? There certainly is a very strong and warm bond between the two countries especially since so many Philippinos have ended up living here.
Three hundred years ++. ;)
one thing Dann:
i'm curious to know how Aguinaldo is regarded in the P.I today. is he considered a patriot? i would hope that he is b/c he definitely wasn't the scoundrel that the Yanks made him out to be at the time.
A hero all right, but a flawed one. Infighting was rife within the fledgling Philippine Republic, sometimes ending in assasination. Some people suspect that Aguinaldo, or at least his faction, had a hand in Andres Bonifacio's death, but the evidence is inconclusive.

Bonifacio was the pioneer and the peasants' hero. The "masa" guy as opposed to Aguinaldo's illustrado background. Unfortunately he was also a poor field tactician. About the only victory he had was the start of the uprising itself where his band raided an armory. He would slowly lose favor in the power struggles as his lack of real battle ability (aside from being a good underground organizer) became more and more apparent. But he was THE founder of the revolution. And chafed at being outmanuevered by someone who came later. Eventually things came to a head and someone decided that his death would be a good thing... :(

As for Aguinaldo, the feeling is that though the fates were not kind to him, he himself had some questionable moments. In a state of relative advantage vis-a-vis the Spanish he still accepted a peace deal and voluntarily went into exile in Hongkong, only to return with guns blazing in front of the Americans. Outgunned and outclassed while fighting the Americans, he chose to surrender and cooperate while some of his generals (like Gen. Sakay) went on to fight to the death as guerillas. I think the few Filipinos who have an inkling of history (most of our youth couldn't care less about the subject :( ) hold in higher esteem other generals of the era, like Antonio Luna or Gregorio del Pilar.

Interesting read, thank you for posting. :)

I assume that you've already given it to your professor (or who ever ends up with it)? If not, there's some tiny language related things you might like to change (like using the word "scathing" two times in less than ten lines).

Three hundred years ++. ;)

A hero all right, but a flawed one. Infighting was rife within the fledgling Philippine Republic, sometimes ending in assasination. Some people suspect that Aguinaldo, or at least his faction, had a hand in Andres Bonifacio's death, but the evidence is inconclusive.

Bonifacio was the pioneer and the peasants' hero. The "masa" guy as opposed to Aguinaldo's illustrado background. Unfortunately he was also a poor field tactician. About the only victory he had was the start of the uprising itself where his band raided an armory. He would slowly lose favor in the power struggles as his lack of real battle ability (aside from being a good underground organizer) became more and more apparent. But he was THE founder of the revolution. And chafed at being outmanuevered by someone who came later. Eventually things came to a head and someone decided that his death would be a good thing... :(

As for Aguinaldo, the feeling is that though the fates were not kind to him, he himself had some questionable moments. In a state of relative advantage vis-a-vis the Spanish he still accepted a peace deal and voluntarily went into exile in Hongkong, only to return with guns blazing in front of the Americans. Outgunned and outclassed while fighting the Americans, he chose to surrender and cooperate while some of his generals (like Gen. Sakay) went on to fight to the death as guerillas. I think the few Filipinos who have an inkling of history (most of our youth couldn't care less about the subject :( ) hold in higher esteem other generals of the era, like Antonio Luna or Gregorio del Pilar.
great comments Dann :) thanks for sharing.

Andres Bonifacio was indeed the pioneer. however, from what i had gathered (alongside w/ all of your comments) was that he was nasty and abbrassive and this is, imho, one of the reasons that he was inefficient at winning the hearts and minds of all Filipinos. i have a section of one of the latter chapters devoted to his movements.

as for his death, i read in a few accounts (Carlos Quirino's accounts as well as American accounts) where Aguinaldo was definitely involved in Bonafacio's death. iirc, Aguinaldo had ordered that Bonifacio be found and killed for insubordination (and a certain level of insecurity on Aguinaldo's behalf i reckon). however, if memory serves me right, Aguinaldo, for some reason, reversed track and order that if Bonifacio was found that he not be killed. sadly, this revised order did not reach Bonifacio's captors in time and it is alleged that he was killed on the spot :( i also have a section on this as well w/ citations.

a note on the effectiveness of Aguinaldo's soldiers:
it seems that when hostilities against the US began, Aguinaldo had a good number of 'crack' units. they cut their teeth so to speak against the Spanish during the war for independence in '96 and managed to capture Spanish Mauser rifles, a whole bunch of artillery pieces, ammo, and even some Maxim machineguns. however, once these 'crack' soldiers began getting depleted, the effectiveness of the Filipino resistance diminished accordingly.

@mrtn
it was submitted some time ago. i also noticed a few instances throughout where i could've used better words. ;)

[I]American involvement in the Philippine Islands is inextricably linked with Admiral Dewey’s smashing naval victory of May 1, 1898 in Manila Bay. The American squadron clearly overpowered an outgunned and unprepared Spanish fleet. The Spanish American War was only a week old at this moment and Spain’s centuries-long grip on the archipelago was in its last days. The crown jewel of the seven thousand islands, Manila, was now subjected to the mercy of American naval superiority. However, there remained an estimated fifteen thousand Spanish defenders still entrenched in Manila. By late June of 1898, the 8th Corps, Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt commanding, had arrived in Manila safely from San Francisco courtesy of the American naval blockade and sought to encircle the old city in an attempt to dislodge the Spaniards. The first Battle of Manila ensued on July 25, 1898 and lasted until August 13 when the Spanish general, Fermin Juadenes, surrendered the city to the Americans. The next day, 11,000 American troops arrived in Manila to bolster the occupation of the city. The historical accounts of the battle vary but the finite result was that the United States now held a foreign possession for the first time in its diplomatic history. These consequences are of paramount importance when attempting to uncover the political motivations of the McKinley Administration. The Philippine issue, for all intensive purposes, had fallen into the lap of William McKinley. How he would handle this issue is the focus of this particular section.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002) 291. Zimmermann details how the Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, was completely unprepared for the Battle of Manila Bay. His squadron was lacking in ammunition and it is claimed that Spansih sailors were either at Mass, painting their ships or doing other “non-gunnery related tasks” when Dewey opened fire.
~ Zimmermann, 295. Zimmermann noted that recent historical authority has concluded that the battle may have been a sham insomuch that it was pre-arranged by Juadenes, Merritt and Dewey in order to preserve Spanish prestige and more importantly, to safeguard them from the nearly ten thousand Filipino insurrectos who were vying for independence.
~ Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959) p. 223. Ms. Leech’s exact text: “The capture and occupation of the capital had inevitably enlarged and confirmed the sense of American involvement with the Philippines.”

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h91000/h91881k.jpg
a colorful painting of the Battle of Manila Bay, 1 May 1898. it appears that USFS Olympia is depicted in the foreground of the image. the "F" in the naval prefix stands for 'Flagship'. the Olympia is now a floating museum in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. it is also the oldest floating iron-sided warship in American history. they spent lots of money a few years back refurbishing it to its original finishes. iirc, it was a private endeavour unlike the USS New Jersey several hundred meters across the Delaware River. this old Iowa class BB (ww2 & cold war era) was restored through NJ state funds; specifically, through customized automobile liscence plates that the state of NJ oversees ;)

President McKinley labored long and hard over the Philippine issue in the days leading up to and immediately following the first Battle of Manila. Annexation of the islands or cession of them through treaty was an imminent and real possibility. It is also the first time in American history that the United States had such a magnified international responsibility or had experienced the ‘spoils’ of a foreign military conquest. He certainly did not enjoy any sort of American executive precedent in this particular area. As a result, McKinley sought the advice and opinion of many. He consulted prominent members of both parties, surveyed the variety of national newspaper editorials on the issue and is said to have “studied the thousands of letters which responded to this invitation” . Thus a hot national debate ensued. The anti-annexationists decried any sort of American colonialism and highlighted the blatant constitutional contradiction in the ‘consent of the governed’ principle. The groundswell of national support for expansion, however, had a much louder voice and the President was all ears.

The following weeks directly following the August 16 ceasefire is when McKinley heard the opinions of what Ms. Leech describes as “two large overlapping groups of citizens” who seemed to dominate the President’s attention: the “aspiration of businessmen” and the “zeal” of the Protestant missionary supporters. The economic impact of American possession of the archipelago could open up the lucrative Asian markets in China and abroad and American business interests were accordingly in full support of annexation so long as there is access to the Orient trade markets. The second group who commanded the President’s ear was the Protestant majority in the U.S. who were in full support of annexation for missionary purposes. Religious conversion of the Filipinos was discussed in several circles and McKinley was at the least convinced by his correspondence with them that the Filipinos’ main grievance was with the Catholic Church in the Philippines. McKinley was therefore falsely led to believe that the Filipinos harbored ill will towards the Church more so than against the Spaniards themselves. Furthermore, McKinley was under the impression that the native Filipinos sincerely wished to distance themselves from Rome. This did not play a tremendously significant role in the issue but it certainly is a blatant oversight on behalf of Protestant religious groups.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 324. Leech declares that McKinley “incorrectly supposed that the grievance (revolt against the Spanish) embraced hatred of the Catholic faith.” It is also stated that several of the Protestant missionaries were “colored by bigotry and self-interest” under the specter of what she described as “gunpowder gospel”.

The nation was still abuzz as President McKinley sought even more opinions on the Philippine issue. The national newspaper editorials in August 1898 relied primarily on one particular article that appeared in the July 1898 issue of an English periodical called the Contemporary Review. It was written by an Englishman named John Foreman, a long time resident of the Philippine Islands. Foreman declared that the Tagalog insurrection under the guidance of Aguinaldo “did not possess nationalistic characteristics” and that the Philippine inhabitants were “divided by fierce racial antipathies and possessed little idea of union.” Foreman continued to elaborate on the issue by stating that any form of immediate native government was completely out of the question and that foreign intervention was imminent if the natives were left to their own devices . The fundamental theme of Foreman’s article, the glaring ‘un-readiness’ of the Philippine natives to conduct self-government, was portrayed by the leading newspapers across the country. Annexationists quickly fed off of the supposed barbarity of the native populace by suggesting that American government in the Philippine Islands was necessary. McKinley still did not know for certain whether exporting American democracy in Asia was his preferred course. It is certain, however, that he clearly rejected the option of an American protectorate and immediate self-government. A closer look at Foreman’s article reveals that the most pressing issue for McKinley was the idea of foreign intervention in the event of an American withdrawal. Specifically, he was worried about possible Japanese or German claims to the archipelago should the United States not retain them.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 328. Leech states that McKinley overtly objected to the idea of an American protectorate because “he would not associate the United States with a weak sovereignty, inexperienced in resisting foreign intrigues and helpless to prevent foreign intervention.”

Spain’s crumbling empire caused a flurry of international diplomacy. The colonial powers were eagerly watching the turn of events in the Philippines. It was becoming quite clear that if the Philippines weren’t ceded or sold to the United States through treaty that they’d be sold off to another colonial power. The British urged McKinley, through his Secretary of State John Hay, that they ought to take possession of the islands simply to keep them out of the hands of their primary rival, Germany. It is even documented that British diplomats indicated to McKinley’s representatives that the English would be willing to take on the islands should the Americans opt out. The Japanese had also expressed an interest. Leech notes that this caused the Russians to become alarmed as they also sought a naval facility in the islands. Meanwhile, “urgent whispers of German diplomacy were echoing in Washington” in mid-August 1898 and it was becoming clear to McKinley and his administration that formal control of the islands was to be either officially transferred to the United States through treaty or be retained by Spain. The “consuming hatred of the Spanish” , however, precluded the option of Spanish retention of the Philippines. McKinley felt that if left under the Spanish dominion, the situation on the islands would further deteriorate and it would be even “more disastrous still.” Leech concludes that McKinley’s “decision seemed inescapable”.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 326. Leech proclaimed that the English had intended to pay the U.S. for control of the islands as a last resort so as to keep them out of the hands of both Germany and Japan.

The next step for the President was to assemble the official Peace Commission delegation bound for Paris. Spanish delegates were likewise preparing for what would formally end the hostilities between Spain and the United States. The complicated issues of the Philippines, Cuba, Porto (sic) Rico and Guam were the hot topics. McKinley chose five men to head the American delegation: Cushman K. Davis, a Republican senator from Minnesota who chaired the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, Senator George Gray, a conservative Democrat from Delaware, William P. Frye, a Republican senator from Maine, Whitelaw Reid of Ohio and Judge William R. Day, a federal judge in the Sixth District Court of Appeals. McKinley instructed them to examine as much evidence as possible in order to reach a conclusion on the newly acquired territories. It was mid September 1898 and the Philippine issue as well as the other newly acquired possessions was becoming even more hotly debated. The anti-annexationists were furious at the seemingly intentional delay tactics by the War Department. The Peace Commission, however, set out to provide McKinley with what Leech describes as “the foundation of McKinley’s thought process.”

The progress of the American and Spanish Peace Commissions was very slow during the fall of 1898. Among the issues stalling the progress was the ongoing annexation debate raging in America and also the Spanish insistence of the U.S. either assuming the significant debts of the Spanish colonies or to rework the debt into the native economic system. The American commissioners focused their attentions to the Philippine Islands. They conducted testimony with Army and Navy officers, diplomats and a variety of other military figures. The commissioners were in constant contact with the President and they undoubtedly shaped his outlook on the Philippine issue leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Paris in December of 1898.
The most significant and telling testimony the Commission conducted during the weeks leading up to the Treaty centered around that of Commander R. B. Bradford, a naval officer who was the chief of the Bureau of Equipment. He had also written a study for the US Navy on the feasibility of coaling stations and possible naval base sites in the Philippine Islands. Therefore, he had an intimate knowledge of the current state of affairs in and around Manila. The gist of Bradford’s testimony would form the foundation of the Commission’s sentiments. He stated that the islands as a whole rather than only one or two islands would be easier to defend from a naval standpoint. He testified to the Commissioners that he sought the “strategic values” of the choke points and straits leading into the China Sea and that the German Navy had their eyes on the island of Palawan “for years”. Bradford continued, “their cruisers frequent the islands and their engineers have explored them”.
The following is the exact excerpt from Bradford’s testimony:
Commissioner Reid to Commander Bradford: “…if divided as you suggested (nearly the entire archipelago), would this satisfy you if any of the neighboring islands fell under the control of a possible enemy?”

Commander Bradford to Reid: “No.”

Commissioner Davis to Commander Bradford: “Would you consider Spain to be a bad neighbor?”

Commander Bradford to Davis: “Most assuredly…”

Commissioner Frye to Commander Bradford: “If we should adopt your line of demarcation, what do you think Spain would do with the balance of the islands?”

Commander Bradford to Commissioner Frye: “Sell them to Germany.”

Commissioner Frye: “Is not Germany about as troublesome a neighbor as we could get?”

Commander Bradford: The most so, in my opinion…”

Meanwhile, President McKinley toured the country in an effort to solicit the opinions of the citizenry. He spoke to crowds in Iowa, Omaha, St. Louis and Chicago. The President wasted little time extolling “the courage of destiny” and that the war had brought “blessings that are now beyond calculation.” Furthermore, McKinley began to reveal more of his sentiment in Hastings, Iowa by declaring that “we have good money, we have ample revenues, we have unquestioned national credit but what we want is new markets, and as trade follows the flag it looks very much as if we are going to have new markets.” McKinley opined at the Omaha Exposition that “the United States has sought neither the war nor the resultant international responsibilities” that the American victory in the Philippines had bestowed upon them. The “throngs” that he greeted applauded wildly. It is now that McKinley has received the validation of the people.

The Peace Commission was in continuous contact with the President via the telegraph. He was kept abreast of most ongoing negotiations and continued to seek the views of others. The Spanish Peace Commissioners had laid out the first two sections of the treaty on October 26, 1898. Judge Day cabled the White House for instructions. “The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none” replied the President. “The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required”. Leech notes that McKinley caused quite a stir in Paris with these remarks. Each of the five American Peace Commissioners subsequently sent their “individual opinions” to McKinley for final review. Four out of the five American Commissioners submitted negative reviews of possible American annexation of the islands.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech,336. Leech notes that McKinley had “several conversations” with Gen. Greene of the Army who essentially echoed the sentiment of the Bradford testimony where it was believed that complete annexation of the archipelago was the best option.
~ Leech, 342. Leech notes that “the President’s message caused misgivings in Paris.”
~ Leech, pp. 342-43. Frye objected to an “outright claim for territory” and Reid concurred. Gray and Day also objected.

The Spanish delegation was beginning to become restless. They had very little left to lose and knew it. They also knew that they stood to receive a large sum for the islands whether it was under American dominion or not. Negotiations had reached a standstill when McKinley once again listened to a variety of suggestions regarding financial considerations for the islands. Finally, in late November 1898, the sum of $20,000,000.00 was agreed upon for transfer of the islands to the United States.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 342. Leech notes that the Spanish delegation were so exasperated by the American delaying that they considered renewing the hostilities in order to force the Americans’ hand.

William McKinley faced a tremendous crossroad in American history when he waded through the implications of Dewey’s victory in Manila Bay. He labored tremendously hard on the issue despite not being able to find the islands on a map when war broke out with Spain. He sought an unprecedented amount of information and opinion on the matter, even by today’s standards. However, he clearly dragged his feet during the negotiations and was evidently influenced by a number of different interests and groups. The notion of added markets to the American economy certainly had an impact on McKinley as did the religious fervor and the morality issue that accompanied them. The encroachment of possible enemies upon the American spoils of war played a role as well. In the end, McKinley went against the recommendations of four out of the five Commissioners. He clearly pushed the issue and the end result was a seven thousand island archipelago located more than seven thousand miles from the continental United States. The task of administering the islands was a tremendous one. It was up to President McKinley to pick the right man to do this task.

The task of administering the newly acquired territories would fall to the War Department with the Secretary of War in command. President McKinley knew that he’d need an astute man to fulfill the “unprecedented” assignment of overseeing an American colonial empire. The governments, economies, infrastructure and industries of the new possessions were now under the sole jurisdiction of the War Department. For that reason, McKinley sought not a military man but a law man instead. On the eve of the Spanish American War, Elihu Root was fifty-three years old and a top attorney in New York City. He had cut his political teeth in the cauldron of New York City politics but was new to Washington politics and was considered a peculiar choice to replace the current Secretary of War, Russell H. Alger. Root would accept McKinley’s invitation and become what could very well be considered the first ‘wise man’ in American history. However, there was serious trouble ahead.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Zimmermann, 143. Zimmerman notes that Root’s duty of administering the newly acquired possessions of Puerto Rico and the Philippines was “a task unprecedented in American history.”
~ Zimmermann, 142. Root was defense council for Boss Tweed during the dismantling of the former’s New York City political patronage machine of the late nineteenth century. Root also lacked not only military experience; he clearly had no experience in international diplomacy either thus making his nomination a rather peculiar one.
~ Zimmermann, 148. Root left the comfortable salary of private life for the greater good of what Root describes as the “ultimate client”, the American Government Others that followed in his footsteps include his protégé and former NYC law firm partner, Henry Stimson, John J. McCloy, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, Douglas Dillon, Cyrus Vance, Paul Nitze and Robert Rubin.

The Treaty of Paris was not yet two months old when hostilities between the Americans and the Filipinos began on February 4, 1899. The tensions between the two had been magnified since the Americans had taken control of Manila in August of 1898. Aguinaldo and his forces had been marginalized by the American forces as well as the President. It was becoming blatantly obvious that the McKinley administration did not intend to recognize Emilio Aguinaldo’s declaration of a new Philippine Republic. Elihu Root’s task as Secretary of War had now become two-fold: a formidable military confrontation with an indigenous opposition to American authority and the cultivation and implementation of civil government throughout the archipelago. The First Philippine Commission under Jacob Gould Schurman had been appointed in January of 1899 and was assigned the task of providing a thorough assessment of the Philippine issue. They very nearly ended the hostilities in May of that year but were ultimately rebuffed by the insurgent leadership.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Zimmermann, 325. Aguinaldo officially declared the existence of the Republic of the Philippines on June 12, 1898.
~ Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root 1845-1909, Vol. 1, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) 353. On January 20, 1899, McKinley, at Admiral Dewey’s urging, approved of what is now referred to as the First Philippine Commission. It is also known as the Schurman Commission and its primary task was to assess the self-governing capacities of the Filipino peoples. Jessup notes that an agreement in principle between the Commission and Aguinaldo’s representatives in May 1899 where an American Governor Gen. would be in control of the islands but would have a cabinet composed of both Americans and Filipinos. Furthermore, there was also an “advisory council” comprised of Filipinos only. Aguinaldo subsequently rejected the offer and demanded complete independence.

---TO BE CONT'D---

Elihu Root wasted little time in expressing his desire to squash the native insurrection. In a letter to his old college friend, Milton H. Northrup, he stated that he’d rather “play a game in the Philippines which has more the rapidity of checkers then the deliberate slowness of our old games of chess at the North College.” There were several options for Root to consider at this juncture. Some in Congress were pining for what Jessup defines as a “conciliatory approach” towards the insurgent faction. Some suggested a complete withdrawal from the islands while others proposed an act of good faith by declaring a cease fire followed by substantive negotiating. There was also a loud and demanding call for armed suppression of what was evolving into a rebellion against American authority. Root, however, chose the latter. Roosevelt notes in a letter to Senator Lodge that Root “realizes that the first thing to do is to smash the Philippine insurrection…” Accordingly, Root petitioned McKinley in August of 1899 for ten more Volunteer regiments to be sent to the islands. Zimmermann notes that by the end of 1899, Root had established “firm military rule with generous paternalism” and that America now had an “implied contract” with the Filipino peoples. It will later be shown how Root’s aggressive approach at this time had a detrimental effect on the pacification process.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Jessup, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) 334. Jessup noted that Root asked the President for five more regiments than were originally asked for by the military command.

Elihu Root confronted the glaring constitutional issues of the Philippine question from the viewpoint of an attorney. Jessup notes that Root admitted that any form of American colonialism was odd in the fact that the Constitution failed to outline any type of groundwork for American actions in the newly acquired territories. There was no such thing as precedent for American colonialism. Should the Constitution’s rights apply to the peoples of a foreign land under the control of American forces? Does the Bill of Rights apply to these peoples? What of the seemingly blatant contradiction of the ‘Consent of the Governed’ clause? Secretary Root had no intentions of molding the Constitution in favor of any type of American colonialism nor did he see the application of the Bill of Rights throughout the islands as a positive. Root also stated to Jessup that he felt that the Administration ought to take “a definite and positive position” on the extension of the Constitution and its inherent rights. He concluded that a series of “hopeless entanglements of contradictions” awaited the Administration should they have floundered on the issue. Furthermore, the Administration’s critics declared that McKinley and Root were in direct violation of the Jeffersonian principle of the ‘Consent of the Governed’. Root countered that Jefferson himself did not apply this concept to the peoples of Louisiana in that the inhabitants of the newly acquired territory simply weren’t fit for self-government and that the task of installing it fell primarily with the Federal Government. The task of interpreting the actual extension and application of the American Constitution, however, lies with the Supreme Court and Root, to his benefit and to that of the other pro-colonialist sentiments operating in Washington, had their interpretations of the Constitution validated in a series of Supreme Court decisions in 1900 and later published in 1901. The gist of the ground-breaking decisions essentially established that constitutional rights do not apply to the peoples of the newly acquired territories. The Court’s renderings effectively nullified any type of American rights granted to the peoples of the islands under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Root’s remarks upon hearing of the Court’s decisions: “…as near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag – but doesn’t quite catch up with it.”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Jessup, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) 346. Root, in a letter to Judge W.W. Howe dated September 11, 1899, stated he had “no desire” to shape the Constitution so that it fit neatly into the parameters of the McKinley Administration. Furthermore, Root reiterates his belief that any application of the principles of the Bill of Rights would hinder the Government’s ability to act. However, no specifics on this particular matter were expounded upon.

Schurman’s Commission had concluded by March of 1900 that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. Root, realizing this, submitted to President McKinley a proposal for the colonial administration of the Philippine islands in what would become the Second Philippine Commission under the control of Judge William H. Taft. The initial instructions and objectives of the Second Philippine Commission were to first attempt to establish municipal governments and to branch out once pacification of the contested areas permits. Issues such as taxation, education, civil service and the judiciary were the main tasks of the Commission. On April 7, 1900, McKinley signed the order authorizing Taft and his fellow commissioners the responsibility of building the Philippine civil government from the ground up. Jessup even went as far as to declare that, up until that time period (1930s), this order formed what he described as “the most important document in American colonial history.” It clearly is the first of its kind in that the United States had never been in this position, the position of nation building.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
Jessup, 354. Jessup notes that Taft, in response to W. Cameron Forbes’s question in the summer of 1912 regarding who it was that actually penned the initial and subsequent instructions regarding the Commission’s tasks. Taft admitted it that it was Root’s instructions with McKinley’s signature.

By early 1901, Elihu Root was beginning to believe that the next step in the Philippine question was the transfer of military governance to the Second Philippine Commission. In a letter to Taft, Root stated that it was time that the Army gets “out of the business of government and restore it to its proper and natural place as an adjunct of civil government.” By June of that year however, Root softened his stance a bit by claiming that the Army ought to retain civil and military control of the areas that remained un-pacified . President McKinley subsequently issued another order on June 21, 1901 effectively transferring civil governance authority from the U.S. military to the Second Philippine Commission effective July 4, 1901. It specified that the areas that remained un-pacified were to still be under the complete jurisdiction of the military until pacification could take root.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Jessup, 360. Root, in the same letter sent also to Gen. Chaffee, the leading military candidate to assume command of a military with a diminished role in the Philippines, acknowledged the potential difficulties that may exist for the individual who takes command; specifically, the reduction of the military’s responsibilities in the area of governance.
~ Jessup, 360. Root, in another letter to Gen. Chaffee dated June 20, 1901: Continue to suppress the insurgency and govern at the same time until the areas in question are completely pacified.

By September of 1901, Root and McKinley had overseen significant recent advances in the Philippines. Aguinaldo was captured in a daring raid by Frederick Funston and a few Macabebe native scouts in March of 1901. Both Jessup and Zimmerman note that this had a significant boost in the pacification process across the islands. The Second Philippine Commission was busy passing numerous laws and establishing the groundwork for the Philippine civil government. The tide had turned militarily against the scattered insurgent bands. The good news came to a temporary halt on September 6, 1901 when President McKinley was shot twice at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York by a self-described anarchist named Leon Czolgosz. McKinley succumbed to the wounds on September 14. The nation was shook by the shocking turn of events. Czolgosz was tried, found guilty and executed on October 29, 1901. His last words before being electrocuted by three jolts of 1700 volts: “I killed the President because he was the enemy of the good people - the good working people. I am not sorry for my crime.”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Zimmermann, 231. Macabebe native scouts were Filipinos who harbored bitter resentment towards the Tagalog population and especially Aguinaldo and the fledgling Republic. In some cases, they fought alongside the Americans but mostly they acted as scouts and guides.

Elihu Root was still not finished. He sought to clarify the economic and industrial growth of the islands by putting forth specific legislation in the U.S. Congress that would provide for “acts governing tariffs, public lands, mines and corporate franchise.” Root felt that this responsibility ought to be afforded to Taft and his Commission. “I presume that no committee sitting in Washington could work the subject out so well as Taft and his associates can do in Manila, dealing day to day with the practical problems as they arise.” At the core of Root’s beliefs was the byproduct of the Spooner Amendment which completely abolished the long-standing Spanish systems of regulation and allowance of business permits. This was having a strangling effect on Philippine commerce and industry such as mining and timber. Root felt strongly that it should be eased by passing a specific set of legislation that allowed for the Commission to take steps to develop the Philippine timber industries, the railroad systems around the archipelago and the overall modernization of the Philippine industrial systems. By July of 1902, Root’s desires became law under the scope of The Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902. It essentially added specificity to the Spooner Bill. Among the other issues it called for included a national census, an election of a native legislative assembly two years down the road, the respect for the Philippine environment and the prohibition against environmental exploitation, the power of the Commission to borrow on government bonds, and subsidiary Philippine coins.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Quoted in Jessup, 361. Root in a letter to Senator Lodge dated July 1, 1901.

The final primary issue that Elihu Root sought to deal with was the relation of the church and state within the archipelago. Jessup wrote that this subject “caused much concern.” Nine out of every ten Filipinos were of the Roman Catholic faith and For that reason, the Church and the friars had possessed “immense power” in the local communities. Their tasks under the yolk of the Spanish included such jobs as inspecting schools, presidents on municipal and provincial tax boards, and counselors for municipal councils and presidents on census boards. The Second Philippine Commission reported that “the priest was not just the spiritual guide, but…in every sense the municipal leader.” To dismantle that base of leadership, the Commission stripped the clergy of the ability to hold office. The larger question surrounding the separation of church and state was the redistribution of the four hundred twenty thousand plus acres of land still in the hands of the friars. The nearly sixty thousand Philippine tenants of these lands were on the brink of what Jessup describes as an “agrarian revolution” due to the exorbitant rent that was being charged. Root knew that this was a very sensitive issue to not only Catholic Americans but to Protestants alike. As a result, he sought the counsel of Catholic Archbishop John Ireland who suggested that the lands under the control of the friars be sold off voluntarily and privately. He also urged Root to exercise caution in dealing with Rome so that he did not alienate the Philippine and American Catholics. Furthermore, Ireland recommended that the Vatican help broker the transactions. Root agreed in principle to Ireland’s suggestions and wrote to Taft on September 5, 1901 indicating his desires. He also stated that the Insular Government of the Philippines ought to purchase the lands. Root did make it very clear to Taft that the United States ought not to engage in direct diplomatic negotiations with the Vatican and that a visit by Taft to Rome would be solely for a “business transaction.” Root’s critics began to clamor that the Vatican had gained access to the White House and their influence in Washington was wholly unacceptable. Rome was attempting to declare the legalities of eminent domain and proper title to the lands. Taft was subsequently sent to Rome to negotiate the legal transfer of the lands in question. The Protestant critics again voiced their displeasure. President Roosevelt appeared to be uneasy about the whole situation but relented. He and Root penned “carefully drafted instructions” to Taft. In April of 1903, Root authorized a Catholic Army chaplain, Father E.J. Vattman to travel to Rome in order to negotiate the final purchase. Nearly all of the friar’s lands were ultimately transferred to the Insular Government for a little more than $7,000,000.00. Jessup states that, in the end, Rome fully cooperated in the transfer and Root was able to diffuse what appeared to be a very touchy issue.

Elihu Root’s contributions to the American nation building effort in the Philippines are unparalleled. By the time he resigned his post as Secretary of War in 1904, Elihu Root left a definitive and positive mark on the McKinley and Roosevelt colonial policies. His aggressive approach provided immediate military gains in large portions of the archipelago. His interpretations of the Constitution were upheld by the highest court in the land. He also oversaw the influence and charter of the Second Philippine Commission and its monumental task of planting a democracy in Asia. He also succeeded in tackling the difficult issues of industry and the dissolution of the Church’s lands.

Theodore Roosevelt’s Philippine policy as President mirrored that of McKinley’s. He stayed the course that was set by Root and authorized by McKinley. Roosevelt addressed issues such as patience, duty, meritorious political appointments and the preparation of the Philippine peoples for self-government in his official 1901 Annual Message. The gist of his 1902 Annual Message was grounded in democracy’s first ever appearance in Asia, the Army’s pacification and initial implementation of civil government and the “constructive statesmanship” of American involvement in the Philippine Islands. By 1903, Roosevelt turned his attention to the industrial development of the archipelago. Roosevelt’s 1904 Annual Message preached of the continuing un-readiness for Philippine self-government and singled out the “foolish persons” who insisted to the contrary.

Theodore Roosevelt’s sentiments on the Philippine issue were a continuation of what Elihu Root and the late President McKinley had put forth. President Roosevelt announced in his 1901 Annual Message that “in dealing with the Philippine people we must show both patience and strength, forbearance and steadfast resolution.” Furthermore, Roosevelt, with a touch of McKinley, proclaimed:
“Our aim is high. We do not desire to do for the islanders merely what has elsewhere been done for tropic peoples by even the best governments. We hope to do for them what has never been done for any people of the tropics – to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations.”

In the 1901 Annual Message, Roosevelt declared that any type of “desertion of duty on our part would be a crime against humanity.” Sticking with this theme, the newly inaugurated Roosevelt expressed a desire to see the Philippine peoples develop the ability to govern themselves . President Roosevelt seconded Secretary Root’s recommendations that Congress ought to enact specific legislation regarding Philippine industries. The 1902 Annual Message of President Roosevelt lauded the general end of hostilities throughout the islands. Roosevelt sought to address the administration’s critics who were demanding for an American withdrawal from the islands. He continued to preach patience by stating that “to hurry matters, to go faster than we are now going, would entail calamity on the people of the islands.” With a touch of virtuosity, Roosevelt stated:
“No policy ever entered into by the American people has vindicated itself in more signal manner than the policy of holding the Philippines…The triumph of our arms, above all the triumph of our laws and principles, has come sooner than we had any right to think.”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, (Charles Scribner & Sons, New York: 1925. 177. Roosevelt’s exact quote: “We are extremely anxious that the natives shall show the power of governing themselves.”
~ note that all of the quotes are from "The Works of TR"

The 1902 Annual Message also contained high praise for the military; especially with regard to the pacification and civil government processes throughout the archipelago.
“Too much praise cannot be given to the Army…they warred under fearful difficulties of climate and surroundings; and under the strain of the terrible provocations which they continually received from their foes…”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Roosevelt, 180. Roosevelt had been addressing the combination of the Army’s alleged atrocities against the indigenous peoples and their dual task of pacification and initial implementation of civil government.

Thus the summation of the 1902 Annual Message was that “taking the work of the Army and the civil authorities together, it may be questioned whether anywhere else in modern times the world has seen a better example of real constructive statesmanship than our people have given in the Philippine Islands.”

By 1903, Roosevelt had shifted away from the military aspects of the islands. Instead, he sought to address the economic and trade complications of the archipelago. He stated that “the Philippines should be knit closer to the United States by tariff arrangements.” Specifically, Roosevelt wished to grant Philippine goods exclusive access to the American markets by reducing the custom taxes that accompany foreign goods. By doing so, goods such as Philippine timber, hemp and sugar would have preferred status in the United States and as a result would boost the Philippine economy in the process. However, Roosevelt was careful to note that “caution and moderation” ought to be exercised by the Insular Government of the islands in this area so as to not exploit the islands’ resources. The final portion of Roosevelt’s 1903 Annual Message reported on the actual gains of the islands over the previous four years.

“The condition of the islanders is in material things far better than ever before while their governmental, intellectual, and moral advance has kept pace with their material advances…No one people ever benefited another people more than we have benefited the Filipinos by taking possession of the islands.”

The “continuation of steady progress” was the theme of Roosevelt’s 1904 Annual Message. However, he again noted caution in proceeding too fast in any type of complete transfer of self-government. He continued to extol the American virtues in the Philippines by stating that “the justification for our stay in the Philippines must ultimately rest chiefly upon the good we are able to do in the islands.” Furthermore, Roosevelt sought to partially justify American’s thrust into the Pacific by declaring that “the Philippines have played and will play an important part” in American naval strategy. More importantly, however, Roosevelt stated that “our chief reason for continuing to hold them (the islands) must be that we ought in good faith try to do our share of the world’s work.” President Roosevelt made it a point to note that “this piece of work has been imposed upon us by the results of the war with Spain.” He compared the American effort in the Philippines to the British in India and Egypt, the French in Algiers, the Dutch in Java, the Russians in Turkestan and the Japanese in Formosa. In response to those who continued to preach for complete and absolute Philippine independence, Roosevelt suggested that “within two years we shall be trying the experiment of an elective lower house in the Philippine legislature” so long as effects of such a legislative body are both “sane and efficient.” Roosevelt stressed that “they (the Filipinos) should remember that their prime needs are moral and industrial, not political” yet, on the same note, “it is a good to try the experiment of giving them a legislature; but it is a far better thing to give them schools, good roads, rail roads which will enable them to get their products to market, honest courts, an honest constabulary, and all that tends to produce order…” In sum, Roosevelt urged for “habits of intelligent industry and thrift.”

It is clear that President Roosevelt continued the course set out by President McKinley and Secretary Root. He preached for such virtues as patience, duty and industrial development of the islands. He noted that the difficulties of planting the seeds of democracy fell primarily with the Army and that their success, combined with the subsequent civil governance of the islands, equated to what Roosevelt described as “constructive statesmanship.” It is also clear that Roosevelt shared Root’s belief that the Philippine peoples were simply not ready for any form of self-government. However, he is keen to suggest the proposition of a natively elected, Philippine-only legislature. In total, Roosevelt’s action in the Philippines as President can be described as a virtuously cautious yet progressive approach to implementing self-government in the Philippines.
In sum, McKinley, Root and Roosevelt set a huge precedent in American history. In the words of Richard Hofstadter, these turn of events “profoundly altered the character of our traditional foreign policy” in that it was a sharp departure from previous endeavors. This most certainly represented “a turning point in our history” . The groundswell of the nationalistic and virtuous elements of ‘Manifest Destiny’ now had a laboratory to conduct their grand experiment: “benevolent assimilation”. However, this task, as it will be shown in the following chapter, fell to the military arm of the United States. Their significance in the pacification efforts, the initial civic decrees of the occupied indigene, and the responsibilities to maintain the general state of order will be shown to have had a gigantic impact on the American efforts in the Philippines.[/I]

---TO BE CONT'D---

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/2/23/Manila646_1899.jpg
U.S. soldiers of the First Nebraska volunteers, Company B, near Manila, 1899

http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/88.4/images/kramer_f5.jpg
Uncle Sam getting into the 'ole colonial rat race

http://www.nps.gov/prsf/history/buffalo_soldiers/images/9th_cav_sf.jpg
Troop E, 9th Cavalry at the Presidio in San Francisco before shipping out to the Philippines, 1900. if you close enough, you'll notice that the entire troop is African American (save the officers). these soldiers fought bravely in most instances depsite experiencing tremendous racism from their own commrades. i remember reading some diary entries by on e of the soldiers from Troop E and he wondered why he should try to do the Army's job of providing civic reconstruction to a foreign peoples when African Americans do not recieve it state-side. this is a great point i reckon...

http://www.ashp.cuny.edu/video/images/acts-6-7a.jpg
a rare image of Filipino soldiers

http://www.memoriallibrary.com/MI/Livingston/1895/SA/spanishc~.jpg
the northern portion of the Philippine Islands

and finally, a link to some absoultely outstanding motion picture footage (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/sawhtml/sawsp5.html) i found some time ago. note this was the first time an American war had been captured for the motion picture screen.

Not that there's anything inconsistent about being a patriot and a scoundrel (some of us would consider them much the same thing, but that's a discussion for another thread).

There was a thread recently in which someone was insisting - contrary to all counter-examples given by me and others - that the US' foreign policy has always and at all times been enlightened and concerned only with people's welfare, and that the US has never fought a war of aggression. I mentioned the war in the Philippines and the poster simply insisted that that, too, was neither aggressive nor brutal. I don't remember exactly what the reasoning was, but it was obviously spurious. Very strange - I can sort of understand why someone might be a religious fundamentalist, but a nationalist fundamentalist? A new one to me.

Well, as Dr. Johnson said, "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel." ;)

As for the "nationalist fundamentalist," I think once you know what you are looking for you will find them all around you. The nf'er is congenitally unable to see, much less accept, any evidence which would show that his or her country (particularly if it is basically a "good" country) could ever do anything which was evil. This is a dangerous disease which if not treated can lead to identity crises especially in people who have a conscience. We are seeing this right now in regards to the murder of 26 unarmed Iraqis by U.S. Marines. People are repulsed by it and are scrambling to find anything which will explain it without compromising their value systems.

In December 1944, elements of the First SS Panzer Division murdered over one hundred American prisoners at a place called Malmedy. Try as I can I can never convince anyone that British and American troops carried out similar actions on a number of occasions. The worst example I can think of is the My Lai incident from the Vietnam War. Despite eyewitness accounts and the confessions of some of the participants, there are still people who swear that the massacre was actually perpetrated by the Viet Cong.

It appears that the war in the Phillipines had its own My Lai thanks to General Jacob Hurd Smith. And Robert Graves' biography, Goodbye To All That covers his experiences in WWI and contains accounts of British soldiers routinely murdering German POWs, stealing any valubles on their persons and blaming the deaths on German artillery, and that their officers covered it up because it wouldn't look very good in the newspapers back home.

One thought about the Battle of Manila Bay having been fixed: the Guinness Book of Naval Blunders by Geoffrey Regan claims that Admiral Montojo knew that his squadron could not win but national honour compelled him to seek honourable defeat in battle. He therefore positioned his fleet at Cavite, sacrificing the use of Manila's shore batteries in order to avoid civilian deaths in Manila due to stray shells, and to ensure that his men would find it easier to swim to shore after his ships (one of his cruisers, the Castilla, was made of wood) were lost.

He was made the scapegoat for decades of government neglect of the navy when he returned to Spain, but he did have one defence witness who testified to his bravery at his court martial: Commodore Dewey.

[7ronin] And Wilde noted that patriotism is the virtue of the vicious. Nice points, although I like to think (perhaps erroneously, especially given the forthcoming events of this summer) that nationalist fundamentalism is far less of a problem here in Britain than in the US. Certainly I've never met any British ones (on the contrary, most British people are extremely cynical about the motives of government and the character of the military). This is one of the reasons I like Singapore - they care so little about patriotism/nationalism that the government has to mount campaigns to encourage people to support their national sports teams!

[El Justo] Going vaguely back on topic, this is getting very interesting. I have to say I'm particularly intrigued by your comments about the friars. Which orders of friars are we talking about here, and how did they acquire such enormous properties?

The picture of "the white man's burden" is excellent - very true. It's been suggested that one of the main reasons why countries such as Russia fell behind Europe and the US in late modern times is that they simply didn't have overseas possessions to exploit ruthlessly. The role of the colonies in providing cheap goods and labour to build the European industrial revolution (the fruits of which, of course, we in the west still enjoy while many people in the former colonies live in poverty) is probably under-appreciated. It'll be interesting to see what you have to say about the material benefits - if any - that occupation of the Philippines brought to the US.

He was made the scapegoat for decades of government neglect of the navy when he returned to Spain, but he did have one defence witness who testified to his bravery at his court martial: Commodore Dewey.
:clap: Real fighting men of character appreciate a good man, even if he comes from the opposing side. :salute:
I have to say I'm particularly intrigued by your comments about the friars. Which orders of friars are we talking about here, and how did they acquire such enormous properties?
All of them. The Franciscan, Dominicans, Jesuits etc. all had vast land holdings in Spanish era Philippines. They were the de facto government in individual towns and cities. Alcaldes and mayores routinely have to suck up to them if they want to keep their posts.

Basically they had a couple hundred years to take over the vast encomiendas (sp?) from descendants of the initial batch of Spanish who came over with the conquistadores.

Very interesting - although I must point out that Jesuits weren't friars.

thanks for the comments everyone.

i would like to add a word or two about "national fundamentalism".
while i am always a tad bit biased wrt to the US (i love my friggin' country), i will never, ever try to sugarcoat her actions. i mean, they are what they are whether it be good or bad. the gist of the passages that i post contain both critical and positive conclusions (at the very end of the essay) wrt to US actions in the Philippines. it is a complicated issue...this war was.

i recall attending a seminar as an undergrad at it was on "American Exceptionalism". i remember being infuriated after hearing some of the stuff that these neo-fundamentalists believed in. do a google search on it and you'll see what i mean.

anyhow, yes 7ronin, it is Arthur McArthur, father of Douglas of WW2 and Korean War fame. Arthur is credited w/ ratcheting up the pressure militarly and i will cover this in the next passage actually.

Plotinus: yes, the Church situation in the P.I. at this time is indeed interesting. i will have to dig through my sources some more to see if i can expound on it a little further. Dann is right though. they had (and still have to a certain degree) a great deal of 'pull'. the thing i found most interesting while drafting this section was the 'walking on eggshells' approach of the McKinley Admin when dealing w/ the Vatican. there is and always has been a certain sense of reservation w/ the American public when dealing with the Catholic Church.

i agree w/ your colonial comments. Russia, i think, didn't have the infrasturcture to operate overseas colonies; at least not to the degree of the British, french, American, or even the Germans.

natural resources in the Philippines were definitely not exploited. sure, American businessmen flooded the islands once they came under US control. however, as noted in the previous section, the US Congress took particluar measures to ensure against exploitation. after all, TR was the granddaddy of American environmentalism.

Gallienus: yeah, Jacob Smith and his 'Howling Wilderness' comments. i'll cover that in detail in the next passage. as you will see though, it was a little different than My Lai b/c the Yanks were 'returning a favor' so to speak. and yes, you're 100% correct about the Manila battle. it was very much one-sided and Montojo did indeed sacrifice his squadron for the sake of protecting the harbour.

the following passages were perhaps my favorite of the entire essay. as many of my CFC friends know, i love military history and this is no expection. i was able to uncover some fabulous records and plenty of first-hand accounts of the pacification process in the P.I. also, i was able to C&P this passage with the footnotes! i was quite happy to find this out! :goodjob:

The roles of the American military in the Philippine Islands went beyond simply rooting out the insurgents. This dual-task of pacification and civil reconstruction will be shown to have a tremendous impact on the outcome of the war. However, it is important to note that these tasks varied greatly from one region of the Philippines to the next. In some areas, the resistance raged on for years while in others, it was disorganized and meager. For that reason, the variety of circumstances that the Americans encountered deserves mentioning. This chapter is not intended, however, to be a standard chronicle of military operations. Instead, the aim is to uncover the particular successes and failures that the U.S. military achieved while pacifying the Philippines. This examination begins with what is now known as the Second Battle of Manila. The goal is to uncover exactly what measures that were taken to secure the city and its surrounding barrios. The second example is the pacification efforts in the Visayan Islands. It will be shown how the American actions here had both positive and negative effects on the pacification efforts. The island of Negros is the next topic. Negros was considered to be the model for American pacification in the Philippines and as a result, it is extremely important that it be reviewed. Following this is an examination of the American efforts to pacify on the island of Samar. The goal of this section is to uncover and debunk the myths that are inevitably attached to it. The final and most interesting portion of this chapter is an analysis of the memoirs of James Parker, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Cavalry. He was responsible for occupying two different regions of Luzon and it will be shown how his efforts there form a good part of the story in the Philippines that is not very well known.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/41/Manila639_1899.jpg
US troops on the outskirts of Manila, 1899

A half a year worth of waiting and negotiating erupted into full-scale war on February 4, 1899. Filipino accounts of the incident vary from that of the American accounts. Linn noted that the fogginess of these initial events in the San Juan del Monte section of Manila are “matters of strong dispute” among Filipino and American historians alike.[1] However, it is clear that the encounter occurred at night, several months after Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation began digging trenches, artillery emplacements and an impressive array of earthworks on Manila’s perimeter. The U.S. Army estimated that between fifteen and forty thousand insurgent troops formed a loose ring around the city at the time hostilities commenced. The American boots on the ground in the Philippines at this time was about 800 officers and a little more than twenty thousand troops. Seventy-seven of the officers and another 2338 troops were either in the southern theater of Cavite or aboard the transports off the coast of Iloilo City. An estimated eight-thousand troops were in Manila and another eleven thousand were in a sixteen mile-wide, home plate-shaped defensive line extending from Manila to the west and extending eastwards. Two brigades were garrisoned at the western banks of the Pasig River: McArthur’s 2nd Division and Brig. Gen. Harrison G. Otis’s (no relation) 1st Brigade. Brig. Gen. Irwin Hale’s 2nd Brigade extended the American lines further eastward in order to link up with Otis’s lines. The 1st South Dakota were dug in around San Mateo near the Pasig River, the 1st Colorado at Samplac on the southern side of the Pasig, and at the point, the 1st Nebraska in Santa Mesa. The remaining American lines were made up Maj. Anderson’s 1st Division and Brig. Gen. Charles King’s 1st Brigade near Blockhouse 12. Brig. Gen. Samuel Overshine’s 2nd Brigade rounded at the southern flank as they stretched from King’s lines at Blockhouse 12 to Manila Bay. These troops that formed the American lines around Manila were referred to as the 8th Corps. These somewhat over-stretched American lines stood a good chance of being either overran or surrounded.[2]

http://www.istockphoto.com/file_thumbview_approve/500009/2/Baseball___Home_Plate.jpg
For our European and Asian friends who may not know what a 'home plate shaped' design is. it is a reference to the game of baseball.

http://b-29s-over-korea.com/General_MacArthur/images/AMARICAS_FINEST_WARRIOR/General-Arthur-Mac-Arthur.jpg
Arthur MacArthur

http://www.albany.edu/jmmh/vol2no1/otiss.jpg
Brig. Gen Harrison G. Otis

As soon as the hostilities erupted on the evening of February 4, Gen. Robert P. Hughes ordered three regiments of the city’s Provost Guard onto the streets of Manila to quell the disturbances as they began “sealing off thoroughfares, dispersing large gatherings, and keeping a close watch on the suspected neighborhoods.”[3] The Guards arrested “dozens, perhaps hundreds” of suspects and fended off a possible disaster for the 8th Corps.[4] However, the street battles continued in other sections of the city. Lt. Col. Victor Duboce and four companies of the 1st California of King’s Brigade were taking heavy sniper fire from the buildings in the Manila suburb of Paco. A house-to-house fight ensued and King ordered all buildings suspected of housing or providing cover for the snipers to be torched. The troops complied and the whole village was essentially burnt to the ground.[5] There would be several other instances similar to the two described above and their impact on pacification efforts in the Philippines would have varying degrees of effect.[6]

The battles raged on into the morning of February 5. It was to become what Linn termed as the “biggest of the entire Philippine War.”[7] The key element to the American victory in Manila was Col. Stotensburg and the 1st Nebraska’s securing of Manila’s water supply. The attack was launched at ten in the morning on 5 February with the support of the 1st Colorado, a few mountain guns from the Utah Battery and a few captured Nordenfelt artillery pieces. The Volunteers “took hill after hill, trench after trench” from the enemy.[8] They eventually captured the waterworks building but found that the fleeing insurgents had disassembled the apparatus. However, the missing parts were found hidden in a coal pile. “The pumps were soon put into order and running smoothly; Manila now had a secure supply of water, and the army could continue using the capital (Manila) as a showpiece for benevolent assimilation.”[9]

The Second Battle of Manila was waged along the aforementioned sixteen-mile American front lines and it involved all or parts of thirteen different U.S. regiments and thousands of Filipinos. American casualty numbers for the conflict report that 194 were wounded and 44 killed, half of whom were Regulars from the 14th Infantry and the 3rd Artillery.[10] Linn suggested that “Filipino losses can only be estimated.” Official army reports claimed the insurgents suffered four thousand wounded and seven hundred killed.[11] It is difficult to determine exactly how many Filipinos perished, both civilians and combatants. However, news of the Second Battle of Manila finally reached Washington in the days following its completion. The news had “stunned the administration.” It was largely believed in the capital that the “situation in Manila had been cooling.”[12] McKinley had recently sent a commission to the Islands to meet with Aguinaldo’s representatives in a sign of good faith. For that reason, the outbreak of hostilities was “emphatically not desired in Washington,” not at this particular time and place.[13] Root’s comments upon hearing of the news: “Our forces were attacked by the Tagalogs, who attempted to take the city.”[14] However, despite the grim possibilities that could have occurred, the 8th Corps effectively snuffed out the offensive capacities of the enemy forces on Luzon during the battles of 4-5 February 1899. Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation suffered incalculable losses and was now on the run. Gen. Otis would spend the next two years sending columns into the dense hills and jungles of northern Luzon in the chase for Aguinaldo and the ultimate destruction of the Republic.

Gen. Otis dispatched Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller of the 1st Separate Brigade to the Visayas on 24 December 1898 with the orders to occupy the port of Iloilo City on the island of Panay. Otis did not anticipate any form of organized resistance and put Miller in command of only the 18th Infantry and Provisional Machine Gun Battery along with the 1st Tennessee. The objective for Miller and his troops would be to peaceably enter the city and lay the groundwork for civil government while maintaining the general order in Iloilos City.[15] However, trouble lay ahead. According to a reconnaissance of the island of Panay prior to the hostilities, it was reported to Otis that insurgent forces had entered the city and formally declared the Federal State of the Visayas which pledged nominal allegiance to Aguinaldo’s Philippine Republic.[16] It was also estimated that some 19,000 insurgent troops were on the island.[17] Miller took notice and promptly arranged for negotiation with the insurgents. He sought to peacefully transfer to American authority on the island but found out that the insurgent government had no intentions of relinquishing their position in favor of the Americans. It became clear that hostilities would be inevitable.

http://www.philtravelcenter.com/images/tagaytay.gif
the Visayas

The Americans initiated hostilities in the Visayas on 11 February 1899 when the U.S. Navy commenced with a naval bombardment of Iloilos City. What occurred next is a matter of dispute between the U.S. Army and the Navy. Each claimed to have “captured” the city even though it lay in ruins from the bombardments and a series of fires set by fleeing insurgents and residents. Admiral Dewey claimed that “naval forces captured, occupied and held the fort and city of Iloilo, and drove the Filipinos out, with absolutely no assistance form the Army.”[18] Miller declared that his troops had “captured five sixths of the city”[19] and that the Army held the main square, all of the trenches surrounding the city and all of the bridges leading in and out of Iloilo. Linn notes that Miller now “occupied a burned-out and deserted town, surrounded on three sides by enemy forces” and that he was now burdened with the task of rebuilding “all public services – water, sanitation, trade and government – and also deal with a substantial military threat” in an effort to “combine civil projects with military operations, to find a proper balance of conciliation and coercion.”[20]

Miller issued an official proclamation on 21 February 1899. The premise of the decree was the establishment of military government in Iloilo and it was promised that private property was to be respected as well as freedom of religion, the retention of local municipal officials save for misconduct and the opening of the port for trade. Miller proclaimed the Americans “have not come to the Island of Panay as conquerors” and that the locals need to “unite as one people in suppressing crime and lawlessness in the Island.”[21] It was also said that a general amnesty would ensue should the insurgents lie down their arms. Miller’s message was beginning to sink in. Local elites began to recognize that the resistance in and around Iloilos was generally comprised of outside influences, most notably the Tagalogs under the direction of Aguinaldo. By early March of 1899, Miller had set up “a thin five mile perimeter” around Iloilo.[22]

By mid-March, the situation on the ground was beginning to deteriorate. Guerilla bands “roamed the countryside extorting money, kidnapping women, and terrorizing the inhabitants.”[23] On 16 March 1899, insurgent Gen. Martin Delgado launched a one thousand man assault on the American perimeter of Iloilo. The lightly defended American garrison near the Iloilo suburb of Jaro was besieged by the insurectos but the 18th Infantry dug in and repelled the onslaught. The waves of bolomen were met by fierce machine gun fire and volley after volley of artillery fire[24]. Delgado and the insurgents quickly retreated to the nearby town of Santa Barbara in an attempt to regroup. However, many of troops sensed the futility of forcibly resisting the Americans. Linn notes that the rebel soldiers “quietly returned to their villages and limited their military activity to service in the local militia.” Furthermore, this essentially crushed the insurgent “offensive capacity” on the island of Panay and “they would never again try a concerted push to drive the invaders off the island.”[25] American casualty figures for the battle stood at one killed and fourteen wounded while the insurgents were believed to have lost at least fifty killed and maybe as high as two hundred[26]. Despite this setback, Delgado and his troops continued to harass Miller’s perimeters around Iloilo City.

http://elitetacticalsources.com/prodimages/Cold%20Steel/97BM.jpeg
pictured above is a 'bolo' which is very much like a machete. some Filipino soldiers were armed w/ these weapons (and no rifles either). they were famous for charging American lines and being struck down in a hail of gunfire. i even convinced CivArmy1994 to make a 'Boloman' unit for civ3 and he did!

On 5 May 1899, Gen. Otis replaced Miller in favor Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes. Otis was insistent upon concentrating the bulk of American manpower in Luzon and around Manila and Miller had petitioned for more troops on several occasions.[27] Thus Hughes’s task was to root out the remaining resistance on Panay while maintaining the military government and general peace. Linn noted that Hughes went into this task with the mindset that Visayans, in general, were friendly and receptive to the Americans and that the ill will was harbored solely towards the Tagalog sector of the island. Hughes quickly discovered that it was not simply Aguinaldo’s Republican and Tagalog supporters. It was now becoming clear that Visayans “were committed to independence.”[28]

Hughes was now becoming “more and more frustrated”[29] with the unconventional and harassing tactics that the insurrectos were now conducting. For that reason, he set out to completely obliterate the remaining resistance by employing a scorched earth campaign in order to deprive the enemy of sustenance. Search-and-destroy missions were undertaken by Hughes’s troops in an effort to squash the rebel army in Panay. By August of 1899, the remaining elements of resistance dispersed and Iloilo City was about to receive a significant boost courtesy of Brig. Gen. Hughes.

The key to the pacification and implementation of civic government in Iloilo City rests wholly with the actions of Robert P. Hughes. The ‘total war’[30] strategy had compounded the already famine-like conditions that surrounded Iloilo City. The rebel army had already stripped much of the island’s livestock, grain and other foodstuffs during the course of resisting the Americans. Hughes’s aggressive approach simply magnified the dilemma. During the summer of 1899, Hughes cleverly initiated a directive that forbade any and all foodstuffs to leave the city of Iloilos. However, he allowed for the provisions to enter the city. In combination with this, it was directed that any persons living outside the city limits of Iloilo would be subjected to meager daily rations. Delgado, the rebel leader still in nominal control of some portions of the countryside surrounding the port city, denounced Hughes’s tactics and countered with a blockade of his own for all food coming into the city. It backfired and by mid-August 1899 the conditions of the famine greatly subsided due in large part to Hughes’s tactics; the city’s population had doubled since June 1899.[31]

The next examination is of the island of Negros. This rich sugar-producing island is located in the central Philippines archipelago. The revolutionary sentiments against Spain had arrived “quite late” on Negros and Linn notes that whatever angst against Spain that existed was restricted to the local levels and that there was no “violence or popular participation” of Negrenses”[32] of the Spanish who departed the island for good on November 22, 1898. However, a flurry of political activities quickly ensued. Aguinaldo promptly claimed Negros as part of the newly created Philippine Republic. The Federal State of the Visayas, those who pledged only nominal allegiance to Aguinaldo’s Republic, also claimed the island. The dilemma became a bit more complicated when the inhabitants of Negros shunned both claimants and officially declared two separate states. El Gobierno Republicano Federal de Canton de Ysla de Negros (The Federal Republican Government of the Canton of Negros Island), which consisted of Negros Occidental, and La Republica Federal Filipina del Canton de Ysla de Negros Oriental (The Federal Philippine Republic of the Canton of Negros Island Oriental) declared shortly thereafter their independence from both Spain and Aguinaldo’s Republic. Both Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental did not prefer Aguinaldo’s rigid, centralized set-up for the Republic and the Negrenses sought a more autonomous and decentralized format. Prior to the American-Philippine hostilities, the Negros Occidental contingent petitioned the Americans for a “protectorate” status. It was promptly rebuffed.[33] Shortly afterwards, Aniceto Lascon, the first president of Negros Occidental, unfurled an American flag in Bacolod as a sign of peace. He also sent a petition to Gen. Otis highlighting the desires for American protection.[34] There appears to have been a certain amount of uncertainty in the American military command regarding this offer. However, by March of 1899, Otis had no choice but to accept the offer from the Negrenses in lieu of the recently initiated hostilities in Manila. For that reason, Gen. James F. Smith was appointed as military governor of the new Sub-District of Negros, part of the new Visayan Military District. A four hundred man force was deployed under the command of the 1st California and Maj. Hugh T. Sime.

http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/bacolod/images/bac3.gif
map showing location of the island of Negros

James F. Smith is an interesting study. Linn described him as an “experienced politico” who had close ties with Gen. Otis and that he avowed the concept of ‘benevolent assimilation.’ Furthermore, Smith is said to have had a great interest in humanitarian endeavors and that he had a particular “interest in political issues.”[35] He arrived in Bacolod on March 4, 1899 and his immediate tasks as military governor was to “control customs and trade, communications and the police.”[36] Smith’s situation in Negros differed greatly from that of his peers’ insomuch that resistance did not initially exist upon the arrival of the Americans. For that reason, a direct route towards civil government was in the offering. Smith promptly left the “day-to-day business of local government in the hands of the locals, or at least the wealthy pro-American Negrenses.”[37] This expedited pace of pacification and installation of civil government allowed Smith to form a Negrense delegation in order to attempt to adopt a local constitution. However, as Linn noted, it “exploded into factional battles” and any such consensus on a constitution would have to wait.[38] Frustrated by the non-consensus, Smith re-organized the format of the local governments and essentially stripped them of most of their municipal authority. Instead, Smith redefined their roles as an “advisory council” in support of American military governance with an eye on a much broader and inclusive local governmental structure. Its participants would be decided in local elections slated for October 1899.[39] In the meantime, Smith “insisted that the 1st California do nothing to disturb the harmonious relations with the public.” In order to facilitate this, Smith “established a list of prices for goods and services – a dozen eggs for a quarter, twenty cigarettes for a nickel” so as to nip any potential conflicts between soldiers and the local merchants in the bud.[40] This, in effect, defused any potential tensions in the market districts of Bacolod and at the same time, stabilized the local economic markets.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, 42. It is noted that Filipino accounts center on the unnecessary provocation by the American sentries. American accounts claim that armed insurgents were seen scurrying about the Manila suburb. The darkness and the seemingly chaotic and unorganized nature of the conflict surely complicates the matter.
[2] Linn, The Philippine War, 44. Linn noted that the defensive troop formations in and around Manila was a “most precarious position” to be in and that the 1st Nebraska, at the extreme eastern point of the lines, suffered from an “extreme vulnerability” to being cut off or surrounded by the enemy.
[3] Linn, The Philippine War, 47.
[4] Linn, The Philippine War, 47. Linn: “Suppression of the Manila disturbances was a crucial, if often overlooked, part of the battle of 4-5 February.” Furthermore, “the Guard’s prompt action secured the city and prevented the terrifying prospect of the 8th Corps facing attack in all directions.”
[5] Linn, The Philippine War, 50.
[6] See Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 42-64.
[7] Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[8] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 56.
[9] Linn, The Philippine War, 57-58.
[10] Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[11] Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[12] Linn, The Philippine War, 54.
[13] Linn, The Philippine War, 55.
[14] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[15] Linn, The Philippine War, 38. The author notes that “Otis gave extensive instructions for setting up a military government” in Iloilos City.
[16] Linn, The Philippine War, 38. The newly arranged Visayan state had a government that was composed primarily of wealthy and influential Panayans and nothing else thus leaving one ethnic group in charge of the entire island chain of the Visayas. They recognized Aguinaldo’s Republic but refused to forward taxes and sought to “pursue independent policies.” This caused a certain amount of friction between the two sides. Some wanted to dig in a fight while other pleaded for a peaceful transition. Others were adamant and promised that they’d burn the city upon the arrival of American troops.
[17] Linn, The Philippine War, 38. According to Linn, an estimated 4,000 tiradors (riflemen), 14,000 macheteros (bolomen – machete-wielding infantry) and an additional 1,000 to 1,500 crack troops sent from Luzon under the direction of Aguinaldo.
[18] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 68.
[19] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 68.
[20] Linn, The Philippine War, 69.
[21] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 69.
[22] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[23] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[24] Linn, The Philippine War, 70. It is stated that approximately three quarters of all the insurgent attackers were bolomen. Linn also notes that the rebel officers convinced the machete-wielding infantry that the American soldiers would simply flee upon sight of the bolos!
[25] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[26] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[27] Linn, The Philippine War, 71-72.
[28] Linn, The Philippine War, 72. Numerous Iloilo elites presented evidence to suggest that they wanted no part of American rule and instead preferred complete autonomy.
[29] Linn, The Philippine War, 72.
[30] This is a direct reference to William T. Sherman’s concept of ‘scorched earth’ or ‘total war’ in that the intention is to deny the enemy of any and all means of sustenance. For more on ‘total war’ see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war.
[31] Linn, The Philippine War, 73.
[32] Linn, The Philippine War, 75.
[33] Linn, The Philippine War, 75. It is noted that Captain Henry Glass of the USS Charleston was approached on 12 November 1898 by the leaders in Bacolod regarding the possibility of an American protectorate in Negros Occidental. Glass deferred on the grounds that Otis and the McKinley Administration had yet to set the official policy for the Islands.
[34] Linn, The Philippine War, 75.
[35] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[36] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[37] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[38] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[39] Linn, The Philippine War, 76. Smith was apparently fed up with the grid-lock that the native legislative body had created within the Balocod.
[40] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.

All you say about the Philippines, the conflict there between the Americans, military and civil, and the pig headedness of the military and their habits of setting "bulldogs to catch rabbits" is immensely cheering to me, because it is precisely what we are doing in South Africa.
--Rudyard Kipling

Take up the White Man's burden
Send forth the best ye breed
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need:
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.
--Rudyard Kipling

http://www.soldiersofthequeen.com/sitebuilder/images/Two8thCorpsPrivatesManila-800x1194.jpg
here's a wonderfully preserved photo of two unidentified privates from the 8th Corps in Manila, 1900.

http://huachuca-www.army.mil/USAG/BTROOP/images/history_pic1_4Cav2.jpg
B Troop of the 4th US Cavalry crossing a river. the American cavalry units played a humongous role in the Philippines. their ability to navigate to rough and dense terrain of the P.I proved tremendously effective as we will see in a later passage.

http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/spanwar/funston3.gif
here's an image of none other than Fred Funston. this dude was the first American bad-ass of the 20th century. some called him dastardly for his deeds.

http://www.wittworldwide.com/images/JonesFMPhilInsr2x.jpg
here's an image of the medals that were awarded to US troops for service in the P.I. note that is says 'Philippine Insurrection' on the medal. it is a long held belief that conflict was deemed as an 'insurrection' instead of a war so that A.) congressioanl approval for funding, etc was not needed and therefore bypassed and B.) veteran services would not need to be provided to the returning soldiers b/c the conflict was not an official 'war'. for some reason, i just don't buy this theory. however, i wasn't able to ever find evidence to refure it. maybe i will look into it at some point.

Great job :goodjob: Some nice information in there!

here's a wonderfully preserved photo of two unidentified privates from the 8th Corps in Manila, 1900.

Get those shoes shined, men.

B Troop of the 4th US Cavalry crossing a river. the American cavalry units played a humongous role in the Philippines.

Judging from this photograph, the engineers also had an important role.


here's an image of none other than Fred Funston. this dude was the first American bad-ass of the 20th century. some called him dastardly for his deeds.

In one of those odd coincidences of history, the sons of Aguinaldo and Funston were in the same class at West Point. Funston is one of the more interesting officers to have served in the U.S. Army. There are several good books about him including one account of his capture of Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo and many of the other leaders of the independence movement were Freemasons. So were Arthur MacArthur and most of the other Americans including possibly Funstan. It could be that Funston used this relationship to help effect his capture of Aguinaldo.

Still waiting to hear about Moros and 45's. :)

edit: fixed my spelling

Get those shoes shined, men.



Judging from this photograph, the engineers also had an important role.




In one of those odd coincidences of history, the sons of Aguinaldo and Funston were in the same class at West Point. Funston is one of the more interesting officers to have served in the U.S. Army. There are several good books about him including one account of his capture of Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo and many of the other leaders of the independence movement were Freemasons. So were Arthur MacArthur and most of the other Americans including possibly Funstan. It could be that Funston used this relationship to help effect his capture of Aguinaldo.

Still waiting to here about Moros and 45's. :)
haha...very nice my friend :)

the Signal Corps (and the engineers, too) in the P.I. most definitely played an important role. they laid hundreds and hundreds of miles of telegraph cable through dense jungles and over rough terrain. and if it weren't for their swift workmanship during a time of war, many more American soldiers could've lost their lives. i touch on this a little in the next passage. the US troops were spread really thin throughout central Luzon at one point and if it weren't for the 'instant' transmittal of the telegraph messages, the light American garrisons could've potentially have been overrun.

that is nuts that the Aguinaldo and Funston offspring were classmates like that. i did not know that! i still need to read up more on Funston. i only really read of his actions in the P.I., Cuba, and the SF earthquake of '06 (?) i know he served during WW1 (stateside iirc) and dies suddenly of a heart attack in his 50s :(

btw, what is the name of that book that you mentioned to me some time ago?

i also wasn't aware that both Funston and Aguinaldo were Freemasons. i do know though that Aguinaldo was part of a similar Filipino group called the Katipunan. i think i touch on this some in a later chapter. Dann mentioned it, too.

ahh...the Colt 45 revolver. no, unfortunately i didn't cover too much from the Mindinao theater. however, it is an interesting story. you should share it with us :yup:

i also wasn't aware that both Funston and Aguinaldo were Freemasons. i do know though that Aguinaldo was part of a similar Filipino group called the Katipunan. i think i touch on this some in a later chapter. Dann mentioned it, too.
The Katipunan was the name of the secret rebel organization that Bonifacio founded. Not sure of its connection with Freemasonry.

At one time they approached Jose Rizal (while he was in exile in Dapitan and before he was executed) and offered him leadership but he declined. Rizal was a reformist but loyal to Spain at heart. Now he was a Freemason.

btw, what is the name of that book that you mentioned to me some time ago?

The title of the book is Sitting in Darkness by David Bain. You can have my copy if I can ever find it. It's boxed up in the garage with the rest of the unshelved portion of my library. If you don't want to wait Amazon has used copies starting at $1.55.

Here is the Washington Post's book review:
"The Washington Post, February 24, 1985

IN WHICH WAR was the term "****" invented? When did American soldiers conduct their first body count and pioneer the use of the "water cure" to persuade Asian guerrillas to betray their comrades?

After which battle did a young rifleman write home to the folks in Kingston, New York, "I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger"?

Modern as it all sounds, the answer is not Vietnam, or even Korea or World War II. The American conquest of the Philippines barely rates a mention in school history books, usually as a cryptic footnote to the short war which President William McKinley and publisher William Randolph Hearst waged on Spain in 1898 for the independence of Cuba and the circulation of Hearst's newspapers. Yet 126,458 Americans fought in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902, of whom 4,234 died, while 16,000 Filipinos died in battle and another 200,000 in "reconcentration camp." There were in addition massacres of civilians in reprisal for guerrilla attacks and similar sideshows all too familiar in subsequent Asian wars.

The story of how, and why America liberated the Philippines from Spain and then took the islands back from their inhabitants two weeks later is a complicated one, already well told in one of the classics of American historiography, Leon Wolff's Little Brown Brother, published in 1960. But the writing of history is never finished, and David Haward Bain has managed another fine book on the subject, not disagreeing with Wolff's conclusions, but making them fresh and vivid for a generation which has seen yet another Asian war.

This is not, however, simply another tale of savagery in the rice paddies. Almost as if he could read tomorrow's newspapers, Bain has brought his account up to the minute, with perceptive entries, for instance, indexed under Aquino Benigno and Ver, General Fabian (the latter currently on trial for complicity in the former's assassination). This energetic young historian has thus pulled off that rarest of publishing coups, a scholarly historical work of bang-on topicality. He has, what's more, found a most original way of bringing his story to life.

From this distance, and even at the time, the American conquest of the Philippines has always been difficult to fathom. But, then and now, two figures jump forth from a cast of thousands: Emilio Aguinaldo, not quite 30, brave and passionately patriotic, the president of the republic of the Philippines proclaimed as the beaten Spaniards departed (and the first republic in Asia) and Colonel Frederick Funston, six years older, who drove the last nail into the republic's coffin by capturing Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, after a long and daring hunt through the jungles and mountains of northern Luzon.

Aguinaldo, who looked remarkably like his current successor, Ferdinand Marcos, survived his capture and lived a long life, long enough to welcome the arrival of the Japanese in 1942 (understandably, perhaps; the new invaders also promised liberation), to march in the Manila independence parade of 1946, carrying the flag he first raised against Spain in 1896, and to see a new American war just getting under way in Asia in 1964, the year of his death. A largely forgotten figure now, even in the Philippines, Aguinaldo emerges from Bain's book an authentic hero and his republic a tragically missed chance for the United States to have been the protector of Asia's first genuine democracy.

His captor, the adventurous son of a Kansas politician known as "Foghorn Funston, the farmers' friend" was plainly just as archetypal a figure. "I am afraid that some people at home will lie awake nights worrying about the ethics of this war, thinking that our enemy is fighting for the right of self-government" he told a New York Times correspondent. "The word independent, which these people roll over their tongues so glibly, is to them a word, and not much more . . . . they are, as a rule, an illiterate, semisavage people, who are waging war, not against tyranny, but against Anglo-Saxon order and decency." Funston's feat, a mixture of reckless daring and ingenious double-cross, or what used to be known in Vietnam as a "John Wayne stunt," was the stuff of movies, and would have made a splendid vehicle for James Cagney (Funston was 5 feet 4 inches tall and touchy about it) if Hollywood had blossomed before American imperialism went out of fashion.

BUT, LIKE MANY a veteran from the East, Funston could not settle down to life back home, took to the bottle and died at 51 in 1917, when he was being seriously considered for command of the American Expeditionary Force that went to France that year. But for his heart attack, in fact, we would very likely now be debating the merits of the Funston rocket instead of the one named for his deputy, General John Pershing, who got the job instead.

Here, unmistakably, we have the Green Beret, or cowboy turned romantic military stuntman. In fact, Funston's boss, General Arthur MacArthur, father of the even more famous Douglas, was an old Indian fighter, and so were many of his buddies in the 20th Kansas infantry he led to the Philippines. The fact that the Far East is West of the Wild West has profoundly shaped America's wars there, a point made in the insightful and absurd movie The Deer Hunter.

It is hard to quarrel with Bain's conclusion that the years of American rule did little or nothing to solve the basic political problem of the Philippines. After three centuries of Spanish colonial government, the islands had none of the institutions of self-rule and no experience of it. All the new rulers achieved was a superficial Americanization of the illustrades, the Hispanicized native upper class, leaving the masses in pious poverty and the way open for a native-born dictatorship to follow the authoritarian rule of slippery Spaniards and decent Anglo-Saxons. People learn self-government by governing themselves and making their own mistakes, and America put off the Philippines' fateful day for 50 years, failing, in the end, even to supply the military protection that is the only justification for empire.

But Americans are still well thought of in the Philippines, as Bain and a group of friends, including his photographer-brother Christopher, discovered when they repeated Funston's epic trek through the Luzon jungle in 1982, talking to the same locals, fording the same streams, and being bitten by descendants of the same mosquitoes which bit the pint-sized adventurer and his party 80 years earlier. Melding past and present, and interweaving the historical background with present politics brings vividly home the long shadows still cast by America's first adventure in Asia. This is an important story, honestly researched and well told -- a second classic, in fact, on a fascinating subject."

I'm amazed! :eek: The "system" edited the Washington Post. :( It deleted a four letter word starting with "g." Oh, well.

The Manila Conflict

Or Germany's role in the Spanish American War

After the Monroe Doctrine was no longer part of the US political agenda also the German and US interests clashed in several occasions before WW1. One of them is called Manila Conflict or Manila Crise.
This is an amendment to El Justo's posts here. He was so kind to allow me to post it here.

The war with Spain brought the Phillipines at least for a short time into the flash light of the international policy. These islands were suddenly claimed not only by the US and Spain but also France, Britain and Russia. And also the Japanese were in the race. Wilhelm II. and the German foreign secretary, v. Bülow, made clear that Germany, despite British press reports, did not have any claims about the islands. (The British press however, like today, went on with her anti German reports and soon the US press followed. This should be known as background information.)
However since so many states had claims on the islands and the situation there was everything else than clear, the Kaiser sent Vizeadmiral Otto von Diederichs to Manila to look after the situation there. His only instruction however was the news Germany had no claims. So v. Diederichs went to Manila to investigate the situation.
In this moment v. Diederichs was the commander of the German East Asian squadron. Following ships belonged to it:
SMS Kaiser as flagship, an old battleship, now rated as Großer Kreuzer (Large cruiser ~Armoured cruiser)
SMS Deutschland, SMS Kaiser's sister
SMS Kaiserin Augusta, a new armoured cruiser
SMS Irene, a light cruiser
SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm, light cruiser
SMS Arcona, light cruiser
SMS Gefion, light cruiser
SMS Cormoran, also a light cruiser

Several nations did have sent already warships to Manila with the same task like v. Diederichs, when he arrived on June 12th on SMS Kaiserin Augusta, as SMS Kaiser was in repair. SMS Cormoran and SMS Irene were already waiting there. None of these three ships had trouble so far entering the port.
V. Diederichs made his first report: The situation was described as chaotic. The US would rule the seas and the shores, but only so long the ship guns would fire. On the islands the Spanish would still fight and also another party, the Phillipinos, would fight both not willing to exchange one colonial master for the other.
However soon nearly another party would have been involved in the war: the Germans. Until the 18th there were no problems with the US ships. However this changed dramatically when SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm and two days later SMS Kaiser arrived. Although the US commander, Rear Admiral Dewey, was told the ships would only bring fresh crews, the relationship between the Germans and Americans became colder and colder. Although v. Diederichs again made clear that Germany has no own claims on the islands, rumors, one of which saying Konteradmiral (rear admiral) Heinrich Prinz von Preußen would soon arrive with the rest of the squadron, and some small struggles between German and US ships nearly lead to an escalation of the situation on July 10th. Admiral v. Diederichs flag officer, Kapitänleutnant Hintze, had the order to make the German position clear, as the US demanded an inspection of the German ships as they flamed the Germans to break the blockade. In the following communication Admiral Dewey got more and more furious. He "forgot himself (er fiel aus der Rolle)" as v. Diederichs wrote in his official report. Dewey threatened with war: "... and this means war, young man!"
V. Diederichs at once talked personally with Dewey. He complained about the situation and the threat. He was mild in the words but strong indeed. Dewey's behaviour is even more unexplaineable as SMS Irene left already the harbour and SMS Cormoran would follow soon, on July 15th, as also Dewey knew (in the US however the NY state Newspaper wrote, Dewey should destroy the German squadron and the other US forces the rest of the German fleet).
Nevertheless the situation soon calmed down after a meeting of the international commanders with Dewey. After that an agreement was made and the crise was over (in my sources it is said between the words that Dewey was taught in law of the seas in this meeting).
So a war with the US was avoided. For this time.

Adler

The Katipunan was the name of the secret rebel organization that Bonifacio founded. Not sure of its connection with Freemasonry.

At one time they approached Jose Rizal (while he was in exile in Dapitan and before he was executed) and offered him leadership but he declined. Rizal was a reformist but loyal to Spain at heart. Now he was a Freemason.
yes, you're right. i would say that the connection between the 2 groups is the secretive and ritualistic nature of both. that's all.

Rizal, imho, was the most fascinating of all of the actors of the Philippine Revolution. his demise was a sad one :(

The title of the book is Sitting in Darkness by David Bain. You can have my copy if I can ever find it. It's boxed up in the garage with the rest of the unshelved portion of my library. If you don't want to wait Amazon has used copies starting at $1.55.

Here is the Washington Post's book review:
"The Washington Post, February 24, 1985

IN WHICH WAR was the term "****" invented? When did American soldiers conduct their first body count and pioneer the use of the "water cure" to persuade Asian guerrillas to betray their comrades?

After which battle did a young rifleman write home to the folks in Kingston, New York, "I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger"?

Modern as it all sounds, the answer is not Vietnam, or even Korea or World War II. The American conquest of the Philippines barely rates a mention in school history books, usually as a cryptic footnote to the short war which President William McKinley and publisher William Randolph Hearst waged on Spain in 1898 for the independence of Cuba and the circulation of Hearst's newspapers. Yet 126,458 Americans fought in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902, of whom 4,234 died, while 16,000 Filipinos died in battle and another 200,000 in "reconcentration camp." There were in addition massacres of civilians in reprisal for guerrilla attacks and similar sideshows all too familiar in subsequent Asian wars.

The story of how, and why America liberated the Philippines from Spain and then took the islands back from their inhabitants two weeks later is a complicated one, already well told in one of the classics of American historiography, Leon Wolff's Little Brown Brother, published in 1960. But the writing of history is never finished, and David Haward Bain has managed another fine book on the subject, not disagreeing with Wolff's conclusions, but making them fresh and vivid for a generation which has seen yet another Asian war.

This is not, however, simply another tale of savagery in the rice paddies. Almost as if he could read tomorrow's newspapers, Bain has brought his account up to the minute, with perceptive entries, for instance, indexed under Aquino Benigno and Ver, General Fabian (the latter currently on trial for complicity in the former's assassination). This energetic young historian has thus pulled off that rarest of publishing coups, a scholarly historical work of bang-on topicality. He has, what's more, found a most original way of bringing his story to life.

From this distance, and even at the time, the American conquest of the Philippines has always been difficult to fathom. But, then and now, two figures jump forth from a cast of thousands: Emilio Aguinaldo, not quite 30, brave and passionately patriotic, the president of the republic of the Philippines proclaimed as the beaten Spaniards departed (and the first republic in Asia) and Colonel Frederick Funston, six years older, who drove the last nail into the republic's coffin by capturing Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, after a long and daring hunt through the jungles and mountains of northern Luzon.

Aguinaldo, who looked remarkably like his current successor, Ferdinand Marcos, survived his capture and lived a long life, long enough to welcome the arrival of the Japanese in 1942 (understandably, perhaps; the new invaders also promised liberation), to march in the Manila independence parade of 1946, carrying the flag he first raised against Spain in 1896, and to see a new American war just getting under way in Asia in 1964, the year of his death. A largely forgotten figure now, even in the Philippines, Aguinaldo emerges from Bain's book an authentic hero and his republic a tragically missed chance for the United States to have been the protector of Asia's first genuine democracy.

His captor, the adventurous son of a Kansas politician known as "Foghorn Funston, the farmers' friend" was plainly just as archetypal a figure. "I am afraid that some people at home will lie awake nights worrying about the ethics of this war, thinking that our enemy is fighting for the right of self-government" he told a New York Times correspondent. "The word independent, which these people roll over their tongues so glibly, is to them a word, and not much more . . . . they are, as a rule, an illiterate, semisavage people, who are waging war, not against tyranny, but against Anglo-Saxon order and decency." Funston's feat, a mixture of reckless daring and ingenious double-cross, or what used to be known in Vietnam as a "John Wayne stunt," was the stuff of movies, and would have made a splendid vehicle for James Cagney (Funston was 5 feet 4 inches tall and touchy about it) if Hollywood had blossomed before American imperialism went out of fashion.

BUT, LIKE MANY a veteran from the East, Funston could not settle down to life back home, took to the bottle and died at 51 in 1917, when he was being seriously considered for command of the American Expeditionary Force that went to France that year. But for his heart attack, in fact, we would very likely now be debating the merits of the Funston rocket instead of the one named for his deputy, General John Pershing, who got the job instead.

Here, unmistakably, we have the Green Beret, or cowboy turned romantic military stuntman. In fact, Funston's boss, General Arthur MacArthur, father of the even more famous Douglas, was an old Indian fighter, and so were many of his buddies in the 20th Kansas infantry he led to the Philippines. The fact that the Far East is West of the Wild West has profoundly shaped America's wars there, a point made in the insightful and absurd movie The Deer Hunter.

It is hard to quarrel with Bain's conclusion that the years of American rule did little or nothing to solve the basic political problem of the Philippines. After three centuries of Spanish colonial government, the islands had none of the institutions of self-rule and no experience of it. All the new rulers achieved was a superficial Americanization of the illustrades, the Hispanicized native upper class, leaving the masses in pious poverty and the way open for a native-born dictatorship to follow the authoritarian rule of slippery Spaniards and decent Anglo-Saxons. People learn self-government by governing themselves and making their own mistakes, and America put off the Philippines' fateful day for 50 years, failing, in the end, even to supply the military protection that is the only justification for empire.

But Americans are still well thought of in the Philippines, as Bain and a group of friends, including his photographer-brother Christopher, discovered when they repeated Funston's epic trek through the Luzon jungle in 1982, talking to the same locals, fording the same streams, and being bitten by descendants of the same mosquitoes which bit the pint-sized adventurer and his party 80 years earlier. Melding past and present, and interweaving the historical background with present politics brings vividly home the long shadows still cast by America's first adventure in Asia. This is an important story, honestly researched and well told -- a second classic, in fact, on a fascinating subject."
that's great info 7ronin. thanks for sharing.

no need to dig through the garage my friend. the title of the book is all i need :D

i hope they had good anti-malaria pills for that repeat of Funston's trek!

The Manila Conflict

Or Germany's role in the Spanish American War

After the Monroe Doctrine was no longer part of the US political agenda also the German and US interests clashed in several occasions before WW1. One of them is called Manila Conflict or Manila Crise.
This is an amendment to El Justo's posts here. He was so kind to allow me to post it here.

The war with Spain brought the Phillipines at least for a short time into the flash light of the international policy. These islands were suddenly claimed not only by the US and Spain but also France, Britain and Russia. And also the Japanese were in the race. Wilhelm II. and the German foreign secretary, v. Bülow, made clear that Germany, despite British press reports, did not have any claims about the islands. (The British press however, like today, went on with her anti German reports and soon the US press followed. This should be known as background information.)
However since so many states had claims on the islands and the situation there was everything else than clear, the Kaiser sent Vizeadmiral Otto von Diederichs to Manila to look after the situation there. His only instruction however was the news Germany had no claims. So v. Diederichs went to Manila to investigate the situation.
In this moment v. Diederichs was the commander of the German East Asian squadron. Following ships belonged to it:
SMS Kaiser as flagship, an old battleship, now rated as Großer Kreuzer (Large cruiser ~Armoured cruiser)
SMS Deutschland, SMS Kaiser's sister
SMS Kaiserin Augusta, a new armoured cruiser
SMS Irene, a light cruiser
SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm, light cruiser
SMS Arcona, light cruiser
SMS Gefion, light cruiser
SMS Cormoran, also a light cruiser

Several nations did have sent already warships to Manila with the same task like v. Diederichs, when he arrived on June 12th on SMS Kaiserin Augusta, as SMS Kaiser was in repair. SMS Cormoran and SMS Irene were already waiting there. None of these three ships had trouble so far entering the port.
V. Diederichs made his first report: The situation was described as chaotic. The US would rule the seas and the shores, but only so long the ship guns would fire. On the islands the Spanish would still fight and also another party, the Phillipinos, would fight both not willing to exchange one colonial master for the other.
However soon nearly another party would have been involved in the war: the Germans. Until the 18th there were no problems with the US ships. However this changed dramatically when SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm and two days later SMS Kaiser arrived. Although the US commander, Rear Admiral Dewey, was told the ships would only bring fresh crews, the relationship between the Germans and Americans became colder and colder. Although v. Diederichs again made clear that Germany has no own claims on the islands, rumors, one of which saying Konteradmiral (rear admiral) Heinrich Prinz von Preußen would soon arrive with the rest of the squadron, and some small struggles between German and US ships nearly lead to an escalation of the situation on July 10th. Admiral v. Diederichs flag officer, Kapitänleutnant Hintze, had the order to make the German position clear, as the US demanded an inspection of the German ships as they flamed the Germans to break the blockade. In the following communication Admiral Dewey got more and more furious. He "forgot himself (er fiel aus der Rolle)" as v. Diederichs wrote in his official report. Dewey threatened with war: "... and this means war, young man!"
V. Diederichs at once talked personally with Dewey. He complained about the situation and the threat. He was mild in the words but strong indeed. Dewey's behaviour is even more unexplaineable as SMS Irene left already the harbour and SMS Cormoran would follow soon, on July 15th, as also Dewey knew (in the US however the NY state Newspaper wrote, Dewey should destroy the German squadron and the other US forces the rest of the German fleet).
Nevertheless the situation soon calmed down after a meeting of the international commanders with Dewey. After that an agreement was made and the crise was over (in my sources it is said between the words that Dewey was taught in law of the seas in this meeting).
So a war with the US was avoided. For this time.

Adler
ahh! now i remember!

i do indeed recall this incident. i did not review any German sources though.

in a nutshell, i believe that the USN felt "disrespected" b/c the German fleet you mentioned failed to yield and honor the American flag of the US squadron in Manila Bay. i reckon that Dewey took it quite personal. i'll dig through my sources right-quick to see if i can find any additional info.

however, this was certainly an interesting turn of events. thanks for sharing! :goodjob:

Adler:

okay - i've found it in Zimmermann, pp 301-2.

a further search reveals that Zimmermann attributes his assertions to Dewey's autobiography. anyway-

i will type the exact text from the Zimmermann passage (it's not too long):

this is during the exact period Adler describes and it's wrt the USN blockade going on around the port of Manila.
Dewey's reinforcements found the newly minted rear admiral in what he himself called "a period of deep anxiety" as he blockaded Manila Bay. Warships from Britain, France, Japan, and Germany, all interested in the newly vulnerable strategic archipelago, had swarmed toward the harbor after the battle. Most of the ships observed the protocol of a blockade, reporting to Dewey and anchoring where they would not impede his blockading operations against the Spanish. But the Germans, who had brought in five warships comparable in power to the American squadron, got shirty about recognizing American authority. They often failed to report, anchored where they chose, and displayed ostentacious chumminess with the Spanish officials in Manila, even exchanging visits with the Spanish captain general. When a German warship interfered with Filipino rebels operations against the Spanish, Dewey decided to get tough with the German commander, Vice Admiral Otto von Diederichs.

By the account of both German and American eyewitnesses, the American admiral lost his temper with Diederich's flag lieutenant and threatened war if the Germans did not stop violating the blockade. The confrontation never got beyond rhetoric, and Dewey chose to play it down. Perhaps embarassed that his temper had nearly propelled him into an unauthorized conflict with a powerful adversary, he did not even report it to Washington. President McKinley heard of it but chose to pass it off lightly the first time he met Dewey face to face. From a more spartan president the feisty little admiral would have merited a reprimand, but McKinley knew better than to take on a war hero.

The skirmishing in Manila Bay demonstrated Germany's predatory interest in the Philippines; v. Diederichs told Dewey that he was there "by order of the Kaiser. It also showed the British in a favorable light. The skipper of the one British ship in the harbor strongly backed Dewey in his successful effort to face down the German commander. The German challenge in the Philippines, though weakened by British cooperation with the American squadron, added complexity to Dewey's problems and made him increasingly anxious for reinforcements. It was becoming difficult just ot "sail away"; Manila at least had to be taken.

I do have problems with autobiographies. They are mostly biased, even if the author tried to be as objective as possible. I don´t think the Germans did not respect the US flag. However Diederichs was sent to investigate the situation and so needed to have contact with ALL parties. The US saw in this because of the rumors perhaps a violating of their interests although the German government did reject all claims on the islands, what also was known the Dewey.
Also to my sources Dewey was faced down, however this passage is missing some valuable informations for the whole picture, as Germany did not have any claims and some German ships already sailed away or were ordered to do so.
However this is a good topic for a further investigation. I mean that the infos we have seem too few to make a whole picture of the situation.

Adler

Diederichs was sent to "investigate" the situation and take as much advantage of it as possible. The Kaiser was anxious to get an overseas empire but most of the prime real estate had already been grabbed. Then the Philippines appear ripe for taking from Spain. If Deiderichs could force Dewey to stand down, then Germany would finally have an overseas empire worth something.

yes, autobiographies most definitely have a tendency to be biased.

i think that their importance as primary resources is that they are often able to uncover the 'humanistic' apsects of event; like Dewey's apprarent rage and temper tantrum.

what would anger me if i was Dewey was the German "chumniess" w/ the Spanish officials in Manila. i mean, there's a blockade going on after all.

however, Adler is correct. instances like these could use some more uncovering and a closer examination of both German and American sources in order to get a more clear picture.

maybe we shall co-author a book my friend? :p

Here's that banknote I was talking about earlier.

I will put something together about Moros and .45's when I get a chance.

There isn't much to Moros and .45s.

During the Philippine War, the standard sidearm (pistol) of the U.S. Army was a .38 caliber (9 mm) revolver. It was discovered that a Moro could be hit six times with .38 slugs and keep on coming. So the U.S. Army decided to change to a pistol firing the largest bullet available, .45 caliber (11.43 mm). The .45, which had been used by some soldiers in the American Civil War, was a known manstopper. For over 80 years, the U.S. Pistol, .45 caliber, M1911A1, was the standard sidearm of the U.S. military. In the 1990s, bowing to NATO pressure for standardization, the U.S. military changed again to a 9 mm pistol.

I understand that, because of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Army is considering changing again, to a 11.5 mm pistol.

well, i think that in the nature of the thread that, yes, the Moros and the .45 is indeed interesting.

Smith’s next significant step for civil reconstruction in Negros consisted of what Linn declared was “unique to the occupied areas”[41]. A two hundred man local constabulary force was raised by Smith upon his arrival to the island. He “constantly sought to improve its pay, rations, medicine, uniforms and weaponry” and as a result, its members were used by the Army in a variety of roles; many were used as scouts and as guides. The “Battalion of Native Reserve” was raised in August of 1899 by Smith and put under the command of Sime. Competent officers were sought by Smith and Sime and at the end of the summer of 1899, this local constabulary in and around Bacolod were capable of conducting traditional police-force patrols thus freeing up American soldiers from the mundane and sometimes dangerous aspects of such work. Smith is even quoted as saying that the native battalion was “among the most successful scout-police forces the U.S. Army raised, without a single deserter or lost rifle in its entire existence.”[42] Their assistance clearly made it easier for American forces to safeguard the eighty mile wide area bordering the island’s interior where the banditti and ladrones operated. [43]

Resistance in Negros paled in comparison to that on other islands within the archipelago. The banditti and ladrones were comprised largely of “guerillas, bandits and Babylanes” and their attacks were done primarily to inflict terror on the peaceful inhabitants of the island’s interior.[44] By late-May of 1899 however, the raids had become such a nuisance to the 1st California and the local constabulary that Smith requested more troops.[45] By July 1899, ten companies of Charles W. Miner’s 6th Infantry arrived on Negros to relieve Sime and the 1st California. Companies H and K, under the command of Captain Bernard A. Bryne, launched a series of daring raids into Negros’s interior in order to destroy the guerilla strongholds and stem the wave of terrorism they were spreading throughout the country sides.[46]
The resistance on Negros was waning by the end of the summer, 1899. Smith had a clear plan for the Negrenses at this point and it was to prepare them for self-government and the forthcoming elections in October. In an August 13, 1899 proclamation, Smith assured local Negrenses that the October elections would establish a local government where all citizens would enjoy “the full measure of human liberty which they may be capable of enjoying.” It was intended to make all of the island’s inhabitants, both rich and poor, “equal before the law.”[47] Smith addressed the newly elected officials on November 9, 1899. Linn stated that this particular address forms the foundation of the ‘benevolent assimilation’ that the Americans so intently were trying achieve in the Philippines.[48] In it, Smith emphasized public order, suppression of “men who live by the bolo” and that the local officials ought to end their “petty extortions and illegal exactions” against the “poor and ignorant.”[49] Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the newly elected officials to “provide honest and efficient government, trim bloated bureaucracies, and collect taxes equitably.”[50] Free public education and a local department of public health were advocated as well. Finally, the commercial aspects of Smith’s reconstruction plan in Negros also demanded the continued promotion of the telegraph and the economic benefits that accompany it. Accordingly, Linn notes that Smith’s actions in Negros form the “hallmarks of U.S. Army civic reform” during the American-Philippine War.

The island of Samar is located south-east of Luzon on the eastern side of the archipelago. It remained a “backwater”[51] in the war for quite some time. Resistance was light and unorganized and Otis did not put much importance on garrisoning any large contingent of forces on the island. By July 1900, the U.S. had tenuously held only the port cities of Calbayog and Catbalogan in the western half of the island. However, Samar would become what Linn described as the “best known” incident of the war, the “Balangiga Massacre” and Jacob H. Smith’s “howling wilderness.”[52] Extremely “controversial at the time,” the incident on Samar “became lodged in both popular and the academic mind as the microcosm of the entire war.” Furthermore, the “many textbooks view the entire war through the prism of these final regional conflicts.” [53] Thus a good portion of the public accounts and perceptions of the Philippine War, even to this day, revolve primarily around the “Massacre.” U.S. Marine Corps lore in Samar had become “symbolic” of the perceived “sacrifice and heroism” performed by these soldiers during the conflict.[54] This aside, it is “one of the greatest historical fallacies” of the entire war that this tragic occurrence is seen as “representative of both U.S. Army pacification and Filipino resistance.”[55] The task of the following analysis is to uncover the truth behind the incident on Samar.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/78/Phillipines.gif

By May 1901, Gen. MacArthur, now in command of the 8th Corps, had decided to transfer Samar back to Gen. Hughes and the Department of the Visayas. Hughes was instructed to take “drastic measures” against “Samar’s ferocious rebels” that were under the command of the insurgent leader Vicente Lubkan.[56] They had been conducting raids from the interior that were similar in nature to those that were being done on the other Visayan Islands. Hughes concluded that the situation had indeed begun to spin out of control due to the lack of American manpower. The aforementioned ‘scorched-earth campaign’ was the method of choice for Hughes as he sought to starve the guerillas out by destroying the countryside’s livestock and crops. The naval blockade around Samar was also heightened. Civilian sea vessels were seized save for those used exclusively for fishing. Of primary concern for Hughes at this time was the illicit smuggling that was occurring in and out of Samar. Most of the activity was coming from the island of Leyte which lye only several miles across the narrow San Juanico Strait. Leyte had recently been turned over to Taft’s Philippine Commission in May of 1901 and as a result, MacArthur pulled the all remaining forces off of this island.[57] In an effort to stem the tide of illicit smuggling into and out of Samar, Hughes stationed a battalion of the 9th Infantry along the coastal towns of Balangiga, Lanang, Santa Rita and Basey. They were also ordered on extended patrols up the Oras River in order to trash the country sides and deny the enemy refuge and sustenance. One particular patrol under the command of Captain Mark L. Hersey claimed to have “burned houses by the hundreds for the next twenty miles.”[58] The American garrison at Laguan estimated that they alone had destroyed 145 houses and 5,025 bushels of rice all in only one month.[59] In August of 1901, Captain Henry Jackson and the 1st Infantry moved “completely across the northern half of the island” in an effort to destroy Lubkan’s rearguard. They succeeded in capturing several members of the insurgent leader’s family as well as “most of his papers.”[60] By the summer’s end, Samar’s interior was devoid of sustenance not only for the insurgents but for many of its peaceful inhabitants. Hughes’s policy of destruction warranted the need to construct resettlement zones for the displaced and war-ravaged locals. Thus the coastal cities were teeming with starving and bewildered Filipinos. “Mass starvation” was becoming a very real possibility, even in the pacified coastal towns.[61] Hughes, sensing an impending calamity, loosened the grip of the naval blockades and allowed for limited trade with Leyte. Agents were put in charge to deal with the Commission in Leyte in order to secure the much needed provisions for the cities.

http://www.easternsamar.de/files/elemente/samar%20map.gif

Samar’s fearsome reputation was born in June 1901 when a twenty-six man patrol under Lt. Edward E. Downes attempted to traverse the narrow peninsula at the extreme southern tip of the island. It consisted primarily of hills, mountains and dense jungles and had not yet been mapped by the U.S. military. During the midst of their destructive path northwards, they suddenly found themselves lost in the dense thickets. The non-commissioned officers urged Downes to make haste for the coast in order to regroup and determine their location. Downes declined and ordered the soldiers on when all of a sudden, “a horde of bolomen” appeared and “chaos” erupted for several minutes as the Filipino swordsmen slashed away at close range.[62] Two Americans died and another two were wounded. Among the dead was Downes who was fatally stabbed in the hand-to-hand fighting. The survivors were “badly shaken” and abandoned their dead and forged on without their leader. It wasn’t for three more days without food or water until they were found. Hughes’s strategy of pillaging and burning seemed to have “increased the ferocity and desperation of the resistance.” [63]

These types of ambushes were beginning to become the norm in Samar. Insurgents attempted to cut American supply lines and raided and terrorized the outlying towns. Hughes’s troops in Samar were stretched dangerously thin and the rebels knew it. An ‘us-against-them’ mentality was prevalent amongst the U.S. troops. Everything finally came to a head on September 28, 1901 in the small coastal town of Balangiga where the seventy-four man garrison of Company C, 9th Infantry was stationed. In the first weeks of September, Captain Thomas W. Connell ordered a “misguided project to clean up the town.”[64] He had concentrated dozens of Filipinos in tents at the city’s outskirts in an effort to clean up and rebuild the town. Hundreds of insurgents began infiltrating into the city. Some came as “laborers, as members of a wedding party, or even dressed as women.”[65] The insurgents had infiltrated the work camp. The soldiers began their Sunday breakfast early on that morning of 28 September when the local police chief approached an American sentry and suddenly pulled out a bolo and cut him down. A “mob” of bolomen charged out of the town’s church and the tents and they went directly for Company C. The soldiers began scurrying, some nearly naked. Connell and his subordinate, Lt. Edward A. Bumpus were killed. The desperate soldiers began grabbing whatever they could to defend themselves whether it was a “Krag, kitchen implements and even cans of food.”[66] Several members of Company C actually managed to flee for the beach and the barcas that would ferry them away to the near-by garrison at Basey. They left behind 100 rifles, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, and large supplies of medicine, food and equipment. Furthermore, forty-eight of their comrades were killed in the sneak attack.[67] Hughes was furious and blamed Connell for his overly conciliatory and nurturing approach. Hughes was quoted as stating that Connell “treated the Filipinos with compassion, and they responded with treachery.”[68] Linn described the sequence of events as “duplicitous and barbaric” and captured letters later revealed that the event had been planned for months.[69] A varying array of accounts of the encounter began to circulate. The Americans claimed that the Filipinos mutilated corpses. A heroic slant was molded out of the American accounts. The insurgent leader denied this claim and also declared that Company C had been “needlessly antagonizing the villagers by stealing, brutality and at least one rape.”[70] Combine this with the famine-like conditions on Samar and a recipe for disaster in most definitely in order.

The American public and the Army alike were outraged. The military brass in Manila was convinced that a full-fledged insurrection was imminent. The Navy bombarded Balangiga until it was a hulking ruin. By November 1, 1901, four thousand troops of the newly-created 6th Brigade were sent to occupy the town. Gen. Hughes selected Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith to lead them. It would turn into “one of the gravest errors of the war.”[71] Smith’s “muddy ethics, his limited military skills, and his intemperate character” would unfortunately be one of the most remembered incidents of the entire war. The first task for Smith was to recapture the lost rifles and ammunition. It is said that Smith interpreted this order as a green light to not only hunt down the remaining elements of resistance but to also exact revenge for the massacre at Balangiga.[72] Thus the scorched-earth campaign continued. Between 10 October and 31 December 1901, U.S. forces had killed or captured 759 insurgents, 587 carabaos (draft animals) and destroyed tons of rice, 1662 houses and 226 boats. Riverine patrols also increased.[73] Smith continued his aggressive approach in a memo to U.S. Marine Maj. Littleton W.T. Waller whose battalion had landed ashore after the naval bombardments. In it, he urged Waller to “kill and burn” and to spare absolutely no quarter for the enemy. Furthermore, he was to regard every Filipino male over the age of ten as a possible combatant. Smith wished Waller to make Samar’s interior a “howling wilderness.”[74] From 31 October until 10 November, Waller set out on this path of destruction. His troops burnt 255 houses, destroyed one ton of hemp, a half a ton of rice, thirteen carabaos, and thirty boats. Thirty-nine insurgents were killed and another eighteen were captured.[75] By January 1902, Waller’s Marines had reached the coastal town of Basey where they conducted a series of summary executions for what Waller described as the purported “treachery” of the captured spies and double-agents of the city.[76] More incidents of retribution were occurring on the island at the same time. Maj. Edwin F. Glenn was alleged to have kidnapped, tortured and conspired to murder twelve Filipinos between October 1901 and January 1902.[77] Cpt. William Wallace was accused of ordering the execution of seven prisoners on 4 December 1901. These incidents would produce an immediate outrage back in the States. The American public demanded answers. Waller and his adjutant, Lt. John H. A. Day, were court-martialed for their actions in Samar. Day claimed that Waller had ordered him to conduct the executions. Accordingly, Waller testified that Gen. Smith had given him the order to murder and torture thus making the directive to make Samar’s interior a “howling wilderness” a reality. It is this term that the American pacification efforts on Samar became to be known. Linn noted that “the trials seem to embody the brutality, ambiguity, and frustration of our first Asian guerrilla conflict.”[78] It is unfortunate that these are the images of the Philippine-American War that seem to have found their way into mainstream American accounts. There are however, more pleasant and successful episodes of military pacification and civic reconstruction in the archipelago.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[41] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[42] Cited in Linn, The Philippine War, 77.
[43] banditti: bandits, ladrones: thieves. Resistance on Negros was concentrated in the island’s interior and the extent of their offensive capacities consisted of foraging, kidnapping and sniping.
[44] Linn, The Philippine War, 77. The Babylanes are a particular race or tribe found on Negros.
[45] Linn, The Philippine War, 77.
[46] Linn, The Philippine War, 79, 81. Byrne led a few raids. One was a “risky night-time raid” against the Babylanes on 18 July 1899. On 31 August, Byrne led another expedition to root out an enemy arsenal. Most importantly, Byrne crushed the remaining elements of resistance on 2 October 1899 when he smashed Santillana, the insurgent leader, in open combat. As a result, numerous other guerilla bands surrendered later that month. In total, his raids proved immensely successful with very few U.S. casualties.
[47] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 82.
[48] Linn, The Philippine War, 82.
[49] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 82.
[50] Linn, The Philippine War, 83.
[51] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[52] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[53] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[54] Linn, The Philippine War, 306. The author notes that, upon entering mess halls years after the incident, Marine veterans were always promptly saluted. “Stand, Gentlemen, he served on Samar!”
[55] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[56] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[57] Linn, The Philippine War, 307. MacArthur and the Commission did not see eye-to-eye on many matters both political and military. This particular instance is typical of friction that existed between the military and civilian authorities in the Philippines.
[58] Quoted in Linn, Ibid., 308
[59] Linn, The Philippine War, 308.
[60] Linn, The Philippine War, 308.
[61] Linn, The Philippine War, 309.
[62] Linn, The Philippine War, 309.
[63] Linn, The Philippine War, 308. Linn noted that “Samar’s fearsome reputation” was born out of incidents exactly like this one.
[64] Linn, The Philippine War, 310.
[65] Linn, The Philippine War, 310.
[66] Linn, The Philippine War, 311. Krag: Krag-Jourgenson rifles were the primary fire arms issued to U.S. soldiers in the Philippines.
[67] Linn, The Philippine War, 311.
[68] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 311.
[69] Linn, The Philippine War, 311. It is noted that the captured letters were addressed to Lubkan and they detailed the “deceptive policy” toward the occupying Americans. On another note, this same cache of captured records revealed a plan for Balangiga’s infiltrators to mutilate the corpses of the American dead. The letter was dated May 31, 1901 and was written by “P. Ayabar” and addressed to the “Commanding Gen. of this Province, Samar.” It later caused quite a stir in lieu of the varying accounts and accusations that followed the massacre.
[70] Linn, The Philippine War, 311. Lieutenant Colonel Daza, the insurgent leader of the uprising, “strongly denied” the American accusations of corpse mutilation by saying that “there was no time to lose for such acts” during the bedlam and confusion that occurred. However, it is still not known for certain whether Daza’s insurrectos actually committed such acts.
[71] Linn, The Philippine War, 312.
[72] Linn, The Philippine War, 312.
[73] Linn, The Philippine War, 312.
[74] Quoted in Linn, Ibid., 312. Gen. Smith could not give an order to Waller to conduct these murderous raids because he was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy as a Maj. in the Marine Corps.
[75] Linn, The Philippine War, 316.
[76] Linn, The Philippine War, 316.
[77] Linn, The Philippine War, 316. Glenn was reported as implying that his company of the 6th Brigade was seeking revenge for the Balangiga massacre. Twelve Filipinos were summarily executed under Glenn’s orders. He kidnapped suspects from both Samar and Leyte and initiated tortuous interrogations – among them, three priests. The official court-martial documents concluded that Glenn possessed a “reckless disregard for human life.”
[78] Linn, The Philippine War, 319.

The actions of Lt. Col. James Parker in the Philippines deserve mention. Between August 1899 and April 1901, Parker commanded six important expeditions and participated in twenty total engagements.[79] Parker arrived in Manila aboard the transport Valencia on July 30, 1899 with two troops of the 4th Cavalry and two companies of the 24th Infantry. By September 1899, he was promoted from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel and placed in command of the 45th Infantry where he saw action in the Laguna de Bay coastal city of Calamba. Not satisfied with the backwater nature of the Calamba assignment, Parker petitioned to be transferred back to the front lines in northern Luzon. On October 19, 1899, he arrived back in Manila and was ordered to head in the direction of San Isidro, the location of Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, the Cavalry’s commanding general in northern Luzon. Parker had numerous engagements with the enemy along his route from Manila. He earned significant distinction in one particular engagement in November 1899. In it, Parker, along with another troop of cavalry and two companies of Macabebe scouts, dispersed a large concentration of insurgents around the town of Cabanatuan in central Luzon. The press later dubbed it “Parker’s Raid” because of his valiance and swift decision making in the heat of battle.[80] Over the next seven months, Parker and his cavalry troops engaged in a wide-ranging search-and-destroy mission all throughout Luzon in order to nullify and wipe out what had remained of Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation. By June of 1900, with much of the aforementioned accomplished, Parker was ordered to dislodge enemy resistance in the south-eastern Luzon city of Lagonoy. Parker’s actions in this region are the focus of the next section.
Lt. Col. Parker, along with three companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry and two guns from the Astor Battery, disembarked from Nueva Caceres towards the southern edge of Mount Isarog on the eastern side of southern Luzon. They were also assisted by the steamboat Montanes which loitered off the coast of Lagonoy. Under Parker’s direct command were two of the aforementioned infantry companies, the two troops of cavalry and the two guns, one hundred eighty-eight men in total. Maj. Dennis E. Nolan and a troop from the 11th Cavalry approached Lagonoy from the north side of Mount Isarog. The third infantry company came from the south and south-west respectively. Their task was to capture the city and disperse any resistance that the city may harbor. As the Montanes approached the coastal defenses of Lagonoy, the insurgents were seen fleeing from their trenches. Parker noted that he and his troops were on the enemy’s “right, their rear and their left rear. It was too much for them; they fled and separated into small bands!”[81] Thus resistance was minimal as the Americans entered the city.

http://data.ecology.su.se/mnode/Asia/Philippines/lagonoy/lagonoymap.gif
Lagonoy is located on the Caramoan Peninsula

Upon hearing of Parker’s relatively easy entry into and around Lagonoy, Gen. Bell recalled half of Parker’s total forces from the city thus leaving him with only one troop of cavalry and one company of infantry. Parker was now responsible for protecting several of the region’s villages and the “four large towns and the port, and keep the rest of the country free of the enemy” with only half of his original man-power.[82] Parker promptly dispatched a corporal and six men to hold the port of Sabang, a lieutenant and twenty men each were sent to both Tiagon and Goa. Baybay was garrisoned with only a corporal and six men and Sangay was defended by a sergeant and six men. San José, located only two miles from Lagonoy and where Parker’s headquarters were erected, was protected by the “remainder of the infantry company, the two guns and the cavalry troop,” about ninety-two men in total including the attendants and porters.[83] A seventeen-mile long telephone line was constructed and it linked all of the towns of the Lagonoy District. The city of Lagonoy, however, was left unoccupied. Thus Parker faced a “problem” in the Lagonoy District in that his troops were stretched thin and he was responsible for pacifying a rather populous district. He admitted that “only by continuous aggressiveness could I keep my garrisons from being beleaguered.” In other words, “the best defensive is the offensive.”[84] Patrols were sent out throughout the district in order to squash what remained of the enemy resistance. Pacification in the Lagonoy District was beginning to take shape.

Lt. Col. Parker consulted with a man named “Forregrosa”, the alcalde of San José, on July 1, 1900 and urged him to have the local priest give a sermon to the natives preaching “peace and conciliation.”[85] The alcalde assured Parker that the ringing of the town’s church bell would bring San José’s inhabitants back to their homes and send the message that all was safe. Parker and the alcalde then took to the streets of San José and were then led to the church by a native brass band and hundreds of Filipinos. Parker admitted that “the church filled rapidly” and that one huge cultural boundary was hurdled during the subsequent mass.[86]

By mid-July 1900, Parker had decided that “it was time to have a baile.”[87] Although there still remained a minor resistance in and around the Lagonoy District, Parker declared that the best “way to pacify is to dance.”[88] Furthermore, he said that “a dance is a great help toward bringing about more cordial relations” between the Americans and the Filipinos. The hall of the San José headquarters was the venue and Parker, along with the alcaldes of several of the district’s towns, gathered the “forty horns and drums” for the principal entertainment.[89] The officers’ stash of beer and whiskey were broken out. The bands had assembled by 5 p.m. and “many guests were making their appearance.” Among them were “native officials of the various towns” and several “priests and a number of the principales.” However, as Parker noted, “not a woman appeared!”[90] He noted this to a local police chief who advised him that the insurgents had warned that they’d kill any woman who attempted to go the dance. By 6:30 p.m., Parker was beginning to doubt the arrival of the towns’ women. However, a message was received from Goa that Lt. Odell had passed “four wagonloads of bailerinas” on his way back from a patrol in Tigaon.[91] As it turned out, Lt. Odell “had become very influential and popular at Tiagon and Sangay” and that he had convinced the towns’ “belles” to go to San José and enjoy the baile. Soon thereafter, “the ladies of Goa and San José hastened to imitate their example.”[92] Among Parker’s recollections of the ladies’ arrival, he noted the “rather antique and very picturesque” appearances of them. The “waltz, two-step, and an ancient square dance called the rigadon” were danced. The ball had opened with the “rigadon,” which Parker described as “a somewhat complicated dance.” The officers gleefully tried to stay in-step with this indigenous jig but Parker admitted that they “made various and ludicrous mistakes.”[93] As a result of the officers’ silly and awkward blunders, “the Filipinos, who at first had been looking rather sour and solemn, burst out laughing, the ice was broken and the ball became a merry one.”[94] The dancing, drinking and laughter continued until 7 a.m. the next morning! An officer who had served in San José ten years later confided to Parker that his “grand military ball” of July 1900 was still being talked about. Furthermore, a prominent street in San José had been named after Parker. To make matters even more complicated, another had been named after Aguinaldo. Parker’s response upon hearing that both he and Aguinldo had streets named after them: “I am not sure…that I like the association of names!”[95]

By the end of July 1900, Parker sought to “re-establish the schools in the district.”[96] He ordered a soldier in San José to organize English lessons for the local school children and Parker stated that “they seemed glad to learn” it.[97] One other feature of the pacification of Lagony that should be revealed is the actions of Parker’s chief surgeon, Dr. Frederick Sparrenberger and his “extremely gallant” actions of shuttling from one town to the next aiding Americans and Filipinos alike by administering medicines, conducting surgical operations, and providing specific measures to improve sanitation. Sparrenberger often rode alone and unescorted through the hostile countrysides in an effort to ply his trade. Parker suggested that “his work was an important element in the pacification of the district.”[98] The successful establishment of the telephone line by Lt. Frank P. Lyman also played an indispensable role in the region’s pacification. By October 1900, the insurgency in the Lagonoy District of south-eastern Luzon was nearly extinct.
Lt. Col. Parker departed San José and the Lagonoy District for good on October 16, 1900. He would eventually reach Manila for court-martial duty until embarking back to southern Luzon on December 14, 1900. His destination was the city of Iriga, located about twenty-five miles south of Lagonoy. As soon as he took command, he immediately reversed the standardized rule of two companies of infantry for guard duty. Instead, he took a more pro-active initiative and installed ten man cavalry detachment. This allowed Parker to free up extra man-power for other more productive tasks around Iriga. In the process, school text books were updated; more arithmetic and geography were added as well as less of an emphasis on religion. As in San José, soldiers were “detailed” to teach English in the schools “with promising results.”[99] In addition, the issue of sanitation was addressed by Parker in Iriga. He issued fines to the city’s inhabitants who failed to keep their homestead up to standard. The money generated from the fines was given out to residents who kept the tidiest and sharpest properties. Parker admitted that he had “made a practice of inspecting the conditions in the various towns” of the district.[100]

Lt. Col. Parker was advised in February 1901 that there was a good chance that Taft and the Commission were to be touring the region soon and that Iriga was a possible stop on the tour. Parker, over bottles of champagne, urged the mayors of the five towns within the district to help coordinate a massive civic cleanup in order to “make a good showing” for Taft and the commissioners.[101] Following up on this initiative, Parker suggested that all the homes in the downtown area be painted. Soon thereafter, “not only all the wooden houses” were painted “but all the bamboo houses” as well; “not even in the woods or in the mountains that was not covered in a virgin white.” Unfortunately for the townspeople, Taft and the Commission never arrived. In their place, Gen. Bell inspected the region on February 27, 1901. Parker proclaimed that the “general was truly surprised” at how far and how fast the people of Iriga had reconstructed their town.[102] The locals threw a ball for Gen. Bell during his stay in Iriga. Parker wrote that it was completely of the natives’ doing and that neither he nor his officers had anything to do with it. Townspeople hung out windows waving American flags and the bands played. It was quite a joyous occasion.[103]

A March 1, 1901 directive from Manila advised Parker that alcohol on the Islands would soon be outlawed.[104] He admitted that the officers’ quarters still had a “large quantity” of beer, whiskey and champagne on hand. He decided that he needed to get rid of it and what better way to do so than to have another baile? Parker declared that “we gave a series of bailes” in order to reduce the rations of the soon-to-be contraband beverages. Song and dance was then gleefully conducted throughout Iriga.[105] Shortly thereafter, “in the interests of pacification and commerce,” Parker organized a fifteen-hundred man local work crew to rebuild the road leading from Bato to the Province of Albay. On March 27, 1901, a twelve-mile long, twenty-four foot-wide road was completed linking up the provinces of Caceres and Albay for the first time in twenty-four years.[106] On March 22, 1901, Parker was relieved of his duties in Iriga and ordered back to Manila where he would depart the Philippines and head back to the States. However, it is clear that “Galloping Jim” Parker left and definitive and progressive mark on American pacification efforts in the Philippines.

In sum, the American military efforts to pacify the Philippine Islands varied greatly from one region to the next. Different measures were employed for a variety of reasons and the results differed. Gen. Hughes’s and Lt. Stotensburg’s actions in and around Manila were shown to have a considerable effect on the pacification of Manila. It is clear that the hostilities and carnage in the Visayas required the Americans to not only root out the resistance but to also have to reconstruct the hulking ruins of Iloilo City. The model of American benevolence in the Philippines can be traced to their actions on the island of Negros. Facing a less-than-hostile resistance, the military was able to jump right into civic reconstruction and portray to all Filipinos the benefits of assimilation. The unfortunate events on Samar clearly show the effects that the ‘scorched-earth’ policy can have upon pacification. Lastly, Parker’s excellent narrative leaves the reader with the impression that the United States did actually accomplish something in the Philippines and that his creative and thoughtful applications of pacification are quite unique.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[79] James Parker, The Old Army - Memories, 1872-1918, with a new introduction by Sandy Barnard. 1st ed. (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2003) 232.
[80] See Parker, pp. 250-251. The highlight of the Cabanatuan encounter was Parker’s daring assault on the insurgent perimeter in which he found himself encircled by the enemy. However, his initial charge on the entrenchments caused enemy confusion and retreat and it enabled U.S. forces to capture the rebel stronghold and disperse a large contingent of enemy troops and weapons.
[81] Parker, 322.
[82] Parker, 326.
[83] Parker, 327.
[84] Parker, 326.
[85] Parker, 328. alcalde: mayor
[86] Parker, 329. It ought to be noted that several officers, Parker included, attended the mass. Parker made mention of the instance where the locals observed him responding during the mass and many of them approached him afterwards clamoring “El coronel dice amen! El coronel dice amen!” (The colonel says amen! The colonel says amen!) The insurgents had spread rumor and innuendo that the invading Americans were heretics. Much to their surprise, the locals were overwhelmed to see that the Americans believed in the same God as them. Thus a huge cultural barrier was broken down between the Americans and the Filipinos.
[87] Parker, 331. baile: a dance or ball.
[88] Parker, 331.
[89] Parker, 331.
[90] Parker, 332. principales: the elite class.
[91] Parker, 332. bailerinas: female dancers.
[92] Parker, 332.
[93] Parker, 333.
[94] Parker, 333.
[95] Parker, 334.
[96] Parker, 334.
[97] Parker, 334.
[98] Parker, 335.
[99] Parker, 351.
[100] Parker, 352.
[101] Parker, 353.
[102] Parker, 354.
[103] Parker, 354.
[104] Parker, 356. Under the pressure of the “Prohibitionists” back home, booze in the Philippines was to be prohibited beginning in the spring of 1901.
[105] Parker, 356.
[106] Parker, 356.

El J, you're doing a fine job with this. I've emailed you a suggestion which you might find interesting.

thank you 7ronin ;)

here is the final substantive chapter:

The Filipino identity for this examination begins with the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish between 1896 and 1898. Fought on many different fronts throughout the Islands, the rebellion finally subsided in late 1898 after Spain, the Filipino rebels and the United States all agreed to cease hostilities. However, the political developments of the Islands were beginning to take shape. Aguinaldo officially declared the independence of the Islands and the formation of the Philippine Republic in June of 1898. Achútegui and Bernad consider this timeframe, 1896 until 1901, to be the “yardstick” in Philippine history in that it defines “the mark of a great historical event” for the Filipino identity.[1]

What is a “great historical event” and how can it have “such a profound effect upon the mind of an entire nation?”[2] John Kenneth Galbraith is said to have declared that England’s “yardstick” or defining moment for their national identity was World War I because “this was a war in which no man posted to active service on the western front could reasonably expect to survive.”[3] For that reason, it had a monumental impact on the English identity. For the United States, it was not the World Wars but the Civil War and the Depression for they both involved the whole of the peoples and it forever changed the identities of the country. For the people of the Philippine Islands, it was the Revolution against Spain that produced similar thoughts. In total, the Philippine Revolution lasted five years, from the “Cry at Balintawak” in 1896 until Emilio Aguinaldo’s capture in 1901.[4] It is most definitely their “yardstick.” Galbraith, quoted in Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896, stated that “the mark of a great historical event is that it changes the people and their way of thinking, so that they are never again what they are before.”[5] Achútegui and Bernad declared that though the Philippine Revolution was “not one single event”, it was clearly a “great upheaval involving the entire national life of the Philippines” and that “that those five years changed the course of Philippine history.”[6]

Andrés Bonifacio was “drastically different” from the other Filipino revolutionaries of his era.[7] He was a man “attracted by nationalistic ideas” and in 1892, he founded a secret Filipino revolutionary group called Kataastaasang Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan, or Katipunan for short. It is also referred to as KKK. Katipunan, translated into English, means “The Exalted and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the People.” The group was composed mostly of “clerks and workers” and they “borrowed slogans and symbols of the Catholic Church, the Freemasons, and the Triads.”[8] They had “mystical rituals, sealed blood pacts, used covert names, exchanged arcane passwords, wore colored masks and sashes, invented secret codes and ciphers and memorized aphorisms.”[9] The Spanish officials initially dismissed Bonifacio and the Katipunan. However, depressed sugar and hemp prices as well as rice shortages all throughout central and southern Luzon was beginning to drive the peasants to “desperation.”[10] Bonifacio capitalized on the agrarian discontent and the masses began to perceive the Katipunan “as an instrument for redemption.” [11] He then declared that “violence…was the only option.”[12]

http://www.elaput.com/bnfcboni.jpg
Andres Bonifacio

By August 1896, the Spanish officials began to suspect Bonifacio and the Katipunan of conspiring against them after they raided a warehouse in Manila that was being used to print revolutionary material. “Exhorted by the archbishop, Spanish vigilantes fanned out across the city, wantonly slaughtering or rounding up natives.” One report suggested that “hundreds of Filipinos” were suffocated to death by their Spanish captors at Fort Santiago, near Manila.[13] Bonifacio began rallying the “underpaid, lower-class expatriates” and the local officials behind him and the Katipunan ideals. However, the merchant, proletariat classes were not grasping Bonifacio’s class-driven ideals. These tensions that existed between the upper-class Filipinos and the worker-classes were beginning to produce a divide between the local populaces of central and southern Luzon. Members of the Katipunan began rounding up local merchants and wealthy Filipinos in an effort to forcibly enlist them into the revolutionary cause. Bonifacio and his followers “took a perverse satisfaction in arresting, humiliating, or even killing” the mostly merchant and upper-class Filipinos who resisted them. This ilustrado class “found themselves with no choice except to rally behind Bonifacio.”[14] Thus he and his followers initiated a “wholesale repression” against anyone who opposed them and these ranks included both Spanish and Filipinos. On August 29, 1896, Bonifacio declared war against the Spanish and “thousands heeded his call.”[15] However, he would prove to be much less effective as a military commander.

Andrés Bonifacio led an ill-fated assault on a Spanish garrison around Manila at the end of August 1896. Despite his fiery rhetoric, he and his troops were “repulsed with heavy losses” and the defeat “made clear his delinquency” as a military leader.[16] The initial results of the war versus Spain were quite different for one of Bonifacio’s lieutenants and fellow Katipunan member, Emilio Aguinaldo.[17] He was fighting with more success than Bonifacio in his home province of Cavite which was the center of the insurrection. He “scored a major victory” against the Spanish on 3 September 1896 when he and his troops ambushed five hundred Spanish soldiers attempting to cross a bridge leading into the Manila suburb of Imus. The insurgent troops “cut them to shreds” as the Spanish hurriedly retreated across the river and marshy terrain surrounding the town.[18] In the process, Aguinaldo captured seventy Remington rifles and a sword dropped by a retreating Spanish commander. It had inscribed on it “Made in Toledo – 1869,” the year of Aguinaldo’s birth. “Seeing it as an omen,” he kept the sword at his side until his capture in 1901 when the American forces disarmed him and forced him to declare his oath to the United States. It was not until a “nostalgic ceremony” in 1960 that the sword was returned to him by Charles Bohlen, the U.S. ambassador in Manila. Aguinaldo was ninety-two years old when the sword was presented back to him![19]

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/Charles_Bohlen.png/180px-Charles_Bohlen.png
Charles Bohlen

By early 1897, Spanish forces had recaptured large portions of Luzon. The rebel leaders, however, had begun to jockey for power within the insurgent ranks. In March 1897, Aguinaldo took it upon himself to promote his rank to that of a “generalissimo.” Bonifacio, upon hearing the news of Aguinaldo’s self-promotion, was furious and Karnow notes that “tensions between them rose.” A meeting was then arranged between Bonifacio’s representatives and Aguinaldo’s at an abandoned estate in Cavite Province in an attempt to resolve the differences between the rival factions. What happened next is clearly a subject of uncertainty but it is noted that the meeting between the two groups resulted in an agreement for the official formation of a Philippine Republic with Aguinaldo as its first president.[20] Bonifacio “angrily” rejected the decision that was reached in Cavite and promptly formed what Karnow describes as a “rival regime.” In an act of spite, he then ceded “several areas of control to Spanish troops, who in one undefended spot killed Aguinaldo’s brother Crispulo.” Bonifacio had begun to unravel. Bonifacio’s actions caused Aguinaldo and his supporters to track him down, try him in an impromptu kangaroo-court and to sentence him to death.[21] Aguinaldo would soon thereafter attempt to commute the pre-arranged death sentence but his message arrived too late.[22] Andrés Bonifacio and his brother Procopio were shot and killed by Aguinaldo’s men in May 1897. “Aguinaldo’s command was now secure.”[23] The war against Spain continued until a truce was declared on December 14, 1897 which is also known as “The Pact of Biyaak-na-bato.” Aguinaldo and his followers agreed to voluntarily exile themselves in Hong Kong. However, Aguinaldo had now consolidated his power among the Filipino revolutionaries. His next task was to transform the foundations of the Katipunan into a working government.

http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/img/emilio.jpg
Emilio Aguinaldo - note the sabre at his hip.

Filipino-American diplomacy began in late 1897 when Aguinaldo’s foreign diplomat, Felipe Agoncillo began conferring with the American consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman. Agoncillo, sensing the possibility of war between the U.S. and Spain, offered a Filipino-American alliance in the case that war erupted in the archipelago. Dialogue was again resumed in early 1898 when “Aguinaldo and his companions” corresponded directly with Dewey’s fleet.[24] With war looming between the United States and Spain, the exiled Filipinos once again initiated contact with the Americans. E. Spencer Pratt, the American consul to Singapore, met with Aguinaldo on 7 April 1898. Pratt urged Aguinaldo “to arrange for cooperation against the Spaniards” in the event that war breaks out.[25] Meanwhile, under the orders of President McKinley, Dewey and his fleet was steaming towards Manila. Soon thereafter, Ambassador Wildman received one hundred fifteen thousand pesos from Aguinaldo and guaranteed him that the cash would be used to provide arms to the Filipino rebels in an effort to renew the hostilities against Spain. On 4 May, 1898, Aguinaldo was urged to return to the Islands in an effort to renew hostilities against Spain, who was now reeling from Dewey’s destruction of their fleet.[26] On 19 May, 1898, Aguinaldo and thirteen other insurgent leaders arrived back in Cavite Province aboard the McCulloch, an American gunboat. He was then dispatched to Dewey’s flagship, the Olympia, to once again confer with the commodore. Alip raises a series of very interesting questions regarding these meetings between the insurgent leaders and the American naval brass. He asks the following questions:

- “What was the understanding between Aguinaldo and the American leaders?”

- “Was Aguinaldo promised the independence of his country?”

- “Under what conditions did he renew the war against Spain in alliance with the United States?”[27]

The answers to these questions deserve a closer look. Alip states that “Aguinaldo’s own testimonies categorically state that Pratt and Dewey promised him the independence of the Philippines under an American protectorate.”[28] Isidro de los Santos, a Philippine rebel who claimed to have been present during the conferences between Aguinaldo and Pratt, stated that he was “ready to swear to this.”[29] Dewey and Pratt, however, claimed that the promise of an independent Philippine republic was a “tissue of lies” and that they advised Aguinaldo and his men that they did not possess the authority to promise independence. Furthermore, it was expressed that the United States Congress held this authority.[30] Aguinaldo, asked later why he did not get the alleged agreement in writing, claimed that the Americans had told him that “American verbal promises were more binding than the written promises of the Spaniards.”[31] Nevertheless, the Americans did not yield to the rebels and Gen. Merritt and the 8th Corps arrived in Manila and set up the American perimeter surrounding the fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers that were garrisoning the old city. For the rebels, capturing Manila was clearly “the most important military and strategic objective.”[32] However, a series of other developments began to unfold and it began to complicate the situation even further.

Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence from the Spanish on 12 June 1898. A constitutional assembly was to be organized and a whole-sale mobilization for war versus Spain was initiated. Insurgent soldiers were to be initially equipped with the two thousand rifles and several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition that were purchased from the American consul, Rounseville Wildman as well as arms not turned over by insurgents after the December 1897 ceasefire. Four thousand more rifles were provided by Commodore Dewey. In sum, the insurgents were armed with an estimated ten thousand rifles, hand guns and various other weapons.[33] By the end of June 1898, the insurgents had dislodged the Spanish in four of Manila’s suburbs. They now had the city surrounded as well. The insurgent forces now formed a second layer of entrenchments outside of the American lines that were already ringed around Manila.

Meanwhile, the revolution was beginning to “receive the support of the best minds in the land.”[34] While the Americans and Spanish were negotiating for the surrender of Manila, Aguinaldo and his troops, now firmly entrenched on the outskirts of Manila, were poised to assault the city and defeat the Spanish once and for all. Gen. Merritt, however, “categorically informed the Filipino leaders that his government permitted him to discuss the affairs with the Spanish government alone” and that the Spanish, fearful of the frightful reprisals that the Filipino rebels could unleash on them, insisted that the “Filipino troops should be excluded from participating” in negotiations for surrender.[35] Merritt did, however, inform the rebels that they should prepare to go to Washington to consult with McKinley and his staff. The surrendering of Manila by the Spanish to the Americans finally occurred on August 13, 1898. The Filipinos had been kept completely out of the loop.

Despite the setback, Aguinaldo called for the first constitutional congress of the Republic to meet on 15 September 1898 in the Central Luzon city of Malolos, some thirty miles north of Manila. One hundred ten total delegates were appointed from the various provinces. Eighty-five of them attended the first session. The composition of the congress consisted of forty-four lawyers, eighteen physicians, five pharmacists, and one priest. The remaining were either farmers or merchants. “Many of them were educated abroad” while others were alumni from the Filipino universities Santo Tomas, Letran College and Ateneo Municipal. They formed what Alip described as “the cream of the Filipino intelligentsia.”[36] Three constitutional drafts were put forward to the delegates. One drafted by Pedro Paterno, another by Felipe Calderón and a third by Apolinario Mabini. Calderón’s version won out and on 29 November 1898, it was approved by the congress.[37] A provision to the draft that would have established Catholicism as the official state religion was debated among the delegates but it was eventually voted down.[38] Mabini, however, vehemently disapproved of the Calderón draft. Being a close aide to Aguinaldo, he advised the president not to sign the draft because, in his estimation, it did not provide the executive branch of the Philippine government enough power. He insisted that an option be available to the president that allowed for the dissolution of the natively-elected legislature and also advised that the constitutional congress was simply an “advisory” council and that they do not and should not represent the majority of the Philippine populace.[39] Mabini argued that the “safety of the state during war time” required absolute power for the president. He also stressed for the state-sponsored religion clause which was voted down. Surrounded by “militarists” and “absolutists”, Mabini heavily influenced Aguinaldo and the president subsequently sent the constitution back to the delegates un-signed and demanded for more executive power. However, Aguinaldo gave in and signed the Calderón draft on 21 January 1899. He proclaimed that he relented on the previous demands of more executive power in order “to prove that he was not a militarist at heart but a lover of democratic processes” instead.[40]

http://www.atsnotes.com/auction-jpg/a42/4382.JPG
Apolinario Mabini picured here on the Filipino 'ten spot'

The Calderón draft became known as the “Malolos Constitution” and it established ten main principles for the Philippine Republic. It called for a parliamentary composition with a uni-cameral legislature. Sovereignty rested entirely with the federal branch thus leaving the provinces very little authority in national matters. The executive branch, however, was subordinate to the National Legislature. Particular rights and liberties of the citizens were also established. It called for the formation of an emergency legislative committee to be formed during the current recess. Parliamentary immunity was granted to its members. Penal codes were drawn up and codified. The official formation of the executive branch of government was established – the Council of State and finally, the official formation of the legislative branch – the Constituent Assembly, were decreed at Malolos. On 23 January 1899, the official inauguration ceremonies were to be held. Alip notes that Aguinaldo’s Republic was now receiving “the support of the entire country.”[41]

The outbreak of war between the Americans and the Filipinos of 4 February 1899 was not what Aguinaldo and his followers had in mind while they sought to get the fledgling Republic up and running. It should be noted that “Aguinaldo had informed Gen. Otis that the Filipinos had acted without his orders” and that he was “desirous of putting an end to hostilities.”[42] Otis stated that he would not entertain any negotiating and that the hostilities must continue “to the grim end.”[43] Meanwhile, the Treaty of Paris was in the process of being ratified by the U.S. Congress. On 6 February 1899, the Treaty of Paris was ratified by Congress thus ceding the Islands completely to the United States. Open warfare between the Americans and Filipinos was only two days old. This left Aguinaldo with no other choice but to attempt to mobilize for war despite having to simultaneously manage the affairs of the fledgling Republic. It will be shown how Aguinaldo and his subordinates performed this daunting task.

John R.M. Taylor declares that “the character of a government, like that of a corporation, may be judged by an inspection of its account books.”[44] Taylor takes a very close look at the “transmittal of funds, records of their receipt, memoranda, cash books, and treasury ledgers” of the insurgent government.[45] These documents were among those captured by American forces as they tracked Aguinaldo from central Luzon into the northern reaches. The “carefully written volumes” were “packed in haste” during Aguinaldo’s flight but Taylor notes that a close examination of them may enable “the investigator to form a definitive idea of what the government really was as distinguished from what it pretended to be.”[46] The primary feature of this examination is the insurgent tax revenue that was collected by Aguinaldo and his appointed collectors.

Between 28 May and 2 September 1898, Aguinaldo appointed twenty-seven tax agents throughout the archipelago and made them responsible for gathering the funds, accounting for them and finally, sending them forward to the Republic. However, as Taylor notes, these funds were “arbitrarily” gathered by Aguinaldo’s agents. Specifically, the Tagalogs, of which Aguinaldo was one of, paid very little in taxes in comparison to the other regions of the Islands.[47] Furthermore, “the funds of the insurgent government were considered property of the men who had established it and not a trust to be managed for the benefit of the people of the country.”[48] As a result of these methods, the tax revenue generated by Aguinaldo throughout the Islands was “much larger than the amount which reached the treasury of his government.”[49]

According to tax records from a nine month period between 1898 and 1899, insurgent government receipts totaled 2,056,265.66 pesos. However, it should be noted that 367,606.76 pesos were “never entered upon the cash books” of the federal government despite their receipts being present. An additional 317,280.12 pesos were “noted upon the cash books and memoranda of receipts” but was not on the “general ledger of the government” thus implying that Aguinaldo or his staff members had either skimmed from the funds or simply misallocated them. In addition to these non-accounted-for funds, 213, 187.70 pesos were mysteriously “omitted” from the “final ledger.” In sum, 896,074.58 pesos were marked as accounted for but they did not appear on the so-called “final ledger.” This amounts to a whopping forty-three percent of the total receipts that were collected yet remained unaccounted for. Furthermore, it left what amounts to only 1,160,191.08 pesos remaining from the recorded receipts of 2,056,265.66 pesos. This data does not include any of the taxes or funds collected at the local levels that weren’t accounted for. In other words, the forty-three percent deficiency rate could theoretically be much higher than what it already is. To muddle the picture even further, Taylor notes “some of the insurgent leaders had found that a revolution might be used for private profit.” Thus if the “character of a government…may be judged by an inspection of its account books,” the insurgents were either thoroughly corrupt, wholly dishonest, or maybe they were simply poor record keepers. Either way, it is clear that this form of taxation is not only inefficient but ill-prepared and ineffectively conducted.[50]

The five year period between 1896 and 1901 most definitely reshaped Filipino identities. The formation of the Katipunan by Andrés Bonifacio was the first in a series of events that permanently changed the Filipino character. The mystical and secret society is shown to have evolved from a mysterious and clandestine society into the groundwork for Aguinaldo’s Philippine Republic. However, several features emerge from Bonifacio’s rise to prominence. His harsh methods of adherence and propensity for violence display an alarming trait. It is clear that a class-driven ideology had emerged as a result of Bonifacio’s actions. Emilio Aguinaldo quickly distinguished himself as a leader during the revolution against Spain. It appears that he maneuvered himself and his faction to the forefront of the revolution. In the process, he displayed certain tendencies such as political strong-arming and a desire to concentrate and solidify his role as the leader of the revolution. His failure to secure the guarantees of independence from the Americans, as he and his followers insisted had occurred, was a grievous error. Despite the lack of guarantees from the Americans, Aguinaldo and his followers managed to set the framework for their own government. However, a closer examination of the fledgling Republic and its taxation schemes suggest that Aguinaldo’s government was both inefficient and dishonest.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Pedro S. de Achútegui and Miguel A. Bernad, Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896 A Documentary History, (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1972), 1.

[2] Achútegui and Bernad, 1.

[3] Achútegui and Bernad, 1.

[4] Achútegui and Bernad, 2. “The Cry at Balintawak”: this was when the rebels declared war against the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines.

[5] Achútegui and Bernad, 2.

[6] Achútegui and Bernad, 2.

[7] Karnow, 72.

[8] Karnow, 73. Triads: secret Chinese brotherhoods.

[9] Karnow, 73.

[10] Karnow, 73.

[11] Karnow, 73.

[12] Quoted in Karnow, 73.

[13] Karnow, 73.

[14] Karnow, 73.

[15] Karnow, 74.

[16] Karnow, 74.

[17] Aguinaldo was inducted into the Katipunan on 1 January 1895 in an elaborate and secretive ceremony in his hometowm of Kawit, in Cavite Province.

[18] Karnow, 74.

[19] Karnow, 75. This exact sword can be seen at Aguinaldo’s side in many of the photographs taken of him during this time.

[20] Karnow, 75-76. The author notes that “Aguinaldo’s supporters maneuvered the group into agreeing to form a republic with him (Aguinaldo) as president.” This is rather ambiguous in that there are no specifics given as to the final agreement or even the process of deliberating between the two groups.

[21] Karnow, 76.

[22] Karnow, 76. Aguinaldo is said to have had a last-minute change of heart and attempted to commute Bonifacio’s death sentence. Members of the firing squad were said to have received the last-minute order too late.

[23] Karnow, 76.

[24] Alip, Eufronio M., In the Days of General Emilio Aguinaldo A Study of the Life and Times of a Great Military Leader, Statesman, and Patriot Who Founded the First Republic in Asia, (Manila: Alip & Sons, Inc., 1969) 47. It is noted that Aguinaldo, “through the initiative of Edward P. Wood, the commander of the American gunboat Petrel” met and “conferred” with Commodore Dewey early in 1898.

[25] Alip, 47.

[26] Alip, 48. At Ambassador Wildman’s urging, Aguinaldo and his fellow exiles in Hong Kong began preparing for a return to their homeland.

[27] Alip, 48.

[28] Alip,, 48.

[29] Quoted in Alip, 49.

[30] Quoted in Alip, 49.

[31] Quoted in Alip, 49.

[32] Quoted in Alip, 56.

[33] Alip, 55-56. It should be noted that the insurgent group in Hong Kong paid the American consul, Rounsville Wildman, fifty thousand pesos for the initial shipment of two thousand rifles and ammo. A second deal between Aguinaldo and Wildman, in the amount of sixty-five thousand pesos, never materialized and the money was never returned nor was any more arms delivered to the insurgents. Furthermore, the initial insurgent arsenal was also bolstered by guns turned over by Filipinos who defected from the Spanish army.

[34] Alip, 57. Filipino nationalists of the time, such as Mabini, Rianzarez, Bautista, Apacible, Ponce, Agoncillo and Buencamino, all gave their blessings to the formation of the Philippine Republic. Alip notes that “these men greatly strengthened the leadership of Aguinaldo.”

[35] Quoted in Alip, 58-59.

[36] Alip, 60.

[37] For more on the origins of the Filipino constitutional debates, see Eufronio, 64-66.

[38] Alip, 60. The author notes that the Calderón draft’s state religion provision was shot down on a tie-breaker vote by Pablo Tescon, a late-arriving delegate to the congress.

[39] Alip, 65.

[40] Alip, 66.

[41] Alip, 70.

[42] Alip, 79.

[43] Quoted in Alip, 79.

[44] Taylor, John R.M., The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II May 19, 1898 to July 4, 1902, (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971) 453.

[45] Taylor, 483.

[46] Taylor, 483.

[47] For more on this topic, see Taylor, 483-485. It provides for the provincial breakdowns and the accompanying statistics.

[48] Taylor, 453.

[49] Taylor, 484.

[50] For more information on the tax receipts, statistics, and regionalized taxation schemes of the insurgent government, see Taylor, 453-458 and 483-485.

Bravo! :clap:

If I may just add something. There was another man in the revolution that you failed to mention (but perhaps understandable because his role wasn't that big): Emilio Jacinto, Bonifacio's own Mabini i.e. intellectual advisor. Jacinto was the true brains behind the Katipunan. Had he not suffered an early death perhaps Bonifacio's later fortunes might not have been so grim.
It is most definitely their “yardstick.” Galbraith, quoted in Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896, stated that “the mark of a great historical event is that it changes the people and their way of thinking, so that they are never again what they are before.” Achútegui and Bernad declared that though the Philippine Revolution was “not one single event”, it was clearly a “great upheaval involving the entire national life of the Philippines” and that “that those five years changed the course of Philippine history.”
And how. Prior to the revolution even the idea of Philippine nationhood did not exist. There were no major empires or sultanates prior to the arrival of the Spanish to look back to, unlike Srivijaya and Madjapahit for the Indonesians or Malacca for the Malayans. The people living here in the late 19th century knew that they were living in Las Islas Filipinas, but considered themselves Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Pampanguenos, Bicolanos, Cebuanos, Warays, Chabacanos etc. etc. In fact other rebellions in the previous 300+ years all failed because they were always localized affairs, and the Spanish could safely draft troops from somewhere else to put down these rebels, thus driving intercultural animosity even further. This revolution was the very first time all regions in the Philippines were fighting against Spain. The revolution itself created the very concept of a Filipino people.

Excellent point Dann. This seems to be partly the case even today. When I talk to Philippinos about where they are from it never seems to be that they are from the Phillipines. They are always more concerned about being perceived as being from Illocos Norte or the Visayas or someplace else. And the smaller the island or the remoter the province the more they identify with it.

Sadly old habits die hard. :( This lack of patriotism is a major flaw in the Filipino character. There are millions of us in the US, and yet they can't form an effective "Filipino Chamber of Commerce" or suchthat unlike the Chinese. Instead you have Samahang Ilocano, Samahang Pampangueno etc. etc. The Chinese have individual associations too, but divided into surname-based clan associations or, rarely and remarkably, based on the individual villages where their ancestors originated. :eek: But these are always all organized and subservient to an even bigger "all-Chinese" organization that bends over backwards to avoid anything political, focusing instead on economics and mutual help. (Chinese overseas communities are always apolitical, partly because they don't want to get mixed into the whole China-Taiwan issue.)

I know other Filipinos are going to hate me for saying this, but I feel that our country is an artificial construct, a legacy of colonialism. The Spanish did too well a job, destroying our original culture, language, writing, religion, everything. What culture we have today is closer to that of Mexico despite the fact that appearances wide we are almost identical to the Muslim Indonesians and Malaysians next to us. Is it a wonder then why our Muslim countrymen to the south (who were never conquered by the Spanish and were incorporated only under the Americans) hate our (majority Christian) guts and wish to secede?

This lack of patriotism is a major flaw in the Filipino character.

I'm not going to start this again, but come on! Surely this is a major virtue to the Filipino character. Patriotism is a bad thing - all countries are artificial constructs, one way or another.

Plotinus:
one man's garbage is another man's treasure.

who are you to say that a fractured and non-patriotic sentiment is a good thing for the Filipinos?

it is not about patriotism; at least with regard to the most recent passage of the article. it is about identity. and whether or not you want to lump patriotism into that mix is a matter of debate i presume.

i think what Dann is trying to say is that the Filipinos were stripped of their nationalist identity and i agree. it is not about nationalistic fervor, blind nationalist loyalty, or political loyalties. it is about character, identity, culture, and ancestry and i reckon that the Spanish and the Americans stripped a piece of this away from the P.I. and this is sad.

Prior to 1521, we never had a national identity in the first place. :p The Spanish were the ones who gave us the idea of Las Islas Filipinas. Before Legaspi's conquistadores came all there was here was "Datu Kalantiaw's domain", "Rajah Humabon's domain" etc. etc.

But basically we felt cheated. Christian Filipinos today, being the devout and God-fearing Catholics that they are, are actually grateful to the Spanish for bringing along Christianity and making them different from the neighboring Muslims. :rolleyes: But they hate the abuses, the mismanagement, and the long time being kept in the dark, uneducated and ignorant.

Come a successful revolution (somewhat) and then what happens? We get denied a hard won victory, get betrayed by our ally, and SOLD out by the ex-master!

If an independent Phillipines had been allowed to exist in 1898, two things might have happened: 1) It could have been another Thailand, another wedge of neutrality between several colonial possessions. or 2) Somebody else would invade anyway and we'd still lose our brief independence. Given the global situation in the late 19th century (it was the height of colonialism) I have a feeling option 2 would have been the most likely result. :(

i think what Dann is trying to say is that the Filipinos were stripped of their nationalist identity and i agree. it is not about nationalistic fervor, blind nationalist loyalty, or political loyalties. it is about character, identity, culture, and ancestry and i reckon that the Spanish and the Americans stripped a piece of this away from the P.I. and this is sad.

Ah, well that's not what I'd call patriotism. That's fine, then.

The lasting effects that the Philippine-American War has generated are grossly underrated. It represented a huge shift in American foreign policy; and in the process it greatly strengthened the executive branch of the American government. It may even be said that William McKinley and his cabinet members wielded the most executive power since Lincoln.[1] It should be noted however, that while McKinley often surrounded himself with aggressive and hawkish men, the situation in the Philippines literally fell into his lap. War with Spain had been imminent for several years as evidenced by the brutal suppression in Cuba by the Spanish. Americans were outraged at the Spanish atrocities on the island. Newspaper magnates of the time such as William Randolph Hearst capitalized on the human rights violations that were occurring only seventy miles from the United States. A new patriotic fervor was born. Men were asked to heed the call and thousands of state volunteers signed up. War between Spain and the United States was officially declared on 25 April 1898 under the pretense of the alleged Spanish detonation of the American battleship Maine.[2] However, the first shots fired in the war came from Dewey’s fleet in Manila Bay. Soon thereafter, U.S. troops landed in southern Cuba and dislodged the Spanish from both Cuba and Puerto Rico. Troops were being ferried from the U.S. west coast bound for the Philippine Islands. President McKinley clearly labored long and hard on the Philippine issue. He solicited the advice of numerous politicians, advisors and military men. The press also had a huge impact on the seemingly indecisive McKinley. His motives during this period in which the great debate on the Philippine question raged were substantially grounded in the overall improvement of human rights for the oppressed inhabitants of Spanish colonialism. It was the “validation of the people” that he sought. Furthermore, McKinley set a precedent for American presidents in that he considered it a moral duty of Americans to carry on the “White Man’s Burden.”[3] There are also several negatives associated with McKinley’s handling of the Philippine issue. It appears that he solicited so much advice on the matter that it produced a dead-lock in those months which the Treaty of Paris was being negotiated by his commissioners in Paris. McKinley insisted on terms that were contrary to four out of the five peace commissioners that he personally appointed. Despite these few blemishes, William McKinley’s “greatest legacy was America’s overseas empire. His next greatest was the quality of men he chose to run it.”[4]

Elihu Root is perhaps the most underrated American statesman in the history of the Republic. He entered service as the Secretary of War at a time when his country was undergoing tremendous changes both internally and externally. He was therefore responsible for managing the demanding responsibilities of the U.S. Army’s dual-task in the Philippines, to pacify first and then to rebuild. Once the hostilities between the Americans and Filipinos broke out, Root took a clear and decisive approach to the insurgency. He felt that the best way to handle the issue was to squash it completely. He felt that self-government for the Filipinos was a gradual process and he stood by this stance even after receiving a good deal of criticism from his critics. He did, however, see a need for a swift transition from military to civil governance. Root’s greatest legacy in the Philippines is most definitely the economic and industrial improvements that he initiated in the U.S. Congress. He saw the need to develop both the Filipino bureaucracy and its industrial and commercial infrastructure and he aggressively pursued congressional legislation to secure it. It should also be noted that Root dealt deftly with the Vatican while he attempted to broker the transfer of the friars’ lands in the Philippines. This was clearly a hot-button issue for many in the U.S. If there was a negative to Root’s handlings during the Philippine War, it was the cover-up of the atrocities being committed by U.S. troops in Samar. It resulted in an embarrassing moment for Root and the Roosevelt administration. Despite this shortcoming, it is clear that the actions of Elihu Root during the Philippine War deserve great attention and detail and that there are many good examples that can be learned from by historians who wish to determine the arduous task of nation building.

Theodore Roosevelt maintained William McKinley’s program of benevolent assimilation in the Philippines. Roosevelt’s best trait during this affair may have been his progressive attitude that he so often professed. He firmly believed in the notion that it was a duty to civilize and he often used words such as “patience”, “strength”, and “steadfast resolution.” His progressiveness is seen is his willingness to grant an experimental native legislature so long as “caution” and “moderation” accompanied it. It is interesting to note that Roosevelt continually cautioned that the “moral and industrial” endeavors of the Filipinos should take precedence over their aspiring self-governing ambitions. Like Root, Roosevelt’s image was blemished a bit by the cover-up of the atrocities committed by U.S. troops but in the end, his legacy in the Philippine Islands is that of a firm but progressive visionary who affirmed America’s newest international responsibility: to civilize.

The roles of the Unites States military in the Philippine War was a difficult, two-pronged responsibility to pacify and then rebuild while maintaining the general peace. Despite underestimating local desires for independence, the U.S. military in the Philippines was a great success. The “policy of attraction” that the Americans espoused in the Philippines included but was not limited to a concerted “commitment to schools, roads, municipal government, health care, and sanitation.”[5] The United States military was successful in the Philippines primarily because they adhered to a “coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression.” Thus the “judicious mixture of carrot and stick” was applied.[6] It is what Prof. Linn describes as the “most successful counter-insurgency campaign in U.S. history.”[7] For that reason, there are many lessons to be learned from this. Despite these impressive final results, the Americans faced a bevy of problems in the Philippines. The considerable difficulties of pacifying and reconstructing demands that experienced and professional soldiers, officers and commanders were of the utmost necessity. Linn notes that “even while engaged in combat operations, soldiers built schools and sanitation systems, roads, bridges, and brought to many a village the first law and the first real peace it had known in years.”[8] The varying degrees of resistance that the military faced throughout the archipelago demanded an improvisational approach and regional commanders needed to be able to act freely and quickly instead of waiting for orders, submitting to alternative methods, or even doing nothing at all. Most commanders performed brilliantly in this arena. It was also shown how the path of destruction that followed the American troops in the Philippines can have very grave circumstances. Not only was famine, disease, and starvation a real possibility in many parts, the collateral damage and subsequent reconstruction also greatly burdened the workload of the occupying Americans. This, as shown in the Philippines, results in desperation of the enemy which in turn, opens the door for a bitter, partisan, guerrilla war in which reprisals become more and more frequent. However, men such as “Galloping Jim” Parker showed a keen knack for overcoming the cultural differences that come attached with occupying a foreign land. His methods of “carrot and stick” included social events such as church masses and bailes in an effort to win the “hearts and minds” of the Filipino people. The humility and magnanimity that Parker exuded when he dealt with the inhabitants certainly went a long way and it is clear that he put the stereotypical ethnic biases of the era to the side in order to accomplish his goals. In sum, it can be said that the U.S. military’s responsibilities in the Philippines were immense. They accomplished these tasks by being able to adapt to the situations as they developed and by doing so, allowed most of the military commanders the opportunity to showcase the benefits of benevolent assimilation.

The evidence put forth in this thesis suggests that the Filipinos were clearly not ready to govern themselves in an efficient manner during what Achútegui and Bernad consider “the great historical event” of Filipino history, The Philippine Revolution – 1896-1901. However, it is unfortunate that Aguinaldo and his fellow revolutionaries have been judged through the scope of rebellion, war, and insurgency. One must ask whether Aguinaldo and the First Philippine Republic may have flourished or, at the very least, had been able to stabilize the state of affairs that by many accounts was shown to have spiraled out of control. Among the accomplishments of Aguinaldo’s Republic was a modern constitution, a legislative branch with elected representatives, provincial governments, its own schools, newspapers, post offices and stamps, and most important of all, a national army. It should be noted that Aguinaldo’s short-lived Philippine Republic was the first ever natively inspired democracy in Asia. Aguinaldo and his men were also the first Asian nation to openly revolt against their European colonizers and in the process, evicted them once and for all; albeit under unusual circumstances. Thus their identity from an historical viewpoint is very unique.

If there was a barometer or a report card of sorts in which Aguinaldo and the men that surrounded him could be calculated or graded on their actual capacities to govern themselves in an efficient and democratic manner, they’d have performed quite poorly. The harsh methods employed by Bonifacio, the violence, and the wedge that he drove between the lower and upper class Filipinos suggests that serious social problems existed in the Philippines at this time. This undoubtedly made Aguinaldo’s task of governing terribly difficult. It is also unfortunate that he and his men were dealt with in such a duplicitous manner by the Americans. His failure to secure official diplomatic recognition was the first sign that the Republic was doomed. Of course, this was not entirely Aguinaldo’s fault. The American consuls in Hong Kong were discussing arms deals and independence with the exiled rebels while the military brass and the McKinley administration plotted their imperialistic ambitions in the Islands. The capturing of Manila by the American essentially sealed the fate of the Republic. Had the rebels controlled the old city prior to the American arrival, Aguinaldo and the Army of Liberation could have made matters much more complicated for the Gen. Merritt and the 8th Corps. The most alarming deficiency of Aguinaldo’s government was most definitely the corrupt and delinquent tax scheme. The irregularities and dishonesty associated with the collection of taxes was devastating for the fledgling republic. While Carlos Quirino may claim that John R.M. Taylor’s Philippine Insurrection Against the United States is “biased”, which to some extents it is.[9] However, numbers do not lie. 896,074.58 pesos, or forty-three percent of all tax revenue received by the insurgent government within the critical months of late 1898 and early 1899 was not allocated to what it should have been; namely, the trust fund in the interests of the nation. Where did this money go? Was it applied to the national cause and not reported as such? It is reasonable to assume that much of the money was simply pocketed by those who collected and received it. These tendencies clearly display an inability to properly govern. In conclusion, it can be said that while the Filipinos seemed to lack the ability to properly govern themselves, they certainly possessed a unique identity in that they were indeed the first recipient of this new American export called “democracy.”

Considering this, there are many lessons to be learned from the Philippine-American War. For starters, it is obvious that any American president needs to thoroughly think through their course of actions. A clear and concise plan of entrance and exit is needed. Exporting our lofty ideals of democracy abroad to peoples who are not ready to sufficiently operate self-government comes with a very heavy price tag. The costs in blood and treasure are immeasurable. Each and every American death in combat is a serious loss. By seeking the whole and complete “validation of the people,” William McKinley was chasing after what President George W. Bush sought from the United Nations prior to the Second Gulf War: validation to carry out the administration’s ambitions. In a truly eerie similarity, both espoused the virtues and morals of planting democracy in areas of the world which were unfamiliar to it.[10] This, in a nutshell, is potentially very dangerous as well as a bit contradictory. After all, one of the principle pillars in American democracy is the ‘consent of the governed’ clause which states that no government shall be enacted that is not ‘of the people’ and ‘for the people.’ As a result, what arises is the question of imposing our morals and beliefs upon others with out the direct consent of the people. Is it an American duty to see that all of the oppressed and less-fortunate peoples of the world be fitted with the freedoms and the virtuous ideals of democracy? In a post-Cold War era, the United States is clearly the lone super power. However, does this give the United States a license to export democracy? Indeed, these are valid questions to ask. Another set of similarities that exists is the likenesses of the cover-up of the atrocities in Samar by the Roosevelt administration and the abuses doled out by the American soldiers at one of Saddam Hussein’s most infamous torture chambers, the prison at Abu Ghraib. A closer look at these similarities suggests that in order to be most effective in nation building, a disciplined, professional, and well-trained military is needed in order to carry out this unbelievably difficult task of winning the hearts and minds of many of whom consider the Americans to be invaders. Thus this “judicious mixture of carrot and stick” needs to be conducted by a military of the utmost professionalism, pro-activism, creativity, and magnanimity. By examining the identities and character of those who are on the receiving end of benevolent assimilation, we can begin to determine the capacities of those who are either just beginning self-government or will eventually be responsible for self-government. An excellent comparison is the situation that the United States faced in the Republic of South Vietnam. The corruption, the harsh methods of repression, the volatile internal power struggles between government leaders, and the hard-line stance taken by South Vietnam presidents in the early years of their existence, primarily before the arrival of American Marines in March 1965, all suggest that the South Vietnamese were clearly not ready for efficient and honest self-government.[11] An alternative analysis would be to compare the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan. It is true that both nations were in hulking ruins after the Second World War. Their economies were shattered and their peoples broken. However, self-government and capitalist principles were certainly not foreign to them. A massive economic reconstruction effort was conducted by the Americans in Germany, Japan and elsewhere in Europe. The results were impressive and it showed that with the proper application, nation building can conclude with desired results. Thus by examining the identities of those who are on the receiving end of nation building, we can truly begin to understand the difficulties that accompany such an arduous task.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Zimmermann, 198-99. The author notes that after Lincoln, the Cleveland administration possessed the most executive power until McKinley arrived in 1897.

[2] Modern theories on the real truth behind the sinking of the Maine has concluded that it was not an act of Spanish sabotage but an explosion caused in the boiler room of the ship’s bowels.

[3] This was an early twentieth century ideology which was born out of a Rudyard Kipling poem written in 1899. It extolled the virtues of nurturing and civilizing the uncivilized.

[4] Zimmermann, 402.

[5] Linn, The Philippine War, 323.

[6] Linn, The Philippine War, 323.

[7] Linn, The Philippine War, 327.

[8] Linn, The Philippine War, 327.

[9] The general theme of Taylor’s interpretation of the captured insurgent documents is that he portrays Filipinos as barbaric and wholly inept.

[10] McKinley: as shown, he sought to “civilize” the Filipinos and introduce them to benefits of democracy. Bush: his goal, as stated to the United Nations

[11] The Republic of South Vietnam: 1954-1975. George C. Herring notes that the South Vietnamese military officials often padded role calls and military benefit disbursements and simply pocketed the money. Ngo Dinh Diem, the Republic’s first president, enacted harsh measures of repression against minority sects such as the Cao Dai and Buddhists. Diem was ultimately assassinated by members of his own staff in a bloody coup in November 1963. The hard-line stance and reluctance to employ measures to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam by Diem and his immediate successors certainly did not improve the situation for the fledgling government.

Good summary. :goodjob:
However a word to Bush, although off topic a bit: In this government there is no Elihu Root with enough influence. There is no Jim Parker in the Iraq. In contrast due to the questionable interpretation of the constitution Bush himself is a problem of pacification. In contrast to the atrocities committed then, I do not doubt that most of the crimes made at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are ordered from very high above. I would not be surprised if Bush himself had to do with that! Also the situation in Germany and Japan were both also different as here no colonized people were but states which had a functional law system and democracy before the dictatorship of a certain Austrian resp. some officers after the world economy crise. However it is the best example to make a caomparison as all historical comparisons are faulty in some way.

Adler

thanks mate :)

however, i bet there will indeed be a "James Parker of Iraq". we just don't know of him yet. although i agree that no comparison is flawless. it's just that there are similarities that should, at the least, be analyzed.

agreed that there is no Elihu Root in the Bush Admin. his equivelant would be Rummsfeld and i don't think that he can be favorably compared to the former. as a matter of fact, i'm surprised Rummy has even lasted as long as he has.

as for the attrocities...yea...it is very likely that the attrocities committed in the P.I. weren't authorized from high up. however, i have doubts that the Bush Admin orderer the Abu Graib torturing. to be honest, i would think that they were extremely peesed off over it as it did a lot of damage (from a PR angle). Guantanimo is another story althogether i reckon as W seems to have has his finger on the pulse of that hot-button issue.

i agree about your Germany and Japan assessments. however, actual methods of civic reconstruction are transferable i think (from an engineering and man power perspective). the existing infrastructure though definitely sped up the time tables.

lastly - here is a link to the civ3conquests scenario for this topic:

http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=131400

it's a pretty neat play and much different (and smaller) than all of my other works.

Read the conclusion only today. Thank you El Justo for the excellent series of works. :goodjob:

I found this particularly interesting:
His failure to secure official diplomatic recognition was the first sign that the Republic was doomed. Of course, this was not entirely Aguinaldo’s fault.
IMO aside from the revolutionaries' own governing deficiencies, another problem was the timing itself. The late 19th century - early 20th century was a world totally different from today. You do not do a regime change without some colonial power hovering nearby waiting to pounce, much moreso if said transfer of power involves kicking out a weakened colonial power. Even prior to the outbreak of the revolution, Rizal and his fellow reformists like Juan Luna, Graciano Lopez Jaina etc. were doing the rounds in Europe for decades, pushing ONLY for reform, not even independence and yet being ignored by everyone. The general thinking then among those with power is: "WTH should anyone care about the desires of some little brown/yellow/black/colored people?"

In contrast I think Sun Yat Sen's revolution in China succeeded because he was able to get on good terms with the foreign powers before anything else. He was Christian, he had cut his queue and dressed in suits (remarkable for a Chinese because it was then illegal, nothing much for a Filipino), and he was against monarchic rule and for democracy. To him and his fellow revolutionaries of the time, the Japanese, the Americans and the Europeans were friends, and bailed them out of trouble more than once. His influence was probably what prevented an outright partition of China ala Africa after the fall of the Qing, which could have happened if it were replaced by just another dynasty which the colonial powers would have no need to respect.

My thanks also, El J (with appreciation to Dann and Adler17 for their insightful comments).

thanks guys :D

Dann:
no doubt the Yanks fleeced Aguinaldo and led him to believe (initially at least - the ambassadors and Dewey) that Aguinaldo and the Republic had a future.

i remember reading one passage about the First Battle of Manila against the Spanish hold-outs in May 1898. the Filipinos had already been dug in for some time around the outskirts of the city and when the Americans came in, they wanted to occupy some of these advantageous positions to lauch assaults from. however, since Aguinaldo and his troops occupied these spots, the Americans offered Aguinaldo several pieces of artillery in exchange for abandoning some of these locales. Aguinaldo accepted and vacated these positions. however, the American arty pieces were never sent over in return. :rolleyes:

the bottom line is that the US most definitely strung Aguinaldo et als along for the opening rounds of the conflict between Spain and the US.

i am glad to see that Aguinbaldo is remembered well in the P.I. (as he should be imo).

a few other notes on Aguinaldo (to the non-native Filipino ;) )
he was chastised by many after his alleged cooperation w/ the Japanese occupiers during WW2. it is imo that he was literally held at gunpoint and forced to cooperate. he took a lot of flak for that one though (undeservadly so imo).

i think i noted it in a footnote along the way but Aguinaldo was actually given back the sword that was pictured in some many photos; it was taken from him after he was captured in '01 by Funston and the Macabebes. iirc, there was a ceremony where official US State Dept officials gave the sabre back to Aguinaldo. this was in the early 1960s i reckon...just before his death.

Dann:
one last thing - how are the Macabebes regarded today in connection w/ Philippine history? i'm curious to find out how Filipinos feel about his...

...a few other notes on Aguinaldo (to the non-native Filipino ;) )
he was chastised by many after his alleged cooperation w/ the Japanese occupiers during WW2. it is imo that he was literally held at gunpoint and forced to cooperate. he took a lot of flak for that one though (undeservadly so imo)....
The Japanese forced a lot of people to cooperate during WW2. Anyone who refused was shot, including the then Chief Justice Abad Santos. Others like Jose Laurel et al cooperated and served as a buffer between the Japanese overlords and the people, possibly saving quite a lot more necks that would have been lost had the kempeitai been allowed to rule the place directly. People shouldn't blame Aguinaldo for that. Besides, how old was he by then?
Dann:
one last thing - how are the Macabebes regarded today in connection w/ Philippine history? i'm curious to find out how Filipinos feel about his...
Traitorous scum, of course. :D Nah, just kidding. Filipinos are generally uninterested in history. Even their own. :( What captures their attention is MTV, showbiz gossip and the NBA. Ask them about Macabebe and some might be able to reply: "It's a place in Pampanga." :sad:

Really. One of the usual phrases Filipinos use to dismiss anything as passe and antiquated is: "Panahon pa ni Jose Rizal yan." Rough translation: "That already belongs to the dustbins of history. Not of interest to us." :sad:

thanks Dann.

i reckon Aguinaldo was in his 70s when the Japanese occupied the Islands.

heh...Filipino 'yoots ain't no different from American ones!

that's an interesting quoute you posted there. thanks for sharing!

Good read, El Justo! :thumbsup:


There certainly is a very strong and warm bond between the two countries especially since so many Philippinos have ended up living here.

Including the father of my fiancé. She is Mexican-Filipina. :)

Good read, El Justo! :thumbsup:


Including the father of my fiancé. She is Mexican-Filipina. :)
hey thanks :D

it's an interesting topic for sure.

Here is a painting from the U.S. Army of an engagement with the Moros.

that's a sharp looking painting :goodjob:

is that the famous colt .45?

You are correct sir!:thumbsup: Notice also that some of the Moros are wearing steel armor.

I guess I ought to wake up and do some AoI work. :sleep: :mischief:

http://www.nps.gov/prsf/history/buffalo_soldiers/images/9th_cav_sf.jpg
Troop E, 9th Cavalry at the Presidio in San Francisco before shipping out to the Philippines, 1900. if you close enough, you'll notice that the entire troop is African American (save the officers). these soldiers fought bravely in most instances depsite experiencing tremendous racism from their own commrades. i remember reading some diary entries by on e of the soldiers from Troop E and he wondered why he should try to do the Army's job of providing civic reconstruction to a foreign peoples when African Americans do not recieve it state-side. this is a great point i reckon...



An interesting note in the insurrection is David Fagen, a black infantryman from the 24th infantry division that defected to the Phillipino side, was quickly promoted by the phillipinos, and did quite a bit of damage to the Americans

http://www.blackpast.org/?q=aaw/fagen-david-1875

interesting. thanks for sharing that.

Prior to 1521, we never had a national identity in the first place. The Spanish were the ones who gave us the idea of Las Islas Filipinas. Before Legaspi's conquistadores came all there was here was "Datu Kalantiaw's domain", "Rajah Humabon's domain" etc. etc.

But basically we felt cheated. Christian Filipinos today, being the devout and God-fearing Catholics that they are, are actually grateful to the Spanish for bringing along Christianity and making them different from the neighboring Muslims. But they hate the abuses, the mismanagement, and the long time being kept in the dark, uneducated and ignorant.


Aglipayan Church included as result of spanish mistreatment. Filipino here too.

David Fagen, I presume is the only american who did that.

there were others for sure. however, due to the racial climate in the US at the time, African Americans often felt disenfranchised, especially when carrying out the so-called "white man's burden". so it is not hard to imagine why this occurred.

the americans did do some good in the P.I. with regard to the Church. Taft and Root stripped the friars of their lands and redistributed them to the tenants and others. now, this can be seen as eminent domain gone wild...or as a realistic and somewhat altruistic attempt to award these tenants and peasants a few acres of land for their own. the friars, it should be noted, had an absolute grip on these lands for centuries...and it perpetuated the drastic class divisions on the islands. so this "defrocking" was a good thing that the Spanish certainly would never had done had they not lost them. also, Taft himself went to the Vatican to broker the deal. and this was at the time a dicey political move considering the anti-catholic sentiment in the US at the turn of the 20th century.

Wow, big necro and most everyone is still around.

I studied this recently for an essay on American imperialism around the Spanish-American War. Wish I'd had this to reference then, although my tutor probably wouldn't have been impressed with a video-games forum as a source. Good read.

this is text copied from my undergrad history thesis. so it's not just a "video game forum" post...i mean, i have hard copies of it, ripe w/ citations etc.

Wow, big necro and most everyone is still around.
We never left. :D

*lurk, lurk.*

been doing some more research on this stuff lately...especially the counterinsurgency efforts by the americans in what they called the First District of Northern Luzon. it eventually was renamed the First District of Luzon in mid-1900.

anyhow, some interesting info re american pacification efforts up here. it covers the provinces of La Union and Ilocos Norte in northwestern Luzon.

some nutshell tidbits -

US efforts up here (it was detatched from the main us forces near manila which is roughly speaking in central Luzon) were a mixed bag. Brig Gen Samuel B. M. Young landed some troops here in 1899 to try and sweep out the revolutionaries and to also hem in Aguinaldo as he made his escape northward. iirc, there werre about 4000 US troops that landed near Vigan. anyhow, they were tasked w/ destroying the "Tinio Brigade" which was one of the last 'regular' infantry groups that the Filipinos had left after sustaining devestating casualties in early 1899. Manuel Tinio, who was one of the finest Filipino officers during the war, was tasked w/ covering Aguinaldo's escape northwards. and he and his men paid a really heavy price.

despite the American successes in Ilocos Norte (Tinio's Brigade was nearly wiped out), hte revolutionaries did manage to establish quite a network of "shadow governments" throughout the province. General Elwell Otis, commanding general for US forces in the PI at the time, urged quick transitions to civli-military governments under the watch of US officers. well, on paper this looked fine. however, the presidentes and jefes, under intense pressure from the guerrillas, provided substantial support and materiel to the revolutionary cause. it took several months for American forces to truly discover the extent of the duplicity (an officer named Johnston published an investigative report that Linn suggests is one of the first in the PI to uncover the true extent of the duplicity present in NW Luzon - Johnston was aided by a Guardia d'Honor leader named Patajo who was at odds w/ the revolutionary cause and "sold out" many rebels). anyhow, once the cat was out of the proverbial bag, stricter measures where put into effect (G.O. 100, a document governing American conduct of war from the US Civil War was rescucitated as well as another newly created directive) and, long story short, US forces, on a shoe-string allocation of troops, were able to use coercion and the threat of massive force...to quell the insurgency.

one point to note about US pacification efforts in NW Luzon was Lt Col Robert L. Howze. this officer had won a Medal of Honor during the Indian Wars and Linn paints quite a picture of this fellow. "Magnanimous but firm" was one term used...i'll try and dig up some more info from my notes. however, he used a "realist" approach (utilized Patajo immensely, leaned heavily on Johnston's report) despite a great deal of push back from the HQ in Manila (Otis is said to have despised Howze's methods). nonetheless, Linn, who is perhaps the foremost authority on the is war (prof at Texas A&M iirc, Military Studies), noted how Howze's approach almost singlehandedly changed the US Army's perception of the war (ie not just a war against Tagalogs and [I]ladrones butr one against a wide range of revolutionaries).

^Now that's more chaos that I know.

been doing some more research on northern Luzon from about late 1899 through mid to late 1901.

this time, it's the Fourth District, Dept of Northern Luzon with the ever so colorful Frederick Funston in command.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/7/79/FredFunston.jpg
Funston in Cuban uniform

the Fourth District was centered in the province of Nueva Ecija which is really located in central Luzon although the Americans categorized it as part of "Northern Luzon". Nueva Ecija is considered to be one of the leading rice producing areas in Luzon and sits at the edge of the Luzon Plains.

http://www.globalpinoy.com/images/newtravel/maps/necija_map_bg.jpg

the insurgency in this area differed greatly in both intensity and composition compared to the First District (La Union & the Ilocos provinces). unlike those provinces, there was not a firmly established guerrilla network of govt in Nueva Ecija. granted, it was present although not nearly on the scale of the First District where duplicity ran amok (ie shadow govt's, double agents among civilian leaders, etc). Linn blames much of this on the commanding guerrilla officer in Nueva Ecija, Lacuna (can't recall his first name atm). it's asserted that he either couldn't establish a substantive support network for the rebels or he was simply incapable of it (as opposed to La Union, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur where the guerrilla presence was omnipresent). it is also claimed that the ethnic breakdown of the region (Ilocanos, some Tagalogs, Macabebes) prevented cohesion wrt the insurgency (ie conflicting ethnicities).

back to Funston -- he is perhaps the most famous American soldier from the war as he is credited with the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo (http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9900E6DC103DEE32A2575AC2A9659C946097D6CF) in 1901. however, despite the controversy surrounding these exploits, this colorful character earned some pretty nice reviews by Linn. he noted how Funston had a unique background since he served with the Cuban rebels during their campaign to evict the Spanish from Cuba (1896 iirc). thus Linn claims that Funston was uniquely suited as a former guerrilla to actually fight and root out his new guerrilla adversaries in Nueva Ecija. now, the Americans had a much easier go at it here in this province since there was little need to root out duplicitous Filipinos serving on the American constructed civil govts throughout Nueva Ecija (this was rampant in the First District). unlike in the First District, Funston did not install civil govt's in Nueva Ecija upon arrival. this contributed greatly to the issues faced in the First District. instead, Funston decided to pacify first and then install the govts.

one other thing that Funston used very well was intel. he leaned heavily on Johnston's formative report, Patajo and his Guardia de Honor contacts, as well as his own intel acquisitions. it is believed that the capture of nearly 2 year's worth of Lacuna's administrative papers helped lead to the discovery of the elusive Aguinaldo's hideout - and subsequent capture - of the Filipino president. at least Linn suggests that this was a major factor in Funston's capture of him.

I might have to spend some time reading this string of posts, as it looks pretty good. However, anyone who knows the history behind the adoption of the .45 automatic as the standard US sidearm for so many years, knows about the war in the Philippines, or should. The lack of stopping power of the .38 Colt revolver pushed the US towards the adoption of the .45 caliber for its standard handgun.

yes, the Moro Rebellion on Mindanao was difficult and the .38 just didn't have enough 'kick' as the charging rebels simply wouldn't go down.