Interested in learning more about this bit of Portuguese history (the coup d'etat and the period that followed, attempted counter-coups, decolonization, socialism, etc.) Can anyone point me to a good book or article?

I checked the Wikipedia, but the articles there seem really weak.

I'm too tired right now, but I'll give you a good summary later. There are a few good books, but (afaik) only in portuguese.

Of perhaps I should rewrite wikipedia's entry on the subject.

I'm too tired right now, but I'll give you a good summary later. There are a few good books, but (afaik) only in portuguese.

Of perhaps I should rewrite wikipedia's entry on the subject.

Thanks. Either one will work. :)

OK, the Carnation Revolution... damn, I wasn't really thinking when I promised a good summary of that - it can't be both good and a summary.

Any good explanation would have to go back to the First Republic (1910), its failure, and how the dictatorship of Salazar was established. About the First Republic I'll give my opinion that it was worst than the constitutional monarchy it replaced, and lost so much credit, after countless government changes and coups, that a temporary military dictatorship was eventually welcomed by most of the population. Salazar maneuvered very skillfully to become the country's strongmen by pushing is idea of a corporatist (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporativist) "Estado Novo", and eventually gained the support of most of the elites. This support was slightly shaken among the intellectuals after WW2 ended, but they were a tiny fraction of the population. The vast majority was illiterate or nearly so, and couldn't care less about democracy - especially as many still remembered the instability and mock democracy of the First Republic.
Things started to change in the late 1950s. The military were one of the main supports of the regime (the catholic church and the political police were the others) . But several generals, especially those involved with NATO, felt that corporatism and dictatorship were outdated and that Portugal must have a democratic regime. However Salazar was by then firmly in control of the state, and simply replaced them, manipulated elections, and had the most vocal one murdered.
They were also hampered by their unwillingness to consider what was by then already a clear problem for the future: the future of Portugal's colonial possessions.

Then the colonial war started in 1961, a process which finally led, directly, to the Carnation Revolution 13 years later. Portugal had, at the time, a small army, in keep with Salazar's aversion to public spending and his fear of a coup against him. The start of the colonial war, in northern Angola, was, in retrospect, easy to predict, but portuguese authorities were caught off-guard.
The organizer of the initial stage of the Colonial War in Angola (Holden Roberto, an unscrupulous bastard impressed with Franz Fannon's tactics, convinced he had noble blood and would reestablish the 16th century Kingdom of Congo, and financed and encouraged by the US Kennedy administration - ) used a shock strategy that had a few years earlier succeeded in making the belgians leave Congo - his movement, UPA (later renamed FNLA), an ethnic-based nationalist movement, launched a series of attacks against white settlers and their african employees, killing a few thousand people in particularly gruesome ways. Simultaneously the US Kennedy administration sponsored a military coup in Portugal against the government and demanded that it grant independence to its colonies. All these things combined had the exact opposite effect of what the Kennedy administration intended: Salazar defeated the coup, gained better control of the military, denounced UPA as a band of murderers, and united the country to fight the colonial war. The rebellion was crushed within a few months, with a series of massacres now by the colonists and the portuguese soldiers against the populations of the rebellious zones (the rebels success depended on shock value, not on military superiority, and that had failed and indeed turned against them). But this rebellion was quickly followed by several others, sponsored by the USSR, independent african states, China, and several other Cold War players in the African theater.
It should be nothed that even before the events in northern Angola there had already been some small open rebellions (also ending in massacres) in early 1961, in Cassange and in Luanda - both exposing the large rift between white settlers and native africans, and how easily they could turn on each other. But while these were clear signs of troubles to come they were not yet a war.

Later in 1961 India would forcefully annexed three small portuguese enclaves, and the military stationed there would refused to be sacrificed in some "heroic last stand" to provide diplomatic ammunition to the portuguese government. The government declared them cowards and traitors, blaming them for the loss of the enclaves and thus relations between the government and the military would got to a very low point. If this had happened previously to the american treachery Salazar's Estado Novo would have probably collapsed. As it was he used the old excuse of "external enemies" to keep himself in power.

The colonial war went on to absorb ever greater portion of the government's budget and ever-increasing numbers of soldiers. Tens of thousands of youths fled the country, mostly to France, first to escape poverty and then (after some surprisingly fast economic growth during the 1960s) to avoid military service. Opposition parties in Portugal gained power, most notably the illegal but long-established Communist Party in the new industrial belts that surrounded Lisbon. Salazar was forced to abandon his old strategy of perpetuating the Estado Novo by limiting people's education (educated people tend to give more importance to democracy and other political ideologies) as the war requires a modern economy and that requires social evolution. The dictatorship was crumbling due to those economic and social changes, that were changing the country from an agrarian to an industrial/urban one. Despite these changes the political police, the control of propaganda by the government, and the economic growth kept popular resentment at the government in check in the late 60s and early 70s - no popular movement would start a revolution - but they would quickly join one.

In the meanwhile, strangely, the colonial war had gotten to an impasse. The small territory of portuguese Guinea was proving indefensible, but in Angola the situation had been controlled, with the independence movements more concerned with fighting each other than the portuguese authorities (foreshadowing the civil war that would ravage post-independence Angola). In Mozambique FRELIMO was gaining some ground, but clearly unable to do much harm to portuguese economic interests. The Kennedy administration was gone, and with it the old Eisenhower doctrine of breaking european hold over colonial territories ti turn them into american areas of influence (already used in the Middle east, 1956). Now the US was experiencing its equivalent of a colonial war, in Vietnam, and american policymakers were terrified of having the "third world" falling under the USSR's influence - The US, France, Belgium, Israel, South Africa and a few other states had economic and strategic interests in the portuguese colonies, and kept their own agents there, but were in the 1970s supporting the portuguese government, even while publicly denouncing portuguese colonialism.

It would be the costs of the colonial war, both human and financial, that would open the way to the Carnation Revolution. Economic growth had slowed, due to mounting expanses, increasing corruption, and the 1973 oil crisis (strangely the portuguese dictatorship had been slow in exploiting the oil in Angola and other colonies, but given a few more years it would probably have made the oil shock proficable). Emigration, now mostly due to the war, was robbing the country of necessary workers. Most people understood that the war could only have a political solution, not a military one, but giving up the colonies was the one thing the Estado Novo could not survive, after all the propaganda linking it to the effort to keep them, and making them look like inalienable portuguese territory. In 1973 one important general published a book that openly challenged the government's colonial policy (through proposing an unworkable solution, a confederation between Portugal and its colonies). No one was satisfied, but no one knew what to do (apart from the communists, who had long advocated simply granting independence to the colonies, a still unpopular platform with the elites and part of the population). The elites understood that Portugal would cease to exist as a sovereign state if it gave up the colonies, but continuing the colonial war was also undesirable. The regime was fragile, but remained in power now mostly out of inertia.

There had been a small problem brewing in the military: due to lack of trained officers the government had legislated that conscripted soldiers could be promoted (with a short course in the Military Academy) to captains and integrated into the professional army, continuing a military career from there, and eventually being promoted above the regular graduates form the Military Academy, and in less time.
The officer corps itself had already changed, going from an "aristocracy" where sons tended to follow their father's military carriers, to a mixed collection of people from different social backgrounds, as the Academy had been expanded in response to an expanding army.
It was these officers that were ready to do the unthinkable to the more traditionalist ones: reunite to put political pressure on the government for the review of a law they considered unfair. After a first meeting with a few dozen captains another was set, and another... eventually hundreds of captains gathered, and started discussing the government itself. The government knew, but initially dismissed the discontentment, and later either feared to intervene or was unaware that the discussion had turned to political subjects.
The captains, in the meanwhile,. concluded that the military had been placed in an impossible position, where it would be blamed by the governments for any setbacks in the war, but could never win and put an end to it, because the nature of the problem was political, not military. But the nature of the regime prevented any political solution (at the time, only independence was viable) to the war.
Thus they decided that the regime had to go! In keep with their social origins (mostly popular, as opposed to the traditional "aristocratic" officer corps) and with the ideas of the time, they decided to overthrow the regime and establish a democratic government. After the revolution they would spend over a year trying to understand with what "democracy" meant :D But I'll leave the revolution itself, and what happened afterwards, as for a next post.

Sorry for writing up such a long text just on the background of the revolution.

Oh, about books in Portuguese: by far the best I read and can recommend is "Os Militares na Revolução de Abril. O Conselho da Revolução e a Transição para a Democracia em Portugal (1974-1976). Lisboa, Campo da Comunicação, 2006.

This is part of the Maria Inácia Rezola's doctorate thesis, "O Processo de Transição para a Democracia em Portugal e o Conselho da Revolução", which unfortunately can only be consulted in her former university. The part that has been published covers the events of late 1974 and 1975. She published another book recently, but I haven't read it yet.

Brown University publishes an online journal of Portuguese/Brazilian history. You will find various interesting topics here discussed at Anglophone graduate studies level. I'm linking to an article which basically takes you through the Kennedy/Salazar Goa crisis at the United Nations.

http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/

Edit: my link only takes you to the general topics. Go to Volume 2, Number 1, then the article called "About Face...". I think this is the type of thing you might be interested in.

Brown University publishes an online journal of Portuguese/Brazilian history. You will find various interesting topics here discussed at Anglophone graduate studies level. I'm linking to an article which basically takes you through the Kennedy/Salazar Goa crisis at the United Nations.

http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/

Edit: my link only takes you to the general topics. Go to Volume 2, Number 1, then the article called "About Face...". I think this is the type of thing you might be interested in.

It's a good summary, except for one think: it doesn't discuss the motives behind the apparent Kennedy's administration policy changes. And the important part here is that those changes were apparent. The goal, increase US influence in the world, was always there.

Throughout the whole portuguese colonial war, and afterwards during the Angolan civil wars, US corporations managed to keep exploring Cabinda's oil. Those corporations provided all the financial support that the "communist" MPLA regime needed to fight and eventually win the civil war, Strange? No, it only goes to show how foreign relations work. Ideology is a cover, what matters are the particular interests at stake in a particular region. Governments well in control of their foreign policy will use ideology as a tool. It's true (as american diplomats are quoted as noting) that it takes some time (for them only couple of years) to replace one propaganda for its opposite, but unless the government is weak they'll manage...

By the middle 1950s it was clear than european colonialism in Africa and Asia was doomed. The Eisenhower administration could sense the way the wind was blowing and reshaped its foreign policy to support the independence of the new states as they appeared, seeking to become patrons of the new governments and bound them with american interests - it amounted to a transfer of areas of influence. The USSR, of course, was doing the same thing, and the governments of France and Britain were doing what they could to keep their influence in the areas from where they were withdrawing their direct administration. Eisenhower tested the new policy of supporting new states as they emerged, in order to draw them to the american area of influence as allies before the soviets did the same thing. Kennedy only continued this policy. And the policy was reversed, by the middle 1960s, simply because the soviets were proving more adept that the US at influencing the governments of the newly-independent nations.

The captains who gathered to address carrier problems first decided that a military coup would be necessary in December 1973. The political programme, and even the issue of the colonial war, was left open. A small commission was tasked with preparing the necessary programme. A first draft done by March 5th, 1974, calling for a political end to the colonial war and a democratic government in Portugal that would be able to do so.

Military coups in Portugal, even during the Estado Novo period, were not entirely unusual, the government had already survived a few. And they did suspect something was about to happen: several captains who had been leading the secret meetings were transferred to the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira before the coup, clearly showing that the government was at least aware of agitation within their ranks and taking steps to prevent further meetings.
General Spínola’s book criticizing the government (“Portugal e o Futuro”) was published in February 1974. As a consequence the government took steps to make sure the top officers remained loyal, arranging for a public display of loyalty in March 14th, 1974. Two generals with a history of criticizing the government (Spínola and Costa Gomes), who refused to take part in this, were dismissed from their duties. They would later occupy, one after the other, the office of president during the two years of the revolution. The ones who attended were older and less charismatic generals who quickly became known as the “rheumatism brigade”.
But the captain’s discontentment caused little concern among the government - they were seen as unable to carry out a coup without direction from officers above. This despite warnings from the political police. Normally this police (DGS) would arrest any opposition figures that were deemed dangerous, but they fared to act on their won against the military. And with good reason, the captains had weapons and were willing to fight back, unlike the usual victims of the DGS.

In March 16th, 1974 there was a first, small, military rebellion, in reaction to the discharge of Spínola. The leaders had been in touch with the Captain’s movement, but were unwilling to wait for the preparation of a careful coup. They advanced towards Lisbon, only to find themselves isolated and quickly surrender - 200 were arrested. The failure of this rebellion may have given a false sense of victory and security to some of the regime’s figures - the spínolistas had made their move and failed.

Preparations among the captains for a proper coup continued. Otelo was tasked with the preparation of the tactical plan and Melo Antunes with the political program. Information on the armed forces, police and other possible supporters of the government was collected and more officers were contacted to ascertain who would support and who would oppose a coup. In early April first Spínola and then Costa Gomes were contacted to discuss the organization of a new government after the revolution. Costa Gomes was noncommittal. Spínola sought to introduce provisions for the formation of a military government and keeping the DGS, but was unable to push these changes.

By April 16th the operations plan was ready, together with contingency plan for the seizure of power in Guinea in case the revolution failed in Portugal. The political plan was ready by the 22nd. Radio transmitters for communications were distributed and a signal was agreed upon to start the revolution: the transmission of two songs by one of the national radio stations. On the 24th the communications of the government, police forces and the army’s general staff were tapped. On that night the captains disclosed the planned revolution to their units and moved to arrest the few officers who refuse to join. Throughout the country the captains and other officers who joined roused their units and start moving towards their preset objectives: radio stations, television and their transmitters, the military regional headquarters, major roads and bridges, airports, air bases, the Tagus river estuary (artillery, to discourage any attempt by the navy to support the government), communication hubs, the national bank and national mint, several barracks of paramilitary police forces, and the main government offices. Forces loyal to the government only became aware of the revolution by the end of the night. The prime minister and part of his government holed up on a police (GNR, paramilitary) barracks inside Lisbon.

The government attempted a reaction, but most of the military forces were already arrayed against it. Soldiers on the only relevant force that it managed to field, mechanized infantry and a few tanks, refused on several occasions obey orders to shoot the rebels – right in front of the army ministry. The minister, who had been there and had his cabined chief by the window screaming orders to the officers on the street, ran away through a hole in the wall to an adjoining building. These forces finally adhered to the revolution and the police barracks with the prime-minister had taken refuge were surrounded.
Everywhere the remaining military units abandoned the regime, despite some officer’s stubborn attempts to order attacks.
The prime-minister (after a few persuading shots against the building by the military surrounding it) agreed to surrender, but only to a general (claiming to be unwilling to let the power “fall to the street”), and demanded Spinola’s presence. This event, unforeseen by the MFA (movement of the armed forces, the former captain’s movement), placed Spínola in a position to claim leadership on the post-revolution period, for which the MFA intended to invite Costa Gomes.

The only bloodshed happened by the political police’s headquarters. After the first communications on radio announced the revolution and the political program of the MFA, and as it became clear that the regime was overthrown, the city’s inhabitants took to the streets to celebrate, and a crown gathered by the DGS headquarters demanding the immediate release of the political prisoners being held there. Before the military could divert enough forces to force their surrender the agents in the building opened fire on the crowd, killing 4 people. The building was later also surrounded, and the DGS surrendered after the government collapsed and the military guaranteed the security of the agents.

Spínola started attempting to concentrate power on himself right on the 25th, and demands changes to the program of the MFA, in particular the removal of the commitments to grant independence to the colonies and to dismantle the political police. That would be the start of a clash that would last until Spínola's resignation in September 1974.

Wow... my grandparents left portugal because my uncle would have been forced to fight in Angola (he later went back to portugal, ironically enough), but ive never heard the whole story...

Oh, this was just a quick overview of the story :D

And it gets more interesting after the revolution, for the one and a half year (April 1974 - November 1975) during which the fate of both Portugal and its colonies was disputed by several factions - most of which appeared, changed, and disappeared in this short time.
I'm not going to write in depth about that, at least not now (unless someone is interested). I'll just say that the period as so fertile in political changes that is still today interpreted very differently by people on the "right" or on the "left" (or rather, "lefts"). Originally the leftist views predominated, currently a lot of people have been busy rewriting that piece of portuguese history to make it seem that the revolution was unnecessary and, probably, a "mistake" - somehow always neglecting to explain exactly how the colonial issue could have been resolved in any other way :rolleyes: . As someone who stands on the "left" I like seeing how the "right" still fears and feels the need to deny the experiences of those wild months.

From April to September 1974 little happened. Spínola blocked as many changes as he could, and procrastinated on a decision on the colonial issue. But with both the people and the military tired of the war, and seeing that Spinola's plans would require its resumption, he finally lost all support (among the military and the nascent political parties) and resigned. The year that followed became known as the "ongoing revolutionary process". Economic power in Portugal was concentrated on a few families, most with heavy investments also on the colonies. Their economic power was anchored on a few banks, and not only the Communist Party and the small radical leftist parties but also those occupying the "political center" (wishing to ride the wave), soon began demanding the nationalization of these - which in effect meant the nationalization of most of the big companies. The past (inevitable) complicity of these families with the former regime, and their support of Spínola, were one of the motives invoked. Another would be accusations of "economic sabotage", as they moved as much wealth as they could out of the country. And finally this move was simply the natural one for the 1960s-70s left.

The prospect of independence for the colonies (with the inevitable severing of most of the economic ties), combined with the oil shock, had damaged the economy. The uncertainty regarding Portugal's future, caused by the revolution, was probably a minor factor, compared to these. The portuguese "economic miracle" had ended only a few years after it had began. The portuguese "right", to this day, complains that the revolution, and especially the nationalizations, destroyed a flourishing economy. The "left" complains that the wealth then nationalized had been gained exploiting the colonies and the workers, and that after the revolution the wealthy decided to forsake their country and flee with what they could take with them, instead of staying and helping during a period of painful changes. I don't think both sides will ever agree.
And it was indeed a hard period. After independence the vast majority of the white population in the colonies fled, losing most of their property on the process. Most (over half a million) returned to Portugal (then with 8.6 million inhabitants) penniless.

All the colonies (except Timor-leste, occupied by Indonesia) gained independence by the end 1975. Only Mozambique and especially Angola were economically important and had a large white population. In Mozambique FRELIMO was the only guerrilla movement and took over power, imposing a strict soviet-inspired communist regime and taking over most of the private property in the country. Scared white settlers, and a few africans, fled the country, most to South Africa, a significant number to Venezuela, and the rest to Portugal. The economy of Mozambique (or at least industry, services and construction) froze. In Angola there were three "liberation movements" (or rather, three new factions interesting in exploiting the country) - FNLA, still with american support but by now Mobutu's tool in an attempt to control Angola and its oil wealth; UNITA, formerly allied with portuguese authorities and by 1975 seeking help from South Africa; and MPLA, marxist, supported by the USSR and directly by Cuba. Portuguese authorities helped MPLA in quashing an attempt at secession by the oil-rich Cabinda enclave, even before independence, and left that faction in control of the capital by the independence day - this faction had the advantage of not being ethnically-based (the other two were, which led directly to racism against other african groups and whites - through they were quick enough to accept military support from whoever offered it) and having weaker, less directly interested patrons - therefore leaving more space for some remaining portuguese influence. It was also the faction most capable of holding the country together, either of the others would turn it into a fiefdom of either Zaire or South Africa.

The revolution changed a lot more than the economy or the politics. Women were finally free to seek divorce without facing near-unsurmountable barriers. They were also finally able to have a live without requiring authorization from their husbands for nearly everything: opening bank accounts, asking for passports, voting, owning houses, working as judges or policewoman, etc. Censorship that had stifled arts and leisure ceased to exist, leading to a cultural eruption (or rather, a leisure eruption - even something as previously unthinkable as porn cinemas appeared). Young man no longer had to fear being dragged into a war for three years, and could finally do something as simple as forming family before their late 20s or, for those who married young, being with their sons ans they grew. Oddly enough, many actually benefited from the years of the colonial war, which despite the hardships gave them a first opportunity to leave their towns and know vastly different realities.

Social security (including pensions) and medical assistance was extended to the whole population. Medics became available, for the first time, in all the municipalities and even most small villages in 1975. Tuberculosis and typhoid fever were finally controlled by the late 70s. Child mortality plunged. The catholic church definitively lost its stranglehold over the population of even the smaller villages. The nationalization of the large financial-industrial groups that had sectoral monopolies on the economy left some space for younger entrepreneurs who lacked the traditional family connections to start their own businesses. Local authorities started being elected, instead of being appointed by the government from among the local wealthy families - these local tyrants who had abused their power to remain wealthy were replaced by elected politicians (who later proceeded to abuse their power to benefit from corruption, but in a much lesses extent that the previous abuses). The new municipal powers expanded the very incomplete water supply systems and started building sewage systems, even in provincial towns and villages. The military lost relevance once the colonies were gone, and after the revolutionary period ceased being relevant to politics. The police stopped policing customs. Most of the political class was replaced - a time of opportunities of witch opportunists as well as idealists availed themselves.

These changes had been fought or stalled by the old regime, and when they became suddenly possible people went into it with a passion. The revolution relaxed all restriction (as most revolutions do), and this also included negative changes. The uncontrolled and unplanned growth of the larger cities, with what could only be described as shanty towns rising. A large informal economy prospered. These have left a legacy of problems. For some 15 years public powers could only try to keep up with these changes, even going as far as providing public services for illegal neighbourhoods. These problems had to be slowly dealt with later. But all things considered, I believe the "social miracle" of the 1970s was more impressive than the "economic miracle" of the 1960s - the first was certainly a prerequisite to the second, but the revolution, all of its excesses included, was a necessary outlet for the social tensions caused by these quick changes, and one that allowed them to happen without violence.