Are there any which do not involve being cut off from supply. Generally this is because of being in enemy territory, in an unihabitable region or desert, or both.

Some obvious examples:
Alexander's retreat from India
Julian's invasion of Persia
Napoleans retreat from Moscow
Germany's Eastern Front

J

I wouldn't call the Eastern Front a complete disaster for Germany (I assume this is World War II), I mean, not in the same league as Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. I'd say the Germans performed remarkably well even though seriously outnumbered, and facing an industrially superior foe. Even as the line moved regressively, the Germans continued to cause numerous problems for the Russians, though had Hitler been more of a fan of flexible defense, they could have arguably cause far more problems, but the best example of that being done successfuly is the events surrounding Operation STAR and the ensuing Third Battle of Kharkov.

Now, for a complete German military disaster on the Eastern Front, you need look no further than the collossal Battle of Minsk, where all of Army Group Center was surrounded and annhilated because of Hitler's incredibly retarded order not to retreat for any reason.

Another nomination would be Crassus' war with Parthia, and the climax at Carrhae.

Still further, during the War of Jenkins' Ear, the British siege of Cartagena, and their catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Spanish.

Another one would be the Second Goguryeo-Sui War, and the disaster at Salsu.

This makes a good read about all kinds of military blunders..

Great Military Blunders by Geoffrey Regan (http://www.amazon.com/Great-Military-Blunders-Geoffrey-Regan/dp/0752218980)

Good book with some quite unbeliavable madness.

My contribution; the charge of light brigade (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charge_of_the_Light_Brigade)

"C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre." ("It is magnificent, but it is not war.") Rarely quoted, but he continued: "C'est de la folie"- "it is madness."

One good example is the inept French defense of Dienbienphu in 1954. Believing the Vietnamese
had no artillery they tryied to effect a static defense of a valley ringed by mountains and seriously underestimated their enemy. Gen. Giap brought in over 300 artillery pieces and thousands of
shells on bicycles and simply pounded the French to oblivion.;)

Singapore 1941
Force Z's sinking 1941
Falklands War Land Campaign for Argentina 1982
Operation Market Garden 1944
Little BigHorn 1876
Battle of Midway 1942
Battle of Isandlwana 1879
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest AD 9

How about the Invincible Armada?

The Battle of Lepanto, where the superior Ottoman Navy was crushed, helped make the Mediterranean a European Ocean once again.

Anything battle involving Pyhrus.

Another one would be the Second Goguryeo-Sui War, and the disaster at Salsu.

I think Salsu has to take the biscuit here. When you recieve casualties of about 300,000 in combat against a force numbering about 10,000 you know something is seriously wrong. When this leads to the failure of a million-men strong invasion force and the collapse of your dynasty I think you've set the bar for failure pretty damn high!

You could check out:

Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (Paperback)
by Eliot A. Cohen (Author), John Gooch (Author)

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Misfortunes-Anatomy-Failure-War/dp/0679732969

Operation Market Garden was a disaster.

Pretty much everything of W.W. 1 was also a disaster.

The Vietnam War was pretty much a definition of a military disaster.

People already took the ones I knew of...

Tsushima. It became a common noun for "disaster".

cannae, 216 bc

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae

Adrianople 378 and Nikopolis, 1396. Both involving besieging armies being caught by surprise by another army that wasn't supposed to be there. Vienna 1683 is one of these with the Turks being annihilated in the middle.

Salsu's a really good one.

Tactically, I'd throw in the Seige of Malta. About 30,000 Ottoman professionals attacked the Knights Hospitaller in Malta. There were about 500 knights and 5,500 allies. The Ottoman forces were equipped with the very best in terms of cannon and explosive whereas the defenders had to make do with pretty ramshackle out-of-repair fortifications. The seige concluded with a decisive Knights Hospitaller victory and over 20,000 dead invaders.

Although the battle didn't strategically alter the balance of powers in the Med, it was a stunning tactical disaster for the Ottomans. It helped dispel the impression of Ottoman invincibility and served as a unifying force in the rest of Christendom. Furthermore, If Malta had fallen the Med would probably have turned into a glorified Ottaman lake.

Afganistan 2001
Iraq 2003

I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Battle of Teutoburg Forest (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Teutoburg_Forest), where three full Roman legions got crushed by German barbarians. The legions weren't defeated because they had no supplies, but because they wandered off into the woods all strung out in a line - incredibly stupid.

Afganistan 2001
Iraq 2003

Not military disasters in the slightest.

Battle of San Jacinto was pretty embarrassing.

Seige of Malta (WWII)

Not a great disaster merely for the Axis Forces lossing the Seige, but more so for the Axis refusual to take the island when it was in their power and when its position was so vital to the War in Africa.

Really Stupid Axis :p

I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Battle of Teutoburg Forest (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Teutoburg_Forest), where three full Roman legions got crushed by German barbarians. The legions weren't defeated because they had no supplies, but because they wandered off into the woods all strung out in a line - incredibly stupid.

See also Braddock's expedition during the French and Indian War. Braddock's men were confined to a narrow road with the Indians attacking from both sides.

Although there was one battle, either Harmar's or St. Clair's defeat, during the war against Little Turtle, which was just plain embarrassing. The Indians left some goods which the Americans decided to loot, and while they were looting, the Indians ambushed them.

St. Clair's defeat was really impressive. The Indians killed something three times as many at the Wabash River as the Sioux did at Little Big Horn.

Not entirely sure whether these two fit the criteria, but all three expeditions brought plenty of supplies.

Fredericksburg and Cold Harbour come to mind along with MacCellan's handling of the entire Antietam campaign and the battle itself. If you can't beat an enemy that you outnumber by nearly 2:1 after you're handed the enemy's entire plan of campaign you shouldn't be a general.

Alexander's retreat from India
How was this a disaster? He lost no battles and merely was forced by his men to stop attacking. Megas Alexandros' march back home was more of a disaster prevention IMHO; if he'd kept going, India would have eaten his army alive, logistically.
Julian's invasion of Persia
Napoleans retreat from Moscow
Thought you said that you didn't want disasters based on supply problems. :p While Iulianus' retreat was prompted by a military repulse as well as supply loss, I think that'd count.
Anything battle involving Pyhrus.
Uh, he won plenty of battles too. There's a reason Hannibal ranked him second in skill, only behind Alexandros.
I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Battle of Teutoburg Forest (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Teutoburg_Forest), where three full Roman legions got crushed by German barbarians. The legions weren't defeated because they had no supplies, but because they wandered off into the woods all strung out in a line - incredibly stupid.
Somebody did mention this. :p And the disaster wasn't just a line-of-march failure (frankly that was also due to the fact that they had a traitor, Arminius, helping guide them), it was a political one (making the Germani hate them).

I'd like to put up that battle that everybody ignores in favor of Salsu, the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields (451), which had comparable casualties. In addition, there's the Battle of Muret during the Albigensian Crusade (40,000 Aragonese get trashed by Simon de Montfort and less than a thousand knights); the Battle of Arausio (comparable numbers to Cannae on the Roman side and a loss to barbarians as opposed to a Great Captain of History like Hannibal); the Siege of Syrakousai (415-413 BC: the Athenian Empire gambles big and loses due to treachery and a narrow defeat in nightfighting); the Battle of Manzikert (a hitherto-victorious Roman army fighting the Seljuq Turks is defeated through treachery and political infighting); and the Battle of Narva (Carl XII with eight thousand Swedes massacres Peter the Great's army of 40,000 Russians in the middle of a snowstorm).

Thought you said that you didn't want disasters based on supply problems. :p While Iulianus' retreat was prompted by a military repulse as well as supply loss, I think that'd count.
Actually I gave those as example of disasters that WERE supply related.

J

Afganistan 2001
Iraq 2003
Wrong years.
The Soviets went into Afghanistan in 1978. Militarily it was not a disaster.
Iraq 2002 was an unqualified military success. The "Mission Accomplished" at the time was spot on.

Perhaps you were referring to something else.;)

J

The British defeat in the Battle of New Orleans was pretty embarrassing. British outnumbered the Americans at least 2-1 and their casualties outnumbered the Americans 20-1. A frontal assault against a fortified position didn't work out too well.

The British defeat in the Battle of New Orleans was pretty embarrassing.

Not to mention out of character since Pakenham put in a solid performance in the Peninsula.

The first naval battle of Guadalcanal.

For whom??

Well from that point of view every battle is a disaster for someone :p

However, the battle I mentioned was a disaster for the US and Australian navies not simply because they got their butts royally kicked, but they got their butts royally kicked because they screwed up by the numbers.

The US navy had the advantage in radar, but failed to develop tactics and training to make effective use of it. So in practice they would have been better off without it. They also misused the radio through failing to develop standards for it's effective use. And the command structure and dispositions of the ships contributed to giving the Japanese navy an overwhelming victory.

Fredericksburg and Cold Harbour come to mind along with MacCellan's handling of the entire Antietam campaign and the battle itself. If you can't beat an enemy that you outnumber by nearly 2:1 after you're handed the enemy's entire plan of campaign you shouldn't be a general.

Along those same lines, Hooker's disaster at Chancellorsville. I say Hooker's disaster and not Lee's miracle because it was Lee capitalizing on the usual Union SNAFU of things; most of all insubordination of Hooker, though the man himself deserves some of the blame for being beaten by an enemy force split thrice yet only half your size.


Uh, he won plenty of battles too. There's a reason Hannibal ranked him second in skill, only behind Alexandros.

You mean Livy?

Somebody did mention this. :p And the disaster wasn't just a line-of-march failure (frankly that was also due to the fact that they had a traitor, Arminius, helping guide them), it was a political one (making the Germani hate them).

It is to Varus' credit that he was able to reorganize after the initial ambush slaughter, though fully aware that he and his legions were not getting out alive. Contributing to their defeat was that at this stage, they were completely surrounded, and when pressed on from all sides at once, the legionaries lost their required diameter for maximum ass-kicking potential, and were crowded together, as at Cannae two hundred years before.

I'd like to put up that battle that everybody ignores in favor of Salsu, the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields (451), which had comparable casualties.

The casualties at Chalons were pretty evenly split between the Roman-Visigoth and Hunnic armies, though; that the Huns were forced to retreat is the only reason its considered a stratiegic Roman victory - well that, and that they managed to effectively beat the Huns without defeating them; had they crushed the Huns at Chalons, the Visigoths may well have felt obliged to nullify their alliance with the Romans; indeed, this is why the Visigoths departed the battle before it was complete.

Wrong years.
The Soviets went into Afghanistan in 1978. Militarily it was not a disaster.
Iraq 2002 was an unqualified military success. The "Mission Accomplished" at the time was spot on.

Perhaps you were referring to something else.;)

J

I think he meant the invasion of Iran in 1981. :)

Not to mention out of character since Pakenham put in a solid performance in the Peninsula.

I had something written up about Wellington's movements defending the Oporto Road, and the general harassment of Massena's huge army, including the engagement at Sabugal in March-April 1811, but CTRL+W is the bane of my posting existence. :mad: Not to single out any specific action during the defense of Portugal, of course, the strategy is what won that war, more than specific engagements; and as the harassment of supply and communication lines was ruled out by the OP, and such things were the name of the game on the Peninsula, it should probably ruled out, but it nonetheless deserves mention as a military disaster for the French and Spanish.

And finally, for another two contributions to this thread's list: The Battle of the Chains, and Al Qadisiyah, during the Arab Muslim invasion of the Sassanid Empire. The severely outnumbered Arabs (most sources say in the area of 6:1) manage to rout an enormous Persian army at Al Qadisiyah, just south of Baghdad and Ctesiphon. The Battle of the Chains, while not quite as great a force difference, still saw outnumbered Arabs decisively defeating a much larger Persian force at the mouth of the Euphrates River.

The Battle of Karánsebes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes).

You mean Livy?

Um, I do remember an account of the meting between Scipio and Hannibal, with S. asking H. whom he thought was the greatest geenral, and H. replying Alexander, then Pyrrhus.
Dialogue continued with: and then? Answer: I [Hannibal], but if I win I'll be number one...

You mean Livy?
Apocryphal stories are the most fun sometimes. :p
The casualties at Chalons were pretty evenly split between the Roman-Visigoth and Hunnic armies, though; that the Huns were forced to retreat is the only reason its considered a stratiegic Roman victory - well that, and that they managed to effectively beat the Huns without defeating them; had they crushed the Huns at Chalons, the Visigoths may well have felt obliged to nullify their alliance with the Romans; indeed, this is why the Visigoths departed the battle before it was complete.
Yeah, I also come down pretty solidly on the side of "being of great macrohistorical importance" due to my not believing it was just a raid; Attila could've put another nail into the coffin of the Empire had he won there, and as it was it managed to survive for another twenty years (if the Vandal fireships hadn't caught the Roman fleet off Carthago they might have actually survived longer...:mischief: ).

Some additions: the Battle of Forum Terebronii during the Crisis of the Third Century (the first Imperator to die in combat, Decius, was killed there; the Goths defeated an initially victorious Roman army that then pursued them into a swamp to be nearly annihilated), the naval Battle of Carthago in 468 (Vandali fireships annihilate a joint Western/Eastern Roman fleet, carrying an army meant to reconquer North Africa for the Western Empire), the Third Battle of Panipat (which stopped the Maratha Confederacy's march northwards), and the Thirty Years' War's Battle of White Mountain (Bohemian Protestants loyal to Friedrich V get beat up by Ferdinand II's men).

If the Panipat you're speaking of is the one I'm thinking of (I can't get wiki to load right now so I can't check to be sure :( ) then the Marathas were fighting the Afghans, coming south after having looted Delhi, correct?

Another battle that fits the bill:

The Battle of Ulm; perhaps the greatest turning movement in history. Napoleon outwitted the Third Coalition and put himself between them and Vienna, and captured 30,000 men without a fight from them.

Pearl Harbor anyone?

The Vietnam War was pretty much a definition of a military disaster.

Which part? The post-Paris accord South Vietnamese offensive and defense was a complete disaster. Particularly the "Ho Chi Minh offensive" for the ROV.

The Tet Offensive is quite paradoxical in that it was a military disaster for the Vietcong and a PR disaster for the Amerikans :mischief:

Wrong years.
The Soviets went into Afghanistan in 1978. Militarily it was not a disaster.
Iraq 2002 was an unqualified military success. The "Mission Accomplished" at the time was spot on.

Perhaps you were referring to something else.;)

J

Do you read the newspaper?

Strange, it seems no one mentioned the Battle of Galipoli yet.

Also, the Six Days War for the Arabs was a total pwnage by the Israelis. Others in the 20th century - Dien Bien Phu (France), Bays of Pigs (exiles + United States, the Falklands War (Argentina) and Operation Eagle Claw (United States).

As far as Vietnam is concerned, I think the fall of Da Nang could be described as the biggest military disaster since WWII. 100,000 demoralized troops fled to Da Nang and were surrounded. They tried to evacuate by ship but the timing was all screwed up and the tides prevented the ships from entering the port so they had to swim out to the ships. Only a few made it and 70,000 ROV troops surrendered soon after.

Do you read the newspaper?

Nothing about a military disaster in Afghanistan in 2001.

Except for the Taliban that is.:D

Fredericksburg and Cold Harbour come to mind along with MacCellan's handling of the entire Antietam campaign and the battle itself. If you can't beat an enemy that you outnumber by nearly 2:1 after you're handed the enemy's entire plan of campaign you shouldn't be a general.Well, kind of agree there but then again it should be always considered who he was up against. ;)

Fighting force like Army of Northern Virginia of that time with all their top men still in the ranks...who would prevail?

But Cold Harbor...

Nothing about a military disaster in Afghanistan in 2001.

Except for the Taliban that is.:D

Well americans haven't still killed all them

Maybe Obama will change the things ;)

Well americans haven't still killed all them

True but does that fact make it a military disaster on par with other examples in this thread?

True but does that fact make it a military disaster on par with other examples in this thread?

Yes but it is a relative disaster. There are more than 200.000 alone americans in Iraq/Afghanistan: they have total airl/naval superiority and they still can't kill few bands of rude men without armors equipped with sniper rifles, bazookas, mortars and improvised explosives.

The most they can do is to stay in their fortress, whilst the civil population, the cops and foreigners got killed.

I don't know who is the commander, but he is a totally idiot.

The Battle of Karánsebes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes).

We have quite a history of incidents like that. :p

There was also the famous (around here, not famous internationally) cavalry charge from WW2 (yes, you read it well, a cavalry charge in WW2) where the most elite cavalry formation, under the command of a general, charged with maximum power against a fortification which they thought was very strong and well-defended. There were many hundreds of people in that formation (not sure exactly how many, but definitely many hundreds). In fact, in that fortification there were only a grand total of 3 people, out of which one was asleep the whole time.

The other 2 soldiers, guarding on top of the fortification had 2 weapons, namely two machine-guns. The cavalry was going on the principle of the "destructive spring" (basically saying that if as the commander of a cavalry formation you order a spring forward with all your troops there is virtually no army that can stop you - principle that was true, in OLDER times), so they charged at extreme speed.

I don't know if I really need to tell you what happened next... the 2 machine-guns decimated THE WHOLE CAVALRY FORMATION, of hundreds of people, leaving NOT 1 PERSON ALIVE in it. That's a good number of hundreds (as I said I don't know exactly how many) vs 2 people.

That's a massacre way worse than even the Conquistadors killing the primitive armies of the Americas. Just think of the numbers of each side.

Of course, that doesn't qualify as a great military disaster since in the end, it was just 1 dead cavalry formation, in a time when they were long obsolete. But it sounds pretty epic if you ask me. :p

And for another example of an amazingly small army (actually it can't really be called an army) resisting a huge and successful one and a complete mistake and utter confusion on the attacker's part:

There was the siege of "Cetatea Neamtului" (literally: the German's Citadel, or the German Man's Citadel), by nobody else than the incredibly famous John III Sobieski.

Long story short, John III Sobieski with his 25,000-men army attacked this fortification, which was defended by less than 20 men (in popular legends, they were 13, but the exact number is not known), believing that it was defended by the "creme de la creme" of the Moldovan army and that contained important provisions, a siege which did end in surrender of the defending side - but which happened after more than one week! That's a ratio of attack/defense of 1666 vs 1. Which means that for every 1666 soldiers in the attacking side, there was 1 defender of the citadel. :lol:

The story is contested by some historians though, so it might not be true, or might be partially true.

A historical, but romantisized event, would have taken place probably during the early years Dimitrie Cantemir's rule in Moldavia, during the latter part of the 17th century and early 18th century. The story is as following: on their way back after raiding Moldavia, the 25 000 men-strong army of Polish king John III Sobieski came across Cetatea Neamţului, defended by less than 20 men. The Poles attacked the stronghold, believing that it contained necessary provisions. After over a week of siege, the small Moldavian garrison surrendered. Legend has it that, moved by the determined opposition from such a minuscule force, the Polish monarch granted life and free passage to the Moldavians in the garrison and gave them ranks in the Polish army.

Although a few historians contest the authenticity of this legendary siege, it nevertheless had a very important place in 19th century Romanian consciousness, finding its most popular version in Costache Negruzzi's novelette called Sobieski şi românii (Sobieski and the Romanians: the title in itself indicates his attitude towards the events described).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Cetatea_Neam%C5%A3ului

Neither of those qualify as great military disasters, but they are really interesting bits of history.

Im going to throw in the Battle Of Salamis. The total tactical defeat and the loss of around 200 ships effectively sunk Xerxe's invasion of the Peloponese, and lead to the defeat at Palatea the following spring.

This was not just a tactical disaster, it also had long reaching strategic affects. Xerxe's failures encouraged an aggressive Greek counter-attack. Much of Cyprus was liberated and Byzantium fell to combined Greek forces. The Athenian-led Delian league was formed.
It effectively ended the Persian prescence in Europe, and campaigned successfully in Pamphylia. The Athenians helped incite and potract rebellion in Egypt before achieving complete victory in Cyprus. Finally, the Peace of Callias was drawn up (449 BC). The terms of which were:

* All Greek cities of Asia were to be autonomous
* Persian satraps were not to reach closer than three days walk from the sea
* No Persian warship was to be in the area between Phaselis in Pamphylia and the Bosporus
* If the Great king and his generals were to comply the Athenians were not to campaign against Artaxerxes

So the Persian defeat at Salamis led to thirty years of pain and suffering in the Eastern Med, followed by a pretty unsavoury Peace treaty.

the Mogol invasion of Japan that got broken up by the Kamikaze. not the fault of the military, but a disaster for the military nonetheless

Do not forget Ulm and Austerlitz battles

More military catastrophes:

- Battle of Annual (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Annual) was widely regarded as a disaster at the time (by the Spanish, not the Moroccans, who regarded as a great victory). The trained Spanish soldiers outnumbered the Rif irregulars, but were massacred (Spanish losses ~20,000, Rif losses ~1000, as per wiki).

- Gallipoli (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galipoli). Allied forces (incl. ANZACs) atempt to capture Constantinople via storming high cliffs on the Gallipoli Peninsula where Ottoman machinegunners lie in wait. Heavy losses on both sides without any real gain - typically WWI battle.

- Battle of Rabaul (http://www.wesleymission.org.au/ministry/suter/070504.asp) - badly planned WWII operation sent a thousand Aussies who were vastly outnumbered by the Japanese. Eventually forced to surrender, the Australian PoWs were killed by a US submarine sinking their ship.

- Battle of Longewala (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Longewala) - In the Bangladesh War of Independence, 2000 Pakistani soldiers and 60 tanks repulsed by 120 Indian soldiers in a small outpost, before being destroyed by the Indian Air Force.

Do not forget Ulm and Austerlitz battles

I already mentioned Ulm, and I wouldn't consider Austerlitz to be a catastophe, merely a very smartly fought battle. There was no way the Allies could have known of Napoleons' corps hiding in the valley fog.

I already mentioned Ulm, and I wouldn't consider Austerlitz to be a catastophe, merely a very smartly fought battle. There was no way the Allies could have known of Napoleons' corps hiding in the valley fog.

Damn they could use some explorers. BTW the large majority of allied forces drowned in the souther lakes. For me this is a big disaster

Yes but it is a relative disaster. There are more than 200.000 alone americans in Iraq/Afghanistan: they have total airl/naval superiority and they still can't kill few bands of rude men without armors equipped with sniper rifles, bazookas, mortars and improvised explosives.

The most they can do is to stay in their fortress, whilst the civil population, the cops and foreigners got killed.

I don't know who is the commander, but he is a totally idiot.

So militarily quite a good move really, they don't want their troops dying. Perhaps from an organisational point of view a disaster but certainly not a military.

the Reconquista happened 600+ years ago, would you call that a disaster because eta are still about?

So militarily quite a good move really, they don't want their troops dying. Perhaps from an organisational point of view a disaster but certainly not a military.

the Reconquista happened 600+ years ago, would you call that a disaster because eta are still about?

Well there aren't 200.000 spanish troops in Basque country.

Well there aren't 200.000 spanish troops in Basque country.

No but there was a historical equivalent number that were there. Whilst i imagine there are still a fair number of Spanish troops in Basque country whilst it is many times smaller.

I'm not sure if anyone else has said this but the battle of Poitiers, Hundred years war. For the French, allthough militarily it was better fought than Crecy (could they have done any worse) its consequences were far larger, the destruction of much of the old French nobility and the capture of the French king pushed France further over the edge.

On that topic, surely Agincourt in 1415 deserves a mention.

Well, kind of agree there but then again it should be always considered who he was up against. ;)

Fighting force like Army of Northern Virginia of that time with all their top men still in the ranks...who would prevail?

But Cold Harbor...

The ANV and its commanders performed well in the Maryland campaign and the battle of Antietam but they didn't beat McCellan, he did. He was present the day before the battle in such force that when three of Jackson's divisions arrived half way through the day McCellan still outnumbered Lee by more than 2-1 but still didn't think he was strong enough to attack. He had Lee backed up against a river which had in that area just one crossing point. He took over direct control of the corps he commanded but failed to co-ordinate the assaults he planned, allowing Lee to move reserves to beat back each in turn. Finally despite all this he nearly won anyway because Lee's army was fought to a virtual standstill after AP Hill (Lee's last reserve of fresh troops) hurled back Burnside but was unable to do much more. Longstreet remarked that 10,000 fresh men could have walked in and captured Lee's entire army. McCellan had nearly twice that many yet refused to commit them.

Full marks to Lee for reading McCellan like a book* but the bottom line is McCellan missed a golden opportunity to wipe the ANV off the map that day, and not even the genius of Lee, Jackson or Longstreet could have prevented it had McCellan been capable enough.

*To paraphrase Pratchett one with lots of pictures and very big writing...

Along those same lines, Hooker's disaster at Chancellorsville. I say Hooker's disaster and not Lee's miracle because it was Lee capitalizing on the usual Union SNAFU of things; most of all insubordination of Hooker, though the man himself deserves some of the blame for being beaten by an enemy force split thrice yet only half your size.

Chancellorsville is a bizarre battle since Hooker's plan for the campaign was actually pretty darn good but he was let down badly by some of his subordinates and then let himself down with a couple of mistake and finally let his nerve go.

I had something written up about Wellington's movements defending the Oporto Road, and the general harassment of Massena's huge army, including the engagement at Sabugal in March-April 1811, but CTRL+W is the bane of my posting existence. Not to single out any specific action during the defense of Portugal, of course, the strategy is what won that war, more than specific engagements; and as the harassment of supply and communication lines was ruled out by the OP, and such things were the name of the game on the Peninsula, it should probably ruled out, but it nonetheless deserves mention as a military disaster for the French and Spanish.

I think if I had to pick one I'd go for a less well known battle - Barossa. 5,200 Anglo Portugese troops who had marched all night and part of the day attacked 10,160 French troops and drove them from the field, inflicting c2,380 casualties (to 1,240 suffered) and capturing an eagle in the process. The French losses probably would have been higher had the Spanish contingent (c10,000) under La Pena done more than watch the battle from a distance refusing to send help, even to persue the enemy.

Ironically the British commander at Barossa (Thomas Graham) had been pro-French revolution for a long time but whilst he was returning home with his the coffin of his late wife some French revolutionaries broke into it and molested her body. He became staunchly anti-French and joined the army, paid for the raising of a regiment from his own money and generally made a nuisance of himself for the rest of the Napoleonic wars as one of the best commanders Britain had.

We have quite a history of incidents like that. :p

There was also the famous (around here, not famous internationally) cavalry charge from WW2 (yes, you read it well, a cavalry charge in WW2)

Italian cavalry is often credited for the last successful "pure" cavalry charge in history (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_199810/ai_n8817479). Nothing like the artisan's touch, eh? :)

where the most elite cavalry formation, under the command of a general, charged with maximum power against a fortification which they thought was very strong and well-defended. There were many hundreds of people in that formation (not sure exactly how many, but definitely many hundreds). In fact, in that fortification there were only a grand total of 3 people, out of which one was asleep the whole time.

The other 2 soldiers, guarding on top of the fortification had 2 weapons, namely two machine-guns. The cavalry was going on the principle of the "destructive spring" (basically saying that if as the commander of a cavalry formation you order a spring forward with all your troops there is virtually no army that can stop you - principle that was true, in OLDER times), so they charged at extreme speed.

I don't know if I really need to tell you what happened next... the 2 machine-guns decimated THE WHOLE CAVALRY FORMATION, of hundreds of people, leaving NOT 1 PERSON ALIVE in it. That's a good number of hundreds (as I said I don't know exactly how many) vs 2 people.

That's a massacre way worse than even the Conquistadors killing the primitive armies of the Americas. Just think of the numbers of each side.

Of course, that doesn't qualify as a great military disaster since in the end, it was just 1 dead cavalry formation, in a time when they were long obsolete. But it sounds pretty epic if you ask me. :p

Incredible story. But the guy putting teh awesome in it is the third gunman sleeping all through it. I mean, the name must be revealed and placed into the Guinness book of records as the soundest sleeper of all time! :lol:

The ANV and its commanders performed well in the Maryland campaign and the battle of Antietam but they didn't beat McCellan, he did.

I agree. I think McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was an even bigger disaster though. While the Union did not suffer devastating casualties the campaign cost a lot of time and money to move the army by sea, march within a few miles of Richmond and then move the army back around by sea. Factor in that the campaign did not end the war quickly, as it could have if only McClellan had pressed on and done a little fighting, but resulted in a few more years of war - I'd say it was a great disaster.

Italian cavalry is often credited for the last successful "pure" cavalry charge in history (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_199810/ai_n8817479). Nothing like the artisan's touch, eh? :)
Wow, yeah, I had absolutely no idea that there was any successful cavalry charge in WW2. I thought we were the only primitives (:p jk) that still had those in the time.


Incredible story. But the guy putting teh awesome in it is the third gunman sleeping all through it. I mean, the name must be revealed and placed into the Guinness book of records as the soundest sleeper of all time! :lol:

Around here, the Germans are stereotyped as having terribly heavy snoring.... maybe he couldn't hear the machineguns because of that? :p

But yes, I agree, he's definitely worth to be in teh Guiness book. ;)

If the Panipat you're speaking of is the one I'm thinking of (I can't get wiki to load right now so I can't check to be sure :( ) then the Marathas were fighting the Afghans, coming south after having looted Delhi, correct?
Basically. It wasn't that close to the sack of Delhi - there was a good year's worth of maneuvering in the Punjab in between - but that's the general idea.
The Battle of Ulm; perhaps the greatest turning movement in history. Napoleon outwitted the Third Coalition and put himself between them and Vienna, and captured 30,000 men without a fight from them.
Does it count if a Great Captain of History is on the winning side? :p Kinda unfair advantage...
Damn they could use some explorers. BTW the large majority of allied forces drowned in the souther lakes. For me this is a big disaster
That's what Boney said in his bulletins, but IIRC the allies withdrew in better order than that. Unfortunately my copy of Kagan's book on the battle has been loaned out, so I can't double-check.

And to make this post more on-topic: the Franco-American siege of Savannah in the American Revolutionary War ought to qualify. Ben Lincoln and d'Estaing (and Pulaski) got thrashed by a smaller Brit force under Prevost which lost a tiny fraction of the allied casualties.

That's what Boney said in his bulletins, but IIRC the allies withdrew in better order than that. Unfortunately my copy of Kagan's book on the battle has been loaned out, so I can't double-check.


I don't know about Kagan but Duffy mentions that:

On the French side the Comte de Comeau was close enough to see what had happened, he points out that most of the Russians actually swarmed around the edges, and that even if a few platoons paddled in the water, it was not deep enough to have drowned them.

He also mentions later on in the book that:

The myth of the ponds was dispelled by the researches of the Moravian Archivist Janetschek in 1898.

But doesn't go into too much detail unfortunately.

Civil War Battles

Hood's Invasion of Tennesse - Disaster
Chickamauga - very nearly a Disaster, had Bragg pursued.
Fredricksburg - Disaster

and my favorite:

The Virginia Campaign, 1864
Grant comes from the west to take charge of the Army of the Potomac. Outnumbering Lee 2-1, Grant puts his army in every position possible to nullify his advantage. First comes The Wilderness - "oh, let's go straight back to where Hooker had problems, and fight in the same place again!" This isn't even in retrospect - I am sure that after Chancelorsville, Shiloh, etc. any commander would know that heading through thick wilderness with a large army is spelling failure. Now, your units can't even tell who-is-who, and you retain no control of your army. The Union advantage in artillery and firepower is completely negated in this difficult terrain. Next is Spotsylvania. Grant launched a head on attack against a determined enemy in a strong position. Good move :rolleyes: . Finally comes Cold Harbor, which in every respect is a disaster. 8,000 men lost in 15 minutes? Is that a joke, General? After losing 60,000 men, Grant lands himself in a siege.

Could he have done better? Hmm...let's look at Sherman's Atlanta campaign - same result, 1/6 of the casualties.

The Virginia Campaign, 1864
Grant comes from the west to take charge of the Army of the Potomac. Outnumbering Lee 2-1, Grant puts his army in every position possible to nullify his advantage. First comes The Wilderness - "oh, let's go straight back to where Hooker had problems, and fight in the same place again!" This isn't even in retrospect - I am sure that after Chancelorsville, Shiloh, etc. any commander would know that heading through thick wilderness with a large army is spelling failure. Now, your units can't even tell who-is-who, and you retain no control of your army. The Union advantage in artillery and firepower is completely negated in this difficult terrain. Next is Spotsylvania. Grant launched a head on attack against a determined enemy in a strong position. Good move . Finally comes Cold Harbor, which in every respect is a disaster. 8,000 men lost in 15 minutes? Is that a joke, General? After losing 60,000 men, Grant lands himself in a siege.

Could he have done better? Hmm...let's look at Sherman's Atlanta campaign - same result, 1/6 of the casualties.

McCellan reached the same position that Grant did after the Overland campaign with a fraction of the losses Grant suffered. The difference being that Grant wasn't inclined to let casualties and a determined enemy put him off the task at hand. Grant may have made some errors during the overland campaign but the one major plus point about him being in command was that he didn't scurry back to Washington with his tail between his legs just because the enemy won a battle or two. Nor did he intend to fight in the Wilderness, he intended to pass through it quickly and draw Lee out of the Mine Run line and engage him in the open. He should have realised that Lee would probably guess his intentions and move into the Wilderness though.

Grant had also inflicted about 30,000 casualties on Lee's men in the overland campaign. That's 30,000 men that were quite literally irreplacable to Lee and the South overall. You say "Grant lands himself in a siege" but that works both ways. Lee was unable to stop Grant like he'd stopped so many others, didn't have the manpower to engage Grant in open battle anymore and couldn't leave Petersburg without exposing Richmond. His army despite being close to the railroad suffered greater supply problems in the trenches and had heavy rates of desertion

Oh and it might be worth pointing out that Grant didn't just try unimaginative frontal assaults at Spotsylvania, when Upton struck gold with his brigade sized assault on the 10th Grant followed it up with a Corps sized attack in similar style on the 12th.

Pearl Harbor anyone?


Debatable. Certainly the Japanese managed complete tactical and strategic surprise, for which a variety of people are responsible. But considering the level of surprise they achieved, the amount of damage they did to the American ability to fight a war was pretty small.


Which part? The post-Paris accord South Vietnamese offensive and defense was a complete disaster. Particularly the "Ho Chi Minh offensive" for the ROV.

Pretty much start to finish. There were things done right from time to time, but in the long run not nearly enough.

Polk's invasion of Kentucky in the American Civil War was a blunder although I don't know if it produced that many casualties. Kentucky had declared itself neutral (the governor sympathized with the South), but Polk's invasion threw Kentucky in on the Union side, opening the entire northern border of Tennessee to Union invasion.

helped make the Mediterranean sea a European Ocean once again.
That's quite an accomplishment!

The Battle of Ulm; perhaps the greatest turning movement in history. Napoleon outwitted the Third Coalition and put himself between them and Vienna, and captured 30,000 men without a fight from them.
I have even better. Napoelon captured 30,000 men at Ulm, but he had 150,000 while Mack had only 72,000.

During the 1806 campaign against Prussia, Colonel Antoine Charles Louis Lasalle, capture the fortress of Stettin, well supplied, armed with 160 cannons and manned by 6,000 men. And Lasalle had only 500 hundreds cavalry men with him, nd scared the Prussians with wooden replica of guns!!

And that's only one of his feats (he captured the prince of Hohenlohe to capitulate at Prezlau, after a hot pursuit and a impetuous charge were he was severly outnumbered, he managed to break the Prussian). His unit got the nickname "infernal brigade"

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Antoine_Charles_Louis_Lasalle.jp g/250px-G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Antoine_Charles_Louis_Lasalle.jp g

How about the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939?

Some 400.000 dead or wounded Soviet troops compared to about 65.000 for the Finnish.

Part of the Wiki article is pretty hilarious by the way: :lol:

Initially, Finland had a mobilized army of only 180,000 men, but these troops turned out to be fierce adversaries employing small-unit surrounding "motti" tactics, fast-moving ski troops in white camouflage suits, and local knowledge. Many had spent most of their lives in the forest; the vast majority of Finns were rural dwellers until the 1950s. The conditions of the winter of 1939–40 were harsh; temperatures of −40 °C (−40 °F) were not unusual, and the Finns were able to use this to their advantage. Often, they opted not to engage the enemy in conventional warfare, instead targeting field kitchens (which were crucial for survival in the cold weather) and picking off Soviet troops huddled around camp fires.

At the beginning of the war, only those Finnish soldiers who were in active service at the time had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing, which was their normal winter clothing in many instances, with a semblance of an insignia added. These mismatched "uniforms" were nicknamed "Model Cajander" after the Prime Minister Aimo Cajander. The Finns alleviated their shortages by making extensive use of equipment, weapons and ammunition captured from the enemy. The army had not changed the calibre of its weapons after independence and was able to use Soviet ammunition. The deployment of poorly trained and badly led Soviet troops gave the advantage to the Finns, allowing the latter ample opportunities to capture war booty. Though the Finns had few anti-tank weapons, they had the Molotov cocktail, an improvised petrol bomb adapted from the Spanish Civil War, which was used with great success in destroying or disabling around 2,000 Soviet tanks. One Finnish soldier is quoted as saying: "I never knew a tank could burn for so long."

The Soviets attacked in regimental strength, with their dark uniforms easily visible against the white snow, so they were easily targeted by the Finns' snipers and machine guns. Corporal Simo Häyhä was credited with 542 confirmed kills, which probably makes him the deadliest sniper in military history. When the Red Army tried to use their own snipers, the Finns countered with the "Kylmä-Kalle" (Cold Kalle) tactic. A mannequin or other doll was dressed as a tempting target, such as an officer sloppily covering himself. Soviet snipers usually were unable to resist the target. Once the Finns determined the angle from which the shot had come, a heavy-calibre gun, such as a "Norsupyssy" ("Elephant rifle") anti-tank rifle, was fired in the Soviet sniper's direction to kill him.

Soviet inexperience, naivety, and lack of motivation were important factors in the Finnish success during the war. The attackers were not expecting much resistance; General Kirill Meretskov estimated it would take only 10 to 12 days for his 26 well-equipped 14,000-man divisions to reach Helsinki. Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border into Sweden by mistake.[15] Their propaganda had been so convincing that it was felt that the Finns would wave flags and welcome the Red Army with open arms.

Because of Stalin's purges, the commanders of the Red Army had suffered 80% peacetime losses. These were commonly replaced by people less competent but more "loyal" to their superiors, since Stalin had superseded his commanders with commissars or political officers. Tactics which were obsolete by World War I were sometimes employed.[citation needed] Tactics were strictly "by the book," because failed initiative carried a high risk of execution. Many Soviet troops were lost because commanders refused to retreat; commissars did not allow them to do so and often executed commanders who disobeyed.

The Soviet army was poorly prepared for winter warfare,[citation needed] particularly in forests,[citation needed] and heavily used vulnerable motorized vehicles. These vehicles were kept running continuously so their fuel would not freeze, which led to increased breakdowns and aggravated fuel shortages. One of the most remarkable losses in military history is the so-called "Raatteentie Incident", during the month-long Battle of Suomussalmi. The Soviet 44th Infantry Division (c. 25,000 troops) was almost completely destroyed after marching on a forest road straight into an ambush of the Finnish "Kontula detachment", a unit of 300 men. This small unit blocked the Soviet advance, while Finnish colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his 9th Division (c. 6,000 troops) cut off the retreat route, split the enemy force into smaller fragments and then destroyed it in detail. The Soviet casualties amounted to up to 23,000 men, while the Finnish lost around 800 men. In addition, the Finnish troops captured 43 tanks, 71 field and anti-aircraft cannons, 29 anti-tank cannons, AFVs, tractors, 260 trucks, 1,170 horses, infantry weapons, ammunition, medical and communication material.

The Soviet commander, Vinogradov, and two of his chief officers survived the battle. When they reached the Soviet lines four days later, they were court martialed, found guilty and sentenced to death; the executions were carried out immediately. The charge was losing 55 field kitchens to the enemy.

Following this battle, on January 7, for the disastrous failures, Kliment Voroshilov was replaced with Semyon Timoshenko as the commander of the Soviet forces in the war (and four months later as the People Commissar [Minister] of Defense as well).

The Soviets failed to take advantage of their numerical superiority at the start of the war. Finland massed 130,000 men and 500 guns in the Karelian isthmus, the main theater of the war; the Soviets attacked with only 200,000 men and 900 guns. Their 1,000 tanks were ineffectively used and took massive losses.

WinterWar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winter_War)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Antoine_Charles_Louis_Lasalle.jp g/250px-G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Antoine_Charles_Louis_Lasalle.jp g
Now that is a squirrely lookin dude.

He is the archetype of the dashing hussar officer.

I think you are setting the bar a little low in some cases people. It has not to to with simple the military defeat, but the long term consquences.

I agree. For something to qualify as a military disaster it should have far-reaching and destructive consequences for the loser. Like a potracted period of military weakness, or the fall of a monarchy. Something in that vein.

The Italian campaign against Greece at the second world war. A force outnumbering the Greek army lead in belief of total victory by arrogant Mussolini was totally destroyed.

I agree. For something to qualify as a military disaster it should have far-reaching and destructive consequences for the loser. Like a potracted period of military weakness, or the fall of a monarchy. Something in that vein.
Fine. The Battle of Magnesia. The hitherto-victorious (and freakin' genius; outside of this single event, he was doing fantastically) Antiokhos III Megas, with his vast and dazzling Seleukid army, faces off against the Roman veterans of the Second Punic War and their Pergamene allies for the hegemony of the Aegean littoral, and loses, an event that reversed his empire's fortunes, allowed Baktria and the Pahlava to reassert independence, and which confined the Arche Seleukeia beyond the Taurus Mountains, forcing them to relinquish some of their most precious provinces and territories which, unlike their other ones, usually didn't rebel. The Arche never recovered, and was slowly forced out of its Persian and Babylonian territories until by the time Pompeius Magnus came through it was a Syrian rump state, barely worthy of mention.

Would operation Barbarossa be a failure for the soviets?

Would operation Barbarossa be a failure for the soviets?

Not really... it was certainly a failure for the Germans in that the decision to turn eastwards not only drained other fronts and took away any hope of victory in Africa, but it ultimately overextended the Germans to the point of breaking. The choice to choose three objects was Hitler's worst mistake (besides not allowing retreat, and butting his head against the break wall of Stalingrad and Kursk), but going after Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad/Cacasus, he ultimately sealed the fate that none of the objectives would be captured.

The Soviets lost alot of men, thats certain, but ultimatly Germany just played the roll of a maddened rioter running into a croud armed/armored police officers... It just isn't gonna work.

I think you are setting the bar a little low in some cases people. It has not to to with simple the military defeat, but the long term consquences.

How about the battle of Tsushima Straits (May 28, 1905) during Russo–Japanese War?

If somebody has already mentioned this one, I apologize.

The Russian Baltic Fleet traveled 18,000 miles and was intercepted by the Japanese fleet, which consisted of four battleships, several cruisers, a few destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian fleet contained eight battleships, cruisers, destroyers and others for a total of 38 ships.
The Russian fleet was blown out of the water. They lost eight battleships, many smaller vessels, and more than 5,000 men. The Japanese lost three torpedo boats and 116 men. The Russians were forced to sue for peace. Russia recognized Korea as part of the Japanese sphere of influence and pulled out of Manchuria. Japan would annex Korea in 1910. Russia also signed over its rights to Port Arthur, including the naval base and the peninsula, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan.
The war was the first major victory of an Asian power over a European power in modern times. Russia lost international prestige. It was no longer feared or respected by Germany or Austria-Hungary. Russia was France's and Serbia's ally. This loss of prestige could have influenced Germany's and Austria-Hungary's later decision to go to war with those countries which resulted in World War 1.
Losing the Russo–Japanese War and Russia’s involvement in World War 1 contributed greatly to the eventual downfall of the Romanov dynasty and the formation of the U.S.S.R.

Weather messed up the Mongols when they tried to invade Japan. Alot.

the Mogol invasion of Japan that got broken up by the Kamikaze. not the fault of the military, but a disaster for the military nonetheless

indeed. this is the worst disaster ever... losing a fight almost without any major fighting... twice.... -_-"

Not really... it was certainly a failure for the Germans in that the decision to turn eastwards not only drained other fronts and took away any hope of victory in Africa, but it ultimately overextended the Germans to the point of breaking. The choice to choose three objects was Hitler's worst mistake (besides not allowing retreat, and butting his head against the break wall of Stalingrad and Kursk), but going after Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad/Cacasus, he ultimately sealed the fate that none of the objectives would be captured.

The Soviets lost alot of men, thats certain, but ultimatly Germany just played the roll of a maddened rioter running into a croud armed/armored police officers... It just isn't gonna work.

Well, the preemptive strike against Russia was probably forced upon Hitler. Hadn't Barbarossa been launched, most of the Western Europe might have had an opportunity to compare Nazi and Stalinist regimes from firsthand experience. And when a dwarf has to slash out against a giant, this is about as good as he can hope to do...

indeed. this is the worst disaster ever... losing a fight almost without any major fighting... twice.... -_-"
IIRC there was significant fighting at least the second time the Mongols came across, but the storm destroyed their supply ships (OP?) so they had to leave.

How about the battle of Tsushima Straits (May 28, 1905) during Russo–Japanese War?

If somebody has already mentioned this one, I apologize.

The Russian Baltic Fleet traveled 18,000 miles and was intercepted by the Japanese fleet, which consisted of four battleships, several cruisers, a few destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian fleet contained eight battleships, cruisers, destroyers and others for a total of 38 ships.
The Russian fleet was blown out of the water. They lost eight battleships, many smaller vessels, and more than 5,000 men. The Japanese lost three torpedo boats and 116 men. The Russians were forced to sue for peace. Russia recognized Korea as part of the Japanese sphere of influence and pulled out of Manchuria. Japan would annex Korea in 1910. Russia also signed over its rights to Port Arthur, including the naval base and the peninsula, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan.
The war was the first major victory of an Asian power over a European power in modern times. Russia lost international prestige. It was no longer feared or respected by Germany or Austria-Hungary. Russia was France's and Serbia's ally. This loss of prestige could have influenced Germany's and Austria-Hungary's later decision to go to war with those countries which resulted in World War 1.
Losing the Russo–Japanese War and Russia’s involvement in World War 1 contributed greatly to the eventual downfall of the Romanov dynasty and the formation of the U.S.S.R.


Russians had 8 Battleships, 8 Cruisers, 8 Destroyers. Japan had 4 Battleships, 8 Cruisers, 21 Destroyers, and numerous smaller torpedo boats.

The Russian strength in capital ships was negated by Japanese maneuverability.

Russians had 8 Battleships, 8 Cruisers, 8 Destroyers. Japan had 4 Battleships, 8 Cruisers, 21 Destroyers, and numerous smaller torpedo boats.
maneuverability.

Thanks for the numbers. I couldn't remember the exact breakdown of the two fleets. I should also add that only 3 Russian ships survived the battle.

IIRC there was significant fighting at least the second time the Mongols came across, but the storm destroyed their supply ships (OP?) so they had to leave.

not really... think they never even manage to secure a beachhead.... and the mongol just doesnt have any idea how to fight an amphibious battle...

its really a horrible failure...

not really... think they never even manage to secure a beachhead.... and the mongol just doesnt have any idea how to fight an amphibious battle...

its really a horrible failure...
1281. Second Mongol Expedition. The Japanese refusing to recognize Mongol suzerainty, and having mistreated and killed Mongol ambassadors, Kublai prepared a major expedition. In Mongol and Korean ships, the army sailed in two divisions from north China and Korea. Again the islands of Tsushima and Iki were captured to provide a base for operations. The invading army was probably less than 50,000. The Japanese were waiting, and a series of violent land and sea engagements took place in and off north Kyushu. The Japanese carried out a number of daring raids against the larger Mongol fleets. On land the Japanese were unable to drive the invaders into the sea, but by superior numbers and fanatic defense were able to limit their advance inland. A few days after the landing, a violent storm wrecked most of the invasion fleets. The Mongols, their supplies cut off, were soon defeated and only a few survived and escaped. Kublai planned another expedition, but never got around to it.
Could check more sources too I guess but this is the best I can do on short notice.

I want to thank Cheezy for mentioning Salsu, I've never heard of it before.

I also want to add the 1921 battle at Annual, in Morocco, to this list. Allegedly one of the worst defeats of a modern army by untrained troops ever. Spain lost 20,000 men and 129 canons to a force just 3,000 tribesmen. This defeat was serious enough to undermine the monarchy and began the movement toward a Spanish republic 10 years later.

Could check more sources too I guess but this is the best I can do on short notice.

ya, this is what i read also.... but failure to anticipate the weather and plan the invasion during the monsoon or typhoon season is just bad...

[nvm 10char etc.]

I have posted this before in some other thread but...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Raate_road

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/02/Raate_road.jpg/250px-Raate_road.jpg

Badly-equipped Finland captured 43 tanks, 71 field and anti-air guns, 29 anti-tank guns, 100 machineguns, armored cars, armored tractors, 260 trucks, 1,170 horses, infantry weapons including 6,000 rifles, one airplane, ammunition and medical equipment as war booty from the Soviets.

The Soviet commander, Vinogradov, and two of his chief officers survived the battle. When they reached the Soviet lines four days later they were court martialed, found guilty and sentenced to death; the executions were carried out immediately. They were charged with losing 55 field kitchens to the enemy.

Anyone yet say Manzikert, 1071?

Battle of Hattin, 1187 - leads to the fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

IIRC there was significant fighting at least the second time the Mongols came across, but the storm destroyed their supply ships (OP?) so they had to leave.

I believe they managed to send an advance force which landed and subsequently established a beachhead but whenever they tried to move inland was beaten by series of walls and the japanese navy, the resulting tsunami finished off any supplys coming there way whilst destroyed the fleet that had been building up near korea to invade. I think i read about it John Man- Kublai Khan.

Anyone yet say Manzikert, 1071?
I always do.
I believe they managed to send an advance force which landed and subsequently established a beachhead but whenever they tried to move inland was beaten by series of walls and the japanese navy, the resulting tsunami finished off any supplys coming there way whilst destroyed the fleet that had been building up near korea to invade. I think i read about it John Man- Kublai Khan.
Sounds a lot like what I quoted above. ;)

I stand by my point about Antietam. McCellan was handed the chance to smash Lee's army to bits and effectively take it out of play with regards to the war. His failure to do contributed directly to the conflict being protracted with all the associated costs that came with that.

I'd certainly consider that a disaster.

I stand by my point about Antietam. McCellan was handed the chance to smash Lee's army to bits and effectively take it out of play with regards to the war. His failure to do contributed directly to the conflict being protracted with all the associated costs that came with that.

I'd certainly consider that a disaster.

In retrospect, yes, it was a disaster that McClellan did not win the war that day. But during the Civil War, when that happened, it is not like the Union lost the war because McClellan did not destroy Lee. It just meant that the war would continue another 2.5 years.

In retrospect, yes, it was a disaster that McClellan did not win the war that day. But during the Civil War, when that happened, it is not like the Union lost the war because McClellan did not destroy Lee. It just meant that the war would continue another 2.5 years.

Loosing the war is but one definition of disaster. The costs of the war from Antietam - Appamatox were considerable in economic damage, lives lost and divisions caused between the two communities. McCellan crushing Lee at Antietam wouldn't have won the war that day but it would almost certainly have shortened it therfore decreasing the cost of the war.

I'm certain that McCellan didn't think that way since he was satisfied he'd done his duty but his excessive caution and lack of co-ordination on that day resulted in a disaster for the Union which whilst not on the scale of loosing the war was still considerable.

I wonder who would have taken command had he been incapacitated and whether they would have done better?

Loosing the war is but one definition of disaster. The costs of the war from Antietam - Appamatox were considerable in economic damage, lives lost and divisions caused between the two communities. McCellan crushing Lee at Antietam wouldn't have won the war that day but it would almost certainly have shortened it therfore decreasing the cost of the war.

I'm certain that McCellan didn't think that way since he was satisfied he'd done his duty but his excessive caution and lack of co-ordination on that day resulted in a disaster for the Union which whilst not on the scale of loosing the war was still considerable.

A very good point. It was disasterous in terms of lives lost, the financial cost, etc. I understand your point there, and now I agree with it. But history books won't call it a disaster, because it didn't have any immediate losses for the North. Granted, again, I agree with what you said, but that can go for Gettysburg, Chickamauga, etc. Had the one side done more, it would have been disasterous for the other. But I think it would have been called a disaster had Lee lost, because I cannot see the war continueing for more than a few months if Lee's army was captured/destroyed.

I wonder who would have taken command had he been incapacitated and whether they would have done better?

Honestly, I think even Sumner, Hooker, and even Burnside could have done better.

I think it's a disaster in this forum when talking about Great military disasters that only disasters that caused something major to the side or made it suffer which is then that it should be considered as disaster.

In other words, it's strange how sins are forgiven if the side has then finally prevailed. I never understood how winning a war can turn to thoughts so that losing battle isn't that big deal militarilily.

It was disasterous in terms of lives lost, the financial cost, etc. I understand your point there, and now I agree with it. But history books won't call it a disaster, because it didn't have any immediate losses for the North. Granted, again, I agree with what you said, but that can go for Gettysburg, Chickamauga, etc. Had the one side done more, it would have been disasterous for the other. But I think it would have been called a disaster had Lee lost, because I cannot see the war continueing for more than a few months if Lee's army was captured/destroyed.I'm sorry but it's rather stupid not to call something a military disaster to one side but not to the other (not saying you are doing that).

As you said South wouldn't have probably survived such disaster so why allow such to North and not call it a disaster?

Personally I think also calling some of the Grant's actions as disaster is also clearly understandable because in the lead of southerners Grant wouldn't have succeeded with the same tactics since he based into the thinking he could lose so much and South had always more to lose. That's it pretty much the reason he prevailed with Lee. He endured him after array of battles because North could lose so much without losing the war when South couldn't afford even near that much.

Full marks to Lee for reading McClellan like a book* but the bottom line is McCellan missed a golden opportunity to wipe the ANV off the map that day, and not even the genius of Lee, Jackson or Longstreet could have prevented it had McCellan been capable enough.Like said, I kind agree there (then again how much McCellan was scared of ANV trio which caused him to hesitate?) but my point was to raise the question in general how much disasters could be counted towards the other side succeeding compared to the mistakes that are made. Sometimes there is fine line between genius move by the winning side and disaster move by the other side but rather often it's much more hazy.

I'm sorry but it's rather stupid not to call something a military disaster to one side but not to the other (not saying you are doing that).

As you said South wouldn't have probably survived such disaster so why allow such to North and not call it a disaster?

What I am saying is that a what-if scenario can be applied to several battles, much the same way it happens at antietam. For example, Chickamauga. Had Bragg followed Rosecran's rout, than the battle would have been disasterous for the Union. But he did not, and as such it wasn't a disaster.

Cleared up for you now? :)

A very good point. It was disasterous in terms of lives lost, the financial cost, etc. I understand your point there, and now I agree with it.But history books won't call it a disaster, because it didn't have any immediate losses for the North. Granted, again, I agree with what you said, but that can go for Gettysburg, Chickamauga, etc. Had the one side done more, it would have been disasterous for the other. But I think it would have been called a disaster had Lee lost, because I cannot see the war continueing for more than a few months if Lee's army was captured/destroyed.

Well many history books shy away from openly addressing the issue of counter factual history, and many that do prefer to think of the "what ifs" for the South winning (much the same as WW2 what ifs tend to talk about the Nazis turning the tables on the allies). Lincoln certainly thought it was enough of a sucess to issue the Emancipation proclomation and Lee's invasion was turned back, so in the immediate strategic sense it was a victory. In a tactical sense he failed, and that lead to a missed opportunity for an even greater strategic success.

I suppose a better term than disaster would be a glorious missed opportunity but never mind.

Honestly, I think even Sumner, Hooker, and even Burnside could have done better.

I agree, especially in the case of Hooker. Unfortunately had any of them taken command after the battle began it would have taken them time to get up to speed with what was happening. McCellan had taken full control over each corps but his orders for the battle didn't think to inform each commander of what role the other corps would be assigned that day. This coupled with McCellan spending all day on the eastern bank of the Antietam Creek meant that there was little or no co-ordination between the attacks.

Like said, I kind agree there (then again how much McCellan was scared of ANV trio which caused him to hesitate?) but my point was to raise the question in general how much disasters could be counted towards the other side succeeding compared to the mistakes that are made. Sometimes there is fine line between genius move by the winning side and disaster move by the other side but rather often it's much more hazy.

Usually there's some element of both, and certainly the ANV fought very hard to maintain its position, with Lee making superb use of reserves. I also agree that McCellan was worried about his opponent and believe this probably played a part in not committing his two reserve corps at the end of the battle. Having said that however the AoP nearly won the battle despite his inefficiency, so for this battle the problem still remains more one of McCellan beating himself than Lee beating McCellan.

I agree, especially in the case of Hooker.
So long as he doesn't get 'shell-shock' again, his planning would actually be pretty brilliant. :goodjob:

What I am saying is that a what-if scenario can be applied to several battles, much the same way it happens at antietam. For example, Chickamauga. Had Bragg followed Rosecran's rout, than the battle would have been disasterous for the Union. But he did not, and as such it wasn't a disaster.

Cleared up for you now? :)Yeah I understand.

Like I made also my point towards the subject considering the other side of things but I think it has lot to do how we define "disaster".

If we are only looking militarily IMO it always leads to the question of expectations for at least "average performance" based into the troops in leader's disposal and things like supply and circustances in the battle field.

Example we can ask/answers in many different ways was Gettysburg military disaster for South? Surely parts were but then again we can see what they were up against so we could maybe say it makes it less of disaster. Then some detailed parts like Pickett's Charge as standalone act could be seen as completely disaster or just one last act of desperation.

This whole thing considered in this thread depends so much of how we define the disaster and also how much we put weight into different elements of the battle and how much we consider it being more of win for one than a loss for the another.
Usually there's some element of both, and certainly the ANV fought very hard to maintain its position, with Lee making superb use of reserves. I also agree that McCellan was worried about his opponent and believe this probably played a part in not committing his two reserve corps at the end of the battle. Having said that however the AoP nearly won the battle despite his inefficiency, so for this battle the problem still remains more one of McCellan beating himself than Lee beating McCellan. I think Lee and co. had psychological edge over most northern leaders especially McClellan. I think one of the defining aspects of Lee's success was his boldness which in many times is the quality that general can express his intentions through his troops and make a difference during the course of the battle. McClellan in the other hand seemed to lack the very quality of it.

I think Antietam for ANV was very much mediocre battle and just used it's opportunities of exploiting the weakness of McClellan and northern army like so many other times.

And I agree. It's more of the question of kind of stalemate battle which was namely won by Lee but actually who made the mess out of it and for the North was McClellan himself.

But my point was that even when McClellan was weak in what-if scenario facing someone else than that deadly trio the result could have been very different.

I think Lee and co. had psychological edge over most northern leaders especially McClellan. I think one of the defining aspects of Lee's success was his boldness which in many times is the quality that general can express his intentions through his troops and make a difference during the course of the battle. McClellan in the other hand seemed to lack the very quality of it.

Well McCellan's main forte was organisation and training of soldiers. As much as I deride his qualities as a battlefield commander the fact remains that he helped to forge the disparate elements of the Northern forces around Washington into a coherent army and helped train it to a competent level. He was undoubtedly very popular with the men also. As you say though he lacked any ability to impose his will on campaign and during battles.

But my point was that even when McClellan was weak in what-if scenario facing someone else than that deadly trio the result could have been very different.

To be honest no-one but Lee was likely to have fought at Antietam in the first place, most probably would have withdrawn beforehand. Lee took a serious gamble putting his army in that position and to be frank gained very little from the battle other than the plaudits that came from holding the position in the face of such a numerically superior foe. It did little to change the strategic situation other than reduce his army by a sizeable figure of men that he could ill afford to loose.

Having said that had another general been in charge of the ANV for the battle the chances are that McCellan would have employed the same level of caution anyway. He didn't show much more initative against McGruder or Johnston in the Peninsula for example, and Johnston wasn't exactly the most agressive of generals that the south had. I would say therefore that whilst its possible that McCellan might have beaten an ANV without its best commanders its not particularly likely.

Well McCellan's main forte was organisation and training of soldiers. As much as I deride his qualities as a battlefield commander the fact remains that he helped to forge the disparate elements of the Northern forces around Washington into a coherent army and helped train it to a competent level. He was undoubtedly very popular with the men also. As you say though he lacked any ability to impose his will on campaign and during battles.I think we're on the same page with that one, McClellan was an orgaziner but not really a battle commander which would need him to control not only his troops but basically the battle itself and opponent as well.

Then again we can always ask were his subordinates up for the task either?
But it's clear what we know about McClellan's orders that he made the position for his commanders very difficult especially when being against foe like ANV.
To be honest no-one but Lee was likely to have fought at Antietam in the first place, most probably would have withdrawn beforehand. Lee took a serious gamble putting his army in that position and to be frank gained very little from the battle other than the plaudits that came from holding the position in the face of such a numerically superior foe. It did little to change the strategic situation other than reduce his army by a sizeable figure of men that he could ill afford to loose.I think he wanted to bloody the nose of the Union and it's very possible he saw that there was such chance with McClellan. It was simply a ballsy move and I believe Lee somehow believed that battle like that could turn the fate for the South. It's very possible it's the same he believed would happen in Gettysburg as well.
Having said that had another general been in charge of the ANV for the battle the chances are that McCellan would have employed the same level of caution anyway. He didn't show much more initative against McGruder or Johnston in the Peninsula for example, and Johnston wasn't exactly the most agressive of generals that the south had. I would say therefore that whilst its possible that McCellan might have beaten an ANV without its best commanders its not particularly likely.Yeah, we can ponder that but then again like you said, hardly anyone other than Lee would have chosen Antietam as battling ground. Also I think Antietam wouldn't have been such high loss for the union if those three wouldn't have been supervising the resistance.

Like said I believe McClellan had problems with his leadership and didn't understand the importance of aggression. Maybe he counted too much towards the numbers he had against Lee and co. Funnily enough add more than touch of aggression and determination to go forward with larger campaign plan to McClellan and you almost get Grant. ;)

But in general like I said I consider Antietam being stalemate battle were the other side has numbers but not the will to fight and the other side has the tactical advantage and also the desire to impose his will to the opponent. Results are usually like that. Considering again that for South the reason it could be considered a loss is because it has always had weakers numbers than North, so it simply couldn't afford such losses or battles. I think in general this is the defining aspect of the US civil war. North could always lose and then come back but South could never afford to lose.

OF course the disastreous element of the whole ordeal is that McClellan had Lee''s plans, which makes it very good reason to add to the disasters list on almost it's own. Add to that the superior numbers and only you can really ask is what happened George?

IIRC, Lee had only 25,000 men when the battle began, while McClellan had 80,000. Really, Lee's invasion wasn't daring or dashing, I think it was suicidal. He hopes to aggressively beat McClellan, but that is not possible simply because, even with McClellan in command, 50,000 men cannot hope to attack a 90,000-110,000 strong army and hope to win. Sure, it was a gutsy move, but I don't see how Lee thought he was going to win.

Wouldn't a retreat into Virginia have been better? I mean, Davis always wanted a campaign of defense, so would it have been so devastating to retreat and wait for a better opprotunity to fight?

Then again we can always ask were his subordinates up for the task either?

I'd back Hooker to give Lee a harder time than McCellan did. His performance to that point was reasonable and showed enough agression to pull it off. Porter was about as cautious as McCellan (part of why McCellan refused to commit to an attack late at Antietam was because Porter disagreed with it) so was unlikely to do any better. Franklin and Sumner were competent enough and Mansfield was old but eager. Burnside was rather an enigma whose performances peaked and troughed a little too much to say either way.

I think of all of them Sumner was probably senior corps commander, or at least he was during the Seven Days battles. Hooker's probably the only one you could rely on to definately do better (always assuming as has been said that he didn't have a loss of nerve or get injured) than McCellan I would say.

Like said I believe McClellan had problems with his leadership and didn't understand the importance of aggression. Maybe he counted too much towards the numbers he had against Lee and co. Funnily enough add more than touch of aggression and determination to go forward with larger campaign plan to McClellan and you almost get Grant.

Possibly although its hard to imagine McCellan ever coming up with the Vicksburg campaign.

But in general like I said I consider Antietam being stalemate battle were the other side has numbers but not the will to fight and the other side has the tactical advantage and also the desire to impose his will to the opponent. Results are usually like that. Considering again that for South the reason it could be considered a loss is because it has always had weakers numbers than North, so it simply couldn't afford such losses or battles. I think in general this is the defining aspect of the US civil war. North could always lose and then come back but South could never afford to lose.

Antietam and the Maryland campaign could also be considered a defeat because most of the aims of the campaign failed. Although the war moved out of Virginia briefly there was no massive influx of Marylanders to Lee's army. The lack of a major victory meant that the tentative thoughts Britain had towards intervention were put on hold. The withdrawl ended any hope that Maryland might be swayed to join the Confederacy. The first of and third of these weren't a major blow since by and large anyone who was likely to throw their lot in with the Confederacy probably would have done so by then. Since Britain did seriously to consider recognition/intervention during that period however the failure to secure a victory in the Maryland campaign coupled with a similar failure in Kentucky had much more impact.

OF course the disastreous element of the whole ordeal is that McClellan had Lee''s plans, which makes it very good reason to add to the disasters list on almost it's own. Add to that the superior numbers and only you can really ask is what happened George?

Indeed.

IIRC, Lee had only 25,000 men when the battle began, while McClellan had 80,000.

That's probably closer to the figure the day before since Lee had about 40-45,000 effectives on the field of Antietam and I doubt that AP Hill's troops (Lee's only significant body of men not present at the opening of the battle) constituted 15-20,000 men on their own.

Really, Lee's invasion wasn't daring or dashing, I think it was suicidal. He hopes to aggressively beat McClellan, but that is not possible simply because, even with McClellan in command, 50,000 men cannot hope to attack a 90,000-110,000 strong army and hope to win. Sure, it was a gutsy move, but I don't see how Lee thought he was going to win.

Its quite possible that he wanted to attack isolated elements of McCellan's army, defeating each in turn whilst McCellan blundered around trying to protect Washington. Little Mc barely held the city when he knew what Lee was up to, god only knows what would have happened if he'd been in the dark.

Wouldn't a retreat into Virginia have been better? I mean, Davis always wanted a campaign of defense, so would it have been so devastating to retreat and wait for a better opprotunity to fight?

Lee was concious of the effect on the Virginia farms and communities the war passed through and eager to take the war into the North to allow those communities time to recover. He also argued that the presence of a Southern army might inspire Southern sympathisers in Northern states, especially if it could win a sizeable victory. Unknown to either Lee or Davis, but hoped for by the latter it may also have brought Britain to at least offer mediation if not intervention. Simply defending Richmond wasn't likely to do any more than give the North the freedom to come back again harder.

But Sharpsburg is right across the Potomac. It isn't a "grand invasion" of the Union. Its trespassing a couple miles over the border.

Lee was concious of the effect on the Virginia farms and communities the war passed through and eager to take the war into the North to allow those communities time to recover. He also argued that the presence of a Southern army might inspire Southern sympathisers in Northern states, especially if it could win a sizeable victory. Unknown to either Lee or Davis, but hoped for by the latter it may also have brought Britain to at least offer mediation if not intervention. Simply defending Richmond wasn't likely to do any more than give the North the freedom to come back again harder.

As far as this effect goes, whether it was for this reason or that Maryland was a slave-owning state, 22% of our men who fought in the war did so for the Confederacy. I know that my county had a very pro-Southern stance, and it was precisely for that reason that a POW Camp was built at Pt. Lookout: it put Union soldiers in the county, who could do more than just guard duty.

But Sharpsburg is right across the Potomac. It isn't a "grand invasion" of the Union. Its trespassing a couple miles over the border.

I don't think it mattered whether it was a raid or an invasion, what mattered was to take for theatre of war away from Virginia and retain the initative gained by the victory at 2nd Bull Run rather than sitting back on the defensive and allowing the North to dictate where the next campaign would take place. Davis wanted the threat to Richmond removed and Lee argued convincingly that that the best way to do that was to carry the war onto Northern soil.

The British in the form of Palmerston and Russell didn't much care whether it was an invasion or raid either since in their rather narrow view the North were getting nowhere fast and one last defeat would be enough to warrant taking a hand in events.

I'd back Hooker to give Lee a harder time than McCellan did. His performance to that point was reasonable and showed enough agression to pull it off. Porter was about as cautious as McCellan (part of why McCellan refused to commit to an attack late at Antietam was because Porter disagreed with it) so was unlikely to do any better. Franklin and Sumner were competent enough and Mansfield was old but eager. Burnside was rather an enigma whose performances peaked and troughed a little too much to say either way.

I think of all of them Sumner was probably senior corps commander, or at least he was during the Seven Days battles. Hooker's probably the only one you could rely on to definately do better (always assuming as has been said that he didn't have a loss of nerve or get injured) than McCellan I would say.You're probably right. Then again none of them made anything spectacular in Antietam IIRC but probably at least most of them pulled their weight and where more of victim of the circumstances which was partly (great part, must be added) the fault of McClellan and his inability to move forward and also communicate in proper way with his fellow officers.
Possibly although its hard to imagine McCellan ever coming up with the Vicksburg campaign.I see McClellan as organizer for military operations but not certainly a planner or firebrand instigator. Maybe he could have get some sort of role as staff sergeant to fit his talents better. Ok, now I'm being almost too obnoxious.

McClellan IMO saw whole his task as some kind of police operation towards the southern forces. I think this is clearly displayed especially how he managed always be so overly cautious and especially how he handled the Lee's army's withdrawal from Antietam. It seems like he considered it was enough to take that amount of forces and move them to specific place with his own rhythm and then everything would work ok. But without that tip of aggression the whole spear is useless. McClellan seemed not to know this.

It's one of those attributes of humans, that killer instinct that allows making decisive moves and act accordingly. Some people have it, some people don't. Lee and Grant definately had it and I think it kind of rises them above most leaders of that war. It's possible McClellan could have achieved it over time but I think the Seven days battle series really hurt him. And I think he lost his faith to himself. It might have even effect towards his corps commanders.
Antietam and the Maryland campaign could also be considered a defeat because most of the aims of the campaign failed. Although the war moved out of Virginia briefly there was no massive influx of Marylanders to Lee's army. The lack of a major victory meant that the tentative thoughts Britain had towards intervention were put on hold. The withdrawl ended any hope that Maryland might be swayed to join the Confederacy. The first of and third of these weren't a major blow since by and large anyone who was likely to throw their lot in with the Confederacy probably would have done so by then. Since Britain did seriously to consider recognition/intervention during that period however the failure to secure a victory in the Maryland campaign coupled with a similar failure in Kentucky had much more impact.But those are mostly political goals so if we look just the military side of things Maryland campaign could be only considered to be more of like inconclusive than defeat.

I think all along (even with Antietam which seems so crazy!) Lee was looking forward for that perfect win in major battle that would change the course of the war. I personally believe that was actually the reason why Lee made some bit strange decisions also later. He thought it was his chance to make anything drastic to change the outcome.

Unfortunately as said the odds never favoured Lee or the South. The reason was always behind the inability of anyone in south to determine proper campaign goals (they were almost lingering on straws if we really consider the realism of the goals of Maryland campaign originally) and basically all victories were bittersweet. Pulling a victory never seemed to achieve them nothing but maybe some more time but always assured some more lost good men which they simply couldn't affored and ultimately lost cause.

You're probably right. Then again none of them made anything spectacular in Antietam IIRC but probably at least most of them pulled their weight and where more of victim of the circumstances which was partly (great part, must be added) the fault of McClellan and his inability to move forward and also communicate in proper way with his fellow officers.

Burnside performed badly in his efforts to get across the bridge that bears his name then falling prey to pessemism later on in the battle, but its hard to say how much of this was him being obstinate to McCellan after his perceived demotion. Porter has a black mark against him for arguing against pushing Lee towards the close of the battle. Sumner was attacked after the battle and heavily criticised by historians ever since but recent research suggests he didn't do as badly as people have thought. The remainder mostly didn't do too badly but as you say were hampered by the fact that whatever moves they made were isolated from those of other commands making it easy for Lee to switch reserves to meet the threat.

I see McClellan as organizer for military operations but not certainly a planner or firebrand instigator. Maybe he could have get some sort of role as staff sergeant to fit his talents better. Ok, now I'm being almost too obnoxious.

He would have made a good staff officer but the problem was that McCellan's big ego and near total lack of diplomacy and respect for many of those around him would have alienated anyone he was assigned to.

McClellan IMO saw whole his task as some kind of police operation towards the southern forces. I think this is clearly displayed especially how he managed always be so overly cautious and especially how he handled the Lee's army's withdrawal from Antietam. It seems like he considered it was enough to take that amount of forces and move them to specific place with his own rhythm and then everything would work ok. But without that tip of aggression the whole spear is useless. McClellan seemed not to know this.

It's one of those attributes of humans, that killer instinct that allows making decisive moves and act accordingly. Some people have it, some people don't. Lee and Grant definately had it and I think it kind of rises them above most leaders of that war. It's possible McClellan could have achieved it over time but I think the Seven days battle series really hurt him. And I think he lost his faith to himself. It might have even effect towards his corps commanders.

There's been some suggestion that he didn't believe in prosecuting the war to the fullest like say Grant or Sherman clearly did. I think he believed in preserving the Union and wanted what amounted to almost a return to the pre-civil war situation. Unfortunately he appeared unaware that this was unlikely given the amount of blood shed and the irrevocable stances of the two parties.

But those are mostly political goals so if we look just the military side of things Maryland campaign could be only considered to be more of like inconclusive than defeat.

That might be true but I don't see any reason to treat the results of a battle from a purely military viewpoint when assessing success or failure. Generals fight battles to achieve a change in both the military and political situation, they don't operate in a vaccum and frequently base their decisions on what political consequences may arise. Hood for example stood next to no chance of shifting Sherman from his positions around Atlanta but knowing that he'd been put in charge with the specific aim of attacking Sherman and driving him back he had little choice but to do so.

I think all along (even with Antietam which seems so crazy!) Lee was looking forward for that perfect win in major battle that would change the course of the war. I personally believe that was actually the reason why Lee made some bit strange decisions also later. He thought it was his chance to make anything drastic to change the outcome.

Unfortunately as said the odds never favoured Lee or the South. The reason was always behind the inability of anyone in south to determine proper campaign goals (they were almost lingering on straws if we really consider the realism of the goals of Maryland campaign originally) and basically all victories were bittersweet. Pulling a victory never seemed to achieve them nothing but maybe some more time but always assured some more lost good men which they simply couldn't affored and ultimately lost cause.

There's a lot of truth in what you are saying here, but I believe that was just one aspect a;beit an important one of how Lee made his decisions.

I don't recall if anyone mentioned Midway, which was certainly a disaster for the Japanese.

Burnside performed badly in his efforts to get across the bridge that bears his name then falling prey to pessemism later on in the battle, but its hard to say how much of this was him being obstinate to McCellan after his perceived demotion. Porter has a black mark against him for arguing against pushing Lee towards the close of the battle. Sumner was attacked after the battle and heavily criticised by historians ever since but recent research suggests he didn't do as badly as people have thought. The remainder mostly didn't do too badly but as you say were hampered by the fact that whatever moves they made were isolated from those of other commands making it easy for Lee to switch reserves to meet the threat.I must admit it's been some time I last actually looked into the issue of Antietam so I cannot possibly remember everything but pretty much that is the general picture I gather as well.

However I think it's always important question to ask since example if we consider Gettysburg and Lee & Longstreet, we can see that almost anyone can not to get along with each other in pivotal moments and it can have dire consequences. Who's fault it is depends greatly of many factors so it's possible that we might little bit are too tough for McClellan and it's possible example certain subordinates failures played also part in McClellan's hesitation to commit to the battle. I doubt it, but I cannot recall any better the course of the battle.
He would have made a good staff officer ...unlikely given the amount of blood shed and the irrevocable stances of the two parties.I cannot anything but agree with your view of McClellan.

Like already said, I think he just lacked the edge that would have been required from the general of his position especially when being against foe like ANV.
That might be true but I don't see any reason to treat the results of a battle from a purely military viewpoint when assessing success or failure. Generals fight battles to achieve a change in both the military and political situation, they don't operate in a vaccum and frequently base their decisions on what political consequences may arise. Hood for example stood next to no chance of shifting Sherman from his positions around Atlanta but knowing that he'd been put in charge with the specific aim of attacking Sherman and driving him back he had little choice but to do so.I kind of disagree here.

I think it all depends what we are defining and measuring. Even if Maryland campaign might have indirect goals (like that of gaining momentum from the public etc.) when considering the military aspects we have to concentrate into the direct military consequences rather than something that cannot even be clearly defined.

I have found extremely hard in the past to debate with some other people about history that see history of warfare somehow always related to the politics and not being able to see the actual tactical and strategical side of the warfare without the politics. Even though it's clear military is always tied to the politics it's also dire mistake think that in the battlefield where it's about the survival of your troops and possibility of gaining military advantage that politics play such big part in them. Politics can be seen as setting goals for battles and campaign which we can later rate as of success or failure based into the specific criteria and politics can motivate generals do decisions in the field towards specific goal but when considering the military aspect only I think politics must be set aside and ponder only those immediate results rather than something that might or might not be result of military operation. As mentioned though and being one of the themes I have mentioned that these politics do play part as psychological factors for armies and their leaders when they plan their actions but purely militarily they are just that, psychological factors and not raw data that can be gathered and analyzed.

Otherwise we're dead on water with history that is straight line without the possibility of creating those What-if scenarios and really analyzing military decisions or their actual results from military pov.

Example in case of Antietam it's clearly almost impossible to rate a result for both sides that would have caused example Lincoln not to make his declaration or that would have caused foreign power to show their sympathy towards South. We can even ask was that kind of success for South could have been possible in those circumstances so are we measuring their military success with a stick that has wrong scale on it, after all if we consider the political goals as the defining aspect of success and failure of Maryland campaign?

And if Maryland campaign was defeat for South it must be victory to North and we might ask with what grounds if considering the military aspects? What were their goals? Is that they didn't lose more ground good enough for an excuse when they didn't use their superior man power to overwhelm their opponent and make it beg for mercy? I don't think neither of the sides militarily achieved anything special so that's why I consider it inconclusive. There are some points favouring either of the sides though so in the end the rating of the result depends how you value example man losses.

I think this is very important question considering the whole issue of this particular thread and that is how military success or failure can be measured.

I consider it almost strange that winning side like that of Union can get away with lots of stuff militarily just because the side won and reached the political goals while Condeferacy's success is always measured from also political viewpoint making any kind of actual rating of their performance based into military type of stuff almost impossible.

And this isn't only about Civil War but also about other wars as well. IMHO there is time and place for everything and political and military aspects of operations can be measured either together or separately.

I'm not promoting "vacuum"-thinking but I think the different fields of any conflict can be viewed and measured separately while of course being linked to other factors. Just putting everything together might give you clearer picture of the course of the events in general but at the same time the important details and specific aspects like that of military are simply forgotten. I believe this is one of the follies of some of historians and I find it just awfully bad error.
There's a lot of truth in what you are saying here, but I believe that was just one aspect a;beit an important one of how Lee made his decisions.Certainly, but I mention it because I believe it tend to be overlooked as a trait of Lee while I consider it being almost his defining quality. I think as long as he could he was looking forward for such a battle but after the defeat of Gettysburg (and I think this quite well explain's otherwise totally militarily insane Pickett's Charge) he was absolutely gutted to just sit and watch or play cat and mouse with Grant while South was being torn apart.

In the end it was all matter of time and simply there wasn't chance to pull that one rabbit from the hat to save it for the Confederacy.

I cannot anything but agree with your view of McClellan.

Like already said, I think he just lacked the edge that would have been required from the general of his position especially when being against foe like ANV.

It's worth remembering that McClellan was a foreign observer during the Crimean War, and knew well the ease with which catastophe could ensue in a pressed attack on fortified or protected positions. So yes, he was a timid commander, but not for lack of courage, rather, out of compassion for his men (which is also well-recorded), and the unwillingness to shed their blood; he was arguably afraid of creating a bloodbath like those he witnessed in the Ukraine, and understandably so.

It's worth remembering that McClellan was a foreign observer during the Crimean War, and knew well the ease with which catastophe could ensue in a pressed attack on fortified or protected positions. So yes, he was a timid commander, but not for lack of courage, rather, out of compassion for his men (which is also well-recorded), and the unwillingness to shed their blood; he was arguably afraid of creating a bloodbath like those he witnessed in the Ukraine, and understandably so.

Honestly, in my opinion, it didn't matter what his motive was. He lacked the aggression to be in command. I think its great that he didn't want to shed any blood; but, if he didn't want anyone hurt, maybe he should stay home and play a game of chess. War involves losing men, and he should have realized that.

There's no need to be snide; it wasn't that he didn't want to hurt anyone, he was obviously still a general, it was not wanting to throw away lives that need not be lost because of overzealousness of commanders, or cavalier soldiers, again, both of which he was well aware could result in catastrophe. While this might not account well for his performance after Antiedam, it characterizes and defines his actions at the Seven Days' Battles. And again, it wasn't lack of agression, it was mindfulness and regulation of agression. His attacks were purposeful, and not rashly made. Unfortunately for him, his opponents were daring and willing to take risks he would not, and because of that, his tentativeness is a fault, not a gift.

So long as he doesn't get 'shell-shock' again, his planning would actually be pretty brilliant. :goodjob:
When a general claims the defeat was a result of his own cowardice, it says something.

McLellan had his uses as a commander. Put him in Johnston's position in Georgia, for example. He prepared well, and reacted well when on the defensive. However his sense of tactical timing was just dreadful.

I think much of the discussion deals with lopsided deafeats, rather than disasters. Disaster, to my mind, means losing the ability of the nation, or at least a corps or its equivalent, to continue the fight.

J

Cheezy the Wiz, I cannot really agree with you.

Like said if you are against foe like ANV and it's trio you just simply cannot be "soft". And it's of course very possible the reason you described is why McClellan acted like that.

And I'm not sure if being cautious causes your army not to engage it's entirely into the battle that it is really compassion towards your own troops but more like compassion towards your enemy. They got still hell of beating in Antietam. Whether it's compassion, courage or something else, I'm not sure can I approve especially since the war continues for more years and those same men are sent to the battle all over again. You give good beating in Antietam to South and it never is able to hold back that long as it now did.
I think much of the discussion deals with lopsided deafeats, rather than disasters. Disaster, to my mind, means losing the ability of the nation, or at least a corps or its equivalent, to continue the fight.We could use that of course as definition of disaster but then again if we base it into the ability of nation to continue fighting then different nations are treated differently as those with superior forces have chance to continue fighting and others don't.

Example in case of Civil War we can see that South probably never would have had simply chance to continue fighting when compared to North following similar defeats. Also I posted Battle of Raate road which was complete disaster for the SU but it could continue fighting (even though not in the north) but compared to scenario where finns would had suffered same type of defeat it would have finished finns entirely.

Same goes to army level that bigger armies can be seen to able to cope with bigger defeats before they are considered disasters as they are still able to fight but for me example Cold Harbor is disaster. Surely Grant can continue fighting but that is just because he has superior odds and shouldn't that be originally counted towards what to expect from such force rather than it is allowed to "slip away" from definition of disaster military-wise?

This was the thing which I was referring to earlier that the scale and also the perspective must be right in order us to define what is militarily disaster and which not. Of course in the end it's mostly matter of opinion really based mostly to the very definition of disaster...

Personally I would consider disaster as something that based into the beginning of that campaign the expectations that are waited to be achieved have been much higher compared to the eventual results. We consider what kind of succes with the troops etc. the sides had could had been to expected if the faulty decisions and actions wouldn't have been affecting the outcome. (Of course we can also call military disasters plans that have been wrong all along and based into dire miscalculations of one's ability to fight the enemy and reach the goals.)

I think it's all about reasonable results considering the circumstances and also the actions of the opponent that defines military success or disaster. Not some outside factor that the actual battling sides cannot directly affect by playing their cards just right or whether they have just enough more power compared to the enemy to cope with the defeat.

Example in case of Antietam if you look the strategic advantage Union had (troops placement, enemy plans known, man-advantage) the odds very heavily favoured for the McClellan and his army. We can only dream what would had happened if ANV would have even some more troops to make it even worse for AoP. If he couldn't succeed in there, what exactly would have made it as disaster for Union? Whole army forced to swim in Potomac?

Well damn, just had a long reply wiped out by the database error. :sad:

Have to get back onn this later sorry.

Personally I would consider disaster as something that based into the beginning of that campaign the expectations that are waited to be achieved have been much higher compared to the eventual results. We consider what kind of succes with the troops etc. the sides had could had been to expected if the faulty decisions and actions wouldn't have been affecting the outcome. (Of course we can also call military disasters plans that have been wrong all along and based into dire miscalculations of one's ability to fight the enemy and reach the goals.)

I think it's all about reasonable results considering the circumstances and also the actions of the opponent that defines military success or disaster. Not some outside factor that the actual battling sides cannot directly affect by playing their cards just right or whether they have just enough more power compared to the enemy to cope with the defeat.

Example in case of Antietam if you look the strategic advantage Union had (troops placement, enemy plans known, man-advantage) the odds very heavily favoured for the McClellan and his army. We can only dream what would had happened if ANV would have even some more troops to make it even worse for AoP. If he couldn't succeed in there, what exactly would have made it as disaster for Union? Whole army forced to swim in Potomac?
That is a reasonable answer. My idea of a disaster begins with San Jacinto and runs to Julius in Persia and France at Dienbienphu. After the battle, there was nothing left to start over with.

J

That is a reasonable answer. My idea of a disaster begins with San Jacinto and runs to Julius in Persia
Well....Iulianus did leave behind him an army, which was powerful enough to play kingmaker and make Iovianus the next emperor. (He didn't last very long, mostly due to the peace deal he had to make with the Persians, of course.) There was something left.

Not that I want to say that Iulianus' expedition wasn't a disaster - it was. It was a terrible plan, waste of good manpower by a silly pagan with delusions of grandeur, who for whatever reason gets practically deified by atheist historians these days with little to no grounding for it whatsoever. But it didn't quite fit your criteria.

That is a reasonable answer. My idea of a disaster begins with San Jacinto and runs to Julius in Persia and France at Dienbienphu. After the battle, there was nothing left to start over with.
Well in my book those are almost like an overkill. ;)

I think we need some kind of rating system for disasters soon.

I have not read through every single post. So sorry if these have been said aready.

The Battle of the Somme- A huge loss of life for the British with objectives not completed. Overral an appauling waste of human life. Not Haig's fault really he was using the tactics of the time and they did work, sometimes.

Battle of Mogadishu (1993)- Part of Operation Gothic Serpent. Mission was completed but it should have been an easy op turned into a two day battle for survival. The technolgicly supior Americans should have easily beaten the Somali milita and civilians but instead they got 19 of themselves killed and 73 wounded, UN forces 1 dead and 9 wounded. A disaster for the Americans.

Battle of Mogadishu (1993)- Part of Operation Gothic Serpent. Mission was completed but it should have been an easy op turned into a two day battle for survival. The technolgicly supior Americans should have easily beaten the Somali milita and civilians but instead they got 19 of themselves killed and 73 wounded, UN forces 1 dead and 9 wounded. A disaster for the Americans.

To be fair they were operating under pretty strict rules of engagement and only went in with what they needed to complete the raid (no armor, no heavy weapons, no significant air coverage).

When its just 100 guys and a few helicopters vs tens of thousands of heavily armed militiamen the technology gap feels up quick. I'd say total disaster was avoided that day (could have been a lot worse) and it was actually quite an achievement that any of them survived.

You could even say it was a disaster for the Somalis since the UN and US aide and peacekeepers pulled out as a result of the battle and Somalia starved and ripped itself apart for another decade.

The Battle of the Somme- A huge loss of life for the British with objectives not completed. Overral an appauling waste of human life. Not Haig's fault really he was using the tactics of the time and they did work, sometimes.
Philippe Petain and the French Army would beg to differ. (I think; Western Front between 1915 and 1917 really isn't my bag.)

The best description of the command situation on the Western Front comes from Marshal Ferdinand Foch, during the First Marne:

"Hard pressed on my right. My center is yielding. Impossible to maneuver. Situation excellent. I am attacking."

Sounds a lot like what I quoted above. ;)

Yeah pretty much, i mentioned walls though! :D

C~G

With regards to politics and military history I believe it depends on what aspect of military history is being discussed. In any discussion of tactics used in a battle, the decisions taken by generals on the field etc politics is of limited value. When discussing the results of that battle or whether it was a sucess or failure though I do think politics have a part to play. In a discussion of strategy used in a campaign and the overall strategty of a nation however it is impossible to get away from politics and its influence on the decisions made. Whilst it is possible to analyze a campaign from a purely military point of view with regards to what skill it was conducted by either side and its sucess in terms of forces defeated, the quality of the enemy or obstacles overcome, to determine if it was overall a success or a disaster for either side you really have to involve politics otherwise its not the whole picture.

For these reasons when looking at the Maryland (or any other) campaign I tend not to analyze the results of it from a purely military viewpoint, nor have I intended to in this thread.

I don't think that the involvement of politics in a history discussion precludes any discussion of counter-factual history. Political decisions could have been different, generals may have chosen to ignore politically inspired orders and so on. To indulge in what-ifs all that is required is to come up with a feasible diversion point and then work out plausible consequences. Turtledove's alternative history books for example are based on a diversion from our history when the special orders 191 are not found. Britain entering the Civil War in 1862 is a political change of mind but its not an improbable one, so a discussion could be put forward about that.

Oh and just to go back to an earlier point by Dreadnought:

You stated that
Could he have done better? Hmm...let's look at Sherman's Atlanta campaign - same result, 1/6 of the casualties.

With regards to Grant's overland campaign. Sherman lost something like 30,000 men in that campaign which was about 1/2 what Grant lost in the overland campaign. I've been listening to some lectures on the Civil War recently and I'd also like to point out something that they jogged my memory on. Grant's overland fighting may seem at first very straight forward and kind of like Grant banging his head against a brick wall but that wasn't how Grant planned it. The campaign began with him planning a three pronged movement with commands under Sigel (in the Shenendoah) and Butler (Bermuda Hundred) with these two commands hopefully drawing troops away from Lee. Sadly the two generals were not up the job, Beauregard for example was able to send a whole 6,000 strong division from his position facing Butler to aid Lee. Later on Grant's wide turning movement towards Petersburg was very risky but well organised (it suprised Lee which is no mean feat) and would have easily captured the city on the 15th but for the caution of Smith and a mix up in orders to Hancock.

Not military disasters in the slightest.

Battle of San Jacinto was pretty embarrassing.

War of Iraq...not over yet...America almost financially and morally bankrupt...wont be long now I think.

You make fair points privatehudson.

It's indeed about into which part we're concentrating.

I don't find problem if person wants to explain why considers something being disaster also militarily when looking at the big picture with politics and all but what I mean is that if someone just points out how failure Maryland campaign militarily caused that it's situation would worsen by Lincoln's declaration etc. Then I find it problematic if you cannot explain why you consider that campaign being from military point of view as failure.

And I think it becomes very difficult especially since we would have to explain why then Union's effort militarily can be then success if it could have achieved much more from it? And what are the conditions that would had made Maryland campaign success both militarily and politically to the South?

I think the idea of moving the battleground to Maryland is good idea but I think winning the hearts of North with that effort is bit far-fetched idea already so we could even ask are expectations for Southern forces any point of campaign realistic? Let alone it's very hard to predict how exactly South could have achieved such victory that it would have made Lincoln not to make the declaration especially after McClellan gets his 15 minutes in the limelight and eventually blews it.

I think considering the expectations for the Union in that point, you could consider it as disaster for Union.
I don't think that the involvement of politics in a history discussion precludes any discussion of counter-factual history. Political decisions could have been different, generals may have chosen to ignore politically inspired orders and so on. To indulge in what-ifs all that is required is to come up with a feasible diversion point and then work out plausible consequences. Turtledove's alternative history books for example are based on a diversion from our history when the special orders 191 are not found. Britain entering the Civil War in 1862 is a political change of mind but its not an improbable one, so a discussion could be put forward about that. I mean there's fair ground between the vacuum type of thinking and "everything affects everything" in which you cannot percept any what-ifs since history is seen only as direct line from explanation of why campaign started to battles and eventually the results. So since South's goal was to gain advantage by pushing to Maryland and since it didn't do it and then Lincoln made declaration that caused the situation become deadlocked, the campaign was faulty. From military point of view that tells nothing, absolutely nothing.

My problem is that person cannout perceive military scenarios/decisions/results as from pure military perspective in which political and other causes and goals are seen as externals, not internal reasons for the campaign and to the outcome of it.

I have seen this happen so many time when people can only understand the cause of battle or warfare only as means to an end rather than world and reality of it's own, with it's own rules of engagement, which results also to change of many things when considering some campaign from military pov.

This has quite impact whether you then consider something being success or not militarily.

Example in case of Maryland Campaign we have to go beginning of it and forget most of the politics and what exactly militarily can be done with the troops Lee has in order to reach that possiblity of external result (given political goals) and what we can expect reasonably from his troops considering the circumstances in the region and the strenght of union forces.

There are some people who have understanding the history of warfare that can graps those concepts as concrete and really show in stern way what kind of reasonable results could have been achieved and that's basically the brutal realism of warfare what generals have to deal with (compared to theoretical political goals etc.). I really like that kind of analysis that history is seen as multi-level concept rather than as single straight line of events.

Of course even militarilily expanding the idea to the winning of war we could conclude that as South didn't achieve anything in Maryland campaign but just lost valuable men and had to forget plans to push forward at that point that it was failure/defeat for South. But then again we have to also look Union's point of view and what could be achieved with it's troops. IMO example McClellan with the Lee's plans he can clearly probably give such beating to ANV that it won't raise from it anymore even end the war.

It really depends from the perspective (military, politics etc.) and scale of things (time, details) in which we should making conclusions about something.

But if you don't have anything to add, I think we're done.

EDIT: I apologize my errors in the text, it's getting late in here and I'm off to bed. Cheers.

I think broadly speaking we think along similar lines with regards to analyzing history and the Antietam campaign so theres little to discuss now that we've both clarified our viewpoint. I have but one thing to comment on.

I think the idea of moving the battleground to Maryland is good idea but I think winning the hearts of North with that effort is bit far-fetched idea already so we could even ask are expectations for Southern forces any point of campaign realistic? Let alone it's very hard to predict how exactly South could have achieved such victory that it would have made Lincoln not to make the declaration especially after McClellan gets his 15 minutes in the limelight and eventually blews it.

I think with hindsight it was a pipe-dream to expect Maryland or Kentucky to throw off the "tyranny" of Union and join the confederacy but I don't think that was the prevailing view in the South in 1862. Bragg marched into Kentucky with thousands of rifles to issue to volunteers. The Confederate Flag had 13 stars for the 11 official states and one for Kentucky and Missouri. Maryland my Maryland was a popular war song with southern bands, and stories of what happened in Baltimore made southerners think of Maryland as a friendly state. In essence although some may have suspected that it was wishful thinking others did genuinely believe that all Kentuckians and Marylanders needed was the prolonged presence of a southern army in their state to rise up and join the fight for their rights.

On the second point about the Emancipation Proclomation I think that all Lincoln needed was a victory, no matter how slight. He was unwilling to make it sound like a desperation measure, and he knew it would be unpopular with voters in the coming elections (I think they were in November but don't quote me on that). Issuing it without even a partial victory would have been even more unpopular, and the republicans did pretty badly as it was. Unfortunately for Lee Linclnwould possibly have considered Lee retreating without fighting the Antietam battle sufficient also. In the context of how the campaign played out and the way that the odds were stacked against Lee (the revealing of his orders, the relative size of the armies etc) it would have been very hard for Lee to avoid an end result which Lincoln could use as justification for the Proclomation.

Most of this wouldn't have been known to Lee of course, its just my late night musings.

How about the battle of Tsushima Straits (May 28, 1905) during Russo–Japanese War?

The Russian Baltic Fleet traveled 18,000 miles and was intercepted by the Japanese fleet, which consisted of four battleships, several cruisers, a few destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian fleet contained eight battleships, cruisers, destroyers and others for a total of 38 ships.
The Russian fleet was blown out of the water. They lost eight battleships, many smaller vessels, and more than 5,000 men. The Japanese lost three torpedo boats and 116 men.
The war was the first major victory of an Asian power over a European power in modern times.

This reminded me about the site I found over the net the other day and particularly the song there about Russian cruiser "Varyag" that was sunk in 1904 during that war:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cruiser_Varyag_%281899%29

"During the Battle of Chemulpo Bay at the start of the Russo-Japanese War, Varyag, a Russian protected cruiser, (under the command of Vsevolod Rudnev) accepted a badly unequal battle with the Japanese squadron of Admiral Uriu (one armoured cruiser, five protected cruisers and eight destroyers) during her heroic breakthrough from Chemulpo (Incheon) harbour February 9, 1904. Having lost 31 men dead, 191 injured (out of 570) and outgunned, the crew decided not to surrender, but to sink the ship.[1]

In 1907, Vsevolod Rudnev (by that time dismissed in the rank of rear admiral) was decorated with a Japanese order for that battle; although he accepted the order, he never wore it in public."

The song is here; those who understand Russian might want to hear that; the music is pretty good anyway :)

http://www.sovmusic.ru/english/download.php?fname=varyag

That entire site is pretty campy to look around :mischief:

I look at a military disaster to be one that significantly affects a nation's ability to fight further wars. Therefore:

The Somme - 400,000 casualties on the British side, leading to a weakening of British confidence and a lack of fighting men that would last for a long time. The fact that there were 500,000 Germans casualties does not change the fact that it is considered a British disaster.

Battle of Leuctra 371 BCE - First major defeat for a full-strength Spartan army. It weakened the myth of Spartan prowess, and about 1000 Spartans died. Considering their very small population pool of Homoioi this is a significant amount of Spartans put out of action.

There are undoubtedly others for other countries, but IMHO these are the most significant and longlasting setbacks the nations involved have faced.

Battle of Leuctra 371 BCE - First major defeat for a full-strength Spartan army. It weakened the myth of Spartan prowess, and about 1000 Spartans died. Considering their very small population pool of Homoioi this is a significant amount of Spartans put out of action.
Short-term and even medium-term, yes, I'd agree with you, based on your criterion of significantly affecting the ability to fight further wars. But Leuktra didn't really eliminate Sparta's ability to make war as totally as you'd suggest. There was the Battle of Mantineia nine years later, which saw a Sparta that, while seriously weakened by the loss of Messenia and its helots, still managed to give the Theban Epaminondine army a significant run for its money in the campaign leading up the battle (the battle itself was mostly a surprise attack that was wildly successful except for the fact that Epaminondas himself kinda died). And then a hundred fifty years later, Kleomenes III created a Spartan super-state by his protocommunist reforms that beat up the Akhaian League so badly that the great Aratos himself had to call for help from Antigonos Doson. (The Kleomenean War is actually pretty cool, Polybius spends a lot of time on it, and it makes for good reading. It really ought to be better known.) It was only after the disaster of Sellasia, which ended the Kleomenean War, that Sparta was ruined entirely and her prestige and warmaking ability shattered for the rest of classical history. I suppose Sparta's participation in the Chremonidean League shouldn't be discounted either, as it successfully resisted the assault of Pyrrhos of Epeiros, fresh from his conquest of Makedonia, and did so largely by itself.

Usually one refers to Leuktra as the moment Spartan hegemony was broken, but not even that is strictly true, since Sparta really didn't have the ability to win wars by itself as of the Korinthian War of the 390s and 380s. (It only secured a favorable peace, that of Antalkidas, due to the intervention of the Great King.) The loss of Lysandros and the defeats at the hands of, among others, Iphikrates, made certain of that, as did the serious losses during the Peloponnesian War (Pylos-Sphakteria being the forerunner of Leuktra, and perhaps even more important in breaking the myth of Spartan invincibility). Leuktra is more of a marker of the beginning of the brief, decade-long Theban ascendancy, as it made Boiotia secure and showed Epaminondas' and Pelopidas' supremacy in the art of war. It also showcased important new tactics, like the use of the oblique order, cavalry screen, and column of attack. If one were to point at one single battle that ruined Sparta's warmaking chances, I'd probably use Sellasia.

You're right about that, I guess the point I should have been making is that the defeat at Leuctra was a major psychological blow. Until then the mythology of Sparta was that a Spartan army was unbeatable. Leuctra proved that was no longer true. Certainly Sparta would still have the capacity to fight further wars, but the shock of defeat was something that (IMO) would have hit them hardest. I guess the reason that I pick Leuctra as the turning point is that it was unprecedented at the time. It simply couldn't have been expected at that point, whereas all the Spartan defeats that followed that did have precedent and the forces involved would have been aware of that.

The Kleomenean War does look pretty interesting - I'll look it up in Polybius sometime. My interests tend to be more Alexandrian and then Republican Rome, but Kleomenes sounds like an interesting character. Any Spartan who can arrange the murder of the Ephors is good for some reading material. :)

I have considered the question of defeats and disasters a bit more in fact, overnight (when I think clearest). A lot of how we define victory and defeat is in propaganda and expectations. Taking the examples I used - at the Somme Britain had about 400,000 casualties, France 200,000 and Germany 500,000 IIRC; but it was Britain that took a major blow to national confidence. At Leuctra the Spartans had more casualties than it was used to (1,000, from a force of 10,000), but it was the blow to their confidence and national pride that would have really hurt. Compare that to a battle like Hannibal vs. Rome at the Battle of Cannae, where Rome lost about 50,000 from a force of about 70,000, but despite that still kept fighting. It reinforces to me that it's the psychologically strongest that are able to win wars and survive. I'm sure that this is by no means a new idea, but this discussion just reinforced it for me again.

Finally - I love those cartoons you have linked in your sig. They've been entertaining me all afternoon. :D Thanks!

You're right about that, I guess the point I should have been making is that the defeat at Leuctra was a major psychological blow. Until then the mythology of Sparta was that a Spartan army was unbeatable. Leuctra proved that was no longer true. Certainly Sparta would still have the capacity to fight further wars, but the shock of defeat was something that (IMO) would have hit them hardest. I guess the reason that I pick Leuctra as the turning point is that it was unprecedented at the time. It simply couldn't have been expected at that point, whereas all the Spartan defeats that followed that did have precedent and the forces involved would have been aware of that.
I suppose. It's certainly larger in magnitude than the Battles of Pylos and Sphakteria during the Peloponnesian War, after which, I believe, very few Spartiates were ever killed or captured in one place until Leuktra. (Personally, I believe that the capture of some 120 Spartiates at Sphakteria, along with the deaths of many others, did a lot to erase the mythos that Thermopylai erected around the Spartan military. It was absolutely inconceivable that these men, who had fought to the death at the Hot Gates against a vastly superior enemy, would suddenly give themselves up to a group of Athenian light troops and hoplites.) So yeah, Leuktra was a huge psychological blow, greater than anything previous, what with the death of Kleombrotos and much of his army. Sounds good to me. :)
The Kleomenean War does look pretty interesting - I'll look it up in Polybius sometime. My interests tend to be more Alexandrian and then Republican Rome, but Kleomenes sounds like an interesting character. Any Spartan who can arrange the murder of the Ephors is good for some reading material. :)
Kleomenes was one of those genial madmen that you don't get very often. Those social reforms, added to military acumen, made Sparta the terror of the Peloponnese again, which bespeaks a good deal in itself after the rather poor performance that the Lakedaimonians had given for the past century or so. In addition to Polybius, I believe Plutarch uses Kleomenes for one of his Lives, comparing him and Agis IV to the Gracchi.
It reinforces to me that it's the psychologically strongest that are able to win wars and survive. I'm sure that this is by no means a new idea, but this discussion just reinforced it for me again.
Sounds like Ludendorff's ideas. :p What you mention is indeed a very big component of victory or defeat. A 'failure of nerve' has lost many, many struggles; one immediately, for example, thinks of Louis XVI's failure to ally with the Third Estate, which would have pushed through his reforms and broken the power of the other two Estates, making the French monarch incomparably powerful. But on the other hand, the psychological aspect of war isn't, obviously, everything. The Romans continued hauling themselves back from the brink in the Second Punic War because their capital was impregnable and they had more mobilizable manpower available for the fight against Hannibal; Qarthadast kept fighting in the First War despite the defeat of Tunes because Regulus was isolated and his numbers were not so great as to successfully conduct a siege of the city, while their armies in Sicily were still in control of Panormus and Lilybaeum. The possession of concrete advantages is a huge part of psychological reinforcement.
Finally - I love those cartoons you have linked in your sig. They've been entertaining me all afternoon. :D Thanks!
xkcd is awesome. :goodjob:

This seems to fit the criteria pretty well:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Edessa
An entire Roman Army annihilated by a smaller Persian force, the emperor Valerian captured and later murdered and stuffed, the Empire in chaos with "Emperors" everywhere, taking something like fifteen years to reunite, possible treachery.

Bajazet I ran into a few hundred thousand of Tamerlane's troops in the battle of Angora. It was about a decade before the Ottoman Empire recovered from the civil war and several decades before they regained their position in Asia Minor.

Although Operation Barbarossa has been mentioned before, some of its individual battles have been spectacular disasters for the Soviets. In particular, Battle of Kiev '41 - probably the biggest ever disaster with the Germans encircling 55 Soviet divisions. Soviets suffered about 600,000 casualties.

This seems to fit the criteria pretty well:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Edessa
An entire Roman Army annihilated by a smaller Persian force, the emperor Valerian captured and later murdered and stuffed, the Empire in chaos with "Emperors" everywhere, taking something like fifteen years to reunite, possible treachery.
Oh, it was treachery all right. On the Res Gestae Divi Saporis, Shapur bragged about how sneaky he was, getting the Roman Emperor to stupidly agree to negotiations from which he could be kidnapped. But yeah, it qualifies.

There was that one battle where the Austrians lost 10,000 men fighting imaginary Turks. That was a millitary Diasatars. Others would include

Battle of the Nile - That was a complete blow to Napoleons Egyptian Campaign and march to India

Agincourt deserves a mention, the slaugther of the entire country's nobles is rather painful military wise. Especially when you outnumber the enemy

Battle of Myriokephalon and the Battle of Manzikert basically ended in the destruction of Byzantium.

The Fall of Singapore, 80,000 troops and one idiot british commander loses to 30,000 Japanese.

The Spanish Armarda having half its ships chased away and smashed into rocks without a single enemy ship being destroyed.

Napoleons campaign in Spain and Russia. In Russia, well you know, scorch earth, frequent harassing. Spain was where a small British Army defeated the Large French Army for it was too busy trying to hold down insurgents.

Gailipoli, badly planned and conducted attack at Turkey.

Battle of Spion Kop and several other Boer Battles where the farming miltia defeated Trained British Regulars

Battle of Myriokephalon and the Battle of Manzikert basically ended in the destruction of Byzantium.
I don't disagree with Manzikert (although it was far more what happened after the battle that was destructive, not the battle itself; the utter failure of the central authority to pull its head out of its rear and stop fighting civil wars and a similar failure to prioritize Anatolia first as opposed to Bulgars were the main failures...also, treachery :p), but Myriokephalon wasn't all that horrible. Yes, Manuel was beaten back and he lost a lot of men and a few fortresses to the Turk. That didn't exactly break the back of the Romans in Anatolia; in fact, Manuel was even able to campaign the next few seasons and retake most of what he had lost. It was instead the disastrous reigns of the Angeli and of Andronikos I Komnenos that set the stage for the Fourth Crusade, a real disaster. From the end of Manuel's reign to the Fourth Crusade, the southern and northern Anatolian coasts were lost, as well as the northern half of the Balkans, mostly due to the incompetence of the Angeli and their failure to effectively fight off the incursions, a feat that was eminently possible.

My memory fails me, but I do not remember a mention of Isandlwana or Hlobane Ridge in here. The two Zulu victories cast serious doubts about Imperial capability to fight natives, and gave the Brits quite a start about possible uprisings elsewhere in the Empire, a sort of snowballing challenge to Imperial Authority.

There was that one battle where the Austrians lost 10,000 men fighting imaginary Turks. That was a millitary Diasatars.

:) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karansebes

stumbled across this one:

book of military plunders (http://www.amazon.com/Brasseys-Military-Blunders-Geoffrey-Regan/dp/157488252X/ref=pd_bxgy_b_img_b/105-4541090-6692449)

My memory fails me, but I do not remember a mention of Isandlwana or Hlobane Ridge in here. The two Zulu victories cast serious doubts about Imperial capability to fight natives, and gave the Brits quite a start about possible uprisings elsewhere in the Empire, a sort of snowballing challenge to Imperial Authority.

I wouldn't call them disasters. They were horrible loses, yes, but the conclusion of the Zulu wars was never in doubt. They were just setbacks.

Why is the battle of San Jacinto a military disaster? You are talking about the one in the Texan War for Independence, right?

Why is the battle of San Jacinto a military disaster? You are talking about the one in the Texan War for Independence, right?

Being surprised by a supposedly retreating enemy, defeated in 20 minutes, having 600 troops cut down while in retreat, the rest captured and then having your country's leader captured while cowardly trying to hide among his conscripts.

Yeah a pretty big disaster.

Well, at least Mexico took it as a chance to boot Santa Anna but they took him back to fight the French so that canceled out any positives effects the battle might have had for Mexico.

Why is the battle of San Jacinto a military disaster? You are talking about the one in the Texan War for Independence, right?

Being surprised by a supposedly retreating enemy, defeated in 20 minutes, having 600 troops cut down while in retreat, the rest captured and then having your country's leader captured while cowardly trying to hide among his conscripts.

Yeah a pretty big disaster.

Well, at least Mexico took it as a chance to boot Santa Anna but they took him back to fight the French so that canceled out any positives effects the battle might have had for Mexico.
How is it anythng BUT a disaster for the Mexicans? It is easy to say 600 lost, since that is only a single charge at hlf a dozen WW I battles. That 600 men was 1/3 of the army, lost in 20 minutes, to an out manned, out gunned enemy. The cherry on the cake was the capture of the King himself, Santa Anna.

The territory Mexico lost that day is bigger than Spain, Italy and Greece combined.

J

:) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karansebes


I've never heard of this before, very funny (or sad) indeed

Immediately, the hussars and infantry engaged in combat with one another. During the conflict, some infantry began shouting "Turcii! Turcii!" (Romanian for "The Turks! The Turks!"). The hussars fled the scene, thinking that the Ottoman army’s attack was imminent. Most of the infantry also ran away; the army comprised Italians from Lombardy, Slavs from the Balkans, and Austrians, plus other minorities, many of whom could not understand each other. While it is not clear which one of these groups did so, they gave the false warning without telling the others, who promptly fled. The situation was made worse when officers, in an attempt to restore order, shouted "Halt! Halt!" which was misheard by soldiers with no knowledge of German as "Allah! Allah!". :lol:

As the cavalry ran through the camps, a corps commander reasoned that it was a cavalry charge by the Ottoman army, and ordered artillery fire. :goodjob:Meanwhile, the entire camp awoke to the sound of battle and, rather than waiting to see what the situation was, everyone fled. The troops fired at every shadow, thinking the Ottomans were everywhere; in reality they were shooting fellow Austrian soldiers. The incident escalated to the point where the whole army retreated from the imaginary enemy, and Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II was pushed off his horse into a small creek.

Two days later, the Ottoman army arrived. They discovered no fewer than 10,000 killed and wounded soldiers.

The territory Mexico lost that day is bigger than Spain, Italy and Greece combined.
Texas isn't that big. You may perhaps be referring to the outcome of Scott's Veracruz, Cerro Gordo, Chapultepec, etc., etc. campaign.

The battle of Navarino. iThe naval Battle of Navarino was fought on 20 October 1827, during the Greek War of Independence (1821–32) in Navarino Bay, on the west coast of the Peloponnese peninsula, in the Ionian Sea. A combined Ottoman and Egyptian armada was destroyed by a combined British, French and Russian naval force. It is notable for being the last major naval battle in history to be fought entirely with sailing ships. The Allied ships were better armed than their Egyptian and Ottoman opponents and their crews were better trained, contributing to a complete victory.

0 battleships
10 frigates
4 brigs
2 schooners
1 cutter 3 battleships
17 frigates
30 corvettes
28 brigs
5 schooners
5 or 6 fireships
Casualties and losses
181 dead,
480 wounded
Total: 661 4,109
dead or wounded

The battle of Navarino.
Haha, yeah. It was kinda one-sided, and really just a duel between floating batteries, but a Turco-Egyptian disaster any way you slice it. (More for the Ottomans than for the Egyptians, though.)

Texas isn't that big. You may perhaps be referring to the outcome of Scott's Veracruz, Cerro Gordo, Chapultepec, etc., etc. campaign.

Texas of 1836 is not the Texas of 2008.

The Mexican state of Texas included most of New Mexico, a good chunk of Colorado, Wyoming and also smaller chunks of Oklahoma and Kansas.

I don't know if it was more square mileage than Greece, Spain and Italy combined but just looking at a map its not hard to imagine.

Texas of 1836 is not the Texas of 2008.

The Mexican state of Texas included most of New Mexico, a good chunk of Colorado, Wyoming and also smaller chunks of Oklahoma and Kansas.

I don't know if it was more square mileage than Greece, Spain and Italy combined but just looking at a map its not hard to imagine.
Yeah, I know that (though most of those lands were disputed with Mexico and technically under Mexican rule ;)), but I still think that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo lands are what is being referred to here.

Afganistan 2001
Iraq 2003

Yeah, the initial invasion was a disaster for Hussein's Iraqi Army, one of the world's largest and most heavily overfunded (in relation to GDP).

Yeah, I know that (though most of those lands were disputed with Mexico and technically under Mexican rule ;)), but I still think that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo lands are what is being referred to here.
Actually the lands that formed the Republic of Texas, but it is mostly the same thing. The Republic of Texas was as big as Spain, Italy, and Greece, with enough left over for 90% of the Czech Republic. For most intents and purposes, it was lost at San Jacinto. Worse, it was lost to an army that was less equipped, less trained, and which had been run all over the central Texas plains.

J

Yeah, the initial invasion was a disaster for Hussein's Iraqi Army, one of the world's largest and most heavily overfunded (in relation to GDP).

You were thinking of 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, I think. That qualifies as a huge poitical mistake, and the tank battles at the end of the Gulf War definitely qualify as disasters for Iraq.

J

The Vietnam War was pretty much a definition of a military disaster.

You mean political. Militarily it's almost certainly a success.

The battle of Abukir 1799.

Napoleon with a small army wiped out a turkish army of 18 000 soldiers only few turks escaped to the disaster, french casualties were low.