The Eastern campaign seems to be one that is characterised by incredible mishandling at the highest echelons (ie Hitler's interference) which was compensated for by the incredible tactical skills of the lower echelons (ie those actually commanding on the ground).

There are a number of instances where, perhaps with hindsight, perhaps obvious at the time also, the Germans "threw it away". I would include in these, the decision to switch the main objective of 1941 from Moscow to Leningrad and Kiev, the distrastrous Operation Citadel (Kirsk offensive) and the refusal to adopt a flexible approach to the whole Stalingrad conflict.

Which of these (or one of your own ideas) was the most significant and why?

The answer to the question is this: having an eastern front in the first place.

Originally posted by Richard III
The answer to the question is this: having an eastern front in the first place.

What 'ole King Dickie said.

No offense Rodgers, this topic has been done a few times already. There are more than a couple of WWII threads buried in the back pages of this forum, with lots of good info about Operation Barbarossa.

I agree with all of the reasons you mentioned, and a few others. However, R III sums it up pretty good. Hitler back-stabbed his only ally, Stalin, alienated potential allies such as the Ukrainians with horrific brutality, overruled his fine commanders while having little strategic knowledge himself...the list goes on and on.

I am curious though, why all the interest in the Eastern Front?

A third vote for "Opening the Eastern Front". Even
if Stalin eventually decided to attack, the Germans would
have been able to smash it to bits (as the Red Army would
have remained badly organized and led). And with the
forces not used on the Eastern Front available, a successful
invasion from the West would have been impossible.

Here is a vote for "Wrong Objective." Hitler had to fight Stalin eventually, and he wanted the first punch. If he had struck first at the throat and then at the real objectives, ie the resource areas, then he had a good chance. As it is he almost made it to Moscow. Had the campaign been designed with taking and controlling Moscow as the first major objective, then he might have succeeded.

I have no doubt the Germans would have difficulty controlling the Russian people. On the other hand, USSR was a very top down structure. Removing the head destroys the organization and coordination of the resistence.

J

PS I see no problem with bringing up single facits of the largest war in history. After all its hardly possible to cover everything in one thread.

"No offense Rodgers, this topic has been done a few times already. There are more than a couple of WWII threads buried in the back pages of this forum, with lots of good info about Operation Barbarossa"

I'm not surprised - that'll teach me to read the "archives" first

"I am curious though, why all the interest in the Eastern Front?"

Mainly it springs to mind cos there's so much stuff about it on the Discovery/History channels to keep on reminding me of it. Also, it was such a mad gamble that could (perhaps) have worked if done properly, that it generates a bit of a weird fascination in me with that part of the war. Finally, having played a few scenarios on Civ based on the Eastern Front I'm determined to crack it myself one day :)

:) Cool.

I didnt mean to sound like a pr*ck, so sorry. :o

I am putting together a collection of images to start a huge thread here, about WWII. I should start it today, since its veterans day...

There will be alot about Barbarossa in it.

EDIT: ...but I'm too lazy. :p

Gosh, well being a military jackass in the first place doesn't make things easier, does it?

One of the many incidents I think he handled very immaturely and crappy was the Stalingrad encirclement of Paulus' 6th Army. You can't allow yourself and your country to make such massive bummers constantly, if you are to survive amongst a bitter and just as bloodthirsty enemy. I agree, stabbing Uncle Joe in the back in the first place, and so quickly, was utterly retarded, probably why he lost the war so fast.

i think another big mistake made by hitler was him keeping 100's of 88mm flaks in defense of berlin if he would of used these on the eastern front things could have been different.

The Germans could not agree on one target and that delayed them. The splitted attack was carried out badly as ythe generals did all to disobey Hitlers orders and go for Moscow instead of leningrad and stalingrad. Anyway, the Germans should have south first anyway - that was the mayor objective: securing that area with all those resources they so hard needed.

I agree with R.III and the Prince of Denmark.

The whole campaign was set to fail, whether an immensive amount of luck could have changed that is debatable.

Asside from the innial attack

The treatment of white russians/ukranians who opposed stalin. These folks were practically willing to join Hitler, but his Aryian pride wouldnt allow him to. They eventually did a great deal of harm to supply lines and generally harrassed the german rear.

not only ukrainians and white russians actually. Many russians were already fed up of the workers paradise of stalin - especially russian peasants

you know i heared from someone who learned some war-history this:
how come germany sucseeded in destroing so many armies on the border? what all thos armies did their? and than this person told me that the date to attack germany was supose to be some time later, so it germany was a bit smart to hit first...

Stalin had no immeadiate plans to attack Hitler (was ready to in the 30's though) and the poor deployment of the field armies in the USSR was due to the failure to learn from the crushing defeats of Poland, Norway, France...

Everyone prepared to fight the previous war, while the German Army was fighting the next war.

Some not long ago retired colnel or general turn new comentator said:

"Military stupidity come in three grades:
Dumb;
really dumb;
and invading Russia."

To grasp the greatest error, you have to understand Hitler.

The man knew NOTHING of advanced planning, his thinking never went long term, thus NO winter clothing in 41, no way to exploit resources seized in Russia, the list is endless.
He shows time and again he can't plan beyound a few weeks at a time.

He never bothered about improved tanks, securing supply lines, proper defense postions, rebuilding shattered units, feeding and clothing his forces, all of this escaped Hitler's "notice".

To him, a "division" was always a division, no matter what it's losses or current status, he fully expected it to perform as if it was 100%, and would blame others when they couldn't.

The man was a fool on so many levels, it becomes pointless to select one mistake, when the man made literally thousands of them, each more devastating then the last.

Originally posted by Alcibiaties of Athenae
The man knew NOTHING of advanced planning, his thinking never went long term, thus NO winter clothing in 41, no way to exploit resources seized in Russia, the list is endless.
He shows time and again he can't plan beyound a few weeks at a time.

The man was a fool on so many levels, it becomes pointless to select one mistake, when the man made literally thousands of them, each more devastating then the last.

It kind of reminds you of Stormin' Norman 's comment on Saddam Hussein doesn't it? It would be funnier if the purges that followed attempts to remove him had less devistating consiquences.

J

I think a lot of you guys are approaching this from the wrong angle.

Despite the fact that there were no winter supplies, the tanks were becoming out of date and the whole invasion was a mistake, etc etc the Germans did incredibly well and I cant help thinking that if one or two major strategic decisions had been made in the "correct" way then they might have won in the end.

My question was about the major strategic decisions made once the invasion had started, not whether it was a good idea in the first place.

So, any takers?

The very tight dictatorship of Hitler as well as Stalin was an integral part of Nazism and Communism (Stalinism is probably a better word). Without that kind of person-cult and steering from the top, there would have been no Nazism.

An important element of both dictators was the classic divide and conquer-tactic. By making sure no general trusted the other, by constantly swapping a general's position and by liquidating or firing everybody with a differing view than the dictator, Hitler and Stalin made sure there was no organised movement to throw them off power (not surprisingly, Saddam Hussein uses exactly this tactic, too).

Of course, the drawback is that generals are afraid of taking initiative, are afraid of disobeying orders no matter how stupid they are and are unwilling to work for the common goal (to win the war) and instead pursue goals which will make them look better than the other generals who are also competing for the dictator's praise.

Easy, make the target for the "Blau" offensive Moscow instead of Stalingrad/caucasus.

Taking the capital would have greatly disrupted Soviet command and communications, and it might have led to the fall of Leningrad, another error, in that Hitler failed to take the place, he tried to starve it out.

Another mistake was relying on the Italians and Rumanians to defend 6th army's flanks, assuming they could fight the Soviets when Hitler denied them German tank designs and German AT guns.

Yet another error, trying to take the offensive in 43, when he should have listened to Guderian and rebuilt his armored forces while wearing out the Soviets in well prepared defensive postions, he failed at both....as you see, you can go on and on and on.

THere was one decision Hitler made that was a very smart move, he decided to send his Panzers through the Ardennes when everyone thought it wasn't possible. But that was one good choice among a dozen really bad ones. The "no retread" from Stalingrad spelled the beginning of the end for the Wehrmach

I always though the Ardennes tactic was Von Mansteins rather than Hitler's but he stole the credit for it when it turned out to be a roaring success.

Anyway - I reckon Blau was the worst mistake - what's the point of trying to take oil fields that can be comprehensively destroyed in a couple of hours and take years to rebuild? He should of chosen ONE objective - Moscow - and gone for gold, the rest would have fallen into place after that. Er, probably.

that wouldn 't surprise me Rodgers since Hitler had an ego 10 miles high

That is correct. Erich von Manstein was the man who planned "Yellow" as it occured, not Hitler.

Guys, despite what a number of books say, Manstein is not a "Von", he was NEVER part of German nobility, his family was not even of a military tradition.

The "Von" was added because it was assumed that a high ranking general officer of his ability must come from a long tradition, be it isn't so, no "von" for him!

Hitler's biggest mistake was starting the front in the first place.

he would have to eventually anyway. the treaty with stalin was on ideological basis not possible to keep up for long. He would have made his ideology ridiculous if he wouldn`t attack eventually. Exact the same for Stalin. but germans could have had prepared better - waiting till they had fullfilled the development of missile-weapons, carrying out more diplomacy to the west, especially US. eventually the germans did all to make it easier for the allies to "win" the war.

Originally posted by Kasperus
he would have to eventually anyway. the treaty with stalin was on ideological basis not possible to keep up for long.

International relations don't generally work on an ideological basis. Realpolitik is king.

Originally posted by Kasperus
He would have made his ideology ridiculous if he wouldn`t attack eventually.

Well, he didn't attack The Soviet Union for nigh on a decade of his tenure, carved up Poland with them, and nobody really said it was ridiculous. As I said above, things work generally on a realpolitik basis and most people would have recognised that then.

Originally posted by Hamlet



Well, he didn't attack The Soviet Union for nigh on a decade of his tenure, carved up Poland with them, and nobody really said it was ridiculous. As I said above, things work generally on a realpolitik basis and most people would have recognised that then.
Well, till 1938 there was hardly any diplomacy between the 2 countries though. Both states openly criticized eachother, german communists were prosecuted (there were no fascists in russia, and if there ever were they were already exterminated)
The molotov-Ribbentropp pact was an ideological blow in western europe. It was kept secret from german and soviet citizens though - ie wonders what would have happened when all those folks just learned the fact that those 2 arch-enemies allied themselves.
Obviously, the decision was a strategical one as both dictators aimed on expansion but it is very probable that both had already in mind diferent agenda`s and besides everything they still had to stay popular toward their peoples so a permanent treaty was never an option.

Originally posted by sabo10
THere was one decision Hitler made that was a very smart move, he decided to send his Panzers through the Ardennes when everyone thought it wasn't possible

...in 1940. The events of 1944 showed why the Ardennes was considered lously terrain to operate tanks in.

i think hitler biggest mistake is that he made a war... not the eastern mistake but the big mistake... he could have grown powerfull in germany until even usa will be afriad of her power and money, and exapt for this, war is never good, it's always a mistake and a bad idea.

Except for the fact that if Hitler would not have started his wars, germany would have gone bakrupt within a few years...

Yeah - the economy was totally overheating in the years immeditely prior to the outbreak of it all. Hitler's cheif banker - cant remember his name (Edward something?) - was warning him of the effects of such government overspending during this time. In economic terms the war was a good move, in the very short term.

Well, shortterm as long as forced employment in conquered territories would be hold up. That kept german economy alive during the war.

They had two big mistakes. Firstly, they alienated the Russian peasantry, who, at the outset of Barbarossa, were more than willing to take up arms against Stalin. Secondly, and this made the difference, stopping outside of Moscow in the fall of 1941. They could have taken it.

Originally posted by Richard III
The answer to the question is this: having an eastern front in the first place.

The man is right, at least having it so early was stupid.

I disagree. Hitler struck at an excellent time. If he had succeeded in taking Moscow in '41, Russia would have been subdued, for all intents and purposes. The command in Moscow was absolutely vital. Without it, the Russians would not have been able to relocate most of their industial complex to the East, which enabled them to build a colossal force.

German Operational Doctrine

There seems to be some confusion as to whether by "strategic mistakes" one means specific operational procedures in the field, tactical and strategic, or socalled grand strategy which includes such items as manpower and industrial capacity.
The Germans were the ones to put the concept of Blitzkrieg into work although some british theorists had toyed with the idea, and the Russians had developed their 'operational depth' doctrine. Now, it is important to stress that the concept of Blizkrieg was a synthesis of several factors working on difficult levels, tactical, strategic and grand strategic.
Tactically the Blizkrieg revolved around the 'Schwerpunkt' ("Strongpoint"). The 'Schwerpunkt' was were the main concentration of the attack took place. Using Artillery, Panzer and tactical bombers, the object was to break through the defence, preferably at the weakest point and wreak havoc on the enemy's lines of supply and communications. Then motorized and mechanized divisions, along with anti-tank guns would move in to hold the ground against possibe counter attacks. The idea resembled the 'rock-scissors-paper' game in that hopefully the enemy would use his armoured forces against German anti-tank artillery, freeing Panzer for taking out enemy Artillery and infantry. This economical use of force would prevent the so-called 'Material-Slacht' ("material-battle") of the First World War where it was industrial capacity and not tactical maneuvering which decided the outcome.
This takes us to the strategic level. Paramount was the total control of the skies over the theater of operations. This would ensure that supply-columns could move freely. Indeed, often supplies were flown into captured air-fields. Next came the proper allocaton of fuel and ammunition which theoretically meant that succesfully advancing forces were given higher priority than failures. Speed was of the essence and atrittional sieges were to be circumvented.
The final and perhaps most important aspect of Blitzkrig was that pertaining to the grand stategic sphere. Germany simply did not have the material or manpower resources to sustain drawn out campaigns. Ideally, even 4 months was considered excessive. Quick decision would also ensure that the industrial capacity of the enemy would be in mint condition so that it could be sucked into the German war-machine without further ado. In concord with this there was to be the heavy reliance on deficit financing. Why build up the treasury when the enemy's financial assets were there for the taking. The German war economy somewhat resembled the bank-robber who buys his get-away car on credit. Last but not least the inferior German economy had to focus war-production on what was needed in half a year's time, so that when one campaign was over there could be a switch to a new one without any delay.
It goes without saying that even the best laid plans go wrong. And one so meticiously worked out as the German Bliztkrieg was no exception. So where did it go wrong with regards to Russia?
On the tactical level it worked out beutifully, in the beginning, even better than in France. The problem had to do with numbers. Insane Russian casulties, including around 3 million prisoners, did not prevent the Russians from launching seemingly suicidal attacks against German armoured columns. Howver, any counter-attack from no matter how an inferior attacker will eventually wear down the an invading force. The Blitzkrieg worked well against democratic states with well-educated city-dwellers who held their lives dearly, not against peasants brutalized by their living conditions. Therfore the conflict degenerated into the sort of 'Material-Schlact' which the blizkrieg was specifically designed to avoid.
At the strategic level it is well to remember that Russia is not Europe, in economic and infrastructural terms at least. The lack of proper roads and railways ( the Russian railway-system had a different guage than the European), confounded by the long distances and the sheer magnitude of the theater of operations had a debilitating effect on German operational flexibility. The German Army in its initial stages were given the same amont of armour and slightly less airpower than during the Battle of France. The main component was the infantry. Needless to say shifting attack columns from one area to the next was difficult. And how was it possible to give supply priority to the columns that were the most succesful when they all were seemingly moving ahead in good pace? Neither must it be forgotten that the German army had underestimated the operational capabilities and the sheer intelligence of the poeple at the Russian general-staff.
When it comes to grand strategy the Germans were faced with two problems if they were to stick to the concept of Blitzkrieg. The campaign was planned so that it would be over by Christmas. Next target on the list was to be Great Britain. Logically, the German war-machine shifted to production of U-boats and Strategic bombers during Operation Barbarossa, when in hindsight it would have made more sense to focus on equipment for the Army.
The economic integration of the conquered areas into the German war-machine was a total and utter failure. First because the russian economy was a relatively primitive one, it was not a market economy where the country could be looted through inflationary measures. Alos the depth of Russian territory meant that a large part of Russian and particularily Ukrainian industrial plant slipped away to the East.

The conclusion must be that it was the 'asymmetric' nature of the conflict which cost Germany the victory. Individual mistakes and blunders by the Germans made the situation worse, no doubt. However these must be put into perspective with what was the underlying weaknesses of German Operational Doctrine.

In Germany;

1) Albert Speer was not put in charge soon enough, with a total war manifesto.
2) The German high command and party structure was unnecessarilly politicised and hence divided into fiefdoms
3) Technological projects fanned out and created limitless sub-areas. (The Russians only used two tank chassis types during the whole war). The missile effort was a waste, and there was too much duplication and extravagance.

Eastern Front

1) Competent generals purged from army in first year.
2) Command structure did not break authority down properly; field commanders constantly unable to carry out operations in a military manner.
3) Intelligence failures on a large scale. Russian army underestimated from the start. In Kursk, intelligence was available but ignored concerning Russian defences.
4) Huge logistical failure as a result of short-sightedness and failure to grasp modern principles, aggravated by unnecessary partisan warfare
5) Main objective constantly shifted and army corps moved about.
6) Unrealistic concept that Russians would be defeated when the Urals were reached. Taking Moscow and Ukraine/caucasus would only have reduced, not eliminated, Russian defensive power.

I seem to recall reading somewhere how the intelligence service greatly aided Germany's attack on Russia. In the months (years?) leading up to it, Stalin was fed with false information that his generals and lower military levels were planning a revolt. As such, Stalin had most of them killed, thus losing the strategic head for his army, hence greatly decreasing the effectiveness. Can anyone comment on this?

As for the greatest blunder, my view would be the old traditional one that the Russian winter (and following spring thaw) were completely underestimated. Tanks sunk in the snow, diesel froze solid in the tanks, no antifreeze for gun coolants, soldiers freezing to death etc etc.

I agree that he underestimate general Winter, most of german death happen by freezing, i saw some picture of man died in a stand up position because they were froze, it look like a nightmare.

Leaving aside the 'Shouldn't have gone there' aspect, I think the biggest mistake was to lose sight of the strengths of his army, which really was fighting a mobile war. The reason he never attacked Leningrad and didn't want to go for Moscow is because he knew the German army would lose all its advantages if engaged in street fighting. This is what really cost them Stalingrad - he got so fixated with the city as a symbol he couldn't see that the best idea was to simply bypass it. Similarly with Citadel, the Kursk offensive- his generals recommended he order a strategic withdrawal which would have pulled the Russians out of their prepared positions, and they would have been destroyed by the tactically superior Germans, thus allowing a much greater advance afterwards. It was his mad insistence on defending every inch of ground which really did the damage. I think this is also what DR.DR.DR is saying - blitzkreig could only work in the short term and once the Germans lost the initiative and were forced on the defensive they were in trouble.

One other thing which doesn't often get discussed is what was he trying to achieve in invading Russia. I have read that he did not actually want to defeat Russia totally, just push them behind the Urals and leave them there as a sort of punchbag for future generations of troops who would need a war to keep them up the Nazi ideal. I'm not so convinced by this, but he certainly didn't, at the begining, see it in terms of symbolic victories like capturing Moscow - he just wanted to kill and capture as many of the enemy as possible and pushing them behind the Urals, so he could get all the resources.

Another interesting theory is in Kershaw's 'Hitler- Nemesis', where he argues that the the reason Hitler invaded Russia when he did was to pressurise Britain. He did not want to invade Britain, as it was too risky, but he thought Britain only refused peace because they were waiting for Russia or the US to come to their aid. A quick campaign to take out the Russian threat (which is why he didn't prepare for winter) would remove this avenue of aid. You could argue that if the Germans had taken Moscow earlier, then the Japanese would have attacked Russia rather than the US. No Mongolian troops arriving to save Moscow and turn the tide, no US entry to the war, Japan gets the resources it needs from European colonies in Asia (including India) rather than having to attack the US - would Britain have kept fighting?

Hitler's involvement in military commanding was the major problem with the whole war.
He interferred to much, The East could've been won

The missile effort was a waste, and there was too much duplication and extravagance.

I would say to the contrary, it was never put in its full advantage. There was already construction sketches for a two stage rocket at 1936-38, and only because of the V1 (the plane like missile) had an initial success the V2 rocket program did not get as mush funding it needed and was therefore slowed down. If this would have been giving a better priority then they could even have made the two stage rocket, which used the same basic design, and with that reached the US west cost and Moscow from Germany.

An eve more interesting scientific field of rockets was the anti-aircraft model, which sadly lost money to the V2 rocket. A little more money and time into this and they could have taken out allied planes from the ground. From here you could prob also construct missiles for anti-tank use.

Leaving aside all the 'shouldn't have started it' and the thousands of replies possible....


Hitler seems preoccupied with people. Mussolini=Italy, not Mussolini = current leader of italy.....

So he never thought of decapitating Russia (and maby bringing along a Zarist movement designed by the Abwehr). Didn't go for Moscow right away. The lesson of the Separatfrieden in WWI would have been to strike hard, fast (as was done), go for the center of gravity Moscow (Clausewitz says Hi) (wasn't done), then get all you want (resources ina peace treaty. Totally feasible.



lucky us he was too...... dumb?

He alienated too many of the people along the way, considering many in Ukraine hailed the Germans as heroes.

Plus his constant meddling reduced fighting effectiveness.

Originally posted by Blitz79
The missile effort was a waste, and there was too much duplication and extravagance.

You're 100% correct about the inefficency of Nazi rule. However, the rocket program was a reasonable investment. While it sucked up a sizeable chunk of the German war economy, the need to counter it aslo sucked up a large chunk of the British war economy and manpower pool. In late 1944 the British army was having to disband it's combat divisions in order to maintain the surviving divisions at something aproximating full strenght. However at the same time, Britains AA and civil defences had to be expanded in order to counter the V missiles*. Recent analysis sugests that Britain ended up spending more countering the missiles then Germany did producing them.

*However a large chunk of this 'manpower' would be better called 'womenpower'. Much of the AA network, including quite a few gun batteries, was maned by women (which is a good stick to wack the 'women are no good in combat' crowd with ;) )

This timeline (http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/BARBAROS.HTML) spells it out.

Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia, began on June 22nd 1941.

On July 27th, Hitler made his great blunder.

copied from website

July 15. Smolensk is taken, and another 300,000 Russian soldiers with it.

July 22. The German advance is temporarily halted to allow infantry and supplies to catch up to the Panzer armies.

The German's are experiencing a new kind of warfare. The Russians seem content to trade 10 Russian lives for 1 German. They continually mount reckless counter-attacks. These wasteful attacks have an unnerving effect on the Wehrmarcht.

*July 27. Hitler orders Guderian's Panzers to turn south, away from Moscow, in order to conquer Russia's economic centers. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army is renamed ArmeeGruppe Guderian in recognition of his successes. Further, he is no longer subordinate to Kluge, but answers directly to Bock, Commander of Army Group Centre.

August 3. Guderian, who desires to continue the thrust toward Moscow, disobeys orders and intentionally gets caught up in fighting at Roslavl. Hitler, however, is not to be denied. Guderian is forced to move south.

The German high command grows restless at the growing disobedience of forward commanders. Hitler is haunted by the ghost of Napoleon. He admits to Guderian, "had I known Russian tank strength...I would not have started this war."

August 7. Stalin assumes the title Supreme Commander of military forces.

August 19. German troops under von Leeb surround Leningrad in the north.

*August 22. Guderian flies to see Hitler, to convince him of the need to drive on Moscow. Hitler refuses, stating, "my generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war." The drive south continues.

And the rest is history...

Hitler could have had Moscow by late August or September, and likely toppled the Soviet Union for good.

However, lucky for us, he was a terrible general. ;)

Originally posted by joespaniel


However, lucky for us, he was a terrible general. ;)

I wholeheartedly agree! Just imagine him with the military capabilities of Rommel (shudder)

Originally posted by joespaniel
On July 27th, Hitler made his great blunder. ...

And the rest is history...

Hitler could have had Moscow by late August or September, and likely toppled the Soviet Union for good.

However, lucky for us, he was a terrible general. ;)

I entirely agree. As I once wrote many moons ago when this question was previously raised:

1. Attacking Russia without crippling Britain is one mistake; once Mussolini dragged Hitler into the Mediterranean, he probably should have cancelled his preparations for a 1941 start to Barbarossa and reinforced Rommel in Africa and attempted to overrun the Suez Canal and the Middle Eastern oil fields.

2. Once Barbarossa commenced, perhaps the biggest mistake in the invasion itself was commiting the Guderian and Hoth Panzer Groups away from Army Group Center after the Battle of Smolensk. While the Kiev Pocket bagged 650,000 prisoners, I agree with Guderian, Liddell Hart and others that continuing directly from Smolensk would have resulted in the capture of Moscow before the onset of the fall rains. This would have severely dislocated the Russian railnet and all the logistics that rely on rails; and this would have all but effectively cut off Leningrad and the northern front from men, munitions, and food from the rest of the Soviet Union.

Originally posted by Andu Indorin

1. Attacking Russia without crippling Britain is one mistake;

Britain was crippled in 1941. It wasn't untill 1943 that Britain had any real ability to project power in Europe. In 1941 the British Army was a mess, the RAF suitable only for national air defence and the Royal Navy had no real way of hurting Germany.

once Mussolini dragged Hitler into the Mediterranean, he probably should have cancelled his preparations for a 1941 start to Barbarossa and reinforced Rommel in Africa and attempted to overrun the Suez Canal and the Middle Eastern oil fields

Seeing as the Med was off limits to British merchant shipping from the minute Italy entered the war, capturing the Suez Cannal would have achieved nothing. While capturing the Middle East oil fields could have helped Germany, this wouldn't have been in any sence decisive - the Middle Eastern oilfields of the 40's weren't even close to being as important as they are today, and Britain could have gotten oil from the America's to replace whatever she lost in the Middle East. Anyway, putting Barbarossa back would have given the Soviets at least an extra year to rebuild their military.


It stikes me that the amazing thing about Barbarossa isn't that the Germans failed to win, but that they came so close to winning. The Soviets sheer weight of numbers should have stopped the Germans cold within weeks of the attack. However, due to lously Soviet generalship and some good German genralship the Germans were able to wear to Soviets down to somthing aproaching parity of numbers.

Re going straight for Moscow in Sept 41: Wouldn't the Soviets have just moved troops from the Ukraine to Moscow? And wouldn't the Soviets have fought as well for Moscow as they were simultaneously doing for Leningrad?

edit - double post :o

Case: Closing the Suez would have made it unnecessary to help Italy out in the naval warfare in the Med.

Russias ONE center of gravity was Stalin in Moscow. Kill him, take Moscow and the rail net - presto!

I think Lt M covered the important points there.

I cant even begin to stress the importance of taking Moscow in 1941 for the Germans. It would have caused the Ukraine and Leningrad fronts to just wither away, unsupplied.

But, as he did over and over throughout the war, Hitler gave the Allies a little extra help. ;)

Hitler had a habit of not finishing off his enemies when he had them by the throat.

Moscow 41 is a good example. So is the battle of Britain, if you consider that the RAF was on its last legs when the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London instead of the airfields.

Ofcourse, in hindsight its so easy to say these things.

Originally posted by Case


The Soviets sheer weight of numbers should have stopped the Germans cold within weeks of the attack. However, due to lously Soviet generalship and some good German genralship the Germans were able to wear to Soviets down to somthing aproaching parity of numbers.


According to Churchills history of the Second World War, Timoshenko, responsible for the one of the central front (forget which one exactly), was a far better general than his direct opponent Von Bock, the general in charge of the Army group centre. Later von Bock was cashiered, when he did not succed in the belated attempt to capture Moscow. Also Zhukov was not that bad a general.
There were probably a disparity in the lower echelons, but this mainly due to lack of experience on the Soviet side.
Good generalship is also taking advantage of the opponents mistakes.

Hitler made many mistakes during the war and not with Russia, He allowed Goering to talk him into halting his panzers at dunkirk to allow the luftwaffe to finish off the brits (didn't work), invading russia in June and not April or May, (Had he started the war earlier in the year he might very well have gotten the opportunity to encircle Kiev AND take Moscow and Leningrad. But like everyone else had mentioned he should have left the war to the experts (his generals)
lucky for us Hitler (and Goering) had huge ego's and wanted to run the show himself. Hitler was an idiot.

Originally posted by Lt. 'Killer' M.
Case: Closing the Suez would have made it unnecessary to help Italy out in the naval warfare in the Med.

All that would have gained the Germans was the 100 Ju-87s which were sent to the Med. That's not a good trade off for giving the Soviets an extra year to rebuild. As it was, the Med became the graveyard for much of the Royal Navy, and that undoubtably helped Germany's cause.

Hitler got just as much help, if not more so, than he gave the allies.

The fall of France was an Allied blunder. The Appeasement policy was another blunder.

The mistakes were nearly equal by comparison so as you can see Germany would never have won the war.