You may (or may not) know that Montgomery was to be sent to command the British contingent of the landings in Morocco and Algeria (Operation Torch) while General Gott was to deal with the El Alamein operations. Unfortunately, Gott's plane was shot down within days of taking up his post and Monty got his chance.

Now, I couldn't find much about Gott on the Web so I suppose it's difficult to say how the battle would have gone had he been running the show, so perhaps the best way to approach this one is to ask - how much of the success at El Alamein was down to Monty's own genius/flaws/decisions? Could anyone else have won it just as easily?

For instance, after the initial German attack on the Alam Halfa Ridge had been stopped (Operation Lightfoot) the numerical advantage and the initiative lay with the British - any decent General could have made the best of that situation. Further, the success of Lightfoot was mainly due to the excellent planning of subordinates, not Monty himself.

Comments?

Gott was an adequate soldier as he showed in France, but not a paticulary good tactician as he also showed in France. Monty had charisma, and bundles of it to spare too. It mattered a damn lot to the soldiers in thier trenches, in mind-boggilingly hot heat, with next to now water, flies everyhere and only bully beef to eat that the General (yes the bleedin' general for christsakes!) was actually bothering to visit them and stay with them for a few hours. 8th Army morale post 2nd battle of Tobruk was non-existant, they didn't just think, they knew that they would lose in the coming battle. Montgomoery changed all of that in an instant.

Gott would never have been brave enough to take the difficult decisions that Montgomery made, Montogmory wanted to be 100% sure of victory and leave no room for failure and his tactics did that. As I've already said, Gott was nothing special, just your typical British general at the time, still stuck in the 1920's.

Hmm, lucky escape then?

Trouble is, Monty was stuck in the '20s too. I think it would have been hard not to do better with the position he had - an opinion I once heard firsthand at a lecture from one of Rommel's surviving staff officers.

My point exactly - WHAT did he actually do that was so good AFTER Lightfoot? Surely that success alone would have boosted morale as much as all his publicity seeking tours etc etc and Lightfoot was not his brainchild.

I suspect 'Strafer' Gott would had been much deadlier in the pursuit phase.

El Alamein was the British "Moscow" or "Stalingrad" from a propoganda standpoint, as the Germans had won most of the battles up to that point.

After losing Norway, France, Belgium, Greece, Crete and some of Egypt, they really needed that victory.

The history of the desert war reads like a ping-pong match. The two armies traded Libyan and Egyptian territory like it was baseball cards.

what are you getting at here Joe?

:lol:
That's kind of the funniest thread title I've ever read.

The Wehrmacht vs. Gott's army! :lol:

Sorry, couldn't resist.

Huh? What's everyone talking about? :confused:

Gott = God in German.

The guy's always been good for cheap jokes, but this thread title (which you appearently did unintentionally) beats them all. :D

Oh, I see :blush:

I just realised that the defense of Alam Halfa Ridge wasn't called Operation Lightfoot after all - that was a later part of the battle. Sorry for any confusion.

How much of the success at El Alamein was down to Monty's own genius/flaws/decisions? Could anyone else have won it just as easily?

The British had such a huge quantitative advantage over the Germans at El Alamein that not even the worst general ever could have lost. IIRC, the tank-panzer ratio was about 600-50 in favour for the British. :ack: Plus Rommel wasn't in Northern Africa when the battle started - he was recovering from an infection in Berlin, and didn't come back until the battle was allready lost.

The greatest change would have propably been that Gott, not Montgomery would have been in charge of British operations for the remainder of the war. No doubt Gott would have had a different approach on a number of battles, like the infamous Arnheim screw-up.

Alam Halfa Ridge figured prominently in 3 major battle. First Alamein under Auckinlek, Alam Halfa under Montgomery, and 2nd Alamein under Montgomery.

Originally posted by Rodgers
what are you getting at here Joe?
The nazis were thought "unbeatable" until Moscow in 1941, and the British finally dealt a defeat to Germany at el-Alamein as well.
It was important to the public morale, as well as the British soldier.

The desert war prior to Montgomery arriving was a back and forth affair, usually dominated by whomever had better supply at the time.

http://www.civfanatics.net/uploads2/elal11.gif

http://www.civfanatics.net/uploads2/elal12.gif

Sorry for blowing out the screen...

http://www.civfanatics.net/uploads2/elal13.gif

I am afraid I have to agree that Monty wasnt the only reason for victory, since the British strategy was to simply amass equipment until an overwhelming force was assembled and overran the Axis defenders.

Hell, I could have done that... ;)

Wavell, Auchinleck and Monty were all excellent generals.

Wavell had the disadvantage that when he was in charge;
it was the British alone against Germany and Italy; and that
he was instructed to divide his troops between Greece, Iraq and North Africa. Britain's army wasn't powerful enough for all 3.

Auchinleck was let down by the Americans; the American attache was foolishly relaying tactical details of his plans to Washington using a code that the Italians had obtained a copy of from the American embassy in Rome.

Although morale was low; there is no evidence that the British were giving up. As Rommell had overstretched his supply chain; the British and allies could have held on; even if Gott was not the best general.

As it was; Monty arrived at the right time. There is much said about his character and how that inspired his men. However his real contribution was in expounding planning and cooperation between the various types of allied armed forces.

Monty biggest contributions (and apparently Aukinleck's and Cunnignhams's weaknesses) was in oganization, detail, and discipline. When Monty got there Units were spread out, intermingled, rescoures mismatched, support finction were unorganized, radio discipline was abominable, peronnnel were not assigned to the jobs they were acutually doing, problems with insubordination (guess how long that last one lasted after Monty took over).

Originally posted by Lefty Scaevola
Monty biggest contributions (and apparently Aukinleck's and Cunnignhams's weaknesses) was in oganization, detail, and discipline. When Monty got there Units were spread out, intermingled, rescoures mismatched, support finction were unorganized, radio discipline was abominable, peronnnel were not assigned to the jobs they were acutually doing, problems with insubordination (guess how long that last one lasted after Monty took over).

To borrow from Monty's greatest fan, George Patton, if they dont look like soldiers and act like soldiers, how can they be expected to fight like soldiers. Sometimes tactics are not even a secondary concern, preparedness is all. It has been demonstrated again and again that ANY force can be beaten, if it lets itself go.

J

At the risk of arguing against myself here - could Gott have held off Churchill and his demands for immediate action as long as Montgomery did? After all it was the material advantage that counted in the end - if Gott wasn't as stubborn as Monty he may have been pushed into attacking too early and lost it.

Monty could have attacked weeks, perhaps months, earlier and still had a decisive material advantage. He waited until his advantage was beyond decisive. I've always thought his delaying action as long as he did was an indication of a lack of nerve.

I thought his caution was borne out of a horror of inflicting needless casualties on his men after his experiences in WWI.

Ironically, his Market Garden plan, a few years later, to end the war early (AND make him look great too, admittedly) led to thousands of said casualties for barely any gain.