What societal, economic and political factors led Japan going the way it did in the 1930s?

Well probably because of their dependence on foreign resources and their need to get these resources from China, and the East Indies, and perhaps the land they gained during WW1 did not suite their needs well enough. (They were just pointless islands after-all, and were really only good for naval bases.)

One of the biggest causes of Japan's fall was definitely their inferiority complex towards the West. This meant they were apt to seek colonies and expansion even though they really weren't in a position to do either. There are a few other things I could talk about, but to be honest there are guys on the boards with far more in-depth knowledge of the situation in Japan than I do - I'm more of a '1930s Germany' guy - so I don't want to say anything stupid or disproven since I read an old book on it years ago.

I can tell you that, like the Nazis, Japan's military leadership focused on an outdated, disproven mercantilist economic model and sought autarky for Japan, despite the fact that this wasn't desirable if it was even achievable. This is what convinced them to seek raw materials and resources for the Empire by force, as opposed to peaceful trade. What lead them to reach these beliefs in the first place I couldn't say, but it might just be that Japan, already a century behind Europe in terms of its colonialism, was also a century or more behind in terms of economic thought.

From what I understand the population explosion which occurred during the turn of the century meant that by the 1930s Japan was being put under a lot of strain. This coupled with a young population becoming educated and aware of the west's decline lead to a strong will for social change which manifested itself in political upheaval and several secret societies. The military and body politic fell victim to a multitude of assassinations and coups as the largest outlet for young japanese males tried to cope with the problem. Western dismissal of Japan's contribution in WWI as well as a general atmosphere of national pride led to a strong urge to "liberate" the Asian colonies of Europe and wrangle them under Japan, which would run Asia in hegemon in sort of the way the US would attempt to do during the cold war.

A clear example of this chaos attempting to solve itself is the Kwantung forces acting separately from the Imperial Army and seizing Manchuria in an effort to alleviate the stress of resources and population that the empire was going through.

Then again thats just my limited understanding. I have a book on this very subject sitting atop my mountain of "crap I have to read" on my dresser. Some day I'll get around to it.

I remembering reading there were some legitimate fears that China did have the potential to become a competing Asian power as well. Some of their aggression towards China may have been attempt to destroy a much larger enemy before they had the chance to become a threat.

That sounds fairly similar to what I've read, though there's also a bit about the population explosion requiring an escape-valve, and colonisation was it. Particularly as regards Manchuria.

I remembering reading there were some legitimate fears that China did have the potential to become a competing Asian power as well. Some of their aggression towards China may have been attempt to destroy a much larger enemy before they had the chance to become a threat.
Might explain their frequent attempt to smack down Russia as well. Those didn't work out so well.

Japan ran a very similar course to Italy, I'd say. Ultra-militarists came to power in both countries after the moderate-liberals were discredited by poor World War I victory concessions.

Japan ran a very similar course to Italy, I'd say. Ultra-militarists came to power in both countries after the moderate-liberals were discredited by poor World War I victory concessions.

Japan though did gain the lands they'd been promised at the time they entered the war (save for Tsingtao)

Japan though did gain the lands they'd been promised at the time they entered the war (save for Tsingtao)
That's not as much as the people expected to get, however. It's similar to the situation at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905; while the Japanese government got almost all of what it actually wanted - excepting the Liaotung Peninula - the average man on the street was disappointed by the result. And if your average Japanese citizen was disappointed, how furious must the military have been, considering they were the ones who fought and died for such seemingly small gains?

Not to mention they had been totally snubbed in Paris, being flat out told they wouldn't really have a say in the negotiations.

True. But it's not like the German Pacific islands held any value resource wise, so I guess the best thing they had that the Japanese wanted was Tsingtao so yeah I can believe that.

Japan though did gain the lands they'd been promised at the time they entered the war (save for Tsingtao)

That's not as much as the people expected to get, however. It's similar to the situation at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905; while the Japanese government got almost all of what it actually wanted - excepting the Liaotung Peninula - the average man on the street was disappointed by the result. And if your average Japanese citizen was disappointed, how furious must the military have been, considering they were the ones who fought and died for such seemingly small gains?

Also, racial equality clause.

True. But it's not like the German Pacific islands held any value resource wise, so I guess the best thing they had that the Japanese wanted was Tsingtao so yeah I can believe that.

No, but they're imperial bling and great naval bases.

I know their great naval bases. :p I said resource wise :)

Also, racial equality clause.



No, but they're imperial bling and great naval bases.
Which we Australians were instrumental in keeping out. Damn we're awesome. We also screwed them out of a few of those islands, come to think of it.

The arrangement was, IIRC, the Dominions get the islands south of the equator, the Japanese north of the equator. Japan got all the islands it managed to occupy.

Also, RE: racial equality, the United States wouldn't support it either, due to the anti-Japanese laws on the West Coast.

Which we Australians were instrumental in keeping out. Damn we're awesome. We also screwed them out of a few of those islands, come to think of it.
Fair's fair; the British screwed you out of all of the islands by acquiescing to Japanese entry into the war in the first place.

Iinteresting replies so far. Most people seem to blame external factors, which undoubtedly played a part. But couldn't the mismanagement of the sudden creation of an industrial society have factored in too? In some ways it seemed like the state encouraged extreme nationalism to distract from other, less palatable ideologies like socialism and liberalism

"The state" hardly had a coherent policy vis-a-vis nationalism, socialism, and liberalism in Japan at all before the militaristic takeover. For every Katsura Tarō there was a Saionji Kinmochi. :p

Iinteresting replies so far. Most people seem to blame external factors, which undoubtedly played a part. But couldn't the mismanagement of the sudden creation of an industrial society have factored in too? In some ways it seemed like the state encouraged extreme nationalism to distract from other, less palatable ideologies like socialism and liberalism
Well, which part of the state?

Afaik modernisation was pushed and directed by the mostly military-minded Imperial restoration politicians in the late 19th c. Large, modern, western-style manufactures were created, sold to sympathetic well-heeled investors (more often former samuari than actual members of the former merchant class) who often initially ran these businesses at a loss on the government promise of support and how they would eventually turn a profit. As they turned around, these developed into the eight "zaibatsu" industrial conglomerates. It made for an odd structure to the japanese economy, with huge companies at the top, loads of tiny mom-and-pop family companies at the bottom, but a lack of intermediary mid-size companies.

The industrial elite being small, and being used to acting very much in tandem with the political authorities probably were factors in making them go along with the military side pulling the country towards war and militarism in the 1930's. I do seem to recall that the Japanese industrialists weren't necessarily overly happy with the development though. The military's promises of raw materials, markets and profits were all fine and good, except they were aware of them being speculative. The Japanese industrialists apparently were very much aware of the contry's dependency on imports. They were also mostly the same people who after 1945 got a shot at pushing through their rather more peacful agenda of "Japan Incoroporated", once the military establishment had been removed.

As to why the military could pretty much stuff Japan in its own pocket in the 1930's, that would seem to have been provided for by certain constitutional mechanisms inspired by the constitution of Imperial Germany the drafters had used as a blue-print. As a consequence in Japan the military were used to making politics, and decided by themselves about when to go to war and with whom anyway.

Iirc there were attempts at creating ultra-nationalist political parties to support the military governments, but these were never very successful. Veneration of the emperor seems to have cut across party lines, but the parliamentary election results even during the periods when the military formed governments ignoring the Diet seems to have pretty much followed the lines of the 1920's, when civilian parliamentary governments had run Japan.

Afaict in Japan there were never anything like the popularity of ultranationalistic movements like the Italian Fascists or the Germans Nazis. Those were more phenomena of political modernity and actual dissatisfaction with democracy at the time. Japan in the 30's and 40's to me seems to have been more of a "traditional" military dictature variety, bolstered by also traditional monarchical authoritarianism. Closer comparisons with Imperial Germany during WWI might perhaps be made?

There were plenty of internal factors that probably played a role.
If liberal government was discredited by WWI in Japan, why did Japana immediately enter into it's most liberal period in history?
Japans population boom and resource dependency weren't exactly unique during the period.
The biggest factor was the Mukden Incident and it's reaction to it. Yes the Mukden incident can be taken as a sign of militarism, but it was still entirely within the means of the government to seize control in the aftermath. The fact was, they didn't want to. The Military had handed them more land then they'd acquired in all of Japanese History. And this became the guiding light of Japanese militarism during the period: Success is never punished. Anybody could do anything, as long as they got it done.

I might just add to that point. It's important to remember that the civilian leadership and much of the military didn't want to cause trouble in China. This is largely as a result of two factors: (1) the economic significance (both real and imagined) of China to Japan and (2) the strong possibility of making considerable economic and political gains in furtherance of (1) without the expedient of having to resort to war.

There were four principle mechanisms through which this could be pursued.

(A) The one Japanese politicians seemed to have favoured was to support the Kuomintang in its political struggles. This wasn't of course universal, but as Kuomintang strength built up and its reliance on Japan increased (particularly with regards to training of cadres) the possibility of gaining economic and political concessions increased. For a variety of reasons this proved impractical, some related to Mukden and others relating to a sea-change in the opinions of individual Japanese movers and shakers.

(B) The instability of China itself offered significant potential for making economic and political gains without having to reach for the gun. Japan could theoretically trade favours with local power-brokers for favourable outcomes. This it did with limited effect before Mukden. I think the principle problem with this approach was that Japanese interests in China were diametrically opposed to the ad-hoc kind of arrangements that developed out of these agreements. It simply wasn't feasible to invest capital in such chaotic circumstances. The need for the establishment of the Kwantung Army in the first place and the consequent cost of maintaining even the small enclave that Japan controlled was infeasible as a basis for anything more than the most basic extractive enterprises sans military involvement. Obviously, the military favoured an approach that resolved these fundamental problems. This was however quite distinct from what actually happened.

(C) The other possibility was to offer support against European imperialism in exchange for economic and political concessions. This had the obvious logical defect on trading European Imperialism for Japanese Imperialism and foundered predominately on that. Although, it must be noted that Japan was probably incapable of actually effecting anything more than resisting further impositions. It was not itself capable of reversing those already in place, at least by itself. In any case, European Imperialism while topical was not a major practical concern for the Chinese. It would have been nice to free themselves from it, but the realisation was there that Japan was simply not capable of helping them do it. The other consideration, was whether it was worth it at all to even bother. The conclusions seems to have been a resounding no at that time.

(D) The final option was not predominately militaristic in orientation. Basically, Japan proposed to augment its legal position in Manchuria, in exchange for holding down other areas of China for the Kuomintang. This was actually more feasible than it sounded. The Kuomintang relied on the Japanese to a large extent militarily and it was not impossible that the Japanese might be give a limited role in effecting the aims of the Kuomintang in the North. The arrangement would have been mutually beneficial insofar as the Kuomintang gained control over areas it had hitherto exercised only nominal control over and additionally it would have given the Japanese some measure of security without recourse to military power, which was still limited to its concessions. However, elements of the Kuomintang ultimately baulked and the negotiations effectively ended. That didn't stop more pragmatic cooperation at the local level but it did bring to a halt formal proceedings and a framework which both parties could work from.

As it happened, all these possibilities were foundering in the lead-up to the Mudken Incident. The Japanese government had as part of its political program bowed out of negotiations for the moment. It intended to return to them. But before it could, elements of the Kwantung Army frustrated at a lack of progress and convinced that war would resolve the gordian knot of political deadlock engineered the Mukden Incident. This went against the wishes of the military and the government which had dispatched its own represent - a general - to keep the militarists in the Kwantung Army under control. This attempt failed. The result being that the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army who didn't know until after the fact was forced to accede to the wishes of his junior officers in an invasion of Manchuria. The thinking here being that the Chinese were unlikely to back down and that it was quite beyond the ability of the commander in chief himself to actually stop the affair, without compromising what he inferred to be his weak position.

That lead would obviously have to come from Tokyo itself. Unfortunately, Tokyo was also of the opinion that the Kwantung Army was up the river without a paddle and couldn't bring itself to sacrifice its own troops to stop a war it hadn't intended to start. Effectively delivered a fait accompli the government reluctantly (and with additional military prodding from young militarists in the Home Islands) acceded to what had happened. This effectively ruined any hope of squeezing economic and political concessions out of China. War didn't become inevitable. But the militarists gained additional ground and had a ready made and retroactively endorsed stick - 'Incidents' - to beat the Chinese with. In effect, they could provoke the Chinese howsoever and whensoever they pleased and the government could only accede. It simply lacked the ability to restrain elements of its own military. Everything else kind of flows from this.

Very interesting and much appreciated replies lads. Got any good sites about this topic?

Iinteresting replies so far. Most people seem to blame external factors, which undoubtedly played a part. But couldn't the mismanagement of the sudden creation of an industrial society have factored in too? In some ways it seemed like the state encouraged extreme nationalism to distract from other, less palatable ideologies like socialism and liberalism

Your ideology is showing, dearie... :D

Strange that no one has mentioned yet just HOW Japan came to be a modern society. A society dominated by a military caste, the samurai, which believed itself the pinnacle of civilization (much like the Chinese), was militarily humiliated by Commodore Perry and his Black Ships. I mean, the whole reason for the sudden, massive modernization and industrialization, was to redress the military balance and become powerful again!
Think about it: did they end their isolationism, abolish their cherished social strata and build factories so the peasants would have a better life? Nooooo, not really ... they had been humiliated, felt weak and wanted to become strong as soon as possible and show those upstart Westerners!

BTW, look out America... I think the Chinese feel much the same way.... :D