Do you think it was important to the outcome of WW2. I don't think the war could have been any different because most heavy equipment was lost and troops with Lee-Enfield rifles are no match fot tanks.

The Dunkirk evacuation was an important psychological victory for Britain. It showed the British people that their army was still intact and was ready to defend them if Hitler invaded. So I voted yes, it did affect the outcome, although, as Churchill said, "Wars are not won by evacuations."

Originally posted by napoleon526
The Dunkirk evacuation was an important psychological victory for Britain. It showed the British people that their army was still intact and was ready to defend them if Hitler invaded. So I voted yes, it did affect the outcome, although, as Churchill said, "Wars are not won by evacuations."
What I think also. The evacuation at Dunkirk allowed most of the British army to escape, leading to D-Day. If the Germans had persisted and destroyed almost or most of the escaping the British forces, things would be a lot different today...

If the Germans had pushed ahead and destroyed the evacuation, I don't think the brits would have had much fight left in them after that happened.

Militarily it was a significant setback. Politically and psychologically it was critical to the coming air war. IMHO it was at that point that the British people "bought into" the war, and made it their own. Things got very grim for the UK over the next year. Without the memory of the shining moment in France, knees might have buckled. It was a near thing as it was.

J

It was an absolute nightmare for the Germans and was caused 100% by Hitler, yet another one of his ridiculous moves. During the Blitzkrieg Hitler ordered his generals to halt temporarily during the advance, the generals decided this was folly and would lose them the ever important momentum and basically ignored him and continued the push to great effect. Despite the fact they were proved absolutely right, Hitler was furious at being ignored. In order to reassert his authority and basically out of spite he ordered the generals to stop rather than sweep onto the retreating British army. As such precious time was lost and the British army was able to fall back across the channel at Dunkirk.

Had it not been for Hitlers arrogance and little temper tantrums Dunkirk would have been a bloodbath rather than a retreat.

I think Goring had a word in his ear and wanted his Luftwaffe to destroy them, claiming all the credit (I hate Goring!!!!).
Apparently they terrain around dunkirk is marshy and not suitable for armour, and Hitler's panzer divisions needed refitting and didn't want them in street fighting. The only German unit to attack the British and disobey Hitler was the 1st SS division- and they got some good results.

Yeah, Goring was a damn fool. :)

Letting over 300,000 troops get away is always a mistake

Originally posted by Kentonio
Yeah, Goring was a damn fool. :)

if Hitler have had 2 Goebbles and 2 Rommels instead of Goering and Himmler things would be different :)

I dont think an extra Manstein or two would have hurt either. :)

I think the failure to destroy the BEF was a mistake but it didn't completely effect the outcome.

For the Krauts, it was a major disaster.

For humanity and the rest of the civilized world, it was a major triumph.

Please do not let your admiration for the German method of waging war interfere with your moral outrage over a regime that herded small children and sick people into gas chambers as a normal course of business.

Yes, it was the first major turning point of the war. It was the first time the Nazis hadn't completely won. The British could claim a victory in the depths of defeat, something we are quite good at. Propaganda-wise it was a God-send and morale is far too often underrated in my opinion. Wars are not just won on the battlefield. And the greatest threat Britain faced was not invasion but negotiated peace. Dunkirk meant that didn't happen. It saved Britain and ultimately saved the world.

Why do you say "Dunkirk", it's Dunkerque ( comes from the Dutch )....

I agree with the sentiments already stated, although I'd say that militarily it was not really that significant. Yes, failing to destroy the army at...uh...'Dunkerque'...was a textbook failure on Hitler's part, albeit an intentional one. Still, the force that escaped to Britain "to fight another day" was not a significant factor in later British military operations numerically. I voted "No".

The immediate reason for Hitler to destroy the BEF on the French beaches was to enable an invasion of the British Isles, but it was not that army that was stopping him from doing so, either at Dunkerque or later. The Battle of Britain was fought in the air, and the ultimate failure of Operation Sealion was the fault of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, not Wehrmacht. Had the German navy been able to transport the earmarked Wehrmacht units to Britain, the BEF units that had escaped back to Britain from Dunkerque were not enough to stop them. Even with these units, the British land forces in 1940 were wholly inadequate to defend the home Isles.

Dunkerque was an emotional propaganda coup for Britain and helped sustain the public through some lean war times, but in real military terms it didn't add up to much. This isn't to discredit or diminish the accomplishment of those fishermen who braved the war to save the British lads on the French beaches at all; only to say that even given their heroic efforts it would not have been enough to stem a German invasion had not the RAF (with foreign help!) and the Royal Navy not kept Hitler's legions on the Continent.

"Troops with Lee-Enfield rifles are no match for tanks," as you say... but tanks can't be driven without troops inside them.

Aside from that I think there would be as big a psychological effect of a massacre as there was from the successful escape.

If nothing else, Dunkirk allowed my Grandfather to fight also in North Africa, Scilly, Italy and police Germany post-war.

It is impossible to know what would have happened had the BEF not been rescued, but I think it would have immensely strengthened the hand of those in Britain that favoured coming to some agreement with Hitler.


As it was the evacuation was a triumph, which meant that the defense of Britain against a German invasion was much improved and that many of the rescued went on to fight in N.Africa and the other fronts to make a real contribution to winning the war. On the German side it is clear that Hitler chose to let the British go at Dunkirk as he believed it would mean they wouldn't be humilitated and their "honour" demand the continuation of the war. Just like the Kaiser, Hitler had some pretty strange mis-conceptions as regarding the British and the "success" at Dunkirk only inspired continued resistance.

A BEF destruction at Dunkirk means a surrender at Britain. This isn't far fetched since Guderian was 9 km away, 3 days before the BEF escaped but was forced to stop to let Goering finish it off and demonstrate the power of the Luftwaffe.

A surrender of Britain means that Germany isn't at war with anybody and has all the time in the world to prepare an invasion of the Soviet Union. Without a pesky western front, the Soviet Union stands no chance of getting crucial lend-lease supplies and a diversion of german troops. Soviet union is gone...what's next?

Originally posted by kittenOFchaos
On the German side it is clear that Hitler chose to let the British go at Dunkirk as he believed it would mean they wouldn't be humilitated and their "honour" demand the continuation of the war.

I have heard this before but I am not convinced. Is there any primary evidence? It seems to me to be a very limp retrospective excuse for having missed the opportunity to destroy the BEF. I believe that the German decision was made on military grounds.

My understanding is that it was the priority of the german high command to destroy the french army which they knew well constituted the majority of the enemy. The Germans did not know what reserves the French had. [In fact the French had very few reserves then and more importantly had no strategic mechanised counter thrust capability.] The Germans therefore regarded it as inprudent to devote a rapidly diminishing (due to break downs and minor damage rather than destroyed tanks) panzer force to finishing off the lesser British army and regarded it as wiser to destroy the greater French army. With hindsight; they were very probably strong enough to do both; but they did not know that then.

There were I believe five reasons for this military decision:

(a) concern about (non existent) possible French reserves
(b) failure to consider British withdrawal outside of ports
(c) over estimate of the effectiveness of bombing alone
(d) assumption that statistics on tanks reflected lost tanks
(e) failed to realise that rearguards at Calais would fight on

More than anything I think if the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk, Churchill would definitely have sued for peace with Hitler and the US would not have bothered to help Russia till maybe Pearl Harbor.

Originally posted by EdwardTking


I have heard this before but I am not convinced. Is there any primary evidence? It seems to me to be a very limp retrospective excuse for having missed the opportunity to destroy the BEF. I believe that the German decision was made on military grounds.

My understanding is that it was the priority of the german high command to destroy the french army which they knew well constituted the majority of the enemy. The Germans did not know what reserves the French had. [In fact the French had very few reserves then and more importantly had no strategic mechanised counter thrust capability.] The Germans therefore regarded it as inprudent to devote a rapidly diminishing (due to break downs and minor damage rather than destroyed tanks) panzer force to finishing off the lesser British army and regarded it as wiser to destroy the greater French army. With hindsight; they were very probably strong enough to do both; but they did not know that then.

There were I believe five reasons for this military decision:

(a) concern about (non existent) possible French reserves
(b) failure to consider British withdrawal outside of ports
(c) over estimate of the effectiveness of bombing alone
(d) assumption that statistics on tanks reflected lost tanks
(e) failed to realise that rearguards at Calais would fight on


Well, there is ALOT of evidence I could forward from my favorite historian Liddell Hart who was fortunate enough to have interviewed German Generals/Commanders after the war...but to save time as I have tasks to do I'll go with one quote for this post to back up my claim:

Page 89 From "Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War":
At the same time there is evidence that even the Luftwaffe was not used as fully or vigorously as it could have been - and some of the air chiefs say that Hitler put the brake on again here.
All this caused the higher circles to suspect a political motive behind Hitler's military reasons. Blumentritt, who was Rundstedt's operational planner, connected it with the surprising way that Hitler had talked when visiting their headquarters:

"Hitler was in very good humour, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been 'a decided miracle', and gave us the opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain.
He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but 'where there is planing, there are shavings flying'. He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church - saying that both were essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the Continent. The return of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere. He remarked colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics.
He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept."



Liddell Hart himself concludes on the matter having gone into alot of depth in another book of his "The Other Side of the Hill" concerning the miracle of Dunkirk that:

"Hitler's character was of such complexity that no simple explanation is likely to be true. It is far more probable that his decision was woven of several threads. Three are visible - his desire to conserve tank strength for the next stroke; his long-standing fear of marshy Flanders; and Goring's claims for the Luftwaffe. But it is quite likely that some political thread was interwoven with these military ones in the mind of a man who had a bent for political strategy and so many twists in his thought."



Personnally I believe it is impossible given the obvious desire to attack of the commanders on the ground, the obvious predicament of the British forces and the absolute lack of any French counter-offensive whatsoever to trouble the Germans that it was a military decision that called the halt. I believe it was a decision bourne out of respect of the British Empire that Hitler had shown on numerous occasions including in his book "Mein Kampf" that meant he did not want to destroy the army of a Nation he wanted to fight with NOT against.

Kitten, Interesting.

I have been reading Erik Durschmied "The Hinge Factor".

"..Goring then went on to assure Hitler that his bomber pilots would annihilate the Tommies. The Air Marshal argued that the northern Allied armies were cut off ffrom the rest of France and that the Fuhrer needed his panzer force intact to crush Paris, to avenge the humiliation of 1918. The Fuhrer need only order the panzers to stop so that his Luftwaffe wouldn't strike at their own units. Hitller, still suffering from the aftershock of the Arras tank encounter, readily agreed to Goring's proposals." 22

22: Admiral Ansel, from talks with Luftwaffe General Jeschonnek, Goring's ADC. This fact, that Goring was responsible for the Halte Befehl, was reconfirmed by Air Marshals Kesselring and Milch during an interview in a POW camp in 1945.

Originally posted by EdwardTking
Kitten, Interesting.

I have been reading Erik Durschmied "The Hinge Factor".

"..Goring then went on to assure Hitler that his bomber pilots would annihilate the Tommies. The Air Marshal argued that the northern Allied armies were cut off ffrom the rest of France and that the Fuhrer needed his panzer force intact to crush Paris, to avenge the humiliation of 1918. The Fuhrer need only order the panzers to stop so that his Luftwaffe wouldn't strike at their own units. Hitller, still suffering from the aftershock of the Arras tank encounter, readily agreed to Goring's proposals." 22

22: Admiral Ansel, from talks with Luftwaffe General Jeschonnek, Goring's ADC. This fact, that Goring was responsible for the Halte Befehl, was reconfirmed by Air Marshals Kesselring and Milch during an interview in a POW camp in 1945.

The only thing that I find remarkable if it was solely due to the intervention of Goring and his claims of the power of the Luftwaffe is why then that Hitler did not blame Goring for this failing :confused:

I don't think Hitler would want to publicly berate a long time Nazi party comrade like Goring. Even later on in the war when Goring was a fat drug addicted . .. .. .. .. .. . did Hitler take measures against him. Anyway, Goring and Hitler probably looked foward to the rematch in the skies over Britain.

Originally posted by kittenOFchaos


The only thing that I find remarkable if it was solely due to the intervention of Goring and his claims of the power of the Luftwaffe is why then that Hitler did not blame Goring for this failing :confused:


Umm - not entirely convinced that Goring's intervention was the "sole" reason. I think that most people, and I don't think that there is any particular reason to believe that Hitler was any exception, typically approach complex activities in modular mode.

The overall strategic module in question then was of course defeating the French and there were various objectives associated with this:

(a) breaking through (b) splitting the allied armies
(c) outflanking Paris (d) surrounding and capturing Paris.

Finishing off the BEF was simply not on this list and therefore not allocated any priority (first in terms of serious consideration and secondly in terms of the key armoured and mobile divisions).

I have no particular evidence to support this theory; other than my general observation about Hitler; that he did not always think strategically and that many of his modules contradicted each other. For example Hitler did not like Russians or Jews.

So why did he send German Jews of military age to death
camps when he could have sent them as assault troops
to be obliterated aginst the more akward Russian defences?

If Hitler had been kinder to the defeated french; e.g. offered to create a Belgium like buffer state for Alsace and Lorraine, he might have been able to charm them into making a substantial military contribution against Russia.

Hitler spent several years in WW1 on the western front. He will have observed that the High Command failed in four years to properly strategically break through despite deploying gas and storm trooper tactics. In WW2 the Luftwaffe very rapidly had in succession (a) obtained air superiority over the French (& British) in France (b) bombed out obstacles blocking the Panzers and (c) induced widespread chaos to the rear of the allies. Hitler therefore had good reason to believe that Goring had, when viewed overall, been both as successful in France as in Norway and Poland. The fact that the BEF had been (a) driven out of France (b) lost all its equipment and (c) taken heavy casualties was most likely seen as an extra bonus success.

I suspect that it was only much later on when Britain had, to his surprise, decided to fight on, sunk the French fleet and after Goring had not won the Battle of Britain; that Hitler realised that (d) maybe more soldiers had got away than he could have permitted and that he might have missed an opportunity. I don't think that he had any real concerns about humiliating the British; he never seemed to mind about that with others although he'd occasionally try his charm with the Italians, Finns and Spanish. He probably thought that making certain of finishing off the french was the best method of strategically defeating Britain.

Of course it is possible that he may have had some vague idea about later doing a deal with Britain to invade Russia; certainly the planning for the invasion of Britain was very hesitant; but the majority evidence for the order to halt was that it was military.

Consider the battle in the North as a secondary sub-module. A military factor here is the result of the Begium collapse. This meant that Hitler could attack the BEF from the East instead of just from the South. As the German army to the South of the BEF could engage in a number of directions against the British or the French; but the German army to the East only had one direction West; it made strategic sense to conserve the Southern army that was most isolated from its supply lines and send the Eastern army west as the hammer against the anvil of the army to the south of the BEF.

I refer to Alan Brooke's war diary:

"25 May Lomme"

During the night I received information at 2 am that German penetration through the Belgian front was growing rapidly and that the Belgians were not offering much resistance. I came to the conclusion that this was the beginning of a German offensive intended to push through to our left rear and to join up with the armoured divisions which must have just about shot their bolt."