tank,, n. 1. A container for liquids
2. An armored fighting vehicle.

At first glance, definitions 1. and 2. don't appear to have anything in common. However, the common name for an armored fighting vehicle (AFV) originally comes from the first definition.

During WW1, supplying troops in the Western Front trenches with drinking water was a major problem. Because of enemy artillery fire, pipes could not be laid to the trenches and trucks and pack animals could not get that far forward, so water was carried in using massive amounts of manpower.

When the British were developing the first AFV, they put out a cover story that they were developing an armored vehicle to carry water to the trenches. German intelligence did hear this story and, since they were having similar problems supplying water to their trenches, they had no trouble believing the story. As part of the deception, all the British involved in AFV development were ordered to refer to the vehicles as "tanks."

When the tanks were first used at the Battle of Cambrai (starting 20 Nov 1917), the cover name continued to be used. It was short, not used for any other weapon, and everyone was used to using it. Hence, almost 100 years later, the common name for an AFV continues to be the name used in the deception plan.

Interesting story. I kind of had much of it figured out, but it's funny to hear the actual story behind the word. :thumbsup: :lol:

I actully heard it a long while ago and just seeing the title brought back the old memory. Foolish how the British invested so much in making the development secret yet never really thought of the advantages a tank would give them and so quickly lost an important advantage.

interesting or weird, I think both :)

Originally posted by G-Man
I actully heard it a long while ago and just seeing the title brought back the old memory. Foolish how the British invested so much in making the development secret yet never really thought of the advantages a tank would give them and so quickly lost an important advantage.


It's like that with all weapons, machinegun was thought to be a weapon to defend artillery from cavalry charges and against occasional assault of native hordes in colonies. When Maxim was introduced there was speculation if it's really useful and if it was would it be honorable to use it on the battlefield.

Clarification
Tanks were first used en masse at Cambrai; IIRC the first operational use of tanks was in support of attacks on the Somme on 15th September 1916.

(And before anyone starts with how that spoiled the surprise: that was the only time in the war the ENtente launched coordinated assaults on all front. They weren't going to save the weapons at hand for a notional victory parade. Haig is popularly castigated for not being 'tank friendly' and the same people complain the tanks were used too early. Pick one.)

What important advantage did the British lose? The only way to keep a weapon truly secret is not to use it. Were they supposed to hide them all in a forest in case the Germans saw them?

Tanks (and portable MGs eg Lewis guns, and decent artillery) were key to the advances in the last 6 months of the war, including August 8th. The fact that Britain did not develop 'blitzkrieg-like' doctrine came much later - and France (another supposedly poor tank country) actually deployed an armoured before Germany deployed a panzer division, for what it's worth. It just wasn't a well thought out TO&E.

God story, thanks for sharing it :)

Originally posted by MadScot
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What important advantage did the British lose? The only way to keep a weapon truly secret is not to use it. Were they supposed to hide them all in a forest in case the Germans saw them?

Tanks (and portable MGs eg Lewis guns, and decent artillery) were key to the advances in the last 6 months of the war, including August 8th. The fact that Britain did not develop 'blitzkrieg-like' doctrine came much later - and France (another supposedly poor tank country) actually deployed an armoured before Germany deployed a panzer division, for what it's worth. It just wasn't a well thought out TO&E.

I'm not talking just about blitzkrieg. The British could've used the initial element of surprise to give the Germans a much stronger hit than what they eventually did, and they didn't use them very massively, giving the Germans time to prepare for tank assaults. When tanks first appeared there was very little that could've stopped them.

Originally posted by G-Man
I'm not talking just about blitzkrieg. The British could've used the initial element of surprise to give the Germans a much stronger hit than what they eventually did, and they didn't use them very massively, giving the Germans time to prepare for tank assaults. When tanks first appeared there was very little that could've stopped them.

I'm curious as to what you wanted done differently?

At Cambrai there were something like 800 tanks used on the first day (excuse my vagueness, I'm not in the same time zone as my books) and a significant break in to the German defences was achieved. 2-3 days later there were well under 100 tanks left running - my memory says about 20 - due mainly to mechanical failures. There is no way that anything more could have been achieved. In fact, it could be argued that there were too many tanks at Cambrai; the break-in could likley have been effected by a smaller number of tanks, and post-WW1 doctrine supports that. Based on their 1917-18 experiences the allies expected to use one or two battalions of tanks per division of infantry in the attack.

The simple fact is that early tanks were incredibly unreliable, very poorly armoured (any artillery piece could disable one, and a decent machine gun bullet had a chance) and were operating in a tactical/technological environment where they could not be used even to the limit of their poor potential.

Case in point: on the first day at Cambrai, the tanks (and I think an armoured car or two, which had been towed across the battlefield by a tank) actually achieved a break through to "the green fields beyond". There was a fleeting opportunity to move reserves up and through the gap in the lines and perhaps create greater disruption in the German rear area. The Cavalry Corps had been moved up near the front in anticipation of such an opportunity (despite their shortcomings, cavalry remained the ONLY exploitation arm available; German failure to use cavalry to exploit the March 1918 successes was a war-losing oversight, IMO). But WW1 era C3 was not up to the task of moving reserves forward in time - not a command failure per se, but a failure of the system. With no mobile radios it simply took too long for information to get to the people who needed to know.