calgacus
Aug 16, 2003, 09:42 PM
This article on the Seleucids, who ruled most of the old-Persian Empire for more than two centuries, briefly examines their system of control and its degree of success.
WHAT MEANS OF CONTROL WERE AVAILABLE TO THE SELEUCIDS?
The Seleucid Empire was large by any standards, and given the lack of modern technology, which even failed to keep the Soviet Empire properly under control, it is not surprising that the Seleucid kings had difficulties. Of course, the most useful and effective means of control which the Seleucid kings had at their disposal was the use of the army, without which no-one could be compelled to do anything. However, this could only be effective (long-term-wise) as a threat for an empire with problems of territorial scale in ancient times.
From a military point of view, the Seleucids tried to solve this problem of scale by the foundation of new cities and military colonies. This seems to have been especially common for the reigns of Alexander the Great, Seleucus I and Antiochus I. This had the double effect of increasing the ruler’s prestige and planting pockets of power in potentially hostile regions, although many were in the areas where the Seleucids could be expected to assert the most control – in the Near East for example. Appian says that Seleucus founded 34 new cities (Austin 46), which, even if a slight exaggeration or confusion of the facts, is a testament to the importance of the policy. Although the evidence is slight, we can guess that for the cities of more remote regions like Iran and Bactria there was a kind of mutual dependency, the Graeco-Macedonian settlers and veterans would be dependent on the on the king for their rights and in times of trouble and the king would be dependent to a certain extent on their more localized power. Mutual dependency could also be created by moving different populations to different parts of the empire as illustrated by the Stalin-like movement of Jews into Asia Minor.
Another method of control was the king’s use of “friends”. Name surveys have indicated that non-Greeks/Macedonians were excluded from the higher offices of administration for at least the first two generations after Alexander’s conquest. The strength of this system seems to have been that existence of this ethnic elite made the boundaries of local and royal authority clear to the non-Greek subjects. This of course ensured a certain level of voluntary (Austin 168) Hellenization of the behalf of the pre-existing local elites and this in turn would have went a long way to overcoming the empire’s heterogeneity problem.
However, the empire seems to have relied for the most part on the pre-existing Achaemenid systems of control. This was the satrapal system of powerful local but centrally appointed dynasts, kept in check to a limited extent by the “King’s eyes”, i.e. the friends mentioned above, as well as the continued practise of separating military power from financial control. The Persians had already established a system of authority that the provincials were willing to acknowledge and so the Seleucid debt to them was immense.
HOW SUCCESSFUL WERE THEY IN USING THESE MEANS?
However, the Seleucid system of authority broke down. The fact that the Seleucid empire ceases to be an expanding one, with the exception of Antiochus III’s transient conquests, is perhaps as good a piece of evidence as any to suggest that the Seleucid structure was not working. Or rather, that the Seleucid Empire was not able to capitalize on its many territorial claims is a strong indication that the Seleucid system of control was not working, since they clearly were not able to take advantage of their regional superiority in potential manpower and resources.
Yet their use of Greeks as administrators was obviously effective, as it depended on the ability of the Greeks themselves to maintain their positions. The effectiveness of this is obvious in terms of longevity, since this system was taken over by the Romans.
In fact in the Near-East from the time of Alexander and the Seleucids, it lasted more than a thousand years, at least until the time of the Arab takeover of the Sassanian and southern Byzantine provinces. Furthermore, local populations could remain loyal to the dynasty where and when the dynasty could maintain the prowess of its arms (Austin 167).
On the other hand, another way in which Seleucid control failed was in their control over the eastern territories. In the 250s and 260s the Seleucid Empire suffered two major territorial losses: the Greek run kingdom of Bactria broke away and the Parthians established an independent kingdom. In conjunction with the Romans, the latter would put an end to the Seleucid Empire. Failing to maintain control of this area in the east was therefore a major factor in explaining why the Seleucid methods of control broke down elsewhere.
Therefore, the inability of the army to maintain the dynasty’s position was the reason it broke down.
WHAT MEANS OF CONTROL WERE AVAILABLE TO THE SELEUCIDS?
The Seleucid Empire was large by any standards, and given the lack of modern technology, which even failed to keep the Soviet Empire properly under control, it is not surprising that the Seleucid kings had difficulties. Of course, the most useful and effective means of control which the Seleucid kings had at their disposal was the use of the army, without which no-one could be compelled to do anything. However, this could only be effective (long-term-wise) as a threat for an empire with problems of territorial scale in ancient times.
From a military point of view, the Seleucids tried to solve this problem of scale by the foundation of new cities and military colonies. This seems to have been especially common for the reigns of Alexander the Great, Seleucus I and Antiochus I. This had the double effect of increasing the ruler’s prestige and planting pockets of power in potentially hostile regions, although many were in the areas where the Seleucids could be expected to assert the most control – in the Near East for example. Appian says that Seleucus founded 34 new cities (Austin 46), which, even if a slight exaggeration or confusion of the facts, is a testament to the importance of the policy. Although the evidence is slight, we can guess that for the cities of more remote regions like Iran and Bactria there was a kind of mutual dependency, the Graeco-Macedonian settlers and veterans would be dependent on the on the king for their rights and in times of trouble and the king would be dependent to a certain extent on their more localized power. Mutual dependency could also be created by moving different populations to different parts of the empire as illustrated by the Stalin-like movement of Jews into Asia Minor.
Another method of control was the king’s use of “friends”. Name surveys have indicated that non-Greeks/Macedonians were excluded from the higher offices of administration for at least the first two generations after Alexander’s conquest. The strength of this system seems to have been that existence of this ethnic elite made the boundaries of local and royal authority clear to the non-Greek subjects. This of course ensured a certain level of voluntary (Austin 168) Hellenization of the behalf of the pre-existing local elites and this in turn would have went a long way to overcoming the empire’s heterogeneity problem.
However, the empire seems to have relied for the most part on the pre-existing Achaemenid systems of control. This was the satrapal system of powerful local but centrally appointed dynasts, kept in check to a limited extent by the “King’s eyes”, i.e. the friends mentioned above, as well as the continued practise of separating military power from financial control. The Persians had already established a system of authority that the provincials were willing to acknowledge and so the Seleucid debt to them was immense.
HOW SUCCESSFUL WERE THEY IN USING THESE MEANS?
However, the Seleucid system of authority broke down. The fact that the Seleucid empire ceases to be an expanding one, with the exception of Antiochus III’s transient conquests, is perhaps as good a piece of evidence as any to suggest that the Seleucid structure was not working. Or rather, that the Seleucid Empire was not able to capitalize on its many territorial claims is a strong indication that the Seleucid system of control was not working, since they clearly were not able to take advantage of their regional superiority in potential manpower and resources.
Yet their use of Greeks as administrators was obviously effective, as it depended on the ability of the Greeks themselves to maintain their positions. The effectiveness of this is obvious in terms of longevity, since this system was taken over by the Romans.
In fact in the Near-East from the time of Alexander and the Seleucids, it lasted more than a thousand years, at least until the time of the Arab takeover of the Sassanian and southern Byzantine provinces. Furthermore, local populations could remain loyal to the dynasty where and when the dynasty could maintain the prowess of its arms (Austin 167).
On the other hand, another way in which Seleucid control failed was in their control over the eastern territories. In the 250s and 260s the Seleucid Empire suffered two major territorial losses: the Greek run kingdom of Bactria broke away and the Parthians established an independent kingdom. In conjunction with the Romans, the latter would put an end to the Seleucid Empire. Failing to maintain control of this area in the east was therefore a major factor in explaining why the Seleucid methods of control broke down elsewhere.
Therefore, the inability of the army to maintain the dynasty’s position was the reason it broke down.