Does anyone know the details for the Mongols invasion plan of Europe?

Xen, at this point I'll have to ask you to put up some evidence. Name some actual Mongol battles outside of Japan and China where infantry played a major role, please. The Mongols certainly never used any mass infantry armies during their invasion of Europe. (see below)


By the way, Xen, how's it coming on those names? What are the names and places of the battles outside of east Asia (ie China and Japan) where the Mongols used mass infantry armies? Since according to you the Mongols used massed infantry tactics everywhere except during their initial rise I'm sure you would have no problem providing countless examples.

I've consistantly asked for examples outside of East Asia. I haven't changed anything.
 
alrighty; I'll give another look- but to thos ekeepign track of this particuler argument, outside juff Yu and myself, they shoudl note that I have found a very interesting source on the importance of infantry to mongol tactics

@jeff uu- can you point out where I said the mongols relied on infantry tactics? I said they formed an imporantant part of the strategy- and that relaince was placed on them, but not th epoint where you can say I called them a "massed infantry army"

I'll still look for you rprecious battles, however, I have a full plate at the moment, so I hope you wont mind a wait
 
My opinion is if they can fight and win in South China, they can fight anywhere. South Chinese geography is such that the mobility of their cavalry would have been severely curtailed. If you were to describe South Chinese geography it would be very hilly, very mountainous, lots of rivers and swamps and wet. Cavalry is not much use in this sort of terrain, nor is there much pasture for horses. If you read details about how the Han Chinese fought with the "southern barbarians" in earlier times you will see that large numbers held out on top of hills and mountains and the Chinese spent decades sending groups of men to literally storm each hill/mountain and drag them kicking and screaming down to the river valleys where they could be more easily controlled. There are still some isolated groups on hills in South China today. Having great cavalry is not much use in storming hills and mountains or fighting in marshes.

I don't know if it was possible in the time of the Mongolians, but it was definitely true in much earlier times it was possible by taking a few key passes to literally cut off the far south from the rest of China. This is because of the hilly and mountainous terrain. Shu or today's Sichuan could be cut off from the rest of China by controlling several key mountain passes because it was separated from the rest of China by a large mountain range. This is why Liu Bei chose it as his base.

Another factor of South China that generally kept it safe from northern invaders was disease. Even along the Yangtze, disease plagued most major encounters. Northern troops used to call some areas in the far south "poison air".

On the other hand, because of these characteristics, South China was also known for its beautiful environs. This and its warm climate and great exotic food meant there were famous holiday locations in South China during ancient times such as the West Lake.
 
The castle offers only protection for a troops, and they can't exactly harry supply lines since the Mongols didn't have any.

The Mongols did have a supply line and a rather vulnerable one at that, just different from that of the settled peoples. Waggons. Big ones. That's what their children, elderly, sick, wounded, families, craftsmen, stores etc. etc. traveled in. As you can imagine methods of defending these moving towns from other, hostile nomads had been honed to near perfection on the steppes long ago, but how well those techniques would have worked in completely different terrain is a whole another thing. The warriors could and certainly did range far and wide from these mobile bases, but substantial numbers were at all times left behind to guard them.

The Mongols didn't; they simply bypassed fortifications as necessary, and destroyed the cities and countryside instead.

What is exactly what Hannibal had done. Bypass fortified areas and destroy the countryside, in hopes that your opponent will be shamed into coming out and facing you in the field. However, things were quite different in Medieval Europe. The thing is that when confronted with an army in the area and without having an army to oppose it, the people usually went into the castles and fortified towns. Of course that would leave the countryside for looting and the likes, but would keep any invading army from gaining a real foothold if they didn’t invest the time to siege. But if the Mongols want to go into the countryside and butcher the peasantry and undefended villages an towns (which they'd have to do by hand because there aren't any irrigation canals) then they'd have to split up into small bands... which would then be vulnerable to local bands of defenders and incapable of taking castles, no matter how small. A single great horde cannot do this for supply reasons and reasons of expedience and practicality. It would be a futile extermination campaign. Besides, the main population would not hole up in the castles (there are plenty of woods and high mountains west and north of the Hungarian plain to hide in), castles are military strongpoints. One way or another, it comes back to siege warfare. You simply can't ignore castles. Why do you think European lords built them to begin with?

In the end, the lords and his knights might still be alive, but no one else will be and they'll have no economic base for building and supplying an army.

If they all go into walled cities, how long will the food and provisions hold out?

Doesn't make a diff. Peasants aren't continuously making food. You harvest only once a year. If the Mongols come after the harvest, you've got enough stores for at least a year, usually much longer. If they come before the harvest, doesn't matter whether those serfs live or die -- you won't be able to collect it anyways (indeed, that is when you scorch the fields). Usually defenders know when a large attacker is coming well ahead of time. Most castles were routinely prepared for sieges to last awhile--meaning that the local lord and his men and some of the populace can wait there for a long time. They'd gather all the food from the region beforehand and lock themselves in. Meanwhile, the Mongols outside are the ones whose horses are dying from lack of fodder. By the time the Mongols arrive, all the stocks in the surrounding countryside (and indeed, from farther afield) have already been taken into the castle. Stores only run out during sieges if your country's been having some rather poor harvests lately and so does not have much stores to begin with. And if your castle adjoins a river or a coast, it can be endlessly resupplied. Mongols were hopeless at blocking waterways.

As for fighting to the death, that only very rarely happened in Medieval sieges.

What Christian would not give their life, to oppose the hosts of hell? If he wins, he will drive the infidel back from whence he cames. if he loses, he shall go to heaven.

The Mongols would simply go about slaughtering the undefended cities and the countryside.

If the Mongols decided that the way to go in Europe was widespread genocide, AND get away with it, then what would be the point? Ruling over a desert isn't really any fun. And how would they get away with it? There were several fortified castles in Europe. And they were filled with either part-time or full-time soldiers. You can't just go rampaging everywhere and avoid all of them no matter if your army is all mounted or not. You have to eat, you get ambushed, you have to rest, you have to plunder. Third, there are only a few thousand Mongols doing all this. It's not like there is a Mongol for every European. How do they kill all the peasants anyhow? The way they depopulated Iraq was not by slaughtering everyone but by destroying the irrigation system. Europe relies on rainfall agriculture meaning that the Mongols have to win the hard way--seizing castles.

Disunity is a key point in the Mongol's favor. The "Holy Roman Empire" was composed piecemeal of a hundred different duchies, electorates, palantinates, free cities, bishopries, and so on, many without armies other than ceremonial guards.

I'm aware of the inner conflicts in the German empire. But it would be incorrect to overemphasize their importance. Some parts of the huge German empire were only formally under the emperor's control. However, this does not change the fact that Frederick was an extremely capable ruler with a powerful army at his disposal. France and the German empire were often involved in conflicts, but there were times when they could cooperate if necessary. The papal authority couldn't have ignored a serious threat of an all-out Mongol invasion, either. The conflict between the popes and emperors had a long history but in Frederick II's time, most of Germany was still under the emperor's control. Even during the interregnum after 1250 some of Germany's most prominent noblemen signed mutual pacts and alliances to tackle common problems together. I don't see any reason why similar actions couldn't have taken place against a serious Mongol threat if it ever materialized.

The HRE wasn't a united entity, nor was it fortified across the entire land, as you seem to be getting at. It had a population of maybe 20 million at the time. How many can you fit into the fortresses?

Do you know how many castles are in Europe??? In the early 13th century the Count of Provence controlled 40 castles, and the King of France had over 100, including 45 in Normandy. The Duke of Burgundy owned 70. In 1216 King Henry III had inherited from his father 93 royal castles in England, and had secured 10 more in Guyenne by 1220, while for their part the English barons held 179. So even assuming Batu had crushed the leagued Italian, German and French armies on the plains of Italy, and struck off the heads of Gregory IX, Frederick II, Louis IX, and Conrad the Crusader, and then proceeded to rape and pillage the city of Rome, everybody else would have retreated to safety behind these unassailable walls of their castles and cities. And those who do not can seek refuge in forests and mountain areas.

Ha. The Pope called for Christians ally with the Mongols against the Muslims

Can you provide a link to this comment. I seriously doubt the pope said such a thing. Such a alliance signed between Italy and the Mongols would've been an extremely unlikely move. The prospects of one Christian state signing an alliance with infidel invaders would've been extremely slim and would surely have provoked nation-wide outrage. This alliance would also have contradicted common sense. The Pope surely wouldn't have wanted to replace one great opponent -- with an even more dangerous one - a Mongol empire stretching from southern Russia to the Rhine. It is in strategic interests of any nation to choose the lesser evil.


France will soon be engaged in the Hundred Years War, and in any case was far from a nation, but a scattered mess of Duchies like Burgundy, Aquitaine, Brittany, Bourbonais, and so on, some of which the King of France had limited control over at best. And they were certainly of doubtful loyalty. Look at how faithful the Normans and Burgundians end up being. Hell, even in Hungary, the Hungarian nobles bickered over what priviledges and rights they would recieve in return for fighitng against the Mongols.

I'm not saying I know what would have happened in case of a Mongol invasion of Western Europe. Take for instance, the Crusades. When you have French, German and English armies all marching together over the great distances necessary for a Crusade, even if the national forces kept to themselves and their leaders were often at odds, this is still a remarkable thing. When they then live together in a far foreign land that they have conquered, even though separated into the feudal states they were accustomed to in Europe, and still come together in self-defense when necessary, this is even more remarkable...and shows I think that self-preservation is a powerful incentive to "hanging together to avoid hanging separately". Could they have repeated this feat in the face of the Mongol threat? Perhaps, perhaps not---but I do not think we can dismiss the idea as an impossibility. Consequently, I can't tell whether France, Italy, and the German empire would've united their strength. However, I don't think any such coalition would've been necessary to halt the Mongols. The resources and military potential available to Frederick II were great and when employed correctly, they should've sufficed to stop a steppe army the size of the Golden Horde. We'll never know, of course, but there's nothing to make squabbling rivals unite like a common outside threat. The Greeks were notorious for their constant internecine bickering, but just let the Persians dare to invade the homeland...and there were precedents for the medieval period as well, viz. the Crusades, in which multiethnic armies joined together. And throughout the MA there were always alliances; who can say that an incursion by "godless" Mongols would not have pulled Christendom together, at least temporarily? And yes, there was a lot of squabbling on the Crusades---there's a lot of squabbling among supposed "allies" even today---but what you did not get was any contingent of the Frankish armies siding with the Saracens against fellow Christians. ( There were a few isolated instances of minor barons engaging in this practice occasionally for political advantage, but never to the extent of threatening the Kingdom or the Frankish tenure as a whole. ) Btw, you don't seem to be aware of is that Europe strenghtened its defense on the eastern border considerably as a result of the Mongol raid. It triggered a massive building program of fortifications, particularly in Central Europe and the Balkans. Even the backward Balkan states like Bosnia that suffered during Batu's raid began fortifying their borders and reforming their military. This indicates that Europe was aware of the Mongol threat and rallied quickly to respond to it. Europeans historically have always been willing to band together against a mutual threat especially if it is seen as distinctly non-European.

The Mongols did have artillery in Europe. They utilized artillery against the Hungarians across the river at Mohi, and used gunpowder bombs upon the army as well.

We know that Batu had brought a train of minghan engineers, since he was able to field seven ho p’ao catapults to hurl firebombs against the unfortunate Hungarians at the Sajo bridge, teaching them a deadly lesson in the tactical use of artillery. But events showed that these weren’t heavy enough to breach the high stone walls of the Hungarian castles, which Batu had to skirt.

The lack of a strong, centralized rule is what will make it possible for defectors to join the Mongols.

This is extremely doubtful. Down on the lowest level, some forms of cooperation between petty Christian nobles and their Muslim neighbors did take place in Outremer for instance. But there was no instance of one crusader state allying with Muslims against another crusader state. Cooperation between Christians and Muslims could be tolerated only to a certain extent. But on the whole, Christians and Muslims considered themselves common enemies. While the Mongols of the Golden Horde were not Muslims but pagans, they were infidels from the European perspective nevertheless.

Uhmmm, no. The Mongols faced some difficulties crossing the bridge, but they withdrew, and then they completed a double envelopment, the wet dream of generals throughout history. The Hungarians certainly didn't even try to fight to the death; they all ran for it and got slaughtered while fleeing. King Bela didn't stop running till he reached an island :p 70,000 dead Hungarians, double the size of the Mongol force, says that Mohi was most certainly not a Hungarian victory. The Mongols withdrew and retreated not for logistical or strategic reasons, but as anyone who learned history knows: Ogedai died, and Batu was rushing back to Mongolia to secure his place in the succession.

I'll try to address this issue once again. What we're told is that the Mongols split their force in two parts. One part (probably the larger one, albeit this is by no means sure; my sources implies it comprised two thirds of the entire force) was sent to cross the river some distance to the north. For one reason or another, the Mongols decided to build an improvised bridge there (maybe the river didn't permit safe fording?), which may have slowed down their advance considerably. The second part (probably the smaller one - one third?) remained near the bridge on the east bank. At this point, the Hungarians were encamped on the west bank but appear to have taken control of the bridge and a small bridgehead on the east bank. On the next morning, the remainder of the Mongol force overran the Hungarian bridgehead on the east bank, crossed the bridge and attacked the Hungarian camp on the west bank. In the battle the Hungarians were initially victorious until the second part of the Mongol force arrived with some 2-hour delay. I'm not at all implying that the Mongol force was "totally destroyed". It's clear the Mongols won the battle tactically. They inflicted very heavy casualties on the Hungarian army and eventually routed it. However, it's also apparent that the Mongol plan wasn't executed properly. The timing was incorrect. The smaller part of the Mongol force was committed to battle too quickly and was very hard-pressed by the Hungarians. It must've taken heavy casualties as it was caught between the river and the Hungarian army (perhaps the least desirable situation a medieval commander could think of). The only route of escape was the bridge - but it's very difficult for a large army, even if just light cavalry, to escape through such a narrow corridor in time. The arrival of the second part of the Mongol army was of course decisive. However, I believe the evidence at hand makes it quite clear that the victory was hard-won. We don't have the exact bodycount and any attempts to estimate the number of losses on the Mongol side are inevitably speculative. It was the smaller Mongol contingent that took most casualties - it seems it was almost destroyed in the fighting. If we accept that this contingent formed about one third of the entire force, the overall Mongol losses may have approached one third of the army. This is a very substantial figure for an army so far from home, with little chance to receive reinforcements quickly. But if you allow me, let's just analyze the several key facts that seem to be universally accepted:

- the Mongols arrive to Central Europe in February 1241; several skirmishes
- March 1, Mongol army group under Baidar and Kaidu travels north to Poland, sack Sandomir on the following day and win the battle of Krakow on March 3
- March 12, the main force under Batu enters Hungary while a smaller contingent is sent to Transylvania
- March 18, the Mongols win the battle of Chmielnik
- March 24, Krakow is taken
- March 27, the Mongols attack Wroclaw but their assault fails; the Mongols retreat
- April 9, Liegnitz; the largest Mongol victory in Europe
- April 11, Batu's force engages the Hungarians at Mohi; Mongol victory, Bela flees
- December 11, Ogadai's death


Now, let's take a deep breath and think about all this. No need to go into the details, just consider the immense Mongol activity within March 1 and April 11 – which is barely 40 days or less than a month and a half. Within this short period of time, the Mongols took much of Eastern Europe and fought a number of battles. But in sharp contrast to that period of activity are the eight months spent uselessly in Hungary and the poor regions of the Balkans - and that's 8 months before Ogadai's death! Not to mention that Batu didn't learn about it right away. It must've taken several weeks at least for the news to arrive to the Balkans. How can you or any other proponents of the commonly accepted hypothesis sensibly explain that? Eight months of pointless waiting with the riches of Italy just a two days' ride away? Ogadai's death was obviously not the issue because the old khan was still alive at that time. I'm afraid this changes the whole scope of things quite drastically. Clearly the string of Mongol successes wasn't rapidly broken by the death of Ogadai as the prevalent hypothesis would have us believe. So if you're not willing to concede that the losses suffered at Mohi and elsewhere were the deciding factor - just what happened in mid-April 1241 that the Mongols got stuck in Hungary? If reconaissance was the main goal (which it probably was), there was plenty of ground left to explore. In fact, the key routes to Western Europe lay within easy reach of the Mongol force stationed in Hungary. If conquest of Europe was the ultimate goal, the Mongols would've needed to at least locate those routes in order to make a full-scale invasion of Western Europe possible. But they didn't. In fact, they were stuck in Hungary for 8 months, made a quick tour through the Balkans and retreated in early 1242. These are facts. And in my humble opinion, the commonly accepted interpretation to which you're sticking fails to explain them in a believable and satisfactory manner. So we're back to the argument. The only reasonable explanation that I can think of - and also the one that seems in accordance with a careful analysis of the evidence at hand - is that the fighting in Hungary had put too much strain on the Mongol force to continue the conquest. Also not to be dismissed was the role of fortifications. And they never even tried to oppose Friedrich nor raid Italy, which is extremely difficult to explain unless we accept that the battle of Mohi and the failed sieges of Hungarian fortresses indeed bleeded the Mongol force.
 
BOTP said:
Now, let's take a deep breath and think about all this. No need to go into the details, just consider the immense Mongol activity within March 1 and April 11 – which is barely 40 days or less than a month and a half. Within this short period of time, the Mongols took much of Eastern Europe and fought a number of battles. But in sharp contrast to that period of activity are the eight months spent uselessly in Hungary and the poor regions of the Balkans - and that's 8 months before Ogadai's death! Not to mention that Batu didn't learn about it right away. It must've taken several weeks at least for the news to arrive to the Balkans. How can you or any other proponents of the commonly accepted hypothesis sensibly explain that? Eight months of pointless waiting with the riches of Italy just a two days' ride away? Ogadai's death was obviously not the issue because the old khan was still alive at that time. I'm afraid this changes the whole scope of things quite drastically. Clearly the string of Mongol successes wasn't rapidly broken by the death of Ogadai as the prevalent hypothesis would have us believe. So if you're not willing to concede that the losses suffered at Mohi and elsewhere were the deciding factor - just what happened in mid-April 1241 that the Mongols got stuck in Hungary? If reconaissance was the main goal (which it probably was), there was plenty of ground left to explore. In fact, the key routes to Western Europe lay within easy reach of the Mongol force stationed in Hungary. If conquest of Europe was the ultimate goal, the Mongols would've needed to at least locate those routes in order to make a full-scale invasion of Western Europe possible. But they didn't. In fact, they were stuck in Hungary for 8 months, made a quick tour through the Balkans and retreated in early 1242. These are facts. And in my humble opinion, the commonly accepted interpretation to which you're sticking fails to explain them in a believable and satisfactory manner. So we're back to the argument. The only reasonable explanation that I can think of - and also the one that seems in accordance with a careful analysis of the evidence at hand - is that the fighting in Hungary had put too much strain on the Mongol force to continue the conquest. Also not to be dismissed was the role of fortifications. And they never even tried to oppose Friedrich nor raid Italy, which is extremely difficult to explain unless we accept that the battle of Mohi and the failed sieges of Hungarian fortresses indeed bleeded the Mongol force.

this is perhaps the most brilliant line reasoning I have ever seen.
 
storealex said:
As already said, being in enemy territory with a smaller army, even if highly mobile, even if always successful on the battlefield, might get you nowhere.
You will take casualties, and where will you get new troops from? You'll be forced to recruit lesser quality from where you are, thus slowly diminishing your initial advantage in troop quality. Meanwhile, your enemies will have almost unlimited manpower, and will inevitably learn from their mistakes.
Your only chance is to strike them hard before this happens, and take advantage of your victory. But that will be difficult due to the crazy patchwork that is Medieval Europe, and the thousands of fortresses there in.

It's not like there are fortresses on every corner street. There's room to maneuver, and I would have full faith in the Mongols to minimize casualities of their own.

I never said that the Mongols would have to take every single fortress. I compared their situation to Hannibals'. Several cities surrendered to him without a fight, many even joined him as allies, still it wasn't enough.

Hannibal was fighting with an ineffective army.

That might not work forever. Indeed, when Caesar took Gaul, it was his harsh treatment of the subdued which made all of Gaul rebel against him. He after wards began to treat the vanquished with leniency, which made whole armies defect to him.
Or the allied bombing of German cities, which most historians say only stiffened the German defense.
As you can see, the "surrender without a fight or die" might not be successful, and often only make it harder to obtain victory.

I know this very well, yes. The thing is the Mongols were masters at psychological warfare as well, and generally if someone is faced with an option other than painful, slow death, they will take the other option. Generally.

To the whole archery issue, well Im not an expert, but I remember General Fuller writing: "Horse archers will always be out shot by foot archers", because it is indeed harder to shoot from a moving platform. Remember, the foot archer didn't have to aim at a specific enemy, but simply at the entire swarm of enemies. So it's swarm shooting at formation, rather than individual at individual. At least as long as the Mongols kept their distance. If not, well then it dosn't matter, since even a peasant with a crossbow can hit a horse, if right in front of him.
Also, a man on a horse present a larger target than a just a man.

The Mongols generally used the clouds of arrows approach, though, so it works both ways. :)

Alexander the Great used to negate enemy horse archers with foot missile troops too. Knowing that they would perform better in archery duels, and knowing that the cost of an archer was less than the cost of a mounted one.

I do not hold Alexander in high regard, just so you know.
 
Jeff Yu said:
Again, I'll simply supply the simple numbers that more people were devoted to sieging individual Chinese cities than they bothered to send into Europe.

When Batu and his 150,000 horsemen set off on their great ride into the West in 1235, they clearly had annexation in their mind. I know that the Mongols were resolved to conquer the Christian West because in his account of the quriltai which decided on the invasion, Juwayni says that the khans `deliberated together concerning the extirpation and subjugation of all the remaining rebels (tughat).” M. M. Qazwini (ed.) Ata Malik Juwayni, Ta’rikh-i Jahan Gusha, vol. 1, pp. 268-9. The khans considered any nation outside their rule to be a rebel state. While the Mongol motivations regarding the West can be debated, it matters not whether or not the Mongols aimed for the total conquest of Europe in the end. Because it's clear the Western theater was always secondary to the Eastern theater, so its obvious why they would commit more of their men and resources there. But this does not dismiss the possibility they were looking to annex Europe.

Do you even realize where the Mongols come from? Remember that the Mongol steppes aren't the lush grassland you seem to think they are. They're part of the Gobi desert.

You should also know that only the south-east of the Gobi desert is waterless, and three-quarters is covered with grass, and that this grass has supported nomadic herders and their livestock for thousands of years. More than 1,100 herding households and over 200,000 head of livestock can be found living inside the Gurvansaikhan National Park. The three-quarters of the area, has a thin growth of grass, scrub, and thorn sufficient to feed the flocks of the nomadic herders who live there. Since the Gobi Desert covers about 500,000 square miles, that implies 375,000 square miles of pasture, more than twice the total for Western Europe, and while thin it’s not broken up into little village lots between great expanses of woodland, so yes, it would be far easier to feed a vast horse herd in the Gobi than in Western Europe.

I've already mentioned the sustain ability of the Mongols to maintain armies of hundreds of thouands in southern China, sthousands of miles away from the steppes. Remember that in their campaigns in northern China, they were seperated from the steppes by: The Gobi deset in teh norther, Takalmakim desert in the north-west, Tibetan highlands in the west.

LMAO. China is not the same as Europe. Compare these statistics to the Plains of Europe and the Plains of China, and ask yourself, would the Mongols be able to find an even remotely close chance of operating under such areas, which have miniscule amounts of pasture compared to their homeland? Even today Western Europe contains just 159,771 square miles of permanent pasture. That’s a little over a third of the total for Mongolia (454,622 square miles), and a tenth of the total for China (1,587,130 square miles). Even if you add more remote regions like Scandinavia and Finland (4,202 square miles) and the British Isles (55,635 square miles) you still only get 219,608 square miles of pasture. In the thirteenth century that area would be far smaller, since most of Europe was still forest and extensive conversion of open-field arable to pasture didn’t really get underway until the agricultural revolution in the nineteenth century. And what little grass did grow in the thirteenth century was scattered in small pockets, in village meadows and common pastures, which were already crammed to their absolute capacity with livestock. Hay was always in short supply on European manors lacking artificial meadow for want of suitable irrigation, and was precious winter feed, which is why grazing was strictly regulated through village bylaws. A hundred thousand Mongols invading Western Europe on a million remounts would need to be supplied by something on the order of 6,892 long tons of feed, in a baggage train comprising not less than 34,044 hay-carts (including 2,048 just to fodder the carthorses), transported thousands of miles over poor roads and through rough country, PER DAY. Never in the annals of military logistics has anyone ever done anything so stupid. The point here is that Western Europe specialized in agriculture to feed millions of people, while the steppe nomads specialized in pastoralism to feed millions of horses, while China did both, and got hammered. (Middle of the road, gets run over.)
 
Uiler said:
My opinion is if they can fight and win in South China, they can fight anywhere. South Chinese geography is such that the mobility of their cavalry would have been severely curtailed. If you were to describe South Chinese geography it would be very hilly, very mountainous, lots of rivers and swamps and wet. Cavalry is not much use in this sort of terrain, nor is there much pasture for horses. If you read details about how the Han Chinese fought with the "southern barbarians" in earlier times you will see that large numbers held out on top of hills and mountains and the Chinese spent decades sending groups of men to literally storm each hill/mountain and drag them kicking and screaming down to the river valleys where they could be more easily controlled. There are still some isolated groups on hills in South China today. Having great cavalry is not much use in storming hills and mountains or fighting in marshes.

I don't know if it was possible in the time of the Mongolians, but it was definitely true in much earlier times it was possible by taking a few key passes to literally cut off the far south from the rest of China. This is because of the hilly and mountainous terrain. Shu or today's Sichuan could be cut off from the rest of China by controlling several key mountain passes because it was separated from the rest of China by a large mountain range. This is why Liu Bei chose it as his base.

Another factor of South China that generally kept it safe from northern invaders was disease. Even along the Yangtze, disease plagued most major encounters. Northern troops used to call some areas in the far south "poison air".

On the other hand, because of these characteristics, South China was also known for its beautiful environs. This and its warm climate and great exotic food meant there were famous holiday locations in South China during ancient times such as the West Lake.

You're ignoring the fact that Europe at the time was much less agriculturally advanced than the Chinese. The Mongols would not only have had trouble feeding their vast horse herds, but also their men. Their two campaigns into Europe were essentially huge raids, very much different from campaigns of conquest. Raiders hit and move on and can find fresh sources of supply. Conquerors must stay put, sometimes for long periods. At any rate, from what little I know of Chinese history, southern Song was both smaller and less geographically diverse than was Europe and its fortresses were in the main confined to mountaintops and city walls. Is this not the case? If so I am unsure it would constitute a close analogy to Europe. And something to keep in mind - China was actually about the only place outside the great steppes where the Mongols could install themselves. Everywhere else they either didn't even try to push further (such as in the vast forest belt of northern Eurasia and Hungary) or, as in Vietnam, South India, and Korea, were bluntly shown the door often with heavy casualties.
 
North King said:
It's not like there are fortresses on every corner street.
:lol: :lol: :lol: you havent been to europe!
 
Xen said:
:lol: :lol: :lol: you havent been to europe!

I assume there's a fair bit of distance between castles, but I could be wrong, after all, I've only looked at pictures of individual castles...
 
North King said:
It's not like there are fortresses on every corner street. There's room to maneuver, and I would have full faith in the Mongols to minimize casualities of their own.
There was lot's and lot's of fortifications. Some larger and more powerful than others. I don't doubt the Mongol's would have room for maneuver, initally at least, things will change if the enemy use scorched earth, but all this wasn't a part of my point anyway.

North King said:
Hannibal was fighting with an ineffective army.
Yes he was. In the end of course no, after 16 years of warfare or something, but in the beginning it was very good. His cavalry was superior to anything the Romans could muster, his African infantry decent. Only his allied contingents were inferior to the Romans, but this seemed often to play into Hannibals hands. At Cannae for an example.
He knew how to use his forces so even the Gauls would become effective soldiers.

North King said:
I do not hold Alexander in high regard, just so you know.
I strongly disagree with you, but this deserves a topic on it's own, and Im going to Ireland to morrow.
 
I think the critical difference between Hannibal and the Mongols would lie in the fact that Rome could easily sneak back being hannibal and menace Carthage proper, forcing him to take the defensive.

It seems to me the Europeans would have been hard pressed to even hit the mongol holdings in Russia hard, let alone Mongolia proper. Moreover, the mongols would most likely have wanted nothing *more* than to see the Europeans come out and play in the open.

So, due to the following factors :

1)Comparative size. Mongolia simply had more cannon fodders to draw on if it bogged down into a war of attrition ; Zhen has pointed out that they did levy troops.

2)Respective ability to harm each others. The mongols, due to a combination of reason (developed communication network, mobility of their supply bases, to name but two) had more power to harm key european targets than the europeans had to harm key mongol targets (let's face it, an european invasion of mongolia proper was "somewhat" unlikely).

3)Ability of mongol to adapt to varied terrains (Southern China as a case in point.

4)Ability to handle city fortifications, at least to a satisfactory degree (not castles, fortified cities).

5)Extreme ability to resist a siege of the European Castles.

6)Strong Christian faith of the Europeans.

7)Lengthy pause observed by the mongol forces after the battle of Mohi.

I am going to venture that

1)The mongols could, in fact, have overtaken much of Europe, leaving isolated pockets of resistance centered around some castles and particularly rough areas.

2)However, the effort, sacrifices and so forth required to do so would have been prohibitive : I'd envision a conquest lasting a few generations, due among other things to the mongolians being unable to maintain military action (not presence, action) in an area too long (fodder), as well as the European's ability to withdraw to castles if too hard pressed.

3)In addition, due to these same castles providing extremely solid pivotal points to resistance movement, and due to the strength of Christianty in Europe, any attempts at holding Europe in the long term would almost certainly have proven prohibitively expensive, and most likely outright impossible.

4)Which essentialy lead me to believe that while the Mongols could quite possibly have overtaken Europe, Europe was quite able to make sure such an overtaking wasn't worth the price in the first place.
 
North King said:
I assume there's a fair bit of distance between castles, but I could be wrong, after all, I've only looked at pictures of individual castles...

well, simply put, no, thier isnt. now, I've only been to Britian,, Wales and Scot land (and visited castles- by Ireland I was sick of the goddamned things)
but, using its as a guide- as oen fo the area sof western europe that didnt have to constantlly worry abot invasion, its almost as if every other town has a goddamed castle in it- and the ones that dopnt have a castle all look liek they are castles anyway (like Chester for example)
 
Oda Nobunaga said:
1)Comparative size. Mongolia simply had more cannon fodders to draw on if it bogged down into a war of attrition ; Zhen has pointed out that they did levy troops.

Please oda, I respect you,a nd what you have to say; I request that you at least refer to my forum name by its proper spelling, and in doing so, not only give some mutual respect for me, but also the man upon which my name is based upon.

that said, dotn forget- the biggest part of mongol battle tactics WAs thier native cavalry- a native number in which thier WAS some serious limitations on; only 200,000-250,000 mongols total lived durign this period; consider, to sustain a population, half of them have to women- so we now have a workign number fo 125,000 mongols- except you also have to factor in children- I cant say for sure how many children woudl be needed to continue to support such a population, but its unlikelly that at any point, th emongols had over 90,000 availbile warriors of the skill needed to put such tacticle reliance upon; and history shows that indeed, the Mongols werent able to keep it up; soon after thier conquests, thier empire broke up; in no small part sue tot hat fact of the low population of mongols, meanign that they coudl never be every where at once- and even in an army of 90,000, every life lost is going to hurt.

yes they hast vast hordes of infantry at thier disposal- but they didnt have the cavalry needed to hinge thier tactical doctrine in full upon.
 
Two things Xen.

1)I specifically said "cannon fodder". Yes, the mongols had a limited supply of their best troops, as did the Europeans. It's in term of expendable, cheap forces that the mongol's empire size advantage would have (unless I'm misinformed about European pop at this time) served as an edge.

2)90 000 seems a REALLY low end estimate to me ; little to no reports ever *mention* non-cavalry forces being involved in the attack on Europe, and reports points to 70 000 men thrown there. Perhaps not all mongols, but certainly all capable horsemen. It seems to me HIGHLY doubtful that the mongols would throw almost the entirety of their skilled cavalry forces at Europe all at once, retaining barely 20 000 horsemen to control their empire.
 
Oda Nobunaga said:
Two things Xen.

1)I specifically said "cannon fodder". Yes, the mongols had a limited supply of their best troops, as did the Europeans. It's in term of expendable, cheap forces that the mongol's empire size advantage would have (unless I'm misinformed about European pop at this time) served as an edge.

2)90 000 seems a REALLY low end estimate to me ; little to no reports ever *mention* non-cavalry forces being involved in the attack on Europe, and reports points to 70 000 men thrown there. Perhaps not all mongols, but certainly all capable horsemen. It seems to me HIGHLY doubtful that the mongols would throw almost the entirety of their skilled cavalry forces at Europe all at once, retaining barely 20 000 horsemen to control their empire.

I'd imagine that the majority where not mongols at all, but rather turkish, and other assorted lesser skilled nomadic cavlary (they did lose to the mongols in the firs tplace to put them int hat position, so they are, rathe robviousdlly, not as- perhaps now where near asd, skilled as the mongols proper- but thats hard to say) subject cavalry, commanded by an elite retinue of around 10-20,000 mongols- I've pulled that number out of my ass mind you, but its what I woudl suspect to be a logical estimate, given the low population of Mongolia proper, them lookign at a map, and cosidering "times four" to be an acceptable, and reasonable guess at how much more land woudl support nomadic populatiosn akin to the mongols and what not.

seems to me, that, all together, the Mongols nomadica cavalry forces numbered, at thie rpeek, at about 500,000-650,000 troops; gives some leeway to launch 70,000 troop cavalkry expeditions, but not enough to warrant an attempted conquest of europe- as, even fi the mongols were able to conqoure it, it woudl take huge amount sof both time, and effort; niether of which a half million sized total popualtion could reasonable achieve, and still look to keep thier empire abroad.
 
I don't disagree with you - look at my final call about. They could probably have done it, but the europeans were in a position to easily make the costs/benefits final tally completely unacceptable.
 
Oda Nobunaga said:
I don't disagree with you - look at my final call about. They could probably have done it, but the europeans were in a position to easily make the costs/benefits final tally completely unacceptable.

So the crux of our difference is whether Europe was so defensively strong it could weather any Mongol assault (which seems to be the direction you are leaning) or whether it simply wasn't worth the trouble for the Mongols. Any invasion (or defence against invasion) depends on a risk/benefit analysis. When the benefits are very great, enormous effort can be made, at very high risk.
 
I think a combination of both, actually. Take the European ability to make an invasion very bloody and costly (even if ultimately succesful), spice it up with their ability to make holding the place just as bad, and then use that on a place that just wouldn't have seemed all that interesting) and you have the perfect recipe to convince anyone to leave Europe alone.
 
Studying for engineering exams has been killing me this past week, so I'll only have time to address your major points:

BOTP said:
- the Mongols arrive to Central Europe in February 1241; several skirmishes
- March 1, Mongol army group under Baidar and Kaidu travels north to Poland, sack Sandomir on the following day and win the battle of Krakow on March 3
- March 12, the main force under Batu enters Hungary while a smaller contingent is sent to Transylvania
- March 18, the Mongols win the battle of Chmielnik
- March 24, Krakow is taken
- March 27, the Mongols attack Wroclaw but their assault fails; the Mongols retreat
- April 9, Liegnitz; the largest Mongol victory in Europe
- April 11, Batu's force engages the Hungarians at Mohi; Mongol victory, Bela flees
- December 11, Ogadai's death

You're skipping quite a bit of timeline here. Did you really think that as soon as Mohi was over, the Mongols just sat down for several months while doing nothing? :rolleyes:

They were busy consolidating their holdings and sieging the fortresses that they earlier bypassed. They certainly weren't doing nothing during that period of time, they captured the fortified cities of Pest and Gran, for example, and consolidated their holdings east of the Danube. 100,000 Hungarians died defending at Pest, and Kaidan won no less than three decisive engagements against Hungarian forces during this time period as well.

Remember that 1/3 to 1/2 the population of Hungary was wiped out during this period of time. That certainly wouldn't happen if the campaign was a mere raid that won a battle and then just left. You'll also note that unlike the European style of warfare, the Mongols prepared during the summer and falls to launch winter campaigns. They fattened their horses during the summer and launched their invasions winter. The first invasion of Hungary, for example, was launched during a February. Consolidating their position and then preparing for a winter campaign fits exactly what you describe.

Had they took too many casualties and required a withdrawal, they would have returned to their Ukrainian holdings instead of staying in the country for so long. But instead, they prepared for another winter invasion, and crossed the Danube river that winter, at the start of a new campaign the scouting parties reaching as far as Venice, at the beginning of a new campaign, when news of Ogedai's death came.

This also puts doubt to another of your claims. During this extended period of time, no one else in Europe came to Hungary's aid. Where were the armies of all the other countries who you claim would suddenly set aside their animosities and miraculously unite against the Mongols? The population of Hungary was busy being liquidated, and for months, what did the rest of Europe do? Nothing. Hell, Who came to Hungary and Poland's aid? No one. Hell, the Dukes of Pomerania and Bohemia were ASKED to come to Poland's aid, and they retreated instead and hid in their castle, even as the Mongols were putting parts of Moravia to the torch.

LMAO. China is not the same as Europe. Compare these statistics to the Plains of Europe and the Plains of China, and ask yourself, would the Mongols be able to find an even remotely close chance of operating under such areas, which have miniscule amounts of pasture compared to their homeland? Even today Western Europe contains just 159,771 square miles of permanent pasture. That’s a little over a third of the total for Mongolia (454,622 square miles), and a tenth of the total for China (1,587,130 square miles). Even if you add more remote regions like Scandinavia and Finland (4,202 square miles) and the British Isles (55,635 square miles) you still only get 219,608 square miles of pasture. In the thirteenth century that area would be far smaller, since most of Europe was still forest and extensive conversion of open-field arable to pasture didn’t really get underway until the agricultural revolution in the nineteenth century. And what little grass did grow in the thirteenth century was scattered in small pockets, in village meadows and common pastures, which were already crammed to their absolute capacity with livestock. Hay was always in short supply on European manors lacking artificial meadow for want of suitable irrigation, and was precious winter feed, which is why grazing was strictly regulated through village bylaws. A hundred thousand Mongols invading Western Europe on a million remounts would need to be supplied by something on the order of 6,892 long tons of feed, in a baggage train comprising not less than 34,044 hay-carts (including 2,048 just to fodder the carthorses), transported thousands of miles over poor roads and through rough country, PER DAY. Never in the annals of military logistics has anyone ever done anything so stupid. The point here is that Western Europe specialized in agriculture to feed millions of people, while the steppe nomads specialized in pastoralism to feed millions of horses, while China did both, and got hammered. (Middle of the road, gets run over.)


What in the world makes you think that the Mongols ever carted in fodder for their horses? You're thinking of warfare in sedentary terms. The Mongols didn't resupply food for the horses, they simply resupplied horses themselves. They brought in a fresh herd of horses and led the old ones back to the steppe. And again, you seem to think that Mongolia is a lush green grassland when it could be farther from the truth. Mongolia is predominated by the Gobi desert, and during the winter, the place turns into a complete wasteland. And, aas I've already pointed out, the Mongols have no shortage of grassland in their supply base. Most of Poland is a flat plain, and half of the country is covered with steppe. Hungary also has a fairly large plain that will allow the Mongols to support themselves over a campaign before the herd needs to be resupplied. The Mongolian horses, native to Siberia, are well-adapted to being able to eat pretty much anything to survive during those winter months. This includes digging through ice to eat scraps of lichen, and foraging when they have to. Mongolian horses are able to eat tree leaves if they have to, in order to survive. Guess what most of Europe is? Forest, with plenty of pasture and river valleys in between.

Now obviously they're not going to gain any weight doing it, but remember, the Mongols fattened up their horses all summer long by grazing, and typically launched their campaign season during winter. Their horses certainly aren't going to eat the land bare or starve to death.


When Batu and his 150,000 horsemen set off on their great ride into the West in 1235, they clearly had annexation in their mind. I know that the Mongols were resolved to conquer the Christian West because in his account of the quriltai which decided on the invasion, Juwayni says that the khans `deliberated together concerning the extirpation and subjugation of all the remaining rebels (tughat).” M. M. Qazwini (ed.) Ata Malik Juwayni, Ta’rikh-i Jahan Gusha, vol. 1, pp. 268-9. The khans considered any nation outside their rule to be a rebel state. While the Mongol motivations regarding the West can be debated, it matters not whether or not the Mongols aimed for the total conquest of Europe in the end. Because it's clear the Western theater was always secondary to the Eastern theater, so its obvious why they would commit more of their men and resources there. But this does not dismiss the possibility they were looking to annex Europe.

Nice use of selective quoting there. The rebels are very obviously not the Europeans. They're the Cumans, who first allied with the Mongols, and then betrayed them, thus earning the Mongols' wrath. Ogedai didn't invade Hungary UNTIL King Bela offered sanctuary to the Cumans and refused to hand them over to the Mongols. By the time he killed the Cumans himself after they left his favor, it was too late.

More factual inaccuracies of yours.

How do they kill all the peasants anyhow? The way they depopulated Iraq was not by slaughtering everyone but by destroying the irrigation system. Europe relies on rainfall agriculture meaning that the Mongols have to win the hard way--seizing castles.

* 1200, Northern China - 30,000,000 killed
* 1215, Yanjing China (today Beijing) - 25,000,000 killed
* 1221, Nishapur, Persia - ~1.7 million killed in assault
* 1221, Merv, Persia - ~1.3 million killed in assault
* 1221, Meru Chahjan, Persia - ~1.3 million killed in assault
* 1221, Rayy, Persia - ~1.6 million killed in assault
* 1226, Tangut Campaign - Gengis Khan launches war against the northern China people of Tangut.
* 1236, Bilär,Bulgar cities, Volga Bulgaria - 150,000 or more and more (nearly half of population)
* 1237-1240, Kievan Rus' - half of population
* 1258, Baghdad - ~800,000 people. Results in destruction of Abbasid dynasty
* 1226-1266, ~18 million reported killed in conquest of northern Chinese territory. This number estimated by Kublai Khan himself.

The Mongols actually DID slaughter everyone. If all your lords and nobles simply sit in their castles, there's not going to be much of a country leff when they come back out. Because simply put, yes, the Mongols DID want to rule over a depopulated area, and they DID kill everyone. Their notion of wealth wasn't land, people, or cities. They just looted whatever they wanted from the cities, and then killed everyone, and turned former farms and cities into grassland, because to them, wealth was herds of horses and animals, and pretty trinkets you loot from people. The Mongols are famous for leaving huge pyramids of skulls outside of cities, and they usually left behind small forces in cities just to make sure no surivivors hid among the dead.


Vietnam, South India, and Korea, were bluntly shown the door often with heavy casualties.

Do you even know what you're talking about? The Mongols lost a NAVAL battle in Vietnam, never entired South India (or even North India) and conquered Korea. :rolleyes:
 
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