Abraha what if

Merkava120

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What if Abraha, the king of Aksum, had conquered Mecca around 570 (in the Year of the Elephant) and destroyed the city/killed Muhammed/killed Muhammed's future parents?
Would another monotheistic religion have arisen and dominated among the Arabs, or would they have united in some other way, or would something else entirely happen?
 
as an almost never practising Muslim , first ı would said he wouldn't get the city in the first place . Second ; vacuum tends to create interesting stuff ; with the fall of the two superpowers of the era it's immediately possible the Ethiopians find themselves overextented in some way , maybe getting routed when try to get Kudüs and the same exact thing happening . That's if one takes religions are social things and not of God , non-existing for the purposes of the "what-if" question .
 
It's impossible to extrapolate to the present day with a counter-factual from that long ago. All that can be said for sure is that Islam would not have arisen. Whether or not this led to a gradual Christianisation or Judaisation of the Arabs, their continued religious and political fragmentation, the rise of a separate monotheistic religion, or something else entirely, is impossible to say.

What happened on the political front is easier to determine, but depends on exactly how Abraha conquers Mecca. There have been several attempts throughout history to establish a stable kingdom that straddles the Red Sea; all of those attempts have failed. It is unlikely that Abraha would have succeeded where other attempts failed; likely he would have merely sacked the city, then retreated back to his power-base in Ethiopia.

This would have left a power-vacuum in western Arabia, where Mecca was the dominant city. Medina and Riyadh are possible contendors for that title if Mecca is eliminated, as is San'a. My personal money would be on San'a developing a bit of a trading kingdom without interference from the interior of the peninsular, with Mecca, Riyadh, and other cities competing for dominance, with none of them really succeeding in establishing hegemony. My prediction ends fifty years after Abraha takes the city, though; I make no effort to pretend to know what would happen after Mecca is rebuilt and repopulated.
 
What if Abraha, the king of Aksum, had conquered Mecca around 570 (in the Year of the Elephant) and destroyed the city/killed Muhammed/killed Muhammed's future parents?
Would another monotheistic religion have arisen and dominated among the Arabs, or would they have united in some other way, or would something else entirely happen?
God would have never let Abraha kill his Prophet.

And if because of any unfortunate hazard, Muhammad wouldn't have been able to receive the Coran written by God's own hand, than someone else would have picked it. Same thing in the end.
 
It's impossible to extrapolate to the present day with a counter-factual from that long ago.
Indeed it is. From a purely physical point of view, a single fly dying earlier than it actually had 2,000 years ago would entirely populate the population 2,000 years later with different beings, including human.

What matters the most is the fact that the population living in the Middle East area (no matter if you would call it the Arabs or give them any other name) would probably have still flourished from 600AD to the following centuries and this simply because the region is a natural international trade crossroad. Once the powerful Roman Empire out... it's naturally all to theirs.
 
It's not a dumb question. Historians do generally think there was a processural aspect to the rise of the Prophet. Many historians, such as Peter Brown, are prepared to see the rise of Muhammed as the outcome of a general trend whereby elite landowners increasingly focused on the metropolis gave up power in localities leaving a void filled by charismatic holy men. In 5th and 6th century Syria, Iraq and Palestine, such figures provided the dominant models of local leadership. The Roman-Persian wars on the other hand were militarizing Arabian regions adjacent to the Hijaz, using religion as part of their power games, and creating inequality by transferring wealth to selected individuals. Those individuals got that wealth in order to advance imperial interests, but in practice they used the wealth for their own purposes, and an effect was to incentivize and empower neighbours to organize in larger political units.

So some sort of Hijaz unity was probably a strong possible irrespective of individual, and probably some sort of holy-man figure using existing religious models would have led it. Early Islamic sources are replete with references to 'false prophets' in Arabia. Some could argue that because Muhammed won, he ended up being a 'true' prophet and if he didn't, one of those guys would have ended up the 'true prophet'.
 
Pangur Bán;13572637 said:
It's not a dumb question. Historians do generally think there was a processural aspect to the rise of the Prophet. Many historians, such as Peter Brown, are prepared to see the rise of Muhammed as the outcome of a general trend whereby elite landowners increasingly focused on the metropolis gave up power in localities leaving a void filled by charismatic holy men. In 5th and 6th century Syria, Iraq and Palestine, such figures provided the dominant models of local leadership. The Roman-Persian wars on the other hand were militarizing Arabian regions adjacent to the Hijaz, using religion as part of their power games, and creating inequality by transferring wealth to selected individuals. Those individuals got that wealth in order to advance imperial interests, but in practice they used the wealth for their own purposes, and an effect was to incentivize and empower neighbours to organize in larger political units.

So some sort of Hijaz unity was probably a strong possible irrespective of individual, and probably some sort of holy-man figure using existing religious models would have led it. Early Islamic sources are replete with references to 'false prophets' in Arabia. Some could argue that because Muhammed won, he ended up being a 'true' prophet and if he didn't, one of those guys would have ended up the 'true prophet'.
Unified Hejaz or not, the Arab unification came at a perfect time for their expansion, with the Byzantines and the Persians beating each other to exhaustion just before the Muslim hordes came a-callin'. Change the timing of that unification by even a decade, and the expansion of the Arabs beyond the Arabian Peninsular may not have happened.
 
Were they 'exhausted' from war? Usually such activity makes ancient states better at war. In any case if it weren't for those wars, you wouldn't have had the political activity I mentioned, so I don't think this is serendipity.
 
Unified Hejaz or not, the Arab unification came at a perfect time for their expansion, with the Byzantines and the Persians beating each other to exhaustion just before the Muslim hordes came a-callin'. Change the timing of that unification by even a decade, and the expansion of the Arabs beyond the Arabian Peninsular may not have happened.
Or told differently, the weakening of the Byzantines and the Persians favored the unification of the Arabs which couldn't occure as long as the 2 others dominated the region.
 
Pangur Bán;13573346 said:
Were they 'exhausted' from war? Usually such activity makes ancient states better at war. In any case if it weren't for those wars, you wouldn't have had the political activity I mentioned, so I don't think this is serendipity.
Not when it's combined with civil wars.
 
Well, the Roman Empire earlier in its history did much of its expansion during or after civil wars. I don' think we can see ancients states like boxers, able to fight for a while before being exhausted. You could convince me here if you were more specific about the mechanics of 'exhaustion'.
 
Pangur Bán;13574454 said:
Well, the Roman Empire earlier in its history did much of its expansion during or after civil wars. I don' think we can see ancients states like boxers, able to fight for a while before being exhausted. You could convince me here if you were more specific about the mechanics of 'exhaustion'.
I don't have time right now, and am also not knowledgeable enough about the period to be absolutely sure I'm right. Basically the argument I heard at university was that both the Byzantines and the Sassanids were busy fighting both each other and civil wars when the Arabs suddenly burst onto the scene and routed them, much to their surprise. I will look into the situation and see if I am correct when time permits.
 
For what it's worth (which isn't much) Wiki seems to agree with what I was taught.

The Muslim conquests brought about the collapse of the Sassanid Empire and a great territorial loss for the Byzantine Empire. The reasons for the Muslim success are hard to reconstruct in hindsight, primarily because only fragmentary sources from the period have survived. Most historians agree that the Sassanid Persian and Byzantine Roman empires were militarily and economically exhausted from decades of fighting one another. The rapid fall of Visigothic Spain remains less easily explicable.

My own explanation for the fall of Visigothic Spain is that the Kingdom was never all that strong to begin with, and was distracted by on-again, off-again conflicts with the Franks.

The alternative argument on Wiki for the speed of Arab conquests seems to simply be "the Arabs were really strong when united," which is likely not really the case; their population was nowhere near as great as that possessed by either Byzantium or Persia, until their conquests picked up. I suspect Wiki is doing a pretty poor job of elucidating Fred Donner's argument.
 
It's not that that I've not heard the 'exhaustion' explanation stated before, but that I think it results from a [possibly inappropriate] metaphor rather than analysis. The wars involved increased militarization in precisely the regions that the Arabs conquered, it did not reduce militarization. The problem, as I see it, was that this militarization took its form, in the south, from Arab clients.

Arabia was not, as you said, united. Arab unity involved military success and was, many would presume, held together by booty as much (if not more than) religion, the booty coming from the conquests; the unification of the Arabs was a product not a cause of the conquest. On the other hand, the unification of the Hijaz created a military unit large enough to 'get started', whose main rivals were those Persian and Roman clients and, in defeating them, left much of the south with limited immediate ability to defend itself. It still wouldn't have mattered I don't think if the neighbouring populations had resisted more thoroughly, but their willingness to do so was short due, in Roman land, to being oppressed by Constantinople's attempts to impose imperial Christianity at the expense of local variants; and in Mesopotamia and Khuzistan, from being Christians ruled by ambiguous Zoroastrian overlords.

If 'exhaustion' played a role, it might have been in generating consent elsewhere in the Roman Empire to raise armies big enough to retake the lost provinces?
 
Pangur Bán;13574772 said:
It's not that that I've not heard the 'exhaustion' explanation stated before, but that I think it results from a [possibly inappropriate] metaphor rather than analysis. The wars involved increased militarization in precisely the regions that the Arabs conquered, it did not reduce militarization. The problem, as I see it, was that this militarization took its form, in the south, from Arab clients.

Arabia was not, as you said, united. Arab unity involved military success and was, many would presume, held together by booty as much (if not more than) religion, the booty coming from the conquests; the unification of the Arabs was a product not a cause of the conquest. On the other hand, the unification of the Hijaz created a military unit large enough to 'get started', whose main rivals were those Persian and Roman clients and, in defeating them, left much of the south with limited immediate ability to defend itself. It still wouldn't have mattered I don't think if the neighbouring populations had resisted more thoroughly, but their willingness to do so was short due, in Roman land, to being oppressed by Constantinople's attempts to impose imperial Christianity at the expense of local variants; and in Mesopotamia and Khuzistan, from being Christians ruled by ambiguous Zoroastrian overlords.

If 'exhaustion' played a role, it might have been in generating consent elsewhere in the Roman Empire to raise armies big enough to retake the lost provinces?
The argument seems to be that the exhaustion was as much economic as military, so I would imagine that it was a lack of ability to continue to pay, clothe, and feed large enough military force in hostile territory to combat the Arabs, rather than the military not being organised or skilful enough to at least make a fight of it. There's also the matter of such a long war leaving a limited pool of manpower to draw upon after a while, in much the same way that Napoleon, despite winning all of his previous wars, eventually ran out of men to fight with by the time of the Sixth Coalition.

I don't believe the majority of the fighters were Arab clients, though they doubtlessly played a part. I think it's accepted that most of the soldiers were from Anatolia and Persia, with conscripts raised in the disputed territories by whoever held them at the time. This provided another reason for the locals in Syria, Iraq, etc., to welcome the Arabs with open arms, as they promised something more than two or three consecutive generations of near-endless war.
 
The argument seems to be that the exhaustion was as much economic as military, so I would imagine that it was a lack of ability to continue to pay, clothe, and feed large enough military force in hostile territory to combat the Arabs, rather than the military not being organised or skilful enough to at least make a fight of it. There's also the matter of such a long war leaving a limited pool of manpower to draw upon after a while, in much the same way that Napoleon, despite winning all of his previous wars, eventually ran out of men to fight with by the time of the Sixth Coalition.

I don't believe the majority of the fighters were Arab clients, though they doubtlessly played a part. I think it's accepted that most of the soldiers were from Anatolia and Persia, with conscripts raised in the disputed territories by whoever held them at the time. This provided another reason for the locals in Syria, Iraq, etc., to welcome the Arabs with open arms, as they promised something more than two or three consecutive generations of near-endless war.

The Romans and Persians at the time used Arab clients to defend the part of their empires adjacent to 'further Arabia', as opposed to the land in the north that was heavily garrisoned by their own soldiers (which the Arabs didn't have to bother about). They didn't need to be provisioned, or even paid that much. Their military role was a 'be quiet and keep this place quiet' role. 'or else we put another guy in your place'; the guys being paid by each side were the only plausible threat to either empire's territories, there was no question of unbribeable guys emerging in the interior. Also, many of the 'regular' soldiers were directly hired Arabs, and the regional requirements for operations and provisioning in this part of the world were not ones to which outsiders could easily adapt.

The mechanics you described would be the mechanics, but I don't see anyone showing that this was actually what happened nor do I think they are very applicable.
 
It's quite funny to see Riyadh mentioned as if it was of any importance before quite recently...

It is true that Muhammad was just one of the alleged prophets operating in Arabia at the time. But honestly I don't know if the careers of the others started after the example of Muhammad, or at the same time, or even earlier. Probably it was a general trend, but do we have any reason to believe one of them was as adamant in his claim to be the only prophet and subduing all Arabs?
What happened - didn't have to happen. Arabia could have erupted - the same or less, but could have remained a relatively not dangerous backwater place that it used to be for much of its earlier and much of its later history. Or it could've erupted without prophetic claims... There were Arab tribes settling in Syria, Al-Gazira and Iraq long before Islam.

It is likely - but not sure - that eventually, entire Arabia (apart from Jewish areas) would have been Christianised. It was on a good way to it.
Thus, Byzantium would have lasted longer, and Sasanids too. For centuries, because there was no real threat for Egypt, Syria and Anatolia were only endangered by Persia... but thousands of events could have happened to destroy this status quo.
But not religion: Christianity would have remained there, and perhaps finally overtaken Iran, and who knows how far east it would have managed to get.
 
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