Universal empires.

Nope. Assyria and Babylonia were purely Levant based powers; Persia controlled all that plus Anatolia, Egypt, and the Caucasus. Which would amount to about half of its empire.

(I know Assyria briefly possessed Egypt. It doesn't count.)

First, why wouldn't Assyria's possession of Egypt count?

Second, at it's height, Assyria possessed Mesopotamia, the Levant, and Egypt. In Anatolia, it possessed the remnants of the Neo-Hittites (mostly the eastern half of Cilicia). If you don't count the Persian heartland, the bulk of the Persian Empire was the same as the Assyrian Empire. Yes, the Achaemenids also possessed the Iranian Plateau, but they were also western facing, which is why they made their state language Aramaic, which would have been the Lingua Franca of the region (and the most popular language in the Assyrian Empire by default as well).
 
Being a Republic, ironically, helped them built the Empire. A local political from an allied city who threw his lot with a leader of another polity (say, a Cleomenes III, or a Eumenes III) would be out of power or dead as soon as that individual died. Whereas an "ally of the people of Rome" could count on roman help regardless of leadership changes in Rome. The Roman Republic was a small risk as an ally (even if it extracted a lot by way rapacious taxation - which didn't affect its allied elites much, but did cause a number of rebellions). The alternatives to Rome were monarchs who were big risks as allies.

Having a good military was also important, of course. But the romans got good at that by sheer stubbornness at throwing army after army against its enemies. And perhaps the republic also helped with raising armies: monarchs had to pay them, romans (until Marius) just... bred!
The Romans had to pay their armies too.

I'm suspicious of the notion that Rome's republic made it, institutionally, a superior ally to a monarchical state because the senate was...known to change its mind. Qarthadast didn't exactly bring the war of 149-146 down on its own head, and the Romans' abrupt aggression scared the Achaians, an actual long-term ally of Rome, into making defensive preparations that eventually became the pretext for the war that extinguished that polity. Rome also straight-up abandoned allies, as in the immediate aftermath of the second war with Philippos V, when Flamininus left and suddenly Rome's guarantees for the Aitolians and for Nabis meant precisely nothing.

And it's hardly as though Rome was the only non-monarchy in the Mediterranean. Qarthadast was one as well, as were the Aitolian and Achaian leagues, the League of the Islanders, and any number of Italian city-states that were powerful before Rome conquered them, like Capua, Syrakousai, or Taras. Why did "being a republic" work for Rome, and not these other states?
 
Rome wasn't that different from a number of other Mediterranean cities, true. There were other republics, Carthage being indeed a good example of a similar rival. And I guess there was an element of chance to Rome becoming the hegemon, it could have been Carthage.
The roman army was not unique either in conscripting citizens (and allies) instead of paying mercenaries, many other mediterranean cities did that. Carthage, notably, did not. The roman republic could count on its armies being loyal and avoid civil wars (until near its end), Carthage had to deal with dangerous mercenary rebellions... that difference may have been what made Rome likelier to prevail in the west?

As for the east, the obvious difference by the time the romans clash with it is that the polities big enough to challenge Rome were monarchies. And these hellenistic kingdoms were so personal that they could be undone by the death of a ruler. The alliances of the notables might then shift to a different king, easily. The independent city-states and their leagues were more similar to Rome in organization, but they were smaller. Too small to resist by the time the romans turned their attention to the east.

So why did Rome manage to grow, under the republic, to a big state capable of fielding armies to defeat Macedonia, when the greek city states never managed that? Was it because they were better at assimilating their conquered foes into a "roman state", or at least a roman system? Perhaps Rome was similar to Macedonia in one thing: it had less developed neighbors that it could conquer and assimilate. In Rome's case the center/north of Italy became its hinterland. The greek city states had other developed city states as neighbors, and never managed to expand very much.

So was it chance, geography, political system? A bit of all?
 
Sheer size has to come in there, somewhere: I'm not sure I'd buy that Rome was particularly more developed at the time of its early growth than its neighbours in Etruria and central Italy, but the result was that by the time of the Punic Wars it had a much larger territory, with much larger reserves of manpower, than any comparable city-state from the Greek world. Attica, for example, is a touch under 4,000 square km, Laconia is a similar size; Latium alone is in the region of 17,000. Macedon had exactly the same advantage in the period of its early expansion: that it simply had more resources than its opponents in Greece.
 
^The crucial point in the expansion of Macedonia was in the third amphictionic war, ie an allience triggered (again) by Delphoi's independence being threatened (again) by Phocaeans, who pretty much encircle that city state with the oracle. Macedonia managed to annex Thessaly as part of that war. The event was so crucial that Philip B' even named his daughter to commemorate the event, as Thessalonike ;) Later on she wed Kassandros, one of the diadochoi of Alexander, and he named this city with her name.

Macedonia did have larger territory than the other states, yet it also bordered barbarians whereas the others (at least in Greece itself) did not. And barbarian armies had a reputation of sometimes causing devastating defeats due to ambush tactics. Even the events that led to Alexander burning down Thebes were triggered by another fat lie by Demosthenes, according to which Alexander and his army was destroyed by some barbarian ambush, leading Thebes and Athens to revolt.
 
And given that war was mentioned: chance effects can and do play a massive role sometimes. Eg Philip B' wouldn't even be in Thessaly if it was not for Phocaeans (their ruler more precisely) deciding to continue the war after a crucial defeat, AND Thebes thinking the war was over and thus sending some of its army as mercenary help in an inter-persian satrapies conflict.
In the end, though, Philip was named as archon of Thessaly, and now had a rather large territory, including important towns and ports in Thessaly.
 
What the hell is an isolated geopolitical system? How are we defining isolation here? Was Italy an isolated region? Gaul? Britain? Greece? Germany? Isolated from whom?

No, all of those regions traded and warred with the outside world.

I define the Mediterranean as 'isolated' simply because it contained advanced states and the surrounding areas did not. This is an entirely relative measure. Germany wasn't isolated under this definition, but if it had been more advanced than it would have been.

As an example, Nauru is fairly geographically isolated from other landmasses and it had twelve competing tribes when the Europeans first arrived there, which indicates a lack of hegemon - But according to mouthwash, it must have had a single hegemonic power

If it can't develop a bureaucratic or stratified state, than it won't produce a hegemon. What need would it even serve? There's no such thing as 'geopolitics' in a society that doesn't have cities.
 
^There is geopolitics, it just is tribal or horde-driven. (iirc note: Even the Maori invaded some southern island when they already were under british control, and would only hope to gain some more tribal land that would -again- be controlled de facto by the british)
 
Most of this has been said already, but my take is;

Rome certainly had a tactical system that was proven in Italy and evolved successfully as it met new challenges. I wouldn't dismiss its importance by comparison to the Wehrmacht which only enjoyed techological and organizational superiority till mid 1942, when it was way overextended and pretty much alone against half the world. Of course the Roman army also had the cohesion and logistical commitment from a large citizen base guaranteed in their constitution. But that didn't really expand legally till after the social war.

In these respects it seems they didn't start out much different than the larger stable Greek polities - be they democracy, oligarchy, or tyranny - like Athens, Sparta and Syracuse; who were able to dominate by sea or land, but rarely both. Their geopolitical dominance extended to colonies and loose confederations of city states. Rome became what Sparta might have been in Greece, were Sparta not constrained by the balance of power between these city states and the limitations of a slave state. Sparta's belated response after the Macedonian conquests only marked an era where the same rivalries existed on a larger scale with less stable polities. Rome simply would not tolerate rivalries and was able to secure a bigger powerbase in Italy by basically steamrolling their enemies. They suffered some setbacks but lost no wars after 500 BC, though rarely did they enjoy great numerical superiority when the issues were decided - which speaks to their military as well as the durability of their political system. Certainly by 200 BC they had become arbitrator of the Med basin - able to intervene on behalf of or against any of the major players. From that point on many stable and significant polities that remained in the fractious Hellenistic world simply joined the Roman sphere of influence for security, becoming allies. Those that did not were conquered and became subjects or slaves, only much later citizens.

Achaemenid Persia isn't the best comparison. They were able to expand more rapidly by absorbing the already vast Median empire in a tactically inconclusive and near disastrous civil war against the reigning dynasty. It only lasted 200 years but left a precedent for the Arsacid Parthians and Sassanids. The Sassanids were also able to prevail in a fairly quickly resolved transfer of power and did enjoy the same longevity as the Roman empire.

I would venture to say that rivers were effective frontiers if they were long enough and anchored on natural barriers. They were more easily patrolled, even by ships on occasion, than say the approaches to Wallachia. I mean you look Rome was content with the Po for a very long time even after they achieved regional superiority. These rivers were also frontiers instantly recognizable by all compared to some vague and arbitrary line on the map. Though the empire's influence reached beyond them, none of Rome or Byzantium's ventures beyond the Rhine and Danube were ever as secure.
 
If it can't develop a bureaucratic or stratified state, than it won't produce a hegemon. What need would it even serve? There's no such thing as 'geopolitics' in a society that doesn't have cities.

I suspect Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun might contest that point.
 
Most of this has been said already, but my take is;

Rome certainly had a tactical system that was proven in Italy and evolved successfully as it met new challenges. I wouldn't dismiss its importance by comparison to the Wehrmacht which only enjoyed techological and organizational superiority till mid 1942, when it was way overextended and pretty much alone against half the world. Of course the Roman army also had the cohesion and logistical commitment from a large citizen base guaranteed in their constitution. But that didn't really expand legally till after the social war.

In these respects it seems they didn't start out much different than the larger stable Greek polities - be they democracy, oligarchy, or tyranny - like Athens, Sparta and Syracuse; who were able to dominate by sea or land, but rarely both. Their geopolitical dominance extended to colonies and loose confederations of city states. Rome became what Sparta might have been in Greece, were Sparta not constrained by the balance of power between these city states and the limitations of a slave state. Sparta's belated response after the Macedonian conquests only marked an era where the same rivalries existed on a larger scale with less stable polities. Rome simply would not tolerate rivalries and was able to secure a bigger powerbase in Italy by basically steamrolling their enemies. They suffered some setbacks but lost no wars after 500 BC, though rarely did they enjoy great numerical superiority when the issues were decided - which speaks to their military as well as the durability of their political system. Certainly by 200 BC they had become arbitrator of the Med basin - able to intervene on behalf of or against any of the major players. From that point on many stable and significant polities that remained in the fractious Hellenistic world simply joined the Roman sphere of influence for security, becoming allies. Those that did not were conquered and became subjects or slaves, only much later citizens.

Achaemenid Persia isn't the best comparison. They were able to expand more rapidly by absorbing the already vast Median empire in a tactically inconclusive and near disastrous civil war against the reigning dynasty. It only lasted 200 years but left a precedent for the Arsacid Parthians and Sassanids. The Sassanids were also able to prevail in a fairly quickly resolved transfer of power and did enjoy the same longevity as the Roman empire.

I would venture to say that rivers were effective frontiers if they were long enough and anchored on natural barriers. They were more easily patrolled, even by ships on occasion, than say the approaches to Wallachia. I mean you look Rome was content with the Po for a very long time even after they achieved regional superiority. These rivers were also frontiers instantly recognizable by all compared to some vague and arbitrary line on the map. Though the empire's influence reached beyond them, none of Rome or Byzantium's ventures beyond the Rhine and Danube were ever as secure.
Is there any point in arguing with you now about things like Rome's "tactical system", when we had the same arguments six years ago and you basically ignored them?

How are Rome and Sparte comparable in any meaningful way?

On what basis are you comparing the Republic's "frontier" "on the Po" to the later heavily militarized borders on the Rhine and Danube? The Republic had no fleet on the Po, only intermittently had an army up there, and didn't really even use the Po as the border anyway; it was also never the ideological talisman that the imperial borders were.
 
Is there any point in arguing with you now about things like Rome's "tactical system", when we had the same arguments six years ago and you basically ignored them?
Ha. That sounds rather testy. The last thing I remember from 6 years ago was someone throwing a tantrum when I maintained there was enough circumstantial and documented evidence for the time, to support a continuity or connection between Gothic invaders on the Danube pre-300 AD and Alaric's Visigoths 150 years later. (Here we go again!)

Anyway - I made the simple statement that Rome's tactical system "shouldn't be dismissed" on the road to empire - a catch all for the formations, weaponry, training - any technological or organizational edge the army enjoyed. That shouldn't be too controversial given the proof of performance and evolution over centuries - including the many matchups against various alignments of Etruscans, Umbrians, Gauls and Samnites - when Rome did not always have vast reserves of manpower to swamp its enemies.

How are Rome and Sparte comparable in any meaningful way?
I pointed out as many differences as similarities, which is why Sparte did not succeed as Rome did. The basis of this thread includes a comparison of the rise of disparate empires and near empires. Similarities are bound to be superficial, but Sparta comes close to the early Republic in being the recognized land power in Greece - even briefly naval dominance, achieving a measure of hegemony over power blocks of similar potential, but unable to maintain it. Sparta, like Rome, was able to enforce its will on occasion strictly on the basis of reputation of the land army. Before the Samnite Wars were complete Rome had become recognized, even in Greece, as the land power to beat in Italy. Naval power was secondary in Italy. Rome unlike Sparta did not feel compelled to respect any balance of power in their arena of interest.

On what basis are you comparing the Republic's "frontier" "on the Po" to the later heavily militarized borders on the Rhine and Danube? The Republic had no fleet on the Po, only intermittently had an army up there, and didn't really even use the Po as the border anyway; it was also never the ideological talisman that the imperial borders were.

The statement I made was to refute the notion that rivers did not serve as effective
boundaries. The fact that imperial boundaries on the Rhine and Danube were different and more fortified than the Republic's Po, does not digress from the point that the Po served as an effective river boundary to the Republic for some time did it not? Although they held hegemony beyond it, it marked the limit of Roman administration south of it and was the line Gallic invaders crossed at their peril.
 
'Gothic invaders on the Danube pre-300 AD' is a particularly tricky phrase to be throwing around. You need to put a great big question mark over the word 'Gothic'.
 
'Gothic invaders on the Danube pre-300 AD' is a particularly tricky phrase to be throwing around. You need to put a great big question mark over the word 'Gothic'.
Really? I thought it was pretty uncontroversial a group identified as the Goths invaded the Balkans around 260 or so. Drawing a coherent line between them and the Goths of Alaric, or even of Fritigern, is probably of dubious utility but I was under the impression there were groups identifying themselves as "Goths" at that time.
Or is that one of Peter Heather's less defensible arguments that I'm dredging up?
 
I think it is Peter Heather; I was doing a bit of reading on this a couple of weeks ago, and he has a nasty habit of (unconsciously, I think) falling into some of the traps that should become obvious below.

Briefly speaking, we have very little idea of how the various people beyond the Rhine and Danube saw themselves. We have Roman sources placing 'the Goths' in a certain place during the 3rd Century, but that's a very different kettle of fish to knowing anything about what the so-called Goths thought about it - after all, Caesar talked about 'the Gauls' living north of the Alps, and 'the Britons' living over the Channel, and we can be pretty much certain that neither of those saw themselves as a whole group. These categories, like 'barbarian' as a whole, exist because the Romans define them. It's a bit like saying that a group identified as 'barbarians' invaded in the 260s; the terminology only gives you one side of the story, because the contemporary sources all come from one side.

It's only much later, in the later 6th century (claiming to summarise an earlier 6th-century account, but we don't know how true that was), that we have a Gothic writer called Jordanes who tries to set out the Goths' own story of where they came from - almost unique among 'barbarian' peoples. This is where we get the classic story of 'the Goths' coming in from Scandinavia in a great migration, being led across the Danube, and eventually to their battles with the Romans, ending in their defeat by Belisarius. This is our only textual source for the 'Great Migration' idea - even the Roman source used for the 'chain of events' from the Hunnic movements to Adrianople starts off with the Goths roughly where they were in the 3rd century. It has been used quite crudely by scholars, who essentially looked at the archaeology of the area where we know the Romans placed the 3rd-century Goths, look for similarities in that material and material found closer to the Baltic, and argued that this is proof of 'Gothic' migration. The problems with this are that we still have no idea how those people saw themselves in the 3rd century, and even less certainty that ideas and goods cannot travel without movement of people, or that those similar material goods would have been considered important in constructing ethnic identity. To use a modern parallel, you could plot a map or timeline of McDonald's restaurants spreading across the world, but that would tell you nothing about the 'migration' of American people, even if you argue that McDonalds restaurants originated in America and are used by Americans. Without the text, in other words, the archaeology doesn't give good enough evidence to confirm the idea of a large-scale migration. There are further problems - in the text, Jordanes tells us how the Goths fought against Agamemnon, destroyed Troy, and invaded Egypt. All of these stories are rightly considered a lot of rubbish, but - largely thanks to 19th-century German Romantics wanting to find a history for 'the Germans' in opposition to the Classical/Mediterranean heritage - the migration story has had less scrutiny, despite the fact that Jordanes has it all led by ancestors of the rulers of his own part of the Goths in his own time. It still gets taken far more seriously than it should: if you're interested, the book I found which explained this very well was this one. Unfortunately, I'm lucky enough to live in a university town, which makes finding books like this in second-hand shops much easier than it should be.

So we still have an issue of when we can first say that anyone called himself a 'Goth'. There are extremely good reasons to doubt the Jordanes-Heather idea of a small group of 'Goths', whose identity was an extension of the (archaeologically visible) material that they carried, forming a core of a nebulous people throughout centuries of migration which probably never happened. We've come a long way from the outdated view of archaeology that people who leave similar archaeological traces must belong to the same political and ethnic groups, and that all movement of archaeologically-visible material must mean migration of the people to whom it 'really' belongs. All that we can say for sure is that the Romans called these people 'Goths', and that their descendants, living within the Roman Empire, were doing it too by the 6th century. It's more than likely that the two are related - that the people who crossed the Danube saw themselves as Greuthungi, Treveri, and a whole host of other peoples who may have been physically in the same place but didn't necessarily feel any common identity. After generations of contact with the Roman system, being referred to in law and by the Romans whom they met as 'Goths', and recruited (on a huge scale) into Roman regiments named 'Gothic', they took on the identity themselves. The same sort of thing happened in British India, where the British had this idea of 'martial races' whom they wanted to recruit into their own army, and this had the effect of making people much more conscious of identities which they might not have considered important or even felt that they had without this influence.

EDIT: As usual, genuine historians, please feel free to point out if this is all rubbish.
 
I'm not a genuine historian, FP, but while most of what you've pointed out about the constructed history of the Goths is essentially correct, the Romans did identify some of the groups that invaded the Balkan provinces of the Empire in the third century as "Goths".

There are some problems with precisely how closely some of these groups are associated with "Goths", it's true. Unfortunately, I don't know this period very well, so it's hard for me to give specifics. But many of the groups subsequently referred to as "Goths" in the third century were originally referred to by other names and only acquired the "Goth" sobriquet later. Greek writers almost always called the third-century invaders "Skythoi", with smatterings of other names like "Boranoi" and "Boradoi" by late historians. And with Roman ethnography the shambles it was, it's certainly not unreasonable to take the position that most if not all of the identifications that Roman historians made were worthless even when they did assign a nonstandard name to a given group.

A fair number of these ostensibly "Gothic" groups probably owe that name more to nineteenth-century nationalists than anything else. Some historians, like Heather, have acknowledged this but have taken half-measures, claiming that the Gothic name must've stuck somehow so there may have been Goths among these groups instead. I'm in favor of acknowledging when the factual basis for a claim is too sketchy to support it and admitting what we don't actually know. But I'm not a classicist, and I'm not even close, and if I ever come in contact with an argument for Goths that I can see the merits of then I'd be more than happy to change my mind.
Ha. That sounds rather testy. The last thing I remember from 6 years ago was someone throwing a tantrum when I maintained there was enough circumstantial and documented evidence for the time, to support a continuity or connection between Gothic invaders on the Danube pre-300 AD and Alaric's Visigoths 150 years later. (Here we go again!)

Anyway - I made the simple statement that Rome's tactical system "shouldn't be dismissed" on the road to empire - a catch all for the formations, weaponry, training - any technological or organizational edge the army enjoyed. That shouldn't be too controversial given the proof of performance and evolution over centuries - including the many matchups against various alignments of Etruscans, Umbrians, Gauls and Samnites - when Rome did not always have vast reserves of manpower to swamp its enemies.


I pointed out as many differences as similarities, which is why Sparte did not succeed as Rome did. The basis of this thread includes a comparison of the rise of disparate empires and near empires. Similarities are bound to be superficial, but Sparta comes close to the early Republic in being the recognized land power in Greece - even briefly naval dominance, achieving a measure of hegemony over power blocks of similar potential, but unable to maintain it. Sparta, like Rome, was able to enforce its will on occasion strictly on the basis of reputation of the land army. Before the Samnite Wars were complete Rome had become recognized, even in Greece, as the land power to beat in Italy. Naval power was secondary in Italy. Rome unlike Sparta did not feel compelled to respect any balance of power in their arena of interest.



The statement I made was to refute the notion that rivers did not serve as effective
boundaries. The fact that imperial boundaries on the Rhine and Danube were different and more fortified than the Republic's Po, does not digress from the point that the Po served as an effective river boundary to the Republic for some time did it not? Although they held hegemony beyond it, it marked the limit of Roman administration south of it and was the line Gallic invaders crossed at their peril.
Subtle.

What I remember from most of those exchanges is me bringing up the work of historians who have published more recently than several decades ago, with logical understandings of things like "identity" and whatnot, and you obstinately hewing to the same line regardless of any evidence presented against your case. For instance: I would introduce an objection to your (or somebody else's) explanation of something; you would respond to a misreading of what I actually said while restating your position with no new information (and/or some misinformation); I would point this out; rinse and repeat.

This is easily demonstrated with your final paragraph in the quoted post. The original discussion about rivers and political geography was that individuals in this thread claimed that rivers are necessarily the "natural" frontiers on which political borders come to rest, and, by implication, it is possible to predict political history based on using rivers as boundary lines. I pointed out that rivers are not necessarily borders, and have formed the core of political territories just as often as the periphery, that there are no such things as "natural" frontiers, and that prescriptivism of this sort is silly. Your comment was that rivers are still good borders because the Rhine and Danube were borders for Rome for a long time. Nobody disputed that the Rhine and Danube were borders for Rome for a long time. The closest anybody came to that was when Flying Pig pointed out that rivers don't serve as a particularly good place on which to locate a static defensive line, which is a purely military argument and has nothing to do with political borders. Your argument against "the notion that rivers did not serve as effective boundaries" is getting straw all over the place.

As for your belief that the Po was a border for the Republic: it wasn't, and any beliefs you have to that effect probably come from the fact that historical atlas-makers find it convenient to end the "Rome" color at the Po for a few centuries, not from any situation on the ground. In reality, Roman-allied territory and Roman colonies did not come close to the Po until very late in the third century BC, after the crisis with the Boii and Insubres that led to the Battles of Faesulae and Telamon. During that crisis, the Romans allied with the Veneti (north of the Po) and captured the Insubrian city that eventually became Mediolanum (also north of the Po). The Po formed the core of the region Gallia Cisalpina and by the middle of the second century BC the river was not even close to a Roman frontier. If the Po was ever a frontier for the Republic, it was between 216 BC and 202 BC, when some Roman historians claim that the "transpadane" parts of Gallia Cisalpina were abandoned because they could not be protected due to the military emergency in Italy. If 14 years is your definition of "some time" in this context, then it is a poor definition. Your comment about it being a "line Gallic invaders crossed at their peril" is a neat bit of histrionics but it is not actually true: the "Gallic invaders" lived both north and south of the Po.

It looks like the sum total of your beliefs about the comparability of Rome and Sparte is that they both had strong armies and derived some form of political influence from those strong armies. That isn't a comparison in any useful way - although I guess you agree with me on that, since you say that the only reason you're comparing them that way is because the thread's OP was so vague about what constituted a topic of discussion that it's basically open season on bad comparisons.
 
Dachs said:
Unfortunately, I don't know this period very well, so it's hard for me to give specifics.
You mean this in a normal person "don't know this period very well" (like me and Europe before the Great War) or a Dachsian "don't know this period very well" where you can recount both the key events and recent historiography? :p
 
I'd say that mountains and deserts would be a better indication of natural boundaries, seeing as that they are difficult to march an army through, or travel. Which is partly why the border between Spain and France has remained so static over the years, the French were often thwarted by the Pyrenees, and why the Ottomans never expanded into the interior of Africa, what with the Subsaharan desert and all that. Even then that isn't iron proof. Egypt expanded well past the Sinai peninsula and its desert, while the Roman Empire's territory stretched beyond the Alps.
 
As for your belief that the Po was a border for the Republic: it wasn't, and any beliefs you have to that effect probably come from the fact that historical atlas-makers find it convenient to end the "Rome" color at the Po for a few centuries, not from any situation on the ground. In reality, Roman-allied territory and Roman colonies did not come close to the Po until very late in the third century BC, after the crisis with the Boii and Insubres that led to the Battles of Faesulae and Telamon. During that crisis, the Romans allied with the Veneti (north of the Po) and captured the Insubrian city that eventually became Mediolanum (also north of the Po). The Po formed the core of the region Gallia Cisalpina and by the middle of the second century BC the river was not even close to a Roman frontier. If the Po was ever a frontier for the Republic, it was between 216 BC and 202 BC, when some Roman historians claim that the "transpadane" parts of Gallia Cisalpina were abandoned because they could not be protected due to the military emergency in Italy. If 14 years is your definition of "some time" in this context, then it is a poor definition. Your comment about it being a "line Gallic invaders crossed at their peril" is a neat bit of histrionics but it is not actually true: the "Gallic invaders" lived both north and south of the Po.

It looks like the sum total of your beliefs about the comparability of Rome and Sparte is that they both had strong armies and derived some form of political influence from those strong armies. That isn't a comparison in any useful way - although I guess you agree with me on that, since you say that the only reason you're comparing them that way is because the thread's OP was so vague about what constituted a topic of discussion that it's basically open season on bad comparisons.

Okay. I was wrong about the Po. The Cis-alpine Gauls spanned it, but it seemed more than once that Roman intervention was called for when some disturbance or emergency actually crossed it - such as in 225 BC as you noted.
Anyway, you did acknowledge the 'talismanic' value of the Rhine and Danube. It seemed just from skimming this thread that the consensus was rivers were not really effective as frontiers, natural or otherwise.

I dislike distilling my argument down to one variable, that Sparta and Rome were similar only because they were recognized land powers, though that is important when empires are usually founded on conquest. But the rest is admittedly pretty subtle. Their size and importance, relative to their area of interest, was similar at some point with a similar array of potential enemies. As opposed to say, expanding in a barbaric hinterland or facing a monolithic power bloc.
Weak maybe but the comparison is interesting, not because they were the same but because their history turned out quite differently. I recognize that Sparta's weakness in the 4th Century BC was they still did not have a largely enfranchised citizen base among their population, though they were able to recruit helots in emergencies, and could usually count on a substantial commitment from allies, just as the Romans could mobilize their Alae.

I may have something on Goth pseudo-history, maybe part legend or hearsay, but if I can find it I'll share it.
 
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