allhailIndia
Deity
More than anything I think if the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk, Churchill would definitely have sued for peace with Hitler and the US would not have bothered to help Russia till maybe Pearl Harbor.
Do you think Germany's failure to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk was a major setback?
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TrailblazingScot
I was kittenOFchaos
Well, there is ALOT of evidence I could forward from my favorite historian Liddell Hart who was fortunate enough to have interviewed German Generals/Commanders after the war...but to save time as I have tasks to do I'll go with one quote for this post to back up my claim:
Page 89 From "Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War":
Liddell Hart himself concludes on the matter having gone into alot of depth in another book of his "The Other Side of the Hill" concerning the miracle of Dunkirk that:
Personnally I believe it is impossible given the obvious desire to attack of the commanders on the ground, the obvious predicament of the British forces and the absolute lack of any French counter-offensive whatsoever to trouble the Germans that it was a military decision that called the halt. I believe it was a decision bourne out of respect of the British Empire that Hitler had shown on numerous occasions including in his book "Mein Kampf" that meant he did not want to destroy the army of a Nation he wanted to fight with NOT against.
EdwardTking
Deity
Kitten, Interesting.
I have been reading Erik Durschmied "The Hinge Factor".
"..Goring then went on to assure Hitler that his bomber pilots would annihilate the Tommies. The Air Marshal argued that the northern Allied armies were cut off ffrom the rest of France and that the Fuhrer needed his panzer force intact to crush Paris, to avenge the humiliation of 1918. The Fuhrer need only order the panzers to stop so that his Luftwaffe wouldn't strike at their own units. Hitller, still suffering from the aftershock of the Arras tank encounter, readily agreed to Goring's proposals." 22
22: Admiral Ansel, from talks with Luftwaffe General Jeschonnek, Goring's ADC. This fact, that Goring was responsible for the Halte Befehl, was reconfirmed by Air Marshals Kesselring and Milch during an interview in a POW camp in 1945.
I have been reading Erik Durschmied "The Hinge Factor".
"..Goring then went on to assure Hitler that his bomber pilots would annihilate the Tommies. The Air Marshal argued that the northern Allied armies were cut off ffrom the rest of France and that the Fuhrer needed his panzer force intact to crush Paris, to avenge the humiliation of 1918. The Fuhrer need only order the panzers to stop so that his Luftwaffe wouldn't strike at their own units. Hitller, still suffering from the aftershock of the Arras tank encounter, readily agreed to Goring's proposals." 22
22: Admiral Ansel, from talks with Luftwaffe General Jeschonnek, Goring's ADC. This fact, that Goring was responsible for the Halte Befehl, was reconfirmed by Air Marshals Kesselring and Milch during an interview in a POW camp in 1945.
TrailblazingScot
I was kittenOFchaos
The only thing that I find remarkable if it was solely due to the intervention of Goring and his claims of the power of the Luftwaffe is why then that Hitler did not blame Goring for this failing
rilnator
Emperor
I don't think Hitler would want to publicly berate a long time Nazi party comrade like Goring. Even later on in the war when Goring was a fat drug addicted faggot did Hitler take measures against him. Anyway, Goring and Hitler probably looked foward to the rematch in the skies over Britain.
EdwardTking
Deity
Originally posted by kittenOFchaos
The only thing that I find remarkable if it was solely due to the intervention of Goring and his claims of the power of the Luftwaffe is why then that Hitler did not blame Goring for this failing
Umm - not entirely convinced that Goring's intervention was the "sole" reason. I think that most people, and I don't think that there is any particular reason to believe that Hitler was any exception, typically approach complex activities in modular mode.
The overall strategic module in question then was of course defeating the French and there were various objectives associated with this:
(a) breaking through (b) splitting the allied armies
(c) outflanking Paris (d) surrounding and capturing Paris.
Finishing off the BEF was simply not on this list and therefore not allocated any priority (first in terms of serious consideration and secondly in terms of the key armoured and mobile divisions).
I have no particular evidence to support this theory; other than my general observation about Hitler; that he did not always think strategically and that many of his modules contradicted each other. For example Hitler did not like Russians or Jews.
So why did he send German Jews of military age to death
camps when he could have sent them as assault troops
to be obliterated aginst the more akward Russian defences?
If Hitler had been kinder to the defeated french; e.g. offered to create a Belgium like buffer state for Alsace and Lorraine, he might have been able to charm them into making a substantial military contribution against Russia.
Hitler spent several years in WW1 on the western front. He will have observed that the High Command failed in four years to properly strategically break through despite deploying gas and storm trooper tactics. In WW2 the Luftwaffe very rapidly had in succession (a) obtained air superiority over the French (& British) in France (b) bombed out obstacles blocking the Panzers and (c) induced widespread chaos to the rear of the allies. Hitler therefore had good reason to believe that Goring had, when viewed overall, been both as successful in France as in Norway and Poland. The fact that the BEF had been (a) driven out of France (b) lost all its equipment and (c) taken heavy casualties was most likely seen as an extra bonus success.
I suspect that it was only much later on when Britain had, to his surprise, decided to fight on, sunk the French fleet and after Goring had not won the Battle of Britain; that Hitler realised that (d) maybe more soldiers had got away than he could have permitted and that he might have missed an opportunity. I don't think that he had any real concerns about humiliating the British; he never seemed to mind about that with others although he'd occasionally try his charm with the Italians, Finns and Spanish. He probably thought that making certain of finishing off the french was the best method of strategically defeating Britain.
Of course it is possible that he may have had some vague idea about later doing a deal with Britain to invade Russia; certainly the planning for the invasion of Britain was very hesitant; but the majority evidence for the order to halt was that it was military.
Consider the battle in the North as a secondary sub-module. A military factor here is the result of the Begium collapse. This meant that Hitler could attack the BEF from the East instead of just from the South. As the German army to the South of the BEF could engage in a number of directions against the British or the French; but the German army to the East only had one direction West; it made strategic sense to conserve the Southern army that was most isolated from its supply lines and send the Eastern army west as the hammer against the anvil of the army to the south of the BEF.
I refer to Alan Brooke's war diary:
"25 May Lomme"
During the night I received information at 2 am that German penetration through the Belgian front was growing rapidly and that the Belgians were not offering much resistance. I came to the conclusion that this was the beginning of a German offensive intended to push through to our left rear and to join up with the armoured divisions which must have just about shot their bolt."
Hello by any chance can you explain what each of these points mean please and thank you I found it very interesting and wanting to know If I could use it for an essay
James Stuart
King
This discussion is eleven years old. He's not going to reply. It is an interesting discussion though.
I'll see if I can explain what the points mean, since EdwardTKing is no longer around these paprts to do so. I don't like putting words in other's mouths, but I'll make an exception here and hope I get his points across.
A) The Germans were concerned that France might launch a counter-attack if they overextended their line. This actually happened once during the Battle of France; a young Colonel named Charles De Gaulle assumed command of a tank brigade and cut a German brigade to ribbons before reinforcements arrived and forced his retreat. That's the action that got De Gaulle promoted, both to General and to Secretary of State for War.
If De Gaulle's actions had been part of a broad counter-attack instead of an isolated assault by a single commander - and the Germans had no way of knowing which at the time - the German advance could have been in trouble; the blitzkrieg would have been trapped in a pocket behind enemy lines, as later happened to the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge. This would have been disastrous.
So there is an argument for slowing one's advance in this situation, avoiding an over-extension. General Tommy Franks did the same thing in the 2003 Iraq War; his advance stopped short of Baghdad and regrouped, even though it seemed like they could have pushed on, out of a necessity to secure his supply lines from Iraq's armoured brigades.
B) It is very difficult to embark a large force without a port or harbour from which to do so. It is also difficult to disembark them, which is why the British spent a great deal of time and money inventing artifical harbours - known as Mulberries - for the D-Day landings. Since Dunkirk lacked a port of sufficient size to enable a traditional, orderly retreat by the British, the Germans may have discounted the possibility that such a large number of troops could evacuate.
If the British evacuation had taken place through Calais, the Germans may have been more energetic, as Calais was a major port and could easily accomodate 300,000 soldiers and their equipment. As it was, Dunkirk's logistical difficulties are what led to the abandonment of so much equipment on the beach by the British, as they couldn't put tanks or heavy equipment on ships without docking facilities.
C) The Germans showed a habit during WWII to believe that bombing was capable of accomplishing more than it actually did. There was a distinct belief amongst the Luftwaffe's hierarchy that Britain could be forced to surrender through aerial bombings alone, without an invasion, and this belief may have contributed to a lack of advance on Dunkirk, as it may have been believed that the bombers could handle it by themselves.
This was hardly a new concept; several German commanders also believed the zeppelin raids on London would be enough to force a British capitulation in WWI, and the British and Americans both launched similar large-scale bombing campaigns (known as "terror bombing") on German cities later in the war, most infamously at Dresden. With aerial warfare in its infancy, it was fairly common for this mistake to be made. In fact, the British philosophy of strategic bombing in the 1930s cosely parallelled the Luftwaffe's ideas during the Battle of Britain. By winning that campaign, the British ironically proved their own theory wrong.
D) I believe EdwardTKing may be stating that the Germans thought the British had larger numbers of tanks than they really did, because they didn't count the number they'd already destroyed when gauging British strength. I am unsure of exactly what he meant by this, but I have read that argument elsewhere.
E) The Germans may have thought that a demoralised British Expeditionary Force would meekly surrender, or at least offer little resistance, to their approach. The opposite occurred; the British rear-guard at Calais and elsehwere fought savagely and competently, holding the line long enough for their majority of their fellow soldiers to escape.
As for using EdwardTKing's comments in an essay, even Wikipedia is slightly more reliable than a discussion on an online video game forum. I'd suggest doing Google search's for some of the terms EdwardTKing and I have mentioned. Looking up Liddell Hart and other war historians wouldn't be a bad idea either.
Terxpahseyton
Nobody
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Regarding why the Germans did not crush / capture those British troops - there is a theory I have grown rather fond of. Also, it is not just a theory as in something some fringe group entertains - instead, it is something which managed to enter public German documentaries (for whatever that is worth [not that much, I am very much afraid]).
I personally can not possibly put my weight on one theory or the other - but I will quickly outline the theory as it seems to be entertained by several German scholars.
Nowadays we picture Hitler as the unquestionable head of the German army.
But when Germany invaded France - Hitler wasn't that all-powerful head of the army. In stead - he head to struggle with the German military command, a command drawing on experience (WWI) and military tradition. Hitler had to assert himself against that command - as strange as that may sounds to contemporary ears.
So Hitler got lucky, he picked the risky plan to go over the Ardennes and it worked marvelously. Myth has it that "his" feat to conquer France secured him his absolute dominance over the German military. But reality was more complex. In reality, German military command - being very well aware of the 'value' of Hitlers military craftsmanship and at the same time having quit a sense of self-worth - endeavored to assert itself as a force of its own.
But Hitler wouldn't have it. The success if the German campaign against France gave him much credit - but there still was resistance. So Hitler decided to make an example. He picked a situation where the military was united in strongly wanting one thing and would show them who was boss my making the opposite happening.
While the German army command wanted to crush and capture the remaining British continental troops - Hitler ordered the German stoops to not pursue but stop. Not because he hoped that this would give him the favors of the UK (as the most popular theory goes). But because he could. Because he wanted to show the German command who gets to call all the shots.
I personally can not possibly put my weight on one theory or the other - but I will quickly outline the theory as it seems to be entertained by several German scholars.
Nowadays we picture Hitler as the unquestionable head of the German army.
But when Germany invaded France - Hitler wasn't that all-powerful head of the army. In stead - he head to struggle with the German military command, a command drawing on experience (WWI) and military tradition. Hitler had to assert himself against that command - as strange as that may sounds to contemporary ears.
So Hitler got lucky, he picked the risky plan to go over the Ardennes and it worked marvelously. Myth has it that "his" feat to conquer France secured him his absolute dominance over the German military. But reality was more complex. In reality, German military command - being very well aware of the 'value' of Hitlers military craftsmanship and at the same time having quit a sense of self-worth - endeavored to assert itself as a force of its own.
But Hitler wouldn't have it. The success if the German campaign against France gave him much credit - but there still was resistance. So Hitler decided to make an example. He picked a situation where the military was united in strongly wanting one thing and would show them who was boss my making the opposite happening.
While the German army command wanted to crush and capture the remaining British continental troops - Hitler ordered the German stoops to not pursue but stop. Not because he hoped that this would give him the favors of the UK (as the most popular theory goes). But because he could. Because he wanted to show the German command who gets to call all the shots.
James Stuart
King
This is simply part of the post-war 'duh, Hitler sure was a bad leader' mythos, which is not accurate. Hitler was by no means a good general; one need only look at some of his efforts on the Eastern Front, or the Battle of the Bulge, for evidence of that. But he was also, by no means, a bad general; one need only look at some of his efforts on the Eastern Front, or the Battle of the Bulge, for evidence of that. No, that's not a typo.
Hitler seems to have been a pretty decent offensive general, albeit a poor defensive one. Where he had problems was mid-range strategy; he could come up with a five-year plan that would probably work out okay, albeit with a disturbing ideological tinge that makes one wish it wouldn't. He could come up with a one-week plan that would work brilliantly; he was a surprisingly good tactician. But a plan for the next six months, or a realistic campaign strategy? These things eluded him.
The retreats Hitler ordered on the Eastern Front tended to be consistently more effective than retreats ordered by his subordinates, and some of the arguments for his poor generalship are actually arguments in his favour; people often claim that he doomed the Sixth Army by refusing to authorise a breakout, when in practice a breakout would have led to almost as many dead soldiers, if not more, and had less chance of success than allowing the army to dig in and await a rescue in the next campaigning season. At the same time, Hitler is also the man that ordered the army there in the first place, which was a very bad strategic move.
It was in the best interests of both the Allies and the German military to claim Hitler was a bad general after the war; the Allies wanted an excuse to have not assassinated him, and the German generals wanted an excuse to have lost. 'Hitler was a very poor general' suits both purposes.
As for this specific incident, it's clearly codswallop; Hitler was in total command of his army from October 1938 on. The Blomburg-Fritsch affair in January 1938 both consolidated Hitler's official authority over the armed force whilst simultaneously damaging his unofficial standing with the officer corps, but the failure of the planned coup to get off the ground in September 1938 and the resignation of the chief malcontent, General Beck, a month earlier, effectively ended organised resistane to Hitler's rule until 1944. Then it became obvious that Germany would lose the war and the threat of Germany's dissolution invited a desperate, and not well-considered, attempt at his removal.
Hitler may have been prone to the occasional temper tantrum, but in 1940, he had no reason for any tantrums with his army. He saved them for Quisling, who cocked up the Nazi attempt to take Norway relatively peacefully.
That might be because Hitler wasn't a general at all; the highest rank attained by him was corporal.
Actually, Hitler refused Paulus's 6th Army's withdrawal when it was still feasible. Once the Red Army encirclement was complete, the army was effectively doomed - as proven by the failed attempt of the German southern front to reach the 6th Army. I don't quite see how this would show Hitler's military prowess. One of the reasons the British called off an attempt on his life were the poor decisions Hitler made after taking full command of the army. This was already apparent at the end of 1941, when the German offensive proved unable to attain any of the 3 main objectives: Moscow, Leningrad or Sevastopol. Since this overall strategy was ultimately Hitler's responsibility, there is no one else to blaim.
Actually, it was cocked up by lack of support in Norway. when asked to appoint a Quisling government, the king simply refused and resistance continued. and Hitler did not throw a tantrum at this point: Quisling merely ceased to be of use to the invasion. He later did head the 'quisling' government of Norway under a German Reichskommissar.
As to the OP, the failure to capture or annihilate the BEF at Dunkirk was a result of, again, Hitler's decision to halt the Panzers. When they advance was resumed, the Luftwaffe proved unable to prevent the evacuation of both the BEF and a substantial number of French military, who were also holed up in the pocket.
A similar military mistake was made when, during the preparatory air assault on British air fields to eliminate any RAF threat to an invasion force, the decision was made to shift focus on city bombing. This was effectively an admittance that the Luftwaffe was unable to eliminate RAF air superiority over Britain. Soon after invasion plans were shelved indefinitely. Despite these military setbacks Hitler subsequently decided to invade Russia, once again launching Germany in a two front war. Grand strategist? I think not. And again, the key decisions here are Hitler's and Hitler's alone.
James Stuart
King
I think Fuhrer was the highest rank gained by him myself. If it soothes your pedantometre, we can refer to him as the Commander-in-Chief, rather than a general.
This is one of those misconceptions I mentioned in my previous post. Paulus refused to withdraw the 6th Army because he, correctly, judged that it would lose most of its forces if it attempted to do so. It was the correct decision to wait for rescue by the southern Panzer task army. It was also the logical decision to order Paulus to hunker down and await rescue after that attempt failed; this is a decision Paulus agreed with, so it can hardly be laid at Hitler's feat. In hindsight, of course, fewer soldiers would have died if Paulus had made a run for it than died in the gulag, but it was the logical decision at the time. Hitler, Paulus, and everybody else involved had no way of knowing that Case Blue would be the last strategic offensive ever launched by Nazi Germany.
The story that the British called off Operation: Foxley due to the belief that Hitler's incompetence assisted their war effort is a ridiculous story propagated by a BBC documentary with no basis in historical fact. They abandoned Foxley due to the fact that Hitler left the Berghof, never to return, five months before the plan was even proposed. By that point, Allied armies were already on German soil; there would have been little point assassinating a man that would end up dead or in chains within six months anyway. I've long suspected that one of Churchill's reasons for supporting Foxley - virtually alone out of the British Cabinet - was a desire to keep him out of Soviet hands. That's just a gut feeling, however, with no supporting evidence.
Operation: Barbarossa was a very poor plan. Unless you want to blame Hitler for all Nazi war plans - by which metric you also have to credit him for all their successes - you can't hold him accountable for aplan drawn up and agreed to by the OKW. I don't think a single general objected to the plan. It was only after the war that they suddenly took issue with it.
And pray-tell, what did Quisling tell Hitler about Norwegian public opinion before that invasion? And how well did his coup go over with the Norwegian populace? Like a wet fart in church. The Norwegian military hadn't even fully mobilised to fight the Germans - it was a confused situation, with Norway still confused as to whether or not they were being invaded, and by whom - but when Quisling took over a radio station and announced what was happening to the entire population, the mildly anti-Nazi but rabidly anti-Quisling populace directed their anger at the German invaders, immediately mobilised, nd invited Allied troops onto Norwegian soil. Hitler was rightly furious.
To my knowledge, no one has ever disputed that Hitler ordered the advance halted. What has always been disputed is why. And Luftwaffe attacks continued even while the Panzers were halted.
Another misconception. Even Wiki is smart enough to know this one is false.
German strategy changed to avoid further losses, not as an admission of defeat. The fact that they continued bombing raids for a further two months proves that.
There's also a strong argument that Hitler's invasion of the USSR, long-planned, came at the only feasible time. Germany was effectively bankrupt, unable to pay the balance of payment on the Soviet goods they had received since 1939, and the payments were due in September 1941. If Germany had refused to pay the USSR, most of its other trading partners would have balked at ever dealing with it again, and the USSR and Germany would almost certainly have ended up at war with one another anyway. I must admit, the timing of the invasion does make this scenario palatable, but as the invasion was postponed due to inclement weather once before, I doubt it personally.
Still, to claim that Hitler, who, as the head-of-state who took personal interest in mission-planning, was not a grand strategist, is ludicrous. By planning a grrand strategy, he was by definition a grand strategist. He was a terrible grand strategist, but that's another story.
gay_Aleks
from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!
It wasn't. The mass evacuation left many equipment in Dunkirk, which could be later be reused by the Germans.
The crux, however, would be the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of men, which could not be so easily replaced. For instance, the battle of Britain almost went the wrong way - not due to loss of planes, as those could be replaced, but because of loss of trained pilots.
r16
not deity
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- Nov 10, 2008
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- 11,217
"assumption that statistics on tanks reflected lost tanks"
ı would say this is about the difficulties of actually destroying a tank . When a tank is hit , it's indeed possible that some people will be killed , but after given wash and a little welding a round the hole -or even a sandbag on the spot and your tank is ready to fight again . So massive Panzer losses and the fear of running out of armoured strength to deal with the French . actually didn't meant something . Even if Panzer losses were kinda higher in Dunquerke .
for the general discussion , am of the opinion that France would have been saved and the General German offensive would be like broken if Wehrmacht had opted to destroy the BEF , and mind you there's not exactly 100% assurance that would happen , too .
ı would say this is about the difficulties of actually destroying a tank . When a tank is hit , it's indeed possible that some people will be killed , but after given wash and a little welding a round the hole -or even a sandbag on the spot and your tank is ready to fight again . So massive Panzer losses and the fear of running out of armoured strength to deal with the French . actually didn't meant something . Even if Panzer losses were kinda higher in Dunquerke .
for the general discussion , am of the opinion that France would have been saved and the General German offensive would be like broken if Wehrmacht had opted to destroy the BEF , and mind you there's not exactly 100% assurance that would happen , too .
sarahramdave
Chieftain
- Joined
- Dec 3, 2014
- Messages
- 3
um do you think by any chance you could go further into depth about point the 5 points. I understand just the jest of it.
gay_Aleks
from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!
The Germans weren't very concerned about overextension when attacking Russia, now were they?
James Stuart
King
Of course they were. They simply thought they could take Moscow before it became a problem.
You have to bear in mind, blitzkrieg was an idea that was still being developed when Germany invaded France. By the time of Operation: Barbarossa, blitzkrieg was a strategy that had won Germany control of Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, in just two years. They were comfortable with it, and confident that it would work. And it did; they captured 600,000 men at Kiev, and conquered more territory in three months than in the previous two years. The issue was that, contrary to the OKW's thinking, the USSR didn't break, and Moscow didn't fall. With the line held, the vastly superior resources of the USSR came into play.
Guderian, Manstein, and others had developed the proto-strategy for what became blitzkrieg in the 1930s as a way for Germany to win a war quickly, before economic exhaustion could beat it down, as had happened in WWI. This strategy helped them defeat France in stunningly swift fashion, but when it failed in the USSR Germany was faced with the same problem that had killed it in the previous war; blockade. Unable to get imports through either the British-controlled sea routes or through the USSR, Germany was essentially defeated in December 1941, though it held so much territory and had so many men and resources already under its control that it held on for three-and-a-half years.
First off, Dunkirk was a major German victory. War is a series of screwups. The Germans' imperfect execution bested the allies' imperfect execution. That being said....
Had the British not ameliorated their losses and the German victory made more complete, Operation Sea Lion probably would have moved forward. Nothing but the Home Guard and the channel would stand between England and the Wehrmacht. I wouldn't be terribly worried about the Home Guard eradicating my beachhead if I were the Germans. That would have changed history quite a bit.
Had the British not ameliorated their losses and the German victory made more complete, Operation Sea Lion probably would have moved forward. Nothing but the Home Guard and the channel would stand between England and the Wehrmacht. I wouldn't be terribly worried about the Home Guard eradicating my beachhead if I were the Germans. That would have changed history quite a bit.
James Stuart
King
This is incorrect. Even had the BEF been wiped out, Germany never actually possessed the ability to invade Britain. Operation: Sealion was a non-starter, and there is a school of historical thought that suggests the whole thing was a bluff by Hitler, designed to force Britain to make peace. Germany had insufficient transports to invade the UK, even if they had seized the French navy (which they didn't).
Losing 300,000 men would be a blow to the UK, but it would not magically give Hitler troopships. the real threat posed by the destruction of the BEF would be that it might shock the British government into a peace deal, probably backed up with economic assistance to Germany, which is what Hitler needed.
