The Causes of the First World War

Pangur Bán;14404878 said:
This is surely the best explanation and level of analysis for general historical purposes. You have three establishment powers with big, healthy empires, and a newcomer that hadn't been 'unified' until the very late days of colonial aggrandizement but now that it was unified is the strongest power: the big kid with no sweets who arrived at the candy store too late, the prison bear with no cigarettes, etc. The bottom line is that Germany wanted what England, France and Russia weren't prepared to concede. A tension that had to be resolved somehow. Of course, there are different levels of analysis. You could put it down to at one end to a shooting, or to human greed or 'the Problem of Scarcity' at another.

I think it is debatable if England, France and Russia had "big, healthy empires". Germany in 1913 was about to excel England in industry production and also excelled the combined France and Russia. "big, healthy empires" do not have to fear a newcomer. It's the declining empires who are scared of loosing ground to a newcomer ...

A lot of what you write is describing the fears of England and France.

However Germany in 1914 was a saturated empire since foundation in 1870/71. The oversea territories of its colonial empire were purchased with accordance of the other Great Powers, not in conquest. The fleet was smaller than the British Fleet and Germany regularly offered an alliance to the British which refused. Germany was in an arms race with France and Russia, but it was always behind (partly because of the fleet and partly because of its inner structure which made it difficult to raise taxes to finance a bigger army.) In 1914 it was obvious that in a few years the combined French and Russian armies could overwhelm the German troops, so Germany in 1914 was very alert how far Russia and France would go for Serbia. When they would mobilize it meant that they felt ready for a war against Germany and A-H, and in this case it was preferrable to fight the war in 1914 against managable forces instead of in 1917 against overwhelming Russian forces on a new railroad system.

The situation in 1914 was that France and Russia were ready to go to war against A-H and Germany to aid Serbia, which was known to be involved in the assassination of the arch-duke. This war-readyness can be found in Clark, McMeekin and other books. Important was the meeting in St. Petersburg in July where a future course against A-H and Germany was fixed which later allowed Russia to immediately start mobilization without the need to call back France. (2nd blank check for Russia to start war, backed by France if Germany is involved.)

I think it is also noteworthy that Serbia was ready to fully accept the A-H-ultimatum to avoid war until they received note from Russia that Russia would protect them against A-H and would mobilize troops. In case A-H would attack Serbia, Russia would destroy A-H. And in case Germany would aid A-H, Russia and France would also destroy Germany. Russian victory in case of a war was sure. Serbia should not fully accept the ultimatum so that A-H would declare war. (see Clark)

For those who see Germany as a military powerhouse planning world conquest in 1914 :

see
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

Code:
[B]Army and Fleet Strength of Great Powers 1880 / 1900 / 1914 [/B]

Russia : 791.000 / 1.162.000 / 1.352.000
France : 543.000 / 715.000 / 910.000
Germany : 426.000 / 524.000 / 891.000
Great Britain : 367.000 / 624.000 / 532.000
A-H : 246.000 / 385.000 / 444.000
 
The oversea territories of its colonial empire were purchased with accordance of the other Great Powers, not in conquest.
Well, they didn't conquer their empire from other Great Powers, but they still had to fight and negotiate with the indigenous population.
For those who see Germany as a military powerhouse planning world conquest in 1914 :

see
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

Code:
[B]Army and Fleet Strength of Great Powers 1880 / 1900 / 1914 [/B]

Russia : 791.000 / 1.162.000 / 1.352.000
France : 543.000 / 715.000 / 910.000
Germany : 426.000 / 524.000 / 891.000
Great Britain : 367.000 / 624.000 / 532.000
A-H : 246.000 / 385.000 / 444.000
These are regular forces, not the fully mobilized strength of the relevant armies, except Britain's in 1900 which includes the forces employed for the Boer War. Better to match up the numbers upon mobilization in August 1914.

But this also doesn't really prove anything because in 1939 Nazi Germany's military was clearly outnumbered by the available forces of Poland, France, and Britain, not to mention the USSR and USA, yet Hitler obviously premeditated and launched an aggressive war of conquest. There are plenty of historical examples of countries that have attacked other countries despite numerical inferiority, or a low chance of success. I think it's more persuasive to stick to Clark and the other historians who've done a good job of rubbishing the Griff nach der Weltmacht on the basis of concrete historical evidence about motivations and planning.
 
Pangur Bán;14404878 said:
This is surely the best explanation and level of analysis for general historical purposes. You have three establishment powers with big, healthy empires, and a newcomer that hadn't been 'unified' until the very late days of colonial aggrandizement but now that it was unified is the strongest power: the big kid with no sweets who arrived at the candy store too late, the prison bear with no cigarettes, etc. The bottom line is that Germany wanted what England, France and Russia weren't prepared to concede. A tension that had to be resolved somehow. Of course, there are different levels of analysis. You could put it down to at one end to a shooting, or to human greed or 'the Problem of Scarcity' at another.

I'm not totally convinced that it's best to understand the as Great War between 'tier 1' powers with an interest in preserving the world order and 'tier 2' powers interested in disrupting it. That certainly plays into the nice old view that Germany was to blame for upsetting the 'balance of power' (that great British euphemism for 'British supremacy'), but Russia's status as a 'tier 1' power is highly debatable - economically, technologically and societally France and Britain had much more in common with Germany than with Russia. We must also not forget how important Pan-Slavism - that is, the desire to expand Russian influence throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe - was to Russian decision making, and indeed it was Russia out of the Great Powers who mobilised first, in a defence of Serbia largely motivated by (brotherly or otherwise, depending on how you interpret it) feelings of Pan-Slavism. This mobilisation gave Serbia the confidence to reject the July Ultimatum, and was also probably the major reason why the First World War did not remain simply another Balkan War.

In addition, you still have to account for the United States. They were in largely the same place as Germany - a relatively young country with a huge economy that had been historically marginalised in international relations and prestige. Now, you might fairly say that the Americans did find a way of resolving the tension, but they also proved that war with the existing Great Powers was by no means the only way of doing so, and therefore that the tension is missing something fundamental as an explanation for why the Great War happened.
 
In addition, you still have to account for the United States. They were in largely the same place as Germany - a relatively young country with a huge economy that had been historically marginalised in international relations and prestige. Now, you might fairly say that the Americans did find a way of resolving the tension, but they also proved that war with the existing Great Powers was by no means the only way of doing so, and therefore that the tension is missing something fundamental as an explanation for why the Great War happened.

The US had virtually an entire continent at its finger-tips to exploit and de-populate...Germany did not.
 
On the subject of France, I have to disagree. I think that the correlation between French war planning and the outbreak of war is remarkably close. War broke out within a few years of France's adoption of an offensive war plan, and shortly after Russian and French mobilization coordination provided for immediate and synchronized offensives by both sides within a specific time frame after the beginning of mobilization.

This is simply wrong. France did not have an 'offensive' war plan. Plan XVII was merely a concentration plan, rather than any sort of actual strategic framework. It was built for flexibility in defence, not for attacking particular objectives (it was this suppleness that made 1914 different from 1870 and 1940).

Russia was committed to attacking within a set period of time, but this was to avoid Russia sitting back and doing nothing while France got attacked. Again, there is no way that France and Russia would have moved aggressively on Germany on their own. It is utterly unthinkable.

French troops mounted the first offensive of the war, in Alsace

Wrong. The first was the German invasion of Luxembourg, followed very closely by the invasion of Belgium (if we discount German uhlans crossing over the French border a few days earlier, since that wasn't a real 'offensive' by any means).


French troops completed mobilization before the Germans did; the French offensives in the Ardennes and in Lorraine were the opening great battles of the war. The Great War is inseparable from the aggressive aims of the French government, to which it happily admitted then and since: the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhineland.

This is utterly bonkers and way, way out of line with anything in the modern historiography of the war. Go back and look at Neiberg's Dance of the Furies again....there was no revaunchism. It simply didn't exist in 1914.


But even if Germany's mobilization was delayed solely to create an advantageous political situation...so what? Delaying mobilization until after the other side has already begun to mobilize requires the other side to already begin to mobilize. If the whole thing was a trap for the Russians and French to make them look like the aggressors, the Russians and French could have avoided it by, y'know, not mobilizing. Yet they did mobilize, and started the countdown on an inevitable offensive against Germany.

This comment would make sense if mobilisation in different countries all took the same amount of time. They didn't. When it was clear that the Germans and Austrians were sabre-rattling what other option for France and Russia was there but to mobilise? Russia bears some responsability for not pursing a partial mobilization, but that's about it.
 
"Whatever the circumstances, it is the Commander in Chief's intention to advance with all forces united to the attack of the German armies. The action of the French armies will be developed in two main operations: one, on the right in the country between the wooded district of the Vosges and the Moselle below Toul; the other, on the left, north of a line Verdun–Metz. The two operations will be closely connected by forces operating on the Hauts de Meuse and in the Woëvre."

— Plan XVII
 
This comment would make sense if mobilisation in different countries all took the same amount of time. They didn't. When it was clear that the Germans and Austrians were sabre-rattling what other option for France and Russia was there but to mobilise? Russia bears some responsability for not pursing a partial mobilization, but that's about it.
"He looked at me funny, so I had to hit him" doesn't seem like the sort of defence that would hold up in court.
 
"He looked at me funny, so I had to hit him" doesn't seem like the sort of defence that would hold up in court.

Your argument would work if France and Russia launched the first blows. They didn't. Far more accurate to say "He was being belligerent, so I put my hands up and then he hit me."

"Whatever the circumstances, it is the Commander in Chief's intention to advance with all forces united to the attack of the German armies. The action of the French armies will be developed in two main operations: one, on the right in the country between the wooded district of the Vosges and the Moselle below Toul; the other, on the left, north of a line Verdun–Metz. The two operations will be closely connected by forces operating on the Hauts de Meuse and in the Woëvre."

— Plan XVII

Choosing to attack the German armies can hardly count as a war plan designed around aggression and annexation. Don't confuse operational and strategic offense/defence.

Look, I'm happy to discuss the First World War and help people learn and understand and debate...but if you insist on relying on wikipedia quotes taken out of context rather than listening to what a respected expert on the French army in the First World War is telling you, I don't know what to say.....
 
Your argument would work if France and Russia launched the first blows. They didn't. Far more accurate to say "He was being belligerent, so I put my hands up and then he hit me."
France entered Alsace three days after Germany entered Belgium. That doesn't sound like Germany struck first so much as it struck quicker, and the sluggishness of the French high command can hardly be laid at Germany's feet.

I'll admit, I'm not really following this whole line of reasoning, that when the French are late to attack, it shows they never wanted to, but when the Germans are late to mobilise, it simply compounds their wickedness. Sounds like the judge in our little trial has already made up its mind before he even entered the courthouse.
 
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I am aware of issues with the decontextualised quote and I am sorry for letting them stand. Honestly, though, your 'this is wrong, this isn't so' approach is just as lacking.
 
The US had virtually an entire continent at its finger-tips to exploit and de-populate...Germany did not.

I don't think colonialism - certainly not German colonialism - was about such practical motivations, though. When you listen to what the Germans were actually saying, it was all about finding 'a place in the sun' and acquiring colonies because colonies were something that Great Powers had, and attending international congresses and arguing about colonies was something that Great Powers did. Germany arguably had more of a seat at those tables in 1914 than the US did, and their colonial projects - Namibia, Tanzania, Samoa and Cameroon, off the top of my head - were hardly a money-spinner. In fact, I'm fairly sure that Germany lost money on imperialism, as they worked extremely hard - particularly in Africa - to invest in and turn their colonies into a showcase of German sophistication abroad, to demonstrate that they were as respectable a colonial power than any other.

Look, I'm happy to discuss the First World War and help people learn and understand and debate...but if you insist on relying on wikipedia quotes taken out of context rather than listening to what a respected expert on the French army in the First World War is telling you, I don't know what to say.....

If there's a problem with the quotation, then let's hear that: if there's some context which helps explain it, then let's have it. This forum exists for people with an interest in history to talk about history: access to libraries and teachers is not a requirement for getting involved, nor should it be.
 
Flying Pig said:
That certainly plays into the nice old view that Germany was to blame for upsetting the 'balance of power' (that great British euphemism for 'British supremacy')

It's kind of funny because even though I subscribe to that view I don't think Germany is "to blame" any more than anyone else.

Flying Pig said:
I don't think colonialism - certainly not German colonialism - was about such practical motivations, though. When you listen to what the Germans were actually saying, it was all about finding 'a place in the sun' and acquiring colonies because colonies were something that Great Powers had, and attending international congresses and arguing about colonies was something that Great Powers did. Germany arguably had more of a seat in those tables in 1914 than the US did, and their colonial projects - Namibia, Tanzania, Samoa and Cameroon, off the top of my head - were hardly a money-spinner. In fact, I'm fairly sure that Germany lost money on imperialism, as they worked extremely hard - particularly in Africa - to invest in and turn their colonies into a showcase of German sophistication abroad, to demonstrate that they were as respectable a colonial power than any other.

Yep. As I said, it was more a matter of prestige than the substance of power.
 
Look, I'm happy to discuss the First World War and help people learn and understand and debate...but if you insist on relying on wikipedia quotes taken out of context rather than listening to what a respected expert on the French army in the First World War is telling you, I don't know what to say.....

It would be helpfull if you could list some "respected" books about WW1 ...

The first WW1 book I read was "The First World War" by John Keegan. And he makes Russian mobilization responsible for the outbreak of the Great War since the Russian mobilization made a major war inevitable while it was unlikely that A-H (occupied with Serbia) would launch an attack on a neutral Russia ...

McMeekin noted that Russia might have been anxious to start a major war in August 1914 to prevent 2 dreadnought battleships being delivered by the british to the ottoman marine, which would have had a significant impact on russian strategic position in the Black Sea as well as probably would have closed the window of opportunity for Russia seizing control of the city of Constantinople and the Dardanelles.
see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Agincourt_(1913)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Erin

Russia in 1915 was able to convince the british and french to start the Dardanelles Campaign with goal to conquer Constantinople and the straits which would fall to Russia in case of victory.
see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gallipoli_Campaign
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantinople_Agreement
"Russia would get the Ottoman capital, Constantinople. The Dardanelles were also promised to Russia."
 
What, just in general?

- On the causes of WW1 including the (secret) aims and decisions of Great Powers pre-war and during war.
- A general overview on the war (which usually also includes an overview on the causes of the war).

I think we don't have to look into detail of each battle in each theatre since the interesting questions are located pre-war like "Why did Russia mobilize in end of July 1914 when everybody knew that this mobilization meant war?"

I suppose that you have read hundreds of books on WW1 and should easily have some books at hand which cover the current state of the historical research and outline the consensus of current historians' debate ...

You may also provide a blacklist of popular authors which are not "respected" so we amateurs know which of our sources are "respectable" and which are not ...

Moderator Action: Let's keep things civil, please - this sort of sarcasm doesn't help anyone.
 
What, just in general?

I presume that it's possible to come up with a list of (say) seven or eight books that would be found as 'further reading' at the end of a chapter or article on the outbreak of the Great War, designed for interested non-historians? I've heard many goods things about Hew Strachan's To Arms, being the first and so far only volume of his three-book work on the war - and of Clark, out of whose book this thread began.
 
The
respected expert
was a reference to a post above, maybe I have misinterpreted jjkrause84?

I have read Clark, McMeekin (2 books), Fergusson, Keegan, Tuchman, Taylor, Lawrence ... and others.
(I also have read the historic novels by Pasternak and Remarque on WW1 some years ago.)

Hew Strachan's book is shelved. I have not read it completely since 1.200 pages take some free time ... I don't like the fact that his book features "empty" maps without units ...
 
Again, there is no way that France and Russia would have moved aggressively on Germany on their own. It is utterly unthinkable.

How can you prove this? Besides, you describe a situation which was not present in 1914 since you exclude the Russia-A-H-conflict.
It sounds like : It was Germany's fault. If Germany would have dropped A-H so A-H could be destroyed by Russia and Serbia, there would not have been a Great War.
But what about France, Poincare and Alsac-Lorraine after A-H having been destroyed? Would Russia and France stop?

The situation was more complex :
A-H had declared war on Serbia (as expected by Serbia and Russia after rejecting the ultimatum), Russia had started mobilization and rejected the German warning. France started mobilization. When Russia would attack A-H, Germany would have to aid A-H and attack Russia and then France would attack Germany to honor their pact with Russia. Neither Germany nor A-H had an invincible position where they could just wait and see what happens like USA in 1941 Pearl Harbor incident. ("I think the Japanese will attack us on the Phillipines." "I think they strike against the British in Singapore/Malaya.") To not loose advantage, the Central Powers had to react immediately to Russian mobilization and this was communicated to the Russians before German mobilization.
 
I presume that it's possible to come up with a list of (say) seven or eight books that would be found as 'further reading' at the end of a chapter or article on the outbreak of the Great War, designed for interested non-historians? I've heard many goods things about Hew Strachan's To Arms, being the first and so far only volume of his three-book work on the war - and of Clark, out of whose book this thread began.

Hew's To Arms is good for all kinds of reasons, but I'm not sure if we'll ever see volumes 2 and 3. He's left Oxford last year (in effect) and gone back up to St Andrews (we have weird age-related rules, especially at All Souls, where he was based).

As for the beginning of the war I would recommend Clark, even though I don't really agree with him, and also Annika Mombauer's "The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus". Margaret MacMillan's recent-ish book on the subject is also worth a shot "The War that Ended Peace: How Europe abandoned peace for the First World War". Even though it isn't 100% on topic I also really liked Mike Neiberg's Dance of the Furies on the political mood and culture surrounding the outbreak of war. Great book, and really nice guy (if perhaps a bit too much into his Springsteen....).

You could also read David Stevenson's book 'Armaments and the Coming of War', which is well-researched. That should be enough to get one started at least. :)
 
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