History Questions Not Worth Their Own Thread VII
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gay_Aleks
from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!
By the time the Allies starting bombing Germany, there wasn't that much war material production, in first place, as far as I believe.
Things like the Dresden fire-bombing were done to crush the populace and end the war quicker, I think.
Things like the Dresden fire-bombing were done to crush the populace and end the war quicker, I think.
Mount Suribachi
Prince
Speer thought so. When he wrote his memoirs he sent a copy to Bomber Harris and signed it "to the man who caused me more problems than any other". Don't be fooled by the raw numbers going up in the last year of the war, that was because Speer re-organised the German economy to get it on a war footing comparable to the other warring nations.
There was plenty of production, right up to the end - even if it was of planes that lacked engines, and tanks that lacked fuel
Yes. But much of it was also compensated for elsewhere. That is, raw production numbers don't always show it. But a very large part of German production that could have been turning out war materials was instead rebuilding the ability to turn out war materials.
That said, the proponents of strategic bombing pretty much always overstated the case for how much what they did mattered. Bombing did not cause anyone to surrender, nor did it cripple either the ability or the willingness to fight.
If it meant they had to fight with rushed-job equipment instead of shiny, well-made kit, then it probably shifted the balance of casualties somewhat.
Louis XXIV
Le Roi Soleil
Well, maybe Japan...
r16
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the Dutch would have kept killing German paratroopers if somebody had not fired correct coloured flares . So if the French had kept the Meuse and the RAF had been more forward thinking with Spits the German offensive might have failed . Would make Netherlands a center of trench warfare though ...
ı must say this must be about 1943 or so , considering the Russians chose a 122mm HE gun over a 100mm AP type to arm to IS-2 knowing it that the German armour could not cope with the HE stuff and the 122 was so superior for Anti-personnel duties .
PhroX
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Interestingly, the "Speer Miracle", of rapidly rising armaments production figures in Germany over the second half of '42 and early '43 comes to an aprupt halt following the start of major allied bombing of the Ruhr region (March-June '43, including the famous Dambusters raid). The Germans were certainly able to maintain the level of production they had by mid-'43, but the dirsuption caused to the major industrial region of the Reich was a major factor in preventing them increasing production further. Speer himself certainly felt that the Allies had hit Germany where it hurt after these raids.
Indeed, I've seen the argument made that after those initial heavy raids in the Ruhr, Bomber Command in particular got far to focused of bombing cities (especially Berlin), in the hope of creating another Hamburg (the first big firebombing), which had little impact on the war, instead of continuing to batter the Ruhr and other key industrial areas (bombing certainly did continue in these areas, but not to the extent of the early attacks), thereby further disrupting German industry.
The Ruhr was important not so much beacuse of factories actually making armaments, but because of the supply chain for those factories - it was Germany's biggest source of coal and their largest steel producing region, as well as the location of many smaller industries that fed components and sub-components into the actual armaments production. As such, while the bombing of that region didn't actualy directly hit that much of Germany's assembly lines, it seriously disrupted their operation, particularly in the medium term, once their stockpiles of resources had been consumed. IIRC, the German industrial planners were expecting steel production to increase by about 10-15% in mid-'34. Thats to the damage done the the Ruhr, it actually fell by that much. And no matter how effeciently run their factories were, no matter how well mobilised the nation was for war, if you don't have steel, you can't make guns, bullets or tanks. This was always the problem the Nazi administration had with regards armaments production - they never had enough steel to make what they wanted to. And the attacks on the Ruhr certainly did disrupt their ability to produce and distribute that most critical of metals.
This was then exasperated by the other major part of the bombing, hitting the transport links across Germany. Even if the raw materials and sub-components were beign produced, without working rail links, they couldn't be gotten to the factories. In 42-43, the Germans had done well to get the creaking Reichsbahn back on its feet after a decade of massive underinvestment, with major production of engines and railway wagons, but over the last couple of years of the war, the Allies systematically targetted major railways, in particular marshalling yards (and thereby locomotives). Again, the area around the Ruhr was the prime target - without the abiltiy to get coal and steel out of the region, particularly as the Reich was losing the coal and steel producing regions they had captured in the East, German power plants, factories and indeed homes were starved of resources. The damage to this region in particular was so bad that it wasn't until about 3 years after the end of the war that full rail links were restored between the Ruhr and the rest of Germany, which contributed to a severe shortage of coal for civilians in the immediate aftermath of the war.
Overall, my personal feelings on the effectiveness of the bombing campaign are mixed. The attacks on cities were a massive waste of time, resources and lives that did nothing to aid the war effort. The attacks on industry and transport links on the other hand, while not decisive in winning the war, did have a significant effect on Germany's production capabilites, mainly by preventing the actual armaments factories from having sufficient input to be operated at maximum capacity, thus reducing Germany's ability to fight. Obviously, they still put up on hell of a fight in the final couple of years of the war, but I believe it would have been even worse had the bombing campaign not done so much to disrupt their industry.
As with much on the subject of the Nazi economy and industry, Tooze's The Wages of Destruction covers this pretty well and is my major source for the above. (And of course, now one of the experts here will come along and tell me that book is a load of crap and everything I thought I knew is wrong
).Having the Red Army redeploy to the East and get ready to destroy the Imperial Army in China had more to do with the timing than the bombs did.
Louis XXIV
Le Roi Soleil
I've seen the debate either way. I realize there's no way to know for certain, but, to me at least, the evidence seems to suggest that the better answer is that the apparent American intent (that was explicitly threatened) to destroy every Japanese city one by one was the catalyst to surrender. The Atomic Bomb was different from the firebombing of Tokyo in that a single bomber could destroy an entire city in one hit and the Japanese did not know the total number of bombs the United States had.
Not that the Netherlands fought in ww2 or anything, but they did compared the Czechia which surrendered out of the mere threat Prague would be bombed.
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r16
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the Czechs surrendered because the Western Allies didn't show up . And the Dutch could have fought on , had the said Western Allies been more ready to fight . In the first case the Germans were quite respected military-wise by kinda all in 1938 and in the second the entire scenario was visibly based on economic strangulation of the Third Reich and the Dutch simply didn't feel they could hold on until 1941 or '42 .
James Stuart
King
Not much materiel, no. What the strategic bombing campaign - which was not seriously pursued, becuse Bomber Command was run by a bloodthirsty war criminal nick-named "Butcher" by his own men - did accomplish was to establish a few resource bottlenecks, notably synthetic fuel, which made supply more difficult. This was very important, but probably unintentional; the Allies didn't even know the German synthetic fuel research had proven successful, let alone the best places to drop bombs on it.
ParkCungHee
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Also, the question of the bombing campaigns effectiveness needs to be understood in relation to it's alternatives.
The production of Avro Lancasters alone nearly matched the cost of the Manhattan Project.
While Flying Pig is right that the results "probably shifted the balance of casualties somewhat." Putting that kind of effort into other equipment would almost certainly shifted casualties even more.
The strategic bombing campaign was a wasteful, costly project that probably prolonged the war.
The production of Avro Lancasters alone nearly matched the cost of the Manhattan Project.
While Flying Pig is right that the results "probably shifted the balance of casualties somewhat." Putting that kind of effort into other equipment would almost certainly shifted casualties even more.
The strategic bombing campaign was a wasteful, costly project that probably prolonged the war.
James Stuart
King
It most definitely prolonged the war. Those resources would have been far better suited to tactical bombing missions in the Rhineland, for example, which may have netted the Allies multiple bridges, instead of just Remagen.
The follow-up question then becomes why it was continued for so long with such energy. Was it due to faulty intelligence (in other words, are we only able to make this judgement with the benefit of hindsight) or were there other benefits and vested interests involved?
Louis XXIV
Le Roi Soleil
I'm not convinced one kind of bombing could easily have translated into another. Yes, bombing of German cities almost certainly was motivated out of revenge rather than strategic goal, but the allies relied on that over tactical bombing for the same reason the Battle of Britain turned into the Blitz. It's a lower risk strategy that's more likely to achieve its objectives. If the allies had focused their bombing instead on strategic targets (particularly mobile targets like armored units during a battle) there likely would have been greater casualties as plains were shot down. Granted, in war, that makes sense, but I can see the reluctance to take that action.
That's why they might not have easily translated from one strategy to another even if the other would ultimately be more successful.
That's why they might not have easily translated from one strategy to another even if the other would ultimately be more successful.
Mount Suribachi
Prince
The USAAF most certainly targeted strategic bottlenecks, especially fuel. Harris OTOH considered that a pointless diversion from the real job of levelling Germany's cities.
Perhaps the biggest side effect was the destruction of the Luftwaffe in the first 6 months of 1944
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