When the Korean War began, the Chinese were still busy putting their house in order, and were in no mood (or condition) to fight the mighty and very modern armed forces of the United States. In particular, the liberation of Taiwan was a high priority - the conclusion of which would signify the official end to the Chinese civil war, and their KMT arch-enemies (and betrayers), as well as redeem Chinese nationalistic pride (Taiwan had been seceded to Japan, after China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895). There was also the additional consideration that an estimated 400,000 KMT guerillas were still active in S China; the destruction of which was (obviously) highly desired.
Domestically, there was an urgent need to drastically reduce military expenditure, as well as to demobilize the massive PLA, and modernize the remnant. The Chinese economy was also in tatters due to decades of war and chaos - rapid economic development was certainly needed. The Communist Party, in power for a mere 8 months, also had yet to firmly extend its control over all layers of government; both nationally and at the local levels. The Chinese had no lack of new, Herculean tasks to humour themselves with.
As for the relationship (or lack of) between the new PRC and the US, there now existed a dangerous gap in perception by each side of the other. On the Chinese side, no one in the top echelon of the Chinese leadership had had any first-hand experience with America. Some in the second echelon were educated in American missionary schools and universities in China, but these were judged to be unrealiable by Mao and company. They (conveniently) viewed America on the basis of Marxist dogma - that the US would soon enter a depression and that to stave off the expected uprising of workers, the 'reactionary imperialist forces' would engage America in foreign adventures. The Chinese perceived the Americans as the foremost power of the 'imperialistic' bloc, ever ready to reimpose bondage on China and the rest of Asia.
(The French and Dutch had fought to retain their Asian colonies at this time, or slightly earlier.)
On the American side, those Americans with any 'knowledge' of China either viewed the Chinese through the narrow prism of the (earlier) American missionary movement in China (very condescending; as one 'superior', modern society looking upon another primitive, 'feudal' one), or through the lens of a romantic view of Chiang and the KMT as heroic, great fighters against Imperial Japan and the Communists. The Americans also viewed the PLA soldiers as write-offs, based on the imagery of the pathetic Chinese soldiery in the KMT forces. Basically, Americans saw themselves as the good guys, fighting for justice and liberty (not necessarily untrue, but it was hard to see why the Americans would fight to protect the corrupt and brutal regimes of Chiang in Taiwan, and Syngman Rhee in S Korea if they were the good guys).
Then the war came. The Chinese were aware that N Korea would launch an invasion, but not of the timing. And then, the Americans moved the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, to protect Taiwan (the announced aim was to prevent both the Communists and the KMT from continuing the fighting). This one single move incensed the Chinese to no end, and certainly hardened Chinese suspicions regarding American motives. Mao had thought that the US would not intervene on behalf of S Korea, since this was a civil war. Now, it began to look increasingly like the Americans were about to acquire Taiwan and Korea (as initial bases from which to attack China), as part of a plan to encircle China (together with the KMT forces in Taiwan, and the French in Indo-China).
(The Japanese had also acquired both Taiwan, and Korea before moving on to Manchuria.)
The plan for the invasion of Taiwan was postponed, since Mao realized that at this stage that all Soviet equipment would be flowing to the N Koreans (the PLA was still armed with whatever weopans they had captured from the KMT, or Japan); first to 1951, then 1952, and then indefinitely. Demobilization of the PLA continued however, alongside plans to build up naval and air forces (non-existent at this point in time). At the same time, Nie Rongzhen, chief of staff of the PLA, sent an observation group (attached to the Chinese embassy) to Pyongyang, to report on the progress of the war. This group was assured of the fullest coorperation by Kim himself.
As the Chinese watched the tide of war turned in favour of S Korea and with US forces landing rapidly, the realization set in that the war would drag on. On 7 July, the Central Military Commission was called to meet. Those present were told by Zhou Enlai that Mao believed that PLA troops should assemble along the border and that the Chinese should be prepared to enter the war, should the need arise. The order was given, for the central reserve force, the 13th Army Group (composed of the 38th, 39th and 40th Armies) to head for Manchuria. In addition, the 42nd Army (already in Manchuria) was moved closer to the border. These were to be combined into the newly formed Northeast Frontier Force (NEFF); consisting of 12 divisions, 3 artillery divisions, 1 AAA regiment (totalling some 255,000 men).
On 5 Aug, Mao ordered the NEFF to be prepared for war operations in early September. The deadline was later extended to 30 Sept, after a review of the condition of the forces. A final decision had not yet being made, at this point in time, on whether the Chinese would enter the war. The preparations were made, just in case should the need arise.
In the meantime, the Chinese became even more suspicions of American motives when it was learnt that Chiang Kaishek had offered 30,000 KMT troops for deployment in Korea. The level of suspicion sky-rocketed even further when MacArthur decided to take a break from the war, to make a very visible inspection trip to Taiwan. It seemed that the Joint Chiefs had decided to send a team to assess the state of the island's defences. MacArthur took it upon himself to go personally, to the consternation of American allies and Washington. And then Chiang poured more oil on the fire (naturally) by making the announcement that 'the foundation had been laid for a joint defense of Taiwan and for Sino-American military coorperation'. MacArthur poured even more oil later on, when after returning to Tokyo, he praised Chiang for 'his indomitable determination to resist Communist domination'.
(The US had earlier pledged not to interfere in Taiwan, in a public announcement by Truman on 5 Jan 1950. But this was strongly opposed by MacArthur, and the 'China Lobby'.)
Then on 26 Aug, a letter that MacArthur had sent to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was released, in which he openly stated the importance of Taiwan as 'an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender' that must not fall into enemy hands; with which American air power could dominate every Asian port from Vladivostok to Singapore. And his final potshot : -
MacArthur was ordered to withdraw the message, but the damage had been done. There were other alarming signals as well; hints dropped here and there that the US/UN forces would cross the 38th parallel. The Chinese naturally did not look forward to US forces crossing the (former) border and marching up to China's doorstep, and had warned and protested. By now, throughout the ranks of the Chinese forces, it was generally understood that they would enter the war sooner or later, as the N Koreans began to experience difficulties. The question was only of when.
The orders were given to begin moving the 9th Army Group from the lower Yangzi region to join up with the NEFF; as well as for the 19th Army Group (then in W China) to arrive in the following spring. The NEFF was also reinforced with the 50th Army; moved from Hubei on 6 Sept.
The timing of the Inchon landing came as a surprise to the Chinese. While they seemed aware of the location of the planned landing (very probably from spy reports), the leisurely movement schedule of the reinforcements for the NEFF seemed to indicate they were expecting a later date. Within days, 2 emmissaries from N Korea had arrived in Andong (on the Yalu river border with Korea), requesting for aid. Stalin began urging the Chinese to intervene, promising arms and air support, and with a final promise that the Soviets would intervene if the Chinese were routed. Still, Mao agonized.
By now, only the shadow of America's nuclear capability loomed over the final decision. Fear of the A-bomb had pervaded throughout the PLA and China. Debate raged amongst the leaders of the PLA. Mao maintained that the Chinese could face an atomic war and survived. This might seem suicidal, but for the fact that the Americans had only limited stocks of A-bombs (only 30 in March 48; production was limited to 2 per month for 1948). The Soviets knew this; through their spies in the West (notably Donald Maclean, the British liasion with the Atomic Energy Commission, which was the US agency in charge of the A-bombs). And the Chinese probably knew too.
Then there was also the fact that there was nothing in China to use an A-bomb on - Chinese industry was limited and scattered, and the population was extensively rural. The Soviets still had very extensive interests in Manchuria; using the A-bomb there might bring the Soviets in. And the Soviets had detonated their own A-bomb in Sept 1949.
The Chinese continued to issue a series of warnings; the tempo of which kept rising all through September.
Finally on 2 Oct, Mao convened the Politburo to review the request for assistance that had been received from Kim. He announced to the Politburo the questions of who should command and which forces were to be sent. There was no question on whether troops would be send or not. Mao stated his arguments about atomic warfare and admitted that the PLA might lose the coming struggle, in which case they would just withdraw into the interior again and rebuild for future generations. He did not fear the RoK troops (which had been described as 'puppet troops'). As for the Americans, Mao said, 'The key lies in the number of Americans we can kill.' Very prophetic.
Mao also made the case that if there were US forces on the Manchurian border, large forces would have to be stationed there (permanently) to guard it; a torturous border some 650 miles long.
Many members of the Politburo and senior PLA officers were against intervention; including the likes of Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Chen Yi, Lin Biao etc. The reasons were clear enough. Only Mao, Peng Dehuai and Nie Rongzhen supported military intervention. The meeting went on for a few more days, but Mao's mind was already set.
On the same day, Mao telegraphed Stalin and announced that the Chinese would send troops under the guise of volunteers to fight in Korea. He also made it very clear that the Chinese would only fight defensively, until Soviet weopans and equipment arrived. The Chinese would now fight the Americans.
The Dragon Strikes - China and the Korean War: Jun-Dec 1950 by Patrick C. Roe
Domestically, there was an urgent need to drastically reduce military expenditure, as well as to demobilize the massive PLA, and modernize the remnant. The Chinese economy was also in tatters due to decades of war and chaos - rapid economic development was certainly needed. The Communist Party, in power for a mere 8 months, also had yet to firmly extend its control over all layers of government; both nationally and at the local levels. The Chinese had no lack of new, Herculean tasks to humour themselves with.
As for the relationship (or lack of) between the new PRC and the US, there now existed a dangerous gap in perception by each side of the other. On the Chinese side, no one in the top echelon of the Chinese leadership had had any first-hand experience with America. Some in the second echelon were educated in American missionary schools and universities in China, but these were judged to be unrealiable by Mao and company. They (conveniently) viewed America on the basis of Marxist dogma - that the US would soon enter a depression and that to stave off the expected uprising of workers, the 'reactionary imperialist forces' would engage America in foreign adventures. The Chinese perceived the Americans as the foremost power of the 'imperialistic' bloc, ever ready to reimpose bondage on China and the rest of Asia.
(The French and Dutch had fought to retain their Asian colonies at this time, or slightly earlier.)
On the American side, those Americans with any 'knowledge' of China either viewed the Chinese through the narrow prism of the (earlier) American missionary movement in China (very condescending; as one 'superior', modern society looking upon another primitive, 'feudal' one), or through the lens of a romantic view of Chiang and the KMT as heroic, great fighters against Imperial Japan and the Communists. The Americans also viewed the PLA soldiers as write-offs, based on the imagery of the pathetic Chinese soldiery in the KMT forces. Basically, Americans saw themselves as the good guys, fighting for justice and liberty (not necessarily untrue, but it was hard to see why the Americans would fight to protect the corrupt and brutal regimes of Chiang in Taiwan, and Syngman Rhee in S Korea if they were the good guys).
Then the war came. The Chinese were aware that N Korea would launch an invasion, but not of the timing. And then, the Americans moved the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, to protect Taiwan (the announced aim was to prevent both the Communists and the KMT from continuing the fighting). This one single move incensed the Chinese to no end, and certainly hardened Chinese suspicions regarding American motives. Mao had thought that the US would not intervene on behalf of S Korea, since this was a civil war. Now, it began to look increasingly like the Americans were about to acquire Taiwan and Korea (as initial bases from which to attack China), as part of a plan to encircle China (together with the KMT forces in Taiwan, and the French in Indo-China).
(The Japanese had also acquired both Taiwan, and Korea before moving on to Manchuria.)
The plan for the invasion of Taiwan was postponed, since Mao realized that at this stage that all Soviet equipment would be flowing to the N Koreans (the PLA was still armed with whatever weopans they had captured from the KMT, or Japan); first to 1951, then 1952, and then indefinitely. Demobilization of the PLA continued however, alongside plans to build up naval and air forces (non-existent at this point in time). At the same time, Nie Rongzhen, chief of staff of the PLA, sent an observation group (attached to the Chinese embassy) to Pyongyang, to report on the progress of the war. This group was assured of the fullest coorperation by Kim himself.
As the Chinese watched the tide of war turned in favour of S Korea and with US forces landing rapidly, the realization set in that the war would drag on. On 7 July, the Central Military Commission was called to meet. Those present were told by Zhou Enlai that Mao believed that PLA troops should assemble along the border and that the Chinese should be prepared to enter the war, should the need arise. The order was given, for the central reserve force, the 13th Army Group (composed of the 38th, 39th and 40th Armies) to head for Manchuria. In addition, the 42nd Army (already in Manchuria) was moved closer to the border. These were to be combined into the newly formed Northeast Frontier Force (NEFF); consisting of 12 divisions, 3 artillery divisions, 1 AAA regiment (totalling some 255,000 men).
On 5 Aug, Mao ordered the NEFF to be prepared for war operations in early September. The deadline was later extended to 30 Sept, after a review of the condition of the forces. A final decision had not yet being made, at this point in time, on whether the Chinese would enter the war. The preparations were made, just in case should the need arise.
In the meantime, the Chinese became even more suspicions of American motives when it was learnt that Chiang Kaishek had offered 30,000 KMT troops for deployment in Korea. The level of suspicion sky-rocketed even further when MacArthur decided to take a break from the war, to make a very visible inspection trip to Taiwan. It seemed that the Joint Chiefs had decided to send a team to assess the state of the island's defences. MacArthur took it upon himself to go personally, to the consternation of American allies and Washington. And then Chiang poured more oil on the fire (naturally) by making the announcement that 'the foundation had been laid for a joint defense of Taiwan and for Sino-American military coorperation'. MacArthur poured even more oil later on, when after returning to Tokyo, he praised Chiang for 'his indomitable determination to resist Communist domination'.
(The US had earlier pledged not to interfere in Taiwan, in a public announcement by Truman on 5 Jan 1950. But this was strongly opposed by MacArthur, and the 'China Lobby'.)
Then on 26 Aug, a letter that MacArthur had sent to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was released, in which he openly stated the importance of Taiwan as 'an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender' that must not fall into enemy hands; with which American air power could dominate every Asian port from Vladivostok to Singapore. And his final potshot : -
(MacArthur, as well as many self-proclaimed China 'experts', boasted of his understanding of the 'Oriental mind'. But his understanding was that of the mind of the submissive and opportunistic Oriental who had been colonialized/Westernized. Not the angry and fiercely nationalistic mind of the Chinese patriot, determined to rid China of all foreign domination. He was, as it turned out, way out of touch with how things were in the new PRC.)
MacArthur was ordered to withdraw the message, but the damage had been done. There were other alarming signals as well; hints dropped here and there that the US/UN forces would cross the 38th parallel. The Chinese naturally did not look forward to US forces crossing the (former) border and marching up to China's doorstep, and had warned and protested. By now, throughout the ranks of the Chinese forces, it was generally understood that they would enter the war sooner or later, as the N Koreans began to experience difficulties. The question was only of when.
The orders were given to begin moving the 9th Army Group from the lower Yangzi region to join up with the NEFF; as well as for the 19th Army Group (then in W China) to arrive in the following spring. The NEFF was also reinforced with the 50th Army; moved from Hubei on 6 Sept.
The timing of the Inchon landing came as a surprise to the Chinese. While they seemed aware of the location of the planned landing (very probably from spy reports), the leisurely movement schedule of the reinforcements for the NEFF seemed to indicate they were expecting a later date. Within days, 2 emmissaries from N Korea had arrived in Andong (on the Yalu river border with Korea), requesting for aid. Stalin began urging the Chinese to intervene, promising arms and air support, and with a final promise that the Soviets would intervene if the Chinese were routed. Still, Mao agonized.
By now, only the shadow of America's nuclear capability loomed over the final decision. Fear of the A-bomb had pervaded throughout the PLA and China. Debate raged amongst the leaders of the PLA. Mao maintained that the Chinese could face an atomic war and survived. This might seem suicidal, but for the fact that the Americans had only limited stocks of A-bombs (only 30 in March 48; production was limited to 2 per month for 1948). The Soviets knew this; through their spies in the West (notably Donald Maclean, the British liasion with the Atomic Energy Commission, which was the US agency in charge of the A-bombs). And the Chinese probably knew too.
Then there was also the fact that there was nothing in China to use an A-bomb on - Chinese industry was limited and scattered, and the population was extensively rural. The Soviets still had very extensive interests in Manchuria; using the A-bomb there might bring the Soviets in. And the Soviets had detonated their own A-bomb in Sept 1949.
The Chinese continued to issue a series of warnings; the tempo of which kept rising all through September.
Finally on 2 Oct, Mao convened the Politburo to review the request for assistance that had been received from Kim. He announced to the Politburo the questions of who should command and which forces were to be sent. There was no question on whether troops would be send or not. Mao stated his arguments about atomic warfare and admitted that the PLA might lose the coming struggle, in which case they would just withdraw into the interior again and rebuild for future generations. He did not fear the RoK troops (which had been described as 'puppet troops'). As for the Americans, Mao said, 'The key lies in the number of Americans we can kill.' Very prophetic.
Mao also made the case that if there were US forces on the Manchurian border, large forces would have to be stationed there (permanently) to guard it; a torturous border some 650 miles long.
Many members of the Politburo and senior PLA officers were against intervention; including the likes of Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Chen Yi, Lin Biao etc. The reasons were clear enough. Only Mao, Peng Dehuai and Nie Rongzhen supported military intervention. The meeting went on for a few more days, but Mao's mind was already set.
On the same day, Mao telegraphed Stalin and announced that the Chinese would send troops under the guise of volunteers to fight in Korea. He also made it very clear that the Chinese would only fight defensively, until Soviet weopans and equipment arrived. The Chinese would now fight the Americans.
The Dragon Strikes - China and the Korean War: Jun-Dec 1950 by Patrick C. Roe
Thank you! 
), next article will be 'The Chinese People's Volunteers; Through the Gates of Hell'. Probably next week...
