Celtic exploration of the Arctic Ocean and of the North Atlantic

You just said how Russia being able to exercise in the Mediterranean was a good example of how the US doesn't control the sea. I noted that the United States in-fact controls Russian access to the Mediterranean. You've made my point stronger by noting how that control renders the whole of the Russian Black Sea Fleet useless from a strategic point of view. Congratulations.

I named one example of the US navy not controlling the seas. Your explanation does not invalidate that at all, as you yourself show:

You do know what poisoning the well is right? Because saying, "Russia doesn't care about the Mediterranean because it has no vital interests there" and then noting at least one of its major interests before dismissing it in a single sentence is a good example of that. But let's think about this for a moment: does anyone here seriously think the Russians would not overturn Montreux if they could? What's stopping them? Hint: it ain't Turkey.

Firstly, I did not say "Russia doesn't care about the Mediterranean". So you are missing something, I'd say. Secondy, you just undermined your own claim of 'the US navy controls the Mediterrnean": it effectively doesn't. It may seem that way, because there isn't a war where Russia needs to use its 'useless' Black Sea fleet. But indeed, who's to say if Russia, when needed, will oblige the treaty?

I grant the US doesn't maintain an explicit commitment to a two-power standard. But that's kind of irrelevant given that in practice it has a buffer that's somewhat larger than that.

Consider aircraft carriers. The US has 10 aircraft carriers currently in service. This gives it the same number of carriers as the rest of the world combined. And I'm ignoring the fact that the US operates 9 "amphibious assault ships" that are as capable as most other countries carriers. The Wasp class, of which the US has 8, can carry 20 AV-8B Harrier II and displaces 40 000 tonnes (or thereabouts).

Now let's move to submarines... the US has 75 in service all of which are capable boats. I grant that 18 are boomers and can be excluded. Russia has 46 boats. China has 62. So it's not quite a two power standard in submarines. But the reason that Russia has so many boats and such a small surface fleet in relative terms... has to do with the inescapable fact that the Russian surface fleet was not going to survive long. The Soviets knew this and it helps to explain why something like the Kirov-class battle-cruiser exists. Hint: it's fast, doesn't need to refuel and packs an outsized punch. I don't know a huge amount about China boats but I do know that the diesels are fairly short ranged. The Type 039A would be able to operate in the East China Sea and reach just into the Sea of Japan from mainland bases but not that much more.

I could go on but I don't think I need to.

Indeed. You've just confirmed that having the largest single surface fleet does not amount to controlling the seas. Which it did in the 19th century, for the British, that is. That, however, was a quite unique situation.

No, it doesn't. But that doesn't stop the US from operating a fleet that operates all over the damned world. You're also wrong in claiming that the British used the RN to protect their overseas territories. What the British were interested in doing was ensuring that no other European power could stop the flow of trade to Great Britain itself. Not all of which came from the colonies. That explains why the Grand Fleet was so large and everything else was so small. The USN has exactly the same imperative as the RN i.e. to defend the sea lanes. It's less pressing but it's still there.

I don't see how I would be wrong in claiming the British control of the seas protected their overseas territories. That is exactly what their control effectuated. (Which, by the way, is not the same as "the British used the RN to protect their overseas territories".) Not only did the British protect their territories by controlling the seas, it also enabled them to effectively intervene in Russia and China - to name but two examples. And protecting sea lanes is hardly less pressing in a globalized economy - to the contrary. (By the way, any NATO fleet basically operates "all over the damned world". Of course, NATO isn't the US navy. Equally interestingly, the British empire didn't need a NATO.)

The Cuban Missile Crisis... is a really good example of US sea control. Operation Anadyr had to be done in secret because the Russians knew that an overt operation would not work. And lo and behold, when the Russians were caught out... it all went to hell and the operation had to be given up. Amusingly, Operation Kama which a sub-operation of Anadyr and involved sending Russian boats to Cuba which was rather more overt than sending merchantmen... failed miserably. The Russian boats were picked up well before they reached Cuba and had to turn back.

Actually, that would be a rather wrong assessment. The Kennedy administration selected the blockade option (instead of an outright invasion or bombing of Cuba), because it was the less dangerous option. The operation did not "have to be given up", Krushchev decided it was not worth escalating the crisis. So, 'control of the seas' was not the key issue here. The point, however, is that the Cuban missile crisis happened, because the USSR was able to send these missiles to Cuba in the first place - undetected. so much for US navy controlling the seas.

What about them?

Nuclear subs should make it obvious that 'controlling the seas' is no longer a feasible option. Do you wish me to explain further?

Nope. They have the same basic function. "Destroy the other lot". There's a bunch of other stuff they can do now like reduce a country to ruins. Thanks carrier-based aircraft and cruise missiles which is cool, I guess. But rather simpler to do once the enemy fleet is at the bottom of the ocean.[/QUOTE]

Firstly, the function of the Bristish 19th centry surface fleet was never "destroy the other lot". That is of a simplicity unworhty of contemplation. Secondly, reducing a country to ruins is again not the purpose of a 21th century surface fleet. And no, it is not "simple to do" either.

But since you seme to like examples, here's one more: Somali piracy. Run with it.
 
I don't think the Royal Navy ever controlled the seas in such a way as to remove all of the pirates from all of the world. Piracy was still a problem, for example, in the Persian Gulf and around China well into the mid 19th century - what actually made the Gulf safe was merchant ships using steam, which made them faster than the pirates trying to chase them. I don't think 'controlling the seas' was ever, on a large scale, a realistic proposition.

Incidentally, the British Empire did need a NATO - into the twentieth century, alliances such as that with Japan, the Entente Cordiale with France and eventually the Triple Entente with France and Russia were intended precisely to neutralise the threat of Russia and Germany (in order), because British policy-makers realised that they couldn't fight those wars alone. Before that, we had the many alliances that formed the coalition against Napoleon. 'Splendid isolation' was actually quite a short, abnormal period in British diplomatic history.
 
Flying pig has it more or less correct with points. But I'll just reiterate one of them in slightly different language because it deserves repeating: Agent327 is saying that that the US does not control the seas because during peacetime it can't stop the Russians doing stuff. That's his argument. The logical implications of which are that the British never controlled the seas because the Germans in 1913 could move ships around! (Or 1916 because the Germans could still leave port sometimes).

Agent327 said:
Firstly, I did not say "Russia doesn't care about the Mediterranean". So you are missing something, I'd say.
It has no vital interests? A fair reading of that is that it doesn't care. The case is even stronger when that's in the context of poisoning the well to shore up your own deficient argument.

Agent327 said:
Secondy, you just undermined your own claim of 'the US navy controls the Mediterrnean": it effectively doesn't.
This is an assertion not an argument. (There's a pattern of this!)

Agent327 said:
It may seem that way, because there isn't a war where Russia needs to use its 'useless' Black Sea fleet.

So is the Black Seat Fleet useless or not? You can't seem to make up your mind.

Agent327 said:
But indeed, who's to say if Russia, when needed, will oblige the treaty?

So, ah, why hasn't it?

Agent327 said:
Indeed. You've just confirmed that having the largest single surface fleet does not amount to controlling the seas. Which it did in the 19th century, for the British, that is. That, however, was a quite unique situation.
This is an assertion not an argument.

Agent327 said:
I don't see how I would be wrong in claiming the British control of the seas protected their overseas territories. That is exactly what their control effectuated. (Which, by the way, is not the same as "the British used the RN to protect their overseas territories".)

You're wrong because the chief function of the RN was home defense. That it acted as an effective deterrent to other Europe powers messing with the Empire was a happy coincidence. The one time the Empire did come under serious threat, the RN did not come running.

Agent327 said:
Not only did the British protect their territories by controlling the seas, it also enabled them to effectively intervene in Russia and China - to name but two examples.

Those are not great examples. Russia had no fleet in 1918. So the RN wasn't much use. As to China, only the First Opium War involved significant fleet action and even then British control of the seas didn't matter. What mattered was Britain had a handful of modern assets (e.g. the Nemesis) free against a vastly inferior foe. The French and United States could also intervene and did. (Incidentally does the fact that the French could move around during peacetime mean the British did not control the seas?)

Agent327 said:
And protecting sea lanes is hardly less pressing in a globalized economy - to the contrary.

Kinda, sorta. Actual protection of the sea-lanes isn't required because nobody is interested in commerce raiding. Blockades on the other hand are far more practical and much easier. (At least for the US which has global reach). Enforcing an effective distant blockade against China during a war is more or less one and the same thing as protecting the rest of the world's sealanes. Sure, some Chinese boats and ships might have the range to slip the noose... but there's no end of merchant shipping and it's almost impossible to figure out whose it is anyways. Far more effective from a Chinese perspective would be efforts to sink US ships enforcing the blockade. In other words: protecting the sea-lanes isn't that important now.

Agent327 said:
(By the way, any NATO fleet basically operates "all over the damned world".

Not really. Sure the French and British send ships all over the world. But those are usually send as singles or as a small tas-kforce (frigate and a resupply ship). The last time the British tried to operate as a fleet outside of Europe on any scale on their own was during the Falklands and that was touch and go. The British have improved their capabilities since but they now have much fewer assets than during the Falklands so any loss to any hypothetical British fleet would be a much heavier burden to bear. The French are the same. Nobody else in Europe really has a fleet that operates outside of European waters in any strength.

Agent327 said:
Equally interestingly, the British empire didn't need a NATO
Flying Pig touched on this. But I have to note that British asked the French to handle the Mediterranean in World War One free up British assets for the North Sea. I should also add that the whole idea of the alliance with Japan was to free up ships... for the North Sea.

Agent327 said:
Actually, that would be a rather wrong assessment. The Kennedy administration selected the blockade option (instead of an outright invasion or bombing of Cuba), because it was the less dangerous option.

It's not wrong. Kennedy elected to blockade not because the Soviet or Cuban navy was a threat but because escalation in Europe was very likely had he done anything more overt. As events would show, the blockade achieved all his goals.

Agent327 said:
The point, however, is that the Cuban missile crisis happened, because the USSR was able to send these missiles to Cuba in the first place - undetected. so much for US navy controlling the seas.

You don't think the fact that the Russians had to sneak their missiles into Cuba and couldn't just escort them with a large fleet is a sign of weakness? The US for its part had its missiles in Turkey and wasn't stopped by a bold Soviet blockade/counter-stroke whatever.

Agent327 said:
Nuclear subs should make it obvious that 'controlling the seas' is no longer a feasible option. Do you wish me to explain further?

I asked didn't I.

Agent327 said:
Firstly, the function of the Bristish 19th centry surface fleet was never "destroy the other lot". That is of a simplicity unworhty of contemplation.

That was absolutely the function of the British Fleet. But please explain what its function was and why that's not worth contemplation?

Agent327 said:
Secondly, reducing a country to ruins is again not the purpose of a 21th century surface fleet. And no, it is not "simple to do" either.

What is its purpose then? Because that's just another assertion. So is your second sentence.
 
I'm with Agent on that last point - you've got the orders of magnitude wrong, I'm afraid. Yes, surface fleets can provide an unholy amount of fire support - it's not quite as impressive as it would have been at Omdurman or D-Day, when there were battalions worth of cannons lined up on any given battleship, able to hit targets fifteen miles or so inland, but it's quite reassuring to a light-role infantry battalion working inshore to know that the navy can direct heavy firepower or air support where you want it. However, we're talking about destroying dug-in positions or tanks here - not levelling cities, let alone countries. Naval bombardment has been used in major wars against coastal towns, but that's quite a different proposition to destroying a country - unless I suppose the country happens to be Singapore or Malta.

Incidentally, I think that power is rarely the limiting factor in employing military force - the US probably could stop the Russians from accessing the Mediterranean, but they won't, because they don't fancy starting another world war over it. France absolutely could annex Monaco, but this isn't a game of Civ!
 
I think the point is that Russia has access to the Med at the sufferance of the US Navy. And we do so in times of peace because it's not worth fighting a war over. But should a war start, you'll find no Russian ships in the Med which aren't lying on the bottom in multiple pieces. For that matter, that's true of Russian navy surface ships in the Atlantic and Pacific as well. Submarines rely on sneaky, so some may get through. But their surface navy is a trivial opponent.
 
I think the point is that Russia has access to the Med at the sufferance of the US Navy.

As Masada already in detail pointed out, the US navy has little to do with a Black Sea fleet operating in the Mediterranean. He also pointed out the Black Sea is useless, which seems to be a selfdefeating argument. At any rate, Russia clearly doesn't think its fleet is uselesss (see Crimea annexation).

The crucial point, however, is that 21st century surface fleets no longer make a 'controlling the seas' strategy feasible. No single power's fleet has controlled the seas since the late 19th century, when British naval power was caught up by other nations'. The advent of submarines and air power completely altered the picture then further. 'Controlling the seas' just doesn't cut it in a globalized world. I am unaware of any US doctrine that claims such, and if there were such a policy, it would be very hard indeed to maintain. It's just not a strategy fit for today's world, which faces multiple non-national military challenges. Our world is no longer as simple as it seemed in the heyday of colonialism.

As Flying Pig just pointed out, you don't annihilate a country with naval power - unless it's really tiny. Not to mention that 'annihilating a country' is also not a very sound military strategem. Didn't quite work with Vietnam, the most heavily bombarded country in human history.
 
I think 'controlling the seas' works in the same sense as 'controlling the air' - you control the air if you can prevent the enemy from doing anything useful with it. I think NATO certainly could, in the event of full-scale war, prevent any other country from doing anything useful (eg. receiving merchant shipping or sending troops by sea) with the sea - yes, they might be able to get a submarine through, but that's not particularly important on a grand strategic scale. An analogy would be Germany in 1917, which could still launch U-boats but was unable to protect the ships that were supposed to be bringing it food.
 
As Masada already in detail pointed out, the US navy has little to do with a Black Sea fleet operating in the Mediterranean. He also pointed out the Black Sea is useless, which seems to be a selfdefeating argument. At any rate, Russia clearly doesn't think its fleet is uselesss (see Crimea annexation).

The crucial point, however, is that 21st century surface fleets no longer make a 'controlling the seas' strategy feasible. No single power's fleet has controlled the seas since the late 19th century, when British naval power was caught up by other nations'. The advent of submarines and air power completely altered the picture then further. 'Controlling the seas' just doesn't cut it in a globalized world. I am unaware of any US doctrine that claims such, and if there were such a policy, it would be very hard indeed to maintain. It's just not a strategy fit for today's world, which faces multiple non-national military challenges. Our world is no longer as simple as it seemed in the heyday of colonialism.

As Flying Pig just pointed out, you don't annihilate a country with naval power - unless it's really tiny. Not to mention that 'annihilating a country' is also not a very sound military strategem. Didn't quite work with Vietnam, the most heavily bombarded country in human history.


I think you misunderstood Masada's point. During times of peace we don't exclude Russia from the Med. Because to do so without kicking off a war or paying other prices higher than we would wish would be the result. But, that said, should there be a war they are not getting their navy into the Med. If we don't permit it, they can't do a damned thing about it.
 
Are we pretending that the British were able to keep non-allied fleets out of the Mediterranean?
 
That's not really relevant. The Crimean War (the 19th century one) was only possible because the Anglo-French forces could sail unopposed to the Crimea. Quite the naval operation, I'd say.

I think 'controlling the seas' works in the same sense as 'controlling the air' - you control the air if you can prevent the enemy from doing anything useful with it. I think NATO certainly could, in the event of full-scale war, prevent any other country from doing anything useful (eg. receiving merchant shipping or sending troops by sea) with the sea - yes, they might be able to get a submarine through, but that's not particularly important on a grand strategic scale. An analogy would be Germany in 1917, which could still launch U-boats but was unable to protect the ships that were supposed to be bringing it food.

Interesting example. The building of a battle fleet by imperial Germany was precisely what kept the British Grand Fleet permanently unavailbale for duty elsewhere. It was a direct threat (but not the only one) to the British control of the seas. Another example would be the Japanese fleet (which defeated the Russian Black Sea fleet - there it is again - after it had sailed all around the world to face it), which was then neutralized by a Anglo-Japanese treaty, effectively making Japan Britain's ally in the Far East. Until the 1940s, that is.
 
You could say, rather than 'kept the fleet unavailable', that having it boxed into Germany removed the need for most of the fleet to be anywhere else. There's not much point having battleships where there aren't any enemy warships to sink.
 
You could say, rather than 'kept the fleet unavailable', that having it boxed into Germany removed the need for most of the fleet to be anywhere else. There's not much point having battleships where there aren't any enemy warships to sink.

So your argument is the building of the imperial battle fleet actually helped Britain make use of its pointless Grand Fleet. That's certainly original. The only reason the British Grand Fleet wasn't needed elsewhere, lies in the alliance system worked out in advance of WW I. The point, however, is, that if the Grand Fleet should be needed elsewhere, it couldn't go there without leaving Britain navally defenseless. As good luck would have it, this didn't occur. But I feel we're starting to drift here (no pun intended) - certainly from the topic of this thread.
 
I'll admit I'm not much up on Great War-era naval history, but were there major sea battles between other powers, or major Central Powers navies except for Germany's?

And you could certainly argue that the Grand Fleet - and the High Seas Fleet - was primarily a prestige-attracting white elephant with little practical value until a competitor came along.
 
Amend that to "at the sufferance of Turkey and Greece" and I'll agree.


Turkey might be able to stop it. But I can't see them doing so without the Americans backing their play. but Greece? They don't seem very strong to me.
 
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