Greatest general ever?

Best general?

  • Genghis

    Votes: 16 16.8%
  • Napoleon

    Votes: 16 16.8%
  • Alexander

    Votes: 20 21.1%
  • Caesar

    Votes: 7 7.4%
  • Frederick

    Votes: 10 10.5%
  • Hannibal

    Votes: 19 20.0%
  • Belisarius

    Votes: 2 2.1%
  • Subutai

    Votes: 5 5.3%

  • Total voters
    95
Indeed, they ended up shooting him after all.
A pity for everyone that they didn't do it sooner. He was quite probably the least capable of all of Napoleon's relatives elevated to high position. And that's not exactly an impressive list to begin with.

There's an area of Crosby (a town near to Liverpool) which was named Waterloo after a hotel that they started building on the day of the battle. Some of the local streets have names to reflect this such as Hougomont Avenue, Blucher Street and Picton street.

I mention this because rather bizarrely there's also a Murat street which as far as I can work out is named after the French Marshal. Quite why he was chosen is unknown, he wasn't even at Waterloo and even if he had been there he would probably have been doing his level best to cut the British army to pieces.
Was that particular street named before the Hundred Days? Because Murat had deserted Napoleon and sided with the Sixth Coalition after the Russian defeat. I don't recall if this was before or after Leipzig. If it was after the Hundred Days, then I don't know what the hell the town planner was smoking.

Part of the reason Murat declared himself for Napoleon - hilariously, this was the exact last thing Napoleon wanted, seeing as how he wanted to present himself as reformed and peaceful - was because both the Austrians and British had soured on him, wanting him out as the King of Naples. If he'd been smart, he'd have actually immediately declared war on Napoleon to prove his loyalty to the coalition. Idiot.

Hannibal's plan was counting on his brother Hasdrubal to bring the supplies necessary for a siege of Rome, but he was unfortunately defeated and killed at the Battle of the Metaurus. So I'm not sure I would say the entire Carthaginian war plan was bad, it just didn't work out.

Disclaimer: I know a very scant amount about the Punic Wars compared to what I know about the 19th century, so don't take me too seriously in this regard.
Hasdrubal was several years behind Hannibal, was he not? Not a very good plan, especially considering how risky Hannibal's own crossing of the Alps was. And I think he called for Hasdrubal later, when he realised he needed to beseige Rome. Hannibal seemed to be of the opinion that all of Italy would rise in revolt against Rome, when really the only city worthy of the name which rallied to him was Capua. Admittedly, Capua was pretty damn important, but it was nowhere near enough. Who else declared for him, Brundisium and Apulia? Outskirts, no great loss, especially once the Romans had subdued Sicily. He gained no Gallic allies and no allies in Northern Italy. It was very much a case of 'hope for the best' when Hannibal invaded Italy.

Why is Napolean even on this list? He couldn't even invade Russia (where as Ghengis Khan could) and then he got his butt kicked AGAIN at Waterloo. If Napolean is supposed to be the "golden age" of the French in military terms I really don't know what to say.
Dear god I hope this is a troll.

Well, we never really define our terms, do we? What makes a great leader, after all? How do we define their success?
That's one of my major problems with all threads of this type.
 
Murat's not as bad as you're making him out to be. Napoli was, like many countries in the era, split between conservatives (that vaguely supported the Habsburgs, but really just wanted to keep all of the revolutionary nonsense outside of their borders) and the liberals (that were keen on having a pro-Napoleonic regime, and thus threw their weight onto Murat). Neither faction had an overwhelming majority at any point, so the basic consensus was to accept Murat's 1815 exile to Corsica and drop the matter altogether. Murat happened to blunder himself up though because when he returned to Napoli to try and regain his throne, his insurrection began in Calabria, which was (unfortunately for him) a place that wasn't sympathetic to the Napoleonic faction. His execution happened shortly thereafter. But overall in Italy, he wasn't widely hated. Keep in mind that he didn't personally cultivate the army he had in the Neapolitan War, it was an army that pledged allegiance to him as a legitimate king. His service during the Napoleonic Wars was as an exemplary cavalry commander. Keep in mind that he played a critical role in Napoleon's greatest victory, the Ulm Campaign, by using his cavalry divisions to manipulate the Austrian intelligence in such a way that eventually prevented a breakout into the north, thus allowing Napoleon to capture both of Mack's armies.

If you ask me, Napoleon's worst non-naval subordinate was probably Ney. On several occasions (Bautzen, Dresden, Waterloo), he failed to use his cavalry to destroy routing divisions, a duty Napoleon specifically assigned to him. The Sixth Coalition might've gone entirely differently if Bautzen became a second Austerlitz.
 
Was that particular street named before the Hundred Days?

I've never been able to find out to be honest, but I don't think so. The area practically didn't exist prior to the hundred days as the hotel was one of the first buildings around there. They were going to call it the Crosby Seabank Hotel, but renamed it after the battle, with the area adopting the name from the hotel. Any Napoleonic road names are likely to derive from a time after the hotel was built at least, if not after the area adopted the name.

If the road did exist prior to the battle I can't think of any reason why they would name a road after a minor largely out of favour ruler of a foreign power. If it didn't exist before the battle but was named after, then as you say it its one of the most bizarre choices they could have gone for. Its almost like they felt they had to pick a token Frenchman to balance out all the Allied names... in which case why not someone like Bernadotte or Marmont?
 
Well, we never really define our terms, do we? What makes a great leader, after all? How do we define their success?

IMO "great leader" and "great general" are not interchangeable terms.

Patton was a great general, but a terrible leader. If he became the President for example, he would have pretty much been the worst President ever.
 
Lord Baal said:
But, as others have said, his success was largely due to being in possession of the most experienced army in the world at the time.

I can't see your point here.

Hannibal had experienced soldiers only after he himself made them experienced (by using them in battles). However, the "experienced component" of his army, was constantly shrinking due to attrition and lack of supplies from Africa. Available replacements were not experienced and were recruited mainly from among various tribes in Gaul and Italy (like Gauls or Brutti). Hannibal's infantry was undoubtedly of worse quality than that of the Romans - at least on average (Hannibal's infantry was a real mix of very varying combat value and quality). What gave Hannibal edge in battles over the Romans were his tactical abilities and cavalry.

Carthaginian army as a whole (not that small part of it under Hannibal's command) was by no means "the most experienced army in the world".

Actually Carthaginian armies' performance was rather mediocre in both Greek-Punic and Roman-Punic wars. Except of Hannibal of course.

Carthage also had a much smaller population than Rome. Especially when fighting in Italy Romans had almost unlimited manpower reserves.
 
Hannibal is overrated.

I agree with this, but all great generals are.


There, I said it. One need only look at his most famous victory, the Battle of Cannae, to see that it was nowhere near as consclusive and one-sided as is usually supposed - mostly because many people use Livy, noted for his super-bias, as their primary source - to see that. Also, he made several ridiculous errors during his Italian campaign. Then there's his conduct in Gaul and Africa, which was mediocre at best.

I disagree, Cannae was a crushing victory, and virtually destroyed the Roman field army (granted some managed to escape). The main sources we have on the Punic Wars are all heavily biased in favour of the Romans (and for the figures the figures say Livy arrives for at Cannae could well be symbolic)... whatever the true figures, Cannae was a crushing Roman defeat... I'm not sure what ridiculous errors you refer to in his Italian campaign, but I see some great work by Hannibal, though naturally he didn't have the benefit of hindsight and he was just a man capable of making mistakes too. It wasn't his generalship that let him down there, but the very nature of the political situation on the peninsular and Rome's military response... Hannibal correctly identified Roman domination of Italy was an important source of Rome's power, sadly he couldn't build up a network of alliances. Much of his support he received on the peninsular was not from a positive desire to support him, but from local issues that had little to do with the wider conflict, driven by internal political considerations and the opportunity to establish their own areas of influence... Hannibal's strategy may have failed, but it came dangerously close to succeeding and tested Rome's control of Italy severely.

What was wrong with his conduct in Gaul and Africa?

He was also a fairly short-sighted strategist. What exactly did he think he was going to do to Rome once he reached Italy? Breach its walls with harsh language? The man had no siege train, no support from any dissident Roman groups, and no means of getting supplies to Italy on a regular basis. If Capua hadn't rallied to him, he wouldn't have survived nearly as long as he did.

Short-sighted? He had a great strategy, really the only one available to him... The Romans didn't believe for a minute the war would be fought in Italy, and I believe that it was largely Rome's fault than Hannibal and Carthage's for the start of the war (gods forbid they'd admit to starting a war that caused so much devastation in their own doorstep and wasn't divinely justified!), which they may well have been planning as early as 225 BC according to an interesting article by Paul Erdkamp (I'll e-mail you that one if you want). After Cannae, Carthage was preparing to support Hannibal from Africa with an army, while Hasdrubal Barca was planning on leaving Spain, but Hasdrubal Barca's defeat by the Scipio brothers at the Battle of Dertossa in 215 BC saw no reinforcements from these quarters... had Hasdrubal won he would have turned up in Northern Italy with a large army further supported by the Gauls, while Hannibal would have received more troops to protect the towns and cities that had sided with him, and after Cannae, who knew what would happen with these armies operating on their own doorstep. Capua was a helpful ally, but not a great one, they made their own military decisions which were disastrous, and Hannibal actually had to support Capua with food and supplies... making it a lot more trouble than it was worth considering the lack of military support from them... remember, even if they didn't join Hannibal's army and military endeavors, neither could their resources be used by the Romans... Another thing to consider for his invasion of Italy was what the Romans were planning - his invasion stopped the Romans from invading at least Africa and put Carthage on the initiative, and for the first few years, Rome were mainly reacting to what Hannibal was doing...

I'm really not sure where people get the idea he had no siege equipment, as this is not backed up by a reading of the sources. There is abundant evidence that Hannibal used siege weapons throughout his Italian campaign, building them when needed. Appian mentions siege engines in Hannibal's attack on the town of Petilia shortly after the battle of Cannae (App. Hann. 5.29). Livy makes mention of various different siege machinery. One attempt at capturing Nola in 216 BC, Hannibal ordered his men to bring up the equipment needed for an assault of the town (Livy. 21.16.11-12). The assault failed, but he moved onto Acerrae, where he again made siege and assault preparations. The town was circumvalleted and the town was captured (Livy 23.17.4-6). Later that year Hannibal used mantelets and dug saps when he assaulted Casilinum (Livy. 23.18.8-9). The following year he had to wait for a day in his attempt to capture Cumae as he had to bring up the necessary equipment from camp (Livy. 23.36.5-8). When he assaulted the town, he made use of a high wooden tower against the wall. He also used artillery and siege engines against the citadel of Tarentum. His siege capability was not as bad as historians make out, and he did in fact storm a few places, and it is only the ones he failed to take that gets attention.

In fact, very few cities in the war were taken by assault and the capture of fortified places has always been extremely difficult. According to Goldsworthy, 'as we have seen, direct attacks on a large city were only successful when they combined surprise with treachery from the inside or special knowledge of a weakness in the defences.' (p.313)


The man was actually a better administrator than he was a general. It's unfortunate that he didn't devote his whole life to reforming Carthage, instead of just the end of it. He obviously possessed great talents in that area, as evidenced by his time as a Suffete of Carthage.

He was a brilliant administrator, and admittedly achieved more for Carthage in one year as Suffete than the 20 he was a general!

.Hasdrubal was several years behind Hannibal, was he not? Not a very good plan, especially considering how risky Hannibal's own crossing of the Alps was. And I think he called for Hasdrubal later, when he realised he needed to beseige Rome. Hannibal seemed to be of the opinion that all of Italy would rise in revolt against Rome, when really the only city worthy of the name which rallied to him was Capua. Admittedly, Capua was pretty damn important, but it was nowhere near enough. Who else declared for him, Brundisium and Apulia? Outskirts, no great loss, especially once the Romans had subdued Sicily. He gained no Gallic allies and no allies in Northern Italy. It was very much a case of 'hope for the best' when Hannibal invaded Italy.

As I mentioned above, Hasdrubal's original attempt was crushed by the Scipios in what I think was the most desicive battle of the war and one that could have possibly won it for the Romans in the long run. Hannibal's difficulties during the crossing of the Alps is largely nonsense - Carthaginian armies were usually always presented as colossal beasts, and what better way to show how mad Hannibal was prepared to kill his own army to 'destroy' Rome. When Hannibal left New Carthage during the late Spring of 218 BC, according to Polybius his army amounted to 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry (Polybius, 3.35), while Appian adds 37 elephants to the number. Clearly, the size of his infantry and cavalry are exaggerated, and the true size of Hannibal's invasion force will not be known with certainty, but there are a few considerations – particularly logistical – to take into account when viewing these figures.

First we must discover the reported figures for the size of the Carthaginian army before Hannibal took over – when Hasdrubal the Fair was in charge. According to Diodorus, in retaliation for the betrayal and killing of Hannibal's father, Hamilcar in 225 BC, Hasdrubal moved against the Oretani with an army made up of 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 200 elephants (Gabriel, Hannibal, p.72). Four years later, after his assassination and Hannibal took command, that number had increased to 60,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry - in a four year time period (225-221 BC) the number had risen 10,000 and 2000 respectively. It was with this army Hannibal conducted two successful campaigns against the Spanish between 221-218 BC, along with the siege of Saguntum before retiring his troops to winter quarters. If we take Polybius' numbers, we have to believe that Hannibal had just a matter of months to raise 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry to make up this number over the course of the winter.

Polybius tells us that Hannibal also left behind a force with his brother, Hasdrubal, made up of 12,650 infantry and 2550 cavalry to guard the Spanish coast. In order to do this Hannibal would have had to make up 42,000 new infantry and 6,550 new cavalry in the winter to be able to raise the force for Hasdrubal and still have 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry declared by Polybius in the few months of winter. Gabriel believes new reinforcements could not have come from Carthage. The reported troop transfers were nothing more than swapping Spanish infantry for more reliable African infantry with no real gain of numerical strength. (Gabriel, Hannibal, pp.101-3).

Engels (Alexander the Great, pp.3-18)has estimated that there was one mule per 50 men for transport, and one camp follower for every three soldiers – which would increase the total number of people to 136,000 for Hannibal's march. Per day per man would need 3 pounds of rations. This would make it necessary that a total of 408,000 pounds of rations had to be obtained daily to feed the troops. Add to this the 120,000 pounds of grain needed for the horses per day. Around 2700 pack animals would be needed to carry this amount of food for a day, plus another 2000 or so for equipment and heavy baggage. To feed these pack animals, troops and horses for ten days, one would need 55,520 pack animals:



(Shean, Hannibal's Mules, p.171 Table 1)

Gabriel has calculated the length of Hannibal's column would have been more than 100 miles long based on American logistical calculations that an infantry brigade comprising 6310 men and 1021 animals occupied a road space of 4.8 miles, (Gabriel, p.103) – a column of Hannibal's length could not make the reported 80 stades (9 miles) a day that Polybius implies was Hannibal's rate of movement (Polyb. 3.50)

What then, were his numbers? We have to take into account of attrition during Hannibal's campaigns in Spain from 221-218 BC – but we have very little to estimate casualty figures. Gabriel assumes that we should look at a 10 percent casualty figure for these campaigns (including Saguntum) which would make the figure of Hannibal's army before he dispersed for winter around 54,000 infantry and 7000 horse. From this we can deduct the force given to Hasdrubal Barca leaving Hannibal's invasion force a much more manageable 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.
With this force he supposedly fought four tribes north of the Ebro river; the Ilurgetes, the Bargusii, the Aerenosii and the Andosini, leaving Hanno in command of a force made up of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry (along with his heavy baggage) to defend the region. The only tribe of significance were the Ilurgetes, and even coming up against token resistance Hannibal could not have marched an army 100,000 strong in the time Polybius and Livy imply Hannibal took to cover the distance from the Ebro to Emporion.

What then, was the purpose of Hanno's force? We have to question its historicity by the actions that followed. Hanno was reportedly more than 150 miles south of the only strategic location in the region; that of the Greek coastal city of Emporion, supposedly fighting rebels. Hanno did not attempt to lay siege to the city that would see Gnaeus Scipio disembark at the head of a Roman army a few months later. Hanno made no attempt to protect the Spanish coast. The answer was his force was unable to conduct offensive operations. It is more likely that Hannibal did not in fact leave such a force behind as it would have achieved nothing of significance in the region, being unable to defend the Spanish coast or capture the strategic Greek city of Emporion (Gabriel, p.105-6). Hannibal only had around 40,000 troops, and could hardly have afforded to leave such a pointless force behind. More likely, his plan was to defend and hold the line at the Ebro River, where Hasdrubal's main force was located, and where there was friendly tribes and well supplied magazines and solid interior lines linking up with New Carthage. Hannibal was well aware that he could not defend the area north of the Ebro sufficiently against Rome's superior numbers of warships and transports.

Naturally, any attempt to discover the true figure is impossible, and the above analysis is flawed due to the nature of reported ancient figures and ancient sources in general - but Gabriel's approach is certainly an interesting and fresh perspective of the numbers - despite the unreliability of the source figure of Diodorus' in regards to the size of Hasdrubal the Fair's army in 225 BC!
It's also flawed due to ultimately guess-work on ancient logistics, but it does give a good idea how supplying armies (especially stupidly large ones) would have been far from simple. Ultimately, Hannibal knew the difficulties of suppling armies, and wouldn't have left Spain virtually undefended (particularly when half of their area of influence had only recently - within a couple of years - been conquered) to march to Italy with a force virtually half of which would have been very raw indeed...

Hannibal seemed to be of the opinion that all of Italy would rise in revolt against Rome,

That appears to be a very dangerous assumption, you and I have no idea what he thought would happen...

when really the only city worthy of the name which rallied to him was Capua. Admittedly, Capua was pretty damn important, but it was nowhere near enough. Who else declared for him, Brundisium and Apulia? Outskirts, no great loss, especially once the Romans had subdued Sicily. He gained no Gallic allies and no allies in Northern Italy. It was very much a case of 'hope for the best' when Hannibal invaded Italy.

Large Roman armies had to be stationed and hostages taken in Northern Italy, particularly in Etruria which was apparently wavering in loyalty, while 12 of 30 Latin colonies refused to support Rome by 209 BC. The Gauls were tying up Roman legions in the north as well... but appear to be more interested in protecting themselves. Syracuse sided with Carthage which was a great threat to the Roman supply of grain from the island, and only a plague that wiped out the Carthaginian army and betrayal (from both Muttines in the field and those in Syracuse for the Roman cause) returned Sicily back into Roman hands. Lucanians, Apulians and Bruttians actively supported Hannibal. As I mentioned above, the evidence seems to point to local factors, both interstate contacts or conflicts and domestic politics, as being the most influential factors in decisions on whether to remain in alliance with Rome, and a lot was, admittedly out of Hannibal's hands.

Overall though, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it:

It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.

The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314

Another point to consider for great generals is brought up well by Richard Miles:

Hannibal was blessed with two much sought-after qualities; leadership and to know men, both of which are difficult to define and analyze historically. They are perhaps harder to learn or acquire. Yet it may be that these charismatic attributes are what really separated great generals in antiquity, such as Hannibal, from lesser contemporaries (Miles, Hannibal: Tactics, Strategy, and Geostrategy, A Companion to the Punic Wars (ed. Hoyos), p.258)

That's one of my major problems with all threads of this type.

Agreed - perhaps we should just have a thread entitled 'Favorite General' or something along those lines. There are so many variables to consider it is of course, utter nonsense to objectively pinpoint the greatest general ever!
 
Breach its walls with harsh language?

As an aside if that was intentional, kudos for paraphrasing one of my favourite films :D
 
1) The census of 1801 gives the population of England and Wales as 9 million. The population of England was around 8.3 million. If you have a online source to suggest otherwise post it

Please read what wrote.

2) Did you even see my point about Scotland, Ireland and Wales? To the 9 million can be added around 1.5 million Scots and 4.5-5.5 million Irishmen. Try to grasp the difference between the UK And England please.

Yeah, but it's not relevant. I gave the figure to illustrate France's size in this era relative to England because the difference is stark.


LS challenged your claim that France was the most powerful nation when Napoleon took power, so far the only clear evidence you have put forward is her population's size and general statements that she was so. Until you come up with any other reasons, how many people Russia had is somewhat important.

Not sure I understand. No-one here is disputing France was Europe's greatest power. Preferring more optimistic estimates or making quibbles about how to define Russia to make it a little bigger provide, at most, side shows of side shows.


I don't disagree that he benefited from some advantages, but I do disagree that this made it easy for him and explains the brilliance of his early career.

Its quite simple, you advocated the maxim that a general should only fight battles that he was certain to win. I'm asking you to cite examples of who you consider to be a great general so we can examine whether they followed this maxim or not. The maxim sounds good on paper, but in reality simply does not work. It puts me in mind of Sosabowski's comment on the Market Garden plan...

As far as I am concerned, pointing to the disasters of Napoleon's time in charge is sufficient on its own to establish that he is not the greatest general of all time nor even one of them. My line of argument is extremely simple and easy to defend in this respect. The Russia campaign was a planning disaster for any general. Lots of the stuff LS is giving him credit for, his inferiors probably had more to do with; but poor management of France's relations and Russia were clearly down to Napoleon. So the central claim is, quite obviously, clear and papable nonsense, even if you accept and believe all the popular exaggerations of his earlier career.


I do however think that the Russia campaign, for all its calamities cannot be taken as the final statement on Napoleon's abilities. It says much about his limitations, but I prefer to view a general's overall career rather than just one or two campaigns. Waterloo and Russia to name but two are certainly examples that weigh against Napoleon, but do they outweigh and overshadow the genius and audacity of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstadt and others to the point that we should rate him mediocre? I do not think so.

Yeah, but no-one here is arguing that Napoleon was a rubbish general. That is merely the straw man of certain contributors to the thread. The argument is about whether or not he is not the greatest or one of the greatest generals in history.


Even if that was true, and be aware that I'm not saying that it is, that totally misses my point. A country does not acquire one of the largest empires in the world (despite loosing a major war in which its homeland is occupied by a foreign power) whilst being mediocre.

France's "empire" of desert and jungle, essentially the trash Britain let it have, was the bare minimum a country with France's natural power could have had. You can never show it, but had someone a bit more astute than Napoleon got power in France with the momentum available to Napoleon, France's strength in 1800 could have been enough to secure permanent dominance of the western part of the continent (think about Frenchified Rhineland, no united Germany, etc).
 
Pangur Bán;11321865 said:
Yeah, but it's not relevant. I gave the figure to illustrate France's size in this era relative to England because the difference is stark.
The fact that the difference is stark doesn't mean it's more relevant.
What's the population of France if we exclude Brittany, Normandy and Aquitaine?
If we're dividing up Great Britain, does that figure include Wales in England? If we're including Wales because of it's lack of Legal status, why are we excluding Ireland?
 
Pangur Bán;11321865 said:
Not sure I understand. No-one here is disputing France was Europe's greatest power.

As I repeatedly said, when Napoleon got his first generalship, the French Directory was teetering on the brink of financial collapse and was probably going to lose against the First Coalition. Almost its entire deficit was covered by war plunder from Napoleon's victories in northern Italy. You're unable to grasp this simple fact, and when you say "no-one here is disputing" this, you've shown me (again) you're not actually reading peoples' posts.
 
Please read what wrote.

Yo'u're right, I missed the word under in the original sentence. Congratulations for scoring a pedantic but irrelevant point.

Yeah, but it's not relevant.

How exactly is it not relevant to point out that when comparing the size of states you have to actually look at the full size of the state? :rolleyes:

Not sure I understand. No-one here is disputing France was Europe's greatest power.

Actually I think you'll find that there is at least two people disputing this.

Preferring more optimistic estimates or making quibbles about how to define Russia to make it a little bigger provide, at most, side shows of side shows.

Look I don't know why this is hard to grasp. Taking the UK's population is is not a more optimistic estimate, its taking into account the population of the state that was actually fighting France. As LS says, if you're going to pick England for a comparison why not chop off large chunks off France too? I mean I can grasp not including imperial populations in the equation, but not including integral parts of that state is just silly.

The reason by the way that I remarked only on population is that you have yet to spell out any other reason why France was the most powerful state at the time Napoleon took power, nor have you answered LS's points about her financial strife. So we're fixated on it because you have yet to advance any other argument.

As far as I am concerned, pointing to the disasters of Napoleon's time in charge is sufficient on its own to establish that he is not the greatest general of all time nor even one of them. My line of argument is extremely simple and easy to defend in this respect. The Russia campaign was a planning disaster for any general. Lots of the stuff LS is giving him credit for, his inferiors probably had more to do with; but poor management of France's relations and Russia were clearly down to Napoleon. So the central claim is, quite obviously, clear and papable nonsense, even if you accept and believe all the popular exaggerations of his earlier career.

I'm sorry, you seem to have ignored the second part of the quote where I asked you a specific question. This is just a rehash of earlier statements.

Yeah, but no-one here is arguing that Napoleon was a rubbish general. That is merely the straw man of certain contributors to the thread.

:lol:

You might want to look up irony in the dictionary.

Then check whether I said rubbish general or not.

The argument is about whether or not he is not the greatest or one of the greatest generals in history.

Yes it is and I would contend that even the best generals are capable of mistakes, whether they be whole campaigns or single battles. I think he is still one of the greatest generals despite the mistakes he made, with the evidence being clear throughout his career but especially prominent before 1809.

Instead of telling us what you think of other people's contenders perhaps you could tell us who you do consider some of the greatest generals in history. To my knowledge you have yet to do so.

France's "empire" of desert and jungle, essentially the trash Britain let it have, was the bare minimum a country with France's natural power could have had.

Funny how those trashy jungles and deserts proved to be such lucrative targets for occupation by various major powers during World War Two. Strange how the people of these worthless countries proved such good fighters in the two world wars.

But Let's play a game, please cite what colonial possessions that you think France would have acquired if she hadn't been "doomed to mediocrity" by Napoleon's rule.
 
Yo'u're right, I missed the word under in the original sentence. Congratulations for scoring a pedantic but irrelevant point.

This kind of comment comes across to me as quite immature. I choose my words carefully. If you don't read them accurately it is not a "score" that pleases me, just a waste of time.

How exactly is it not relevant to point out that when comparing the size of states you have to actually look at the full size of the state? :rolleyes:

You and your friends have actually misunderstood the puprose of the comment. The purpose was to illustrate the size difference between France and England in 1800. If you don't think it matters for whatever reason, great, but don't waste your time mentioning it over and over again. ;)


Actually I think you'll find that there is at least two people disputing this.

Really? We'll they can go publish an article on the topic or at least post something convincing. The position is historical consensus and pretty much beyond doubt as far as I'm concerned.

:lol:

You might want to look up irony in the dictionary.

Any more comments of this nature, they're gonna get ignored. Just for the record.

The point here of course is not whether you said rubbish (how I summarised your comment) or mediocre (what you said), but whether Napoleon is the greatest general of all time or one of the greatest. Stick to it or don't direct any more posts at me. You're obviously drawing a comparison with the English population comment. Labelling it "irony" suggests to me you still don't get it. So let me explain for you. I said England's population was "under 9 million". That is semantically correct, that was intended, and is not in contradiction to anything that has subsequently been posted. "Mediocre" or "rubbish" are semantically identical for our purposes. Get it now?


Funny how those trashy jungles and deserts proved to be such lucrative targets for occupation by various major powers during World War Two. Strange how the people of these worthless countries proved such good fighters in the two world wars.

But Let's play a game, please cite what colonial possessions that you think France would have acquired if she hadn't been "doomed to mediocrity" by Napoleon's rule.

Hardly. Go look at the map posted of the French empire posted to impress me. Then go look at a topographic map of the world. From the point of view of 1800, France got almost nothing it would have wanted and England almost everything (none got China of course). This is at the heart of why England and Holland had "economic" empires and France had ideological or cultural empire ... territories so poor you couldn't justify the expense of holding them otherwise.


But Let's play a game, please cite what colonial possessions that you think France would have acquired if she hadn't been "doomed to mediocrity" by Napoleon's rule.

Well, Egypt for starters.
 
This kind of comment comes across to me as quite immature. I choose my words carefully. If you don't read them accurately it is not a "score" that pleases me, just a waste of time.

Yeah, I think we've noticed how you choose your words carefully, like say for example not actually responding to direct questions and not taking the time to outline your reasoning in any great depth.

You and your friends have actually misunderstood the puprose of the comment. The purpose was to illustrate the size difference between France and England in 1800. If you don't think it matters for whatever reason, great, but don't waste your time mentioning it over and over again.

If people are questioning the purpose of the comment it is precisely because you have failed to demonstrate why it matters in the first place, or why you chose to single out England when England was not operating as an independent social, military or political entity in 1800. Taking the time to spell out your reasoning is a basic part of debating skills.

Really? We'll they can go publish an article on the topic or at least post something convincing. The position is historical consensus and pretty much beyond doubt as far as I'm concerned

I'm sure they would if they thought there was a chance that you might come back with a reasoned discussion of your side of the argument.

Perhaps if it is as you say historical consensus it would not take much time for you to either outline the basic points, or find a link or two with them. You should not expect people to accept a fact just because you claim it to be a consensus, you should provide evidence of this.

Any more comments of this nature, they're gonna get ignored. Just for the record.

That's your choice. Since you also choose to ignore direct questions and refuse to outline your reasoning to any great depth perhaps the debate is reaching its conclusion anyway.

The point here of course is not whether you said rubbish (how I summarised your comment) or mediocre (what you said), but whether Napoleon is the greatest general of all time or one of the greatest. Stick to it or don't direct any more posts at me.

I'll choose to answer that with a section of my post you did not reply to:

Yes it is and I would contend that even the best generals are capable of mistakes, whether they be whole campaigns or single battles. I think he is still one of the greatest generals despite the mistakes he made, with the evidence being clear throughout his career but especially prominent before 1809.

So I did stick to it thank you. :)

You're obviously drawing a comparison with the English population comment.

Not really, I didn't even think about that before you mentioned it.

I thought it was ironic that you said I was making up strawman arguments a sentence after you completely misrepresented something I had said*, despite actually including what I had said in the quote above it. To then go on and say that I don't read your posts accurately is amusing to me.

*Since for the record I do not agree that medicore and rubbish are in the context of this discussion semantically identical.

Hardly. Go look at the map posted of the French empire posted to impress me. Then go look at a topographic map of the world. From the point of view of 1800, France got almost nothing it would have wanted and England almost everything (none got China of course). This is at the heart of why England and Holland had "economic" empires and France had ideological or cultural empire ... territories so poor you couldn't justify the expense of holding them otherwise.

I'm sorry, when you say "hardly" are you saying that ex-French colonies were not targetted by major powers in WW2, or that French colonial soldiers did not fight well in the two world wars or both?

I don't know a great deal about colonial economic and social history, so hopefully someone else might take the time to discuss that, but on those two points I mentioned I beg to differ.

Well, Egypt for starters.

Hmm. Possibly, but there's a lot of desert in Egypt so by that logic they'd just be adding to their existing medicore gains.
 
Why is Napolean even on this list? He couldn't even invade Russia (where as Ghengis Khan could) and then he got his butt kicked AGAIN at Waterloo. If Napolean is supposed to be the "golden age" of the French in military terms I really don't know what to say.

The Mongols were the only ones to ever conquer Russia. And even they just happened to have the right type of soldiers and struck at the right time. I DO think that Subutai was better than Napoleon, (as I pointed out in the first post), but it doesn't mean Napoleon wasn't one of the greatest generals who ever lived.
 
I'm sorry, when you say "hardly" are you saying that ex-French colonies were not targetted by major powers in WW2, or that French colonial soldiers did not fight well in the two world wars or both?

How is that relevant to his point? I think he's right in that the french did got the sucky portion of Africa, and a somewhat more desirable piece (but harder to subdue) in Indochina. Even the germans grabbed some better land, in Tanzania.
France did had a strategic interest in Algeria, of course, it allowed for better control of the Mediterranean and an end to the pest of piracy that had infested it for some 1500 years by then. But some other europeans doing the dirty work of conquest would have solved it also. Trying to conquer North Africa and the desert had not been, economically, a good move since roman times!
(too bad for them that they now have oil and gas: they're becoming appetizing targets now).

But having supported that point, I'll also add that all things considered those lands do not seem to me worse than Russia's Central Asia, or Australia for the UK. Imperial powers were by the late 19th century grabbing anything they could seize, regardless of "profitability". And I don't think any of them even started the process with some kind of national imperial plan: the acquisition piled up as a result of individual initiatives without a clear conducting line.
 
Oh I was just speculating that if a state was truly worthless it would be of little or no interest to rival powers in a global conflict. Similarly if they were just trash it would be unlikely that France's occupation of them would stir much international interest, whereas in fact on several occasions it did kick up a fuss.
 
Oh I was just speculating that if a state was truly worthless it would be of little or no interest to rival powers in a global conflict. Similarly if they were just trash it would be unlikely that France's occupation of them would stir much international interest, whereas in fact on several occasions it did kick up a fuss.

I think it was all about prestige. No national government wanted to seem weak in a dispute with another, and that because politicians feared the consequences of that loss of prestige at home. One of the main causes of the overthrown of the monarchic regime in my country, Portugal, was silly resentment over accepting british demands for a useless piece of land in Africa (I think it's now roughly the area of Zimbabwe and Zambia).
For a better known example, France's disputes with the UK over a piece of land in Sudan: true, it was important in case they wanted to build a railway line (also the main reason of the UK-Portugal dispute), but who would build such a line across the desert? Such a project would be ruinous on its own! Economically, it made no sense to go to war over it. Likewise for Morocco with Germany and France: I mean, Morocco, and a little piece of it? The real reason for the crisis, it seems to me, was sabre rattling in Europe, for the benefit of pandering to voters in the countries involved.

Which leads me to conclude: early democracy possibly caused more wars that it avoided!
 
If people are questioning the purpose of the comment it is precisely because you have failed to demonstrate why it matters in the first place, or why you chose to single out England when England was not operating as an independent social, military or political entity in 1800. Taking the time to spell out your reasoning is a basic part of debating skills.

No, I haven't been trying to demonstrate that it matters. The point is didactic. England and France have very similar populations today, so it is worth pointing out to those who don't realise that in Napoleon's time England was less than a third of France's size. Make of that what you will. You guys are trying to say it doesn't matter; to me that's very obviously misguided, but I don't really care and am happy enough to leave it to each poster's judgment.

Since you also choose to ignore direct questions and refuse to outline your reasoning to any great depth perhaps the debate is reaching its conclusion anyway.

I've actually outlined my argument several times at this stage, it's just that many of you here have poor focus. Here we go again, Russia, strategic incompetence, Waterloo THEREFORE Napie not greatest ever nor one of greatest. What's not being understood?


So I did stick to it thank you. :)

Not really, you've been bringing up all sorts of other irrelevant and personal stuff.


Hmm. Possibly, but there's a lot of desert in Egypt so by that logic they'd just be adding to their existing medicore gains.

Egypt is the area around the Nile (forget the modern political maps), which is not desert.

Looking from the point of view of the year 1800, France really got nothing of any worth, basically what the English didn't have time for. England also controlled the world's seas, and all oversees territories were held pretty much at England's tolerance, and thus France was essentially a junior partner to England is a multilateral world system of European political expansion. France individually was forced to target poor or hard targets. Economic and technological growth actually made England's areas of less relative worth in the early 20th century than they would have been in the early 19th century, but it's just plain ignorance to claim that France's empire was on a par with England's.
 
But having supported that point, I'll also add that all things considered those lands do not seem to me worse than Russia's Central Asia, or Australia for the UK. Imperial powers were by the late 19th century grabbing anything they could seize, regardless of "profitability"..

Central Asia was actually very wealthy/ regarded as being of high economic importance in the 19th century. Russia's defeat of Britain in the "Great Game" would have been of greater significance, but economic and technological changes in the 19th century reduced the inequalities between different "colonial" regions relative to Europeans.

Australia was also much more worthwhile than France's desert-dominated regions because Australia did not have large populations of agriculturists who, had they existed in Australia would have required management and subjugation, and would have made the region prohibitively unattractive. This was also the reason Russia benefitted from Siberia significantly more than France benefitted from North-West Africa.
 
Plus Australia happens to have gold, and could be conveniently used as a vast penal colony, where it was very difficult for prisoners to return to Britain.
 
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