North King
blech
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I think the main problem the mongols would have was grazing land, and that shouldn't be TOO hard, after all, the Euros themselves supported larger numbers of horses in armies.
Does anyone know the details for the Mongols invasion plan of Europe?
- Thread starter BOTP
- Start date
North King said:
Not really- the had compartivlly large cavry forces when comapring to other, non major horse users (*funny, considering how important mounted comabt was- btu then it was predominat more because of what being mounted symbolized, rather then tactical intitiatives) but when comparing to the armies of east? the europeans were primarilly foot, at least for the vast majority of kingdoms
Oda Nobunaga said:
but look at what trouble the europeans DID cause from what few foritfacatiosn they did it from in eastern europe- now, apply that to western europe, and you begin to see th emongols having real problems due to all thos eunrulelly fortifacations hard to access places; hard to access because the europeans deisigned thier fortifacations wwith most of the seige weapons th emongols had, liek the oh so feared trebuchet, in mind- mind you, cannonry did not work better then the regule rphysics at that point.
well, Veii did, but thats in a period long before th emiddle ages; constantinople had some mighty multi-year seiges thoughNorth King said:
ahem, the tuetonic knights wer ehardley the best europe had to offer- they couldnt even beat disorginzed Finnish tribes very well, let alone a real army liek the mongols
not always; richard proved askilel dmarshal coudl knok out those international tensions, and lead a european force to be VERY effective, and bloody the nose of even saladin; given such a huge prempt of self defence, i thinks its likellt that western europe woudl conceed martial ability to eh most able master- a tleast if the pope commanded it, which woudl be likelly in that case
of course, but the question is if thier plans could themselves be supported
North King
blech
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2004
- Messages
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Xen said:
No, really? What I'm saying is that the huge supply trains of the Western Euro armies managed to survive there as well, though there was difficulty in procuring fodder, it was not impossible.
What's this continual stuff about how much trouble those fortifications caused? It was mentioned once and now everyone is pouncing on it. The only reason they are even noticable as a blip on your Anti-Mongol radar is that the field armies of Hungary were defeated so fast as to make them the only possible points of resistance.
And King Bela put so much faith into them, apparently, that he ran away. Yes, Constantinople, gem of the East, only THE most famous fortifications in Europe, comparable to the ones of the major Chinese cities of the time, yes, they did managed to have several year sieges. So obviously all of Western Europe would be able to replicate this over ant over?
They weren't the best, yes, but they were far from the worst. And Poland and Lithuania weren't the shabbiest armies in Europe either. Certainly not the worst, I think.
Yes, Richard, who was only one of the best generals in Medieval Europe and probably a French speaker as was many of his English subjects, did manage to lead a force of French and British against a much smaller army (whos main attention was devoted to the Mongols).
Given past Mongol experiences, likely they would have.
One comment about supply trains. I don't know if the Mongolians did this but a common Chinese tactic since antiquity was for long-term military expeditions to be self-supporting. These military colonies were not like the retirement colonies of Rome but rather military camps of active duty soldiers who spend half their time growing crops. Sometimes these places became permanent settlements though they still retained a somewhat military character esp. in the north. Some even ended up becoming large cities such as Guangzhou which was founded by the First Emperor as a military colony to keep order amongst the non-Chinese majority in the deep south. Cao Cao made the most famous use of these military colonies.
A famous example of this philosophy was in one of the seiges of Chang'an by the famous strategist Zhuge Liang. Having worked out that there was no way he was going to be able to knock down the super-duper walls (which were extra fortified because of the Qiang) he decided to just outlast the people in the city. Also he had to cart supplies through a large mountain range which made things difficult. So he decided to get his soldiers besieging the city to start growing crops to feed themselves. Hey, if they're going to be there for a few years, might as well do something while waiting for the people inside to starve. Also this would reduce the morale of the people inside the city. People think he might have actually succeeded if internal politics hadn't forced him to be recalled to Shu to face charges of treason.
Self-supporting troops who grew their own food was a common Chinese tactic in long-term military expeditions esp. in hostile territory. Chinese were very good at mixing agriculture and military aggression.
Another thing is while there are not Chinese fortresses per se, Chinese cities were essentially fortresses. They were surrounded by massive walls. Also the location of many important cities were decided in periods of warring states where easily defensive positions were important. We shouldn't forget that for large periods of Chinese history various parts were constantly engaged in civil war. And Chinese tend to be more autocratic about building cities rather than just letting them spring up. There was a lot more central planning involved. For example Nanjing came about because Sun Quan wanted a capital. They scouted around, found a good defensive position and decided to built a capital city there from scratch. Also some cities like Guangzhou originated from military colonies.
Another thing is, I'm not sure the Mongolians were all that serious about invading Europe. Remember in China they used to engage the Chinese in seiges that would last 5 years. In Europe they didn't even bother. They come across a fortification, shrug their shoulders and go "Why bother?" It seemed more like a raid rather than an entirely serious invasion attempt. It seemed more like a "Let's do it because we can" thing. In China after the death of Genghis Khan derailed the first attempt they came back later and defeated China over a gruelling 40 years. In Europe the death of a great Khan derailed the first attempt and then they didn't even bother to come back. It didn't seem as if there was a lot of seriousness involved. China seemed to be the main focus of their attention and Europe was just a sideline they engaged in their spare time.
A famous example of this philosophy was in one of the seiges of Chang'an by the famous strategist Zhuge Liang. Having worked out that there was no way he was going to be able to knock down the super-duper walls (which were extra fortified because of the Qiang) he decided to just outlast the people in the city. Also he had to cart supplies through a large mountain range which made things difficult. So he decided to get his soldiers besieging the city to start growing crops to feed themselves. Hey, if they're going to be there for a few years, might as well do something while waiting for the people inside to starve. Also this would reduce the morale of the people inside the city. People think he might have actually succeeded if internal politics hadn't forced him to be recalled to Shu to face charges of treason.
Self-supporting troops who grew their own food was a common Chinese tactic in long-term military expeditions esp. in hostile territory. Chinese were very good at mixing agriculture and military aggression.
Another thing is while there are not Chinese fortresses per se, Chinese cities were essentially fortresses. They were surrounded by massive walls. Also the location of many important cities were decided in periods of warring states where easily defensive positions were important. We shouldn't forget that for large periods of Chinese history various parts were constantly engaged in civil war. And Chinese tend to be more autocratic about building cities rather than just letting them spring up. There was a lot more central planning involved. For example Nanjing came about because Sun Quan wanted a capital. They scouted around, found a good defensive position and decided to built a capital city there from scratch. Also some cities like Guangzhou originated from military colonies.
Another thing is, I'm not sure the Mongolians were all that serious about invading Europe. Remember in China they used to engage the Chinese in seiges that would last 5 years. In Europe they didn't even bother. They come across a fortification, shrug their shoulders and go "Why bother?" It seemed more like a raid rather than an entirely serious invasion attempt. It seemed more like a "Let's do it because we can" thing. In China after the death of Genghis Khan derailed the first attempt they came back later and defeated China over a gruelling 40 years. In Europe the death of a great Khan derailed the first attempt and then they didn't even bother to come back. It didn't seem as if there was a lot of seriousness involved. China seemed to be the main focus of their attention and Europe was just a sideline they engaged in their spare time.
Jeff Yu
Prince
By the way, Xen, how's it coming on those names? What are the names and places of the battles outside of east Asia (ie China and Japan) where the Mongols used mass infantry armies? Since according to you the Mongols used massed infantry tactics everywhere except during their initial rise I'm sure you would have no problem providing countless examples.
Jeff Yu
Prince
Uiler said:
Yeah, if you notice the pictures I posted, those are two different sets of walls. The one with the moat is an outer defensive wall, while the first picture shows another set of walls.
Xi'an (or Chang'an as it was called then), was built in a very specific way. It was built with the palace at the north, and broad boulevard running North-South, and the city was divided up into countless wards, each of which was walled off.
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|__|__|__|At the time of the Tang Dynasty, (500-800 AD), Chang'an was the largest city in the world (30 square miles, 2 million people), having a size and population greater than that of Rome, Constantinople (300-500 thousand), and Baghdad (half a million). Later though, the population of other cities surpassed it. Can you imagine what kind of hell it must be, having to storm off countless walled-off wards in a city of 2 million?
Edit: If only I found this picture sooner I wouldn't have had to waste time typing it by hand.
First of all, how do you expect the Mongols to transport their seige trains to Europe? And Why would the Mongols want to stay besieging a fortress for 10 years
That would negate their mobility (the one thing that makes them famous) and just make them a sitting duck for larger relief armies.A lot of ignorance here. In 1285 the Kipchak Tatars returned to Europe and occupied Transylvania. As before they were unsupported by Chinese or Persian artillery. In 1286 the Mongol Prince Nogai advanced against Cracow and Tole-Buka attacked Sandomir. But the Poles showed they had learnt by their sobering experience at Liegnitz half a century earlier. This time the garrisons werent tempted to engage the horse archers in the field. They clung to their walls and both cities held out against the Tatar assaults. So the Poles faced the same evil and they defeated it, and the defences of civilisation failed to crumble. The Mongols once again withdrew, first to Volynia, and then to the longitudinal belt of steppes north of the Black Sea: the empty expanses of European Scythia. And they never came back.
North King said:
Well, I thought that was quite obvious. Granted, both the mounted knight and the Mongol horseman fought from horseback. But this is also where all resemblance ends. The two military systems had extremely little to do with each other. The mounted knight, having only two or three mounts, formed a fraction of a typical medieval army. On the other hand, essentially all Mongol warriors were horsemen, routinely bringing a dozen remounts or more along. This alone points out a key difference. A 13th c. European army 30.000 men strong would have had perhaps 5 to 8.000 knights with 15 to 24.000 horses. A Mongol army of the same size would have numbered 30.000 horsemen and several hundred thousand mounts. In regard to logistics, the difference is very clear. On a related note, it needs to be said that a typical European army as a mixed force was, in addition to requiring far less ghrazing, much more versatile. In horse-unfriendly terrain the infantry could provide effective cover for the knights. But where the ground was suitable for the deployment of cavalry, the mounted knights could act as the striking fist. No army made up solely of horsemen could possibly match that, superior mobility being negated by difficult terrain.
@ North King
I don't understand why you think the Mongols could have supported themsleves logistically. When Batu Khan invaded Russia he would have brought with him well over a million horses. Theres no way such a vast herd could have been introduced into Europe: even if all other livestock were somehow exterminated overnight by marauders (and the owners would just turn it loose instead), and every blade of grass miraculously spared, there would still be no physical way for the Mongols to concentrate for a campaign (which in Europe usually meant protracted siege over a period of many months), but such a concentration would be necessary for the Mongols own defence, given that rapid movement would be impeded by the terrain and vegetation. Even today 47 percent of Austria is still woodland, of which 69 percent is mountain forest. Only 23 percent of the country is permanent pasture and 6 percent is winter pasture. The rest of the soil is under the plough, and horses live on grass, not wheat grain. Furthermore, while the clearing of the Austrian wilderness for cattle-breeding had begun by the tenth century, much of the alpine cover was reserved for hunting and only fell to the axe in the nineteenth century, so the thirteenth-century grazing area would have been even smaller than it is today. The annualised estimate for the modern pasturage is still only 7,933 square miles, giving Austria a realistic carrying capacity of about 72,706 steppe horses, enough to sustain 5 remounts for a military force of only 14,541 riders. So in a sustained Austrian campaign a handful of nomads would have found themselves outnumbered two-to-one by the locally-entrenched defenders, their numerical strength held at bay by a crippling lack of paddock, their speed and mobility neutralised by the terrain and the staticity of siege warfare (whose conventions normally demanded a fourfold superiority of the leaguer), and with the imminent prospect of their retreat being cut off by crusading hosts of German and Italian infantry numbering in the hundreds of thousands, with no comparable supply problems on their side, a secure rear, better equipment, and practically infinite reserves of manpower to draw on. Invasion of Middle Europe was a non-starter, which partly explains why, in the century that followed, despite repeated Christian provocations, the Golden Horde got no further west than Beuthen in Oppeln, on the Oder.
I don't understand why you think the Mongols could have supported themsleves logistically. When Batu Khan invaded Russia he would have brought with him well over a million horses. Theres no way such a vast herd could have been introduced into Europe: even if all other livestock were somehow exterminated overnight by marauders (and the owners would just turn it loose instead), and every blade of grass miraculously spared, there would still be no physical way for the Mongols to concentrate for a campaign (which in Europe usually meant protracted siege over a period of many months), but such a concentration would be necessary for the Mongols own defence, given that rapid movement would be impeded by the terrain and vegetation. Even today 47 percent of Austria is still woodland, of which 69 percent is mountain forest. Only 23 percent of the country is permanent pasture and 6 percent is winter pasture. The rest of the soil is under the plough, and horses live on grass, not wheat grain. Furthermore, while the clearing of the Austrian wilderness for cattle-breeding had begun by the tenth century, much of the alpine cover was reserved for hunting and only fell to the axe in the nineteenth century, so the thirteenth-century grazing area would have been even smaller than it is today. The annualised estimate for the modern pasturage is still only 7,933 square miles, giving Austria a realistic carrying capacity of about 72,706 steppe horses, enough to sustain 5 remounts for a military force of only 14,541 riders. So in a sustained Austrian campaign a handful of nomads would have found themselves outnumbered two-to-one by the locally-entrenched defenders, their numerical strength held at bay by a crippling lack of paddock, their speed and mobility neutralised by the terrain and the staticity of siege warfare (whose conventions normally demanded a fourfold superiority of the leaguer), and with the imminent prospect of their retreat being cut off by crusading hosts of German and Italian infantry numbering in the hundreds of thousands, with no comparable supply problems on their side, a secure rear, better equipment, and practically infinite reserves of manpower to draw on. Invasion of Middle Europe was a non-starter, which partly explains why, in the century that followed, despite repeated Christian provocations, the Golden Horde got no further west than Beuthen in Oppeln, on the Oder.
Oda Nobunaga said:
You can't possibly judge the European Military on just two battles. And do you know how the Mongols won and why the Hungarians didn't? The best way we can even hope to even compare the two in battle, is creating simulations for the armies you can use a baseline of gauging their respective effectiveness against similar enemies (like the Scythians and Huns, Chinese, Turks, Sracens, etc.)
North King said:
Really its not impossible? Perhaps the matter would be better approached from a different angle. To take 13th century France as an example, the French king could probably call on as much as half a million fighting men, depending on the seriousness of the situation and the thoroughness of the levy. Yet at no time did he ever assemble even 10% of that number for a single campaign. Why? I believe the real reason lies in logistics. Medieval Europe had considerable reserves of manpower, but the limitations of terrain, communications and agriculture meant that no really large army could operate in Europe for any extended period. Of course, that would also have held true for the Mongols. If the Europeans themselves, being familiar with the terrain, enjoying support of the local population and relying heavily on infantry could not sustain armies of 65,000 men I am certainly sure that the Mongols, lacking the advantages of the defenders and using such a large, inefficient pool of remounts would not have been able survive on a prolonged campaign in Europe in such numbers (oh yeah, let's not forget the lack of fodder 
)Uiler said:
To this I answer you question the Mongol leadership may very well have underestimated the strength of Hungarian fortifications. There were obviously skilled siege engineers in Batu's army who were capable of constructing catapults on the spot. But bringing a siege train would have inevitably slowed the Mongols down to the extent of negating the surprise effect and superior mobility. And to claim the Mongols were disinterested in Europe entirely would be grossly incorrect. First of all, their desire for world domination is clear. This meant that all unconquered nations were treated as targets. The bravado expressed in the Mongol answers to the Pope indicates that Western Europe was consiered a major target. Secondly, the Mongols invaded a number of regions which were poor by any standards. Compare the commitment of the Golden Horde in Eastern Europe and even in the Balkans. The Mongols were for some reason very active in the Russian and Balkan Realpolitik, which was a really petty affair. Yet at the same time you are arguing that these same Mongols considered Western Europe unworthy even of a raid. The very same Mongols by the way who returned from the second invasion of Poland and Hungary with a bloody nose. Therefore, I would like to suggest that from the perspective of the Golden Horde Western Europe was the No. 1 target, by all means preferable to the Russian steppe. It is evident that considerable efforts were invested in a further Mongol expansion to the west, proving that Europe was considered a worthy target.
Jeff Yu said:
you "misunderstand" only to try to slur my point- I specificilly said that th emongols didnt give a hell about thie rinfantry- and didnt make great tacticle concessiosn for it; but that dosent stop the end result from beign what it was- the infantry taking up an incresinglly important role, until, with steppe natiosn that did fulyl settle, it eclpised the cavalry entirelly- that didnt happen witht he moongols, the ecplise of the cavalry, but the tacticle important of the massed infantry is not to be denyied either.
Jeff Yu
Prince
BOTP said:First of all, how do you expect the Mongols to transport their seige trains to Europe? And Why would the Mongols want to stay besieging a fortress for 10 years
Well, the Mongols tended to avoid sieges and bypass fortifications UNTIL they had destroyed the armies out in the open field. As with elsewhere in the world, it's highly unlikely they would have had to siege and storm every last European fortress and stronghold. The Mongols made the promise to slaughter, sack, and annihilate the inhabitants of anything they sieged unless they surrendered. They only need demonstrate a few times.
Remember that during this age in Europe, castels and fortresses were taken and retaken dozens of times without actually storming the castle. As this point in time, campaigning seasons rarely lasted more than a few seasons before retainers and peasants had to return to their fields. Typical sieges during this time started with negotiations where if relief armies didn't arrive in the specified amount of time, the castle would surrender, with the implicit understanding that all inhabitants would be slaughtered mercilessly otherwise. And there were never a lack of traitors who would open the gates, nor minor lords or nobles willing to surrender for suitable compensation, titles, or estates. No siege in Europe lasted for 10 years. Even hundreds of years laters, with considerable advances in logistics, warefare, and siege technology, the sieges of Constantinople didn't last more than a year.
The Kypchak Tartars were hardly the same armies as those of Genghis and Subutai. The key of Mongol success lay not in their technology or quality of their troops: they basically had the same as the Huns, the Avars, Turks, Jurchens, Scythians, Cumans, Bulgars, and so on before them. What allowed them to succeed were their strategic, tactical, organizational, and logistical innovations, which sadly didn't outlast Genghis's sons'.
That the Mongols took too many casualties to sustain their European campaign is largely a Polish fiction. After the occupation of Hungary, they continued right on to invading Austria and Bohemia. They were within sights of the city of Vienna before they withdrew to Mongolia upon the death of Ogedai. You'll also have to remember that did this all with no more than 40,000 or so men. Polish accounts of 100,000 or more were almost certainly exaggerated. Europe was a minor border region to the Mongols. In contrast, Genghis set about invading northern China with over 200,000 horsemen. Even had the entire European invasion force been slaughtered, it would only have been a fraction of the total force available to the Mongols. As for the Mongols considering western Europe to be a worthy target that they withdrew from only after heavy losses, I'd like to point out that the Mongols dedicated more men to sieging individual Chinese cities than they did upon the entire European campaign. China and Persia were considered far more worthy targets of conquest than Western Europe.
Your logistics argument doesn't really hold. The Russian and Ukrainian steppes are far closer to western Europe than the Mongolian grasslands are to southern China. This distance from Karakorum to Beijing is farther than the distance from Moscow to Warsaw. Unlike in Europe, There was a huge Gobi desert lying between northern China and the Mongolian grasslands, while much of southern Poland and parts of Hungary are trasitional plains that allow armies to winter their horses in temporarily. The Mongols were able to launched an extended 30 year campaign into Song China, and as far south as Burma and Vietnam, thousands and thousands of miles away from the steppes. China itself is the about the size of western and eastern Europe combined, minus Scandinavia, yet the Mongols were able to efficiently handle their logistical needs through decades of extended warfare. The distance between Beijing and Guangzhou, for example, is roughly the same as that between Moscow and Paris.
The political disintegration of the Mongol Empire plays a large part in the reason why the Mongols never returned to Europe. The Il-Khans, having razed, sacked, and slaughtered Baghdad drew the ire of the newly converted Muslim Golden Horde, which led to a costly and extended civil war between the two Mongol domains. Furthermore, the rise of Timurlane came largely at the expense of former Mongol dominions and his attacks upon the Golden Horde contributed greatly to its decline and eventual disintegration.
Jeff Yu
Prince
Xen said:
you "misunderstand" only to try to slur my point- I specificilly said that th emongols didnt give a hell about thie rinfantry- and didnt make great tacticle concessiosn for it; but that dosent stop the end result from beign what it was- the infantry taking up an incresinglly important role, until, with steppe natiosn that did fulyl settle, it eclpised the cavalry entirelly- that didnt happen witht he moongols, the ecplise of the cavalry, but the tacticle important of the massed infantry is not to be denyied either.
Then name some Mongol battles outside of East Asia where they used massed infantry tactics then. I didn't even ask for ones where they played a key role. Name some Mongol battles where they used massed infantry at all, period.
This is starting to smell suspciously like BS, just like when you spuriously claimed that Atilla's Huns were a massive horse-mounted steppe army, when in fact they were a settled people settled into Hungary for generations and in fact leading a confederation of Eastern European barbarian peoples.
Jeff Yu said:
all right. gimme some time then
in the beginnign they WERE a nomadic horse mounted army- I woudl never argue that they stayed one, as the lynch of why they lost to Roman armies was the fact that had becoem semi-settled in the ukrain and the area there abouts
Evie
Pronounced like Eevee
BOTP said:
Didn't you try judging how effective the mongols would have been against the European on a SINGLE battle fought by one of the most brilliant commander of medieval Europe (Lionheart) against an enemy that was not even the mongols?
The bottom line is this : the mongol and European armies met twice on the battlefield. Both time the Europeans were routed with heavy losses despite significant number advantages.
Does that mean the Europeans would necessarily have been routed in any other confrontation with the mongols? Hardly. Had they gotten out a man with the tactical brilliance of a Lionheart (or Subotai :-D) to lead the army, you'd have gotten a much more even playing ground, and the mongolians would most likely have had to commit a much larger force to keep their chances.
Did Europe have such a commander at this point, one born in a position of power sufficient to take command? I don't know. Lionheart was in his grave by then, after all.
Will only answer to this due to lack of time.North King said:
NK, you can't say "European fortifications sucked" or whatever your saying, just because only a few sieges lasted more than 10 years. In fact, it's very wrong to do so. Instead, you should have asked "How many sieges proved unsuccesful"
You see, to siege a Castle for 10 years, you'll have to have:
- A large army
- Very good supply lines and forraging units
- And most important of all, a secure rear.
Many siege operations were abbandonned due to lack of one or several of the above. Could the Mongols provide a huge army, yes. Could the Mongols feed it, yes. Could the Mongols providea secure rear, in the middle of Europe, fighting all of Europe? No.
So they would have to either take it by Storm, which is costly, or they would be faced with the constant threat of armies coming to the besieged Castles' rescue. And even if they would constantly beat these armies, the siege it self would take years, and they would be going no where.
Finally, I don't like your arrogant use of smilies and your patronising tone. It's not proper for a serious dicussion. Especially not when you're wrong
Xen, even when I disagree with you, I find your posts interesting. However, sometimes I just stop reading them because of the trillion typing errors. Please read your posts through before you posts them, since it would help us readers a lot.
