Happy 100th anniversary of WWI!

AW Arcaeca

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I assumed this would go in the History section and not Off-Topic.

But anyways, yes, on this very day 100 years ago Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot and killed in Sarajevo, beginning a long series of war declarations that spiraled into the 4-year-long Great War.

...So not necessarily a happy anniversary but still one to remember! I was actually rather surprised no one had made a thread about it yet.
So here we are! I'm thinking in 4 years, 3 months and 1 week we can celebrate the end of WWI (or more precisely, the signing of the Treaty of Versailles). That will probably be a happier holiday. Anyone else think so? Comments on the Great War? It was just something I wanted to point out.
 
But anyways, yes, on this very day 100 years ago Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot and killed in Sarajevo, beginning a long series of war declarations that spiraled into the 4-year-long Great War.

You fail at history.
 
You fail at history.
:confused: I don't get how that's wrong. Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated July June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo - the immediate cause of WWI. And today is July 28, 2014. Upon Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia, Russia declares war on A-H in retaliation, A-H brings in their ally Germany, and then I'm pretty sure France declares war on Germany. Germany does a sweep through Belgium with their Schlieffen Plan (probably spelled that wrong), causing Britain to also declare war on Germany. Thus the, quote and quote, "long series of war declarations that spiraled into the 4-year-long Great War".

So I'm not sure what you're hinting at...?

EDIT: BenitoChavez answered it
 
You fail at history.
You don't have to be so disdainful. Just correct him on his error.

@the OP:
According to Wikipedia WWI did indeed start on July 28th 1914 when Austria-Hungry declared war on Serbia. However the Archduke was assassinated on June 28th 1914.
 
You don't have to be so disdainful. Just correct him on his error.

@the OP:
According to Wikipedia WWI did indeed start on July 28th 1914 when Austria-Hungry declared war on Serbia. However the Archduke was assassinated on June 28th 1914.

Ah, I see. Oops, must have skipped over that part since they're both on the 28th of a month. :crazyeye: I guess I was always misinformed or something that A-H immediately declared war on Serbia in response to the assassination.

Either way, still a momentous day.
 
if WWI had never happened, would there've a (similar to the real one) WWII? (renamed WWI of course).
Too many people died and suffered in the Great War to wish it a happy anniversary.
 
if WWI had never happened, would there've a (similar to the real one) WWII? (renamed WWI of course).
Too many people died and suffered in the Great War to wish it a happy anniversary.

No...ish. So much of WWII was reliant on contingent events. A whole bunch of things coming together in just the right context to spark the war. Many of those contingent events were influenced, or even directly caused by WWI and its aftermath.

That being said, you can't really take out Archduke Ferdinand and suddenly have no WWI. It's important to note that WWI was not inevitable. Even as far ahead as mid-July, 1914 the war absolutely could have been avoided. The July Crisis was severe, but there were many other crises that were even more tense than the one that ultimately kicked off the Great War. It could have just as easily been either of the Moroccan Crises in which Germany went straight up to the line, but did not cross, or the Balkan War. The important thing to take away with WWI's beginning was that no single person or event "caused" the war. Austria didn't start it. Not really. All participants of the war were willing, and all had their own agenda and reasons for doing so. Austria-Hungary pressed the crisis because they genuinely felt (and perhaps rightly so) that their legitimacy was being eroded by the constant undermining of their authority by other Great Powers, and, if they didn't do something to reassert their predominance, they would probably lose their empire. Russia had aspirations on the Balkans and parts of AH. The erosion of Austrian legitimacy and hegemony were to their direct benefit in their areas of interest. The German political machine was built on the nationalistic appearance of dominance and German strength. Although many political players within Germany didn't wish to go to war (certainly not that war), as with the Austrian elite, the German Social Democratic Party (SDP) felt that their status as a great power was being eroded by failures in past crises (particularly with the two Moroccan Crises) and that, particularly, this was harmful to the SDP platform and the center of the very German identity. France had an interest in appearing tough on Germany and they also had aspirations on Alsace Lorraine and revenge for 1871, and the Liberal Party felt, genuinely, that if they didn't do something to distract from the domestic [feces]storm brewing in Ireland the entire nation was going to be torn asunder in Civil War. All nations were equally culpable.

THAT BEING SAID even if you take away THIS WWI there's really no reason to suppose some sort of war wasn't going to kick off. There was too much stuff flying around in early-1900s Europe for something not to happen. Dachs a couple years back wrote a very interesting take in which he posits a Russian victory in 1905 leading to a major reshuffling of political divisions (namely, the breakup of the Entente Cordial and a reforming of the Dreikaiserbund), with conflict breaking out in 1916 over Hungary. For me it's hard to imagine a world in which some kind of war doesn't break out in Europe sometime between 1900-1925ish
 
It's important to note that WWI was not inevitable. Even as far ahead as mid-July, 1914 the war absolutely could have been avoided. The July Crisis was severe, but there were many other crises that were even more tense than the one that ultimately kicked off the Great War. It could have just as easily been either of the Moroccan Crises in which Germany went straight up to the line, but did not cross, or the Balkan War.
The important thing to take away with WWI's beginning was that no single person or event "caused" the war. Austria didn't start it. Not really. All participants of the war were willing, and all had their own agenda and reasons for doing so.

Germany wasn't ready at the time of the Moroccan crisis, it was still building up its fleet. And the UK succeeded in denying it the ports in the Atlantic that the Germans sought.

But you are right, ultimately there were several intractable crisis brewing:
- Germany's insistence in building up a large fleet, which the UK could not tolerate (and tried just about everything to have the germans quit it, including offering them more colonies far away - not in the North Atlantic.
- France's irredentist claims on Alsace and Lorraine;
- Serbia's pan-slavic ambitions;

Russia went to war because it had assurances from France that it would be backed; France gave those assurances because people in Paris calculated, correctly, that the UK could not tolerate a german victory and would necessarily honor its alliance with France.

Even if the crisis in Serbia didn't happen, the UK was preparing for war, in order to prevent Germany from rivaling it with its navy. There was no other way to keep british supremacy at sea, because the german government kept increasing its navy. It wasn't just France that wanted to cut the rising German Empire down to size. The UK's motives for going to war are often forgotten.

And Germany, obviously, had been planning for a war to completely defeat and neutralize France for a long time. I do think they miscalculated in betting that the UK would remain out of it, just because the UK had spend the past two decades trying, through diplomacy, to contain the build-up of the german fleet. The germans took that attitude for a "the UK has no willingness to go to war". But it had.
 
I like to think of WWI as the closest thing to a steampunk war.


That said, I think I only have one living relative who was even alive at during the war, some distant cousin of my grandmother who I think was born towards the end of it. I think my grandfather was born in 1918 or so, but he passed away years ago. Anyways, quite haunting to think it was a century or so ago, despite it's effects.
 
I wouldn't exactly call it a happy anniversary. That makes it sound like it was a good thing. It's kind of like back in 2002 when one of my teachers said it was time to go to the 9/11 celebration, instead of observance. Very different connotations, even if it's fundamentally an anniversary of an event.

Interesting analysis by Owen and innonimatu. I'll leave it to the experts, lest I also fail at history.

cybrxkhan, if anything I'd consider it surprising that you have any relatives who were alive during the Great War. Having ended more than 95 years ago, any relatives alive then would have to be fairly elderly.
 
cybrxkhan, if anything I'd consider it surprising that you have any relatives who were alive during the Great War. Having ended more than 95 years ago, any relatives alive then would have to be fairly elderly.

If I remember correctly this relative of mine is 96 or 97, which would've made her a baby during the Great War, but hey, I think that's still pretty interesting. She was already pretty ancient when I last saw her several years back. Last I heard she's still alive, but I think she'll be going anytime now. I do have a couple other relatives who are around 90 or so, but of course they weren't alive during the war.
 
innomatu said:
- Germany's insistence in building up a large fleet, which the UK could not tolerate (and tried just about everything to have the germans quit it, including offering them more colonies far away - not in the North Atlantic...

Even if the crisis in Serbia didn't happen, the UK was preparing for war, in order to prevent Germany from rivaling it with its navy. There was no other way to keep british supremacy at sea, because the german government kept increasing its navy. It wasn't just France that wanted to cut the rising German Empire down to size. The UK's motives for going to war are often forgotten.
Bethmann Hollweg had unilaterally ended the Naval Race in 1912.
 
We look at what they did to each other and see quite clearly that they were mad. They were mad and fools. Of course we are now so much wiser. Nothing like this could ever happen again.
 
My grandmother told me story about relative. He was captured but I do not know on which front and I am not able to ask her any more. They cut his thumb to make sure that he will be not able to shoot anymore. In POW camp he nearly died because he was exchanging food for cigarettes. He died soon after end of war because bad health.
 
It could have just as easily been either of the Moroccan Crises in which Germany went straight up to the line, but did not cross, or the Balkan War.

Well, not really. It's funny how British propaganda managed to turn a story of French imperialism and British warmongering into a story of German imperialism. The Morocco crisis was all about the French breaking international agreements and the British going apehorsehocky for no reason at all. Heck, if it weren't for the British, this whole story would have been an unimportant footnote in history that would have been easily settled by the French and Germans without much fuss at all. But somehow a token reaction that simply had to come was turned into this big bad evil act, while there was miraculously nothing wrong with France breaking multiple agreements regarding Morocco or Spain sending over a sizeable army to take northern morocco as promised by the French. I guess when you get bribed by the French, and the Spanish and Italians as well, it's best to blame the situation on the one who was left out out of you circumventing an agreement.


WW1 really was one heck of a mess. Lots of countries that had some sort of reason to look forward to war to settle some issues. At some point in time a big war would have come, though it is tough to say what the consequences would have been. What's truly sad is how the war could have been prevented at multiple times, with outside influences screwing things up again. If Bethmann Hollweg hadn't twisted Wilhelm's words towards Austria, they probably wouldn't have gone to war. Just like Nicholas wouldn't have have gone to war if it hadn't been for Poincare. The list goes on and on.
 
Well, not really. It's funny how British propaganda managed to turn a story of French imperialism and British warmongering into a story of German imperialism. The Morocco crisis was all about the French breaking international agreements and the British going apehorsehocky for no reason at all. Heck, if it weren't for the British, this whole story would have been an unimportant footnote in history that would have been easily settled by the French and Germans without much fuss at all.

No, the british went apehorsehocky because Germany was trying to seize a naval base in the North Atlantic in a place where the british fleet couldn't easily blockade it in case of war. It was a fundamental piece of british strategy to absolutely not allow such a thing to happen, and they made it clear to the germans that they were ready to go to war to prevent it.
And that defused the crisis, forcing Germany to back off. No use going to war over a naval base if your fleet isn't strong enough yet anyway.

If Bethmann Hollweg hadn't twisted Wilhelm's words towards Austria, they probably wouldn't have gone to war. Just like Nicholas wouldn't have have gone to war if it hadn't been for Poincare. The list goes on and on.

If you want to blame a single person (two, actually) for the conscious decision to start a world war, blame von Hotzendorff and von Berchtold. Franz Joseph wasn't in a haste to start a war (hell, he was relived that his heir got killed). Wilhelm II thought the austrian emperor would be content with the serbian answer to the ultimatum, and he probably would have accepted it... but for those two pressing him for war.
Wilhelm had good reasons to risk giving his blank check: the need to keep Germany's only reliable ally, and a belief that the austrians wouldn't precipitate a war. But he misjudged the way policy was being set in Vienna.

Austria had already gotten away with seizing Bosnia in 1908, when the Russians were weak, disregarding protests from the Russians and the british. The Russians couldn't let the get away with crushing Serbia in 1914 and still keep any semblance of influence in the Balkans. They'd have preferred to wait until 1916 at least, to be better prepared, but Austria forced their hand. That they had France backing them was an encouragement to take the risk of war, sure. But the austrians started it.
And Germany was the one that actually declared war on France, not the opposite. And that with the usual german lies about being attacked first. So they weren't exactly saints either. In the final act of the cascade of DoW Bethmann-Hollweg had the gall to complain to the british ambassador that the british made war on a "friendly nation" "for a piece of paper", meaning their mutual treaty to respect the sovereignty of Belgium!

Bethmann Hollweg had unilaterally ended the Naval Race in 1912.

That was certainly not the way the british saw things. The Admiralty was warning the government that the german navy might become too strong to be contained by 1917, if it wasn't checked before. Lloyd George warned during the moroccan crisis that peace at the price of sacrificing the prominent british position among the greap powers was unacceptable. Bethman-Hollweg received Haldane (who had already reorganized the british army in 1908 and created the officer corps necessary for the future BEF) in Berlin in February 1912 to try to end the tensions between the two countries. The british were so desperate to put a stop to the naval race that they were even been willing to betray one of their alliances and offer Germany a lot more territory in Africa if the germans froze their fleet expansion. But the germans wouldn't agree to freeze their build-up of the fleet, only to limit the growth. It was too little. In March the british and the french did something unthinkable just a few years before: coordinated their fleet operations to let the british handle the Atlantic and concentrate their power there (thereby assuming the responsibility of defending the french Atlantic coast in the event of war) and the french handle the Mediterranean. The Entente Cordiale finally involved a military compromise that could not be easily broken.

The british still went on to agree to split the portuguese colonies in Africa with Germany... only to see yet another german naval act expand even further the size of the planned german fleet. Without breaking those negotiations, they turned around and warned the portuguese ambassador that Portugal should not to borrow from Germany (a default was to be the excuse for taking those colonies). The agreement, delayed and eventually signed in August 1913, was already void. The british establishment had already accepted that the only way to stop Germany was through war...
 
No...ish. So much of WWII was reliant on contingent events. A whole bunch of things coming together in just the right context to spark the war. Many of those contingent events were influenced, or even directly caused by WWI and its aftermath.

That being said, you can't really take out Archduke Ferdinand and suddenly have no WWI. It's important to note that WWI was not inevitable. Even as far ahead as mid-July, 1914 the war absolutely could have been avoided. The July Crisis was severe, but there were many other crises that were even more tense than the one that ultimately kicked off the Great War. It could have just as easily been either of the Moroccan Crises in which Germany went straight up to the line, but did not cross, or the Balkan War. The important thing to take away with WWI's beginning was that no single person or event "caused" the war. Austria didn't start it. Not really. All participants of the war were willing, and all had their own agenda and reasons for doing so. Austria-Hungary pressed the crisis because they genuinely felt (and perhaps rightly so) that their legitimacy was being eroded by the constant undermining of their authority by other Great Powers, and, if they didn't do something to reassert their predominance, they would probably lose their empire. Russia had aspirations on the Balkans and parts of AH. The erosion of Austrian legitimacy and hegemony were to their direct benefit in their areas of interest. The German political machine was built on the nationalistic appearance of dominance and German strength. Although many political players within Germany didn't wish to go to war (certainly not that war), as with the Austrian elite, the German Social Democratic Party (SDP) felt that their status as a great power was being eroded by failures in past crises (particularly with the two Moroccan Crises) and that, particularly, this was harmful to the SDP platform and the center of the very German identity. France had an interest in appearing tough on Germany and they also had aspirations on Alsace Lorraine and revenge for 1871, and the Liberal Party felt, genuinely, that if they didn't do something to distract from the domestic [feces]storm brewing in Ireland the entire nation was going to be torn asunder in Civil War. All nations were equally culpable.

THAT BEING SAID even if you take away THIS WWI there's really no reason to suppose some sort of war wasn't going to kick off. There was too much stuff flying around in early-1900s Europe for something not to happen. Dachs a couple years back wrote a very interesting take in which he posits a Russian victory in 1905 leading to a major reshuffling of political divisions (namely, the breakup of the Entente Cordial and a reforming of the Dreikaiserbund), with conflict breaking out in 1916 over Hungary. For me it's hard to imagine a world in which some kind of war doesn't break out in Europe sometime between 1900-1925ish

wow! it's all I've got to say to that post, very impressive knowledge of the subject.
 
Is it true France never fully recouped itself after the Great War (despite winning it) and simply wasn't ready for WWII?
Was Germany's surrender unavoidable?
 
Is it true France never fully recouped itself after the Great War (despite winning it) and simply wasn't ready for WWII?

France was materially quite ready for WW2. Their failure was tactic and political. And it they didn't had so many fools (Gamelin) and traitors (Petain) among their generals they might have even recovered and made the germans bleed so much that the whole encirclement at Dunkirk thing was turned around. It was a close thing. It was one of those cases where erratic behaviour was worse than just letting the original strategy, though flawed, be carried on: Gamelin was correcting for the original failures when he was replaced, Weygard failed to do so, Petain was a phony...

Was Germany's surrender unavoidable?

The Central Empires were weaker in terms of resources, due to the british naval blockade. But had done a good job during the first half of the war of seizing alternative sources of supply. Some blunders like having Romania become a belligerent, losing and being quickly occupied, very much helpers the Central Powers.
My opinion is that until 1917, despite the imbalance in resources, it could have gone either way: a peace favorable to the central empires (but with gains essentially to the east), or their defeat as it happened. The collapse of Russia created an opportunity for them to win: France and Italy were hard pressed defending their borders and could be really threatened if the germans and austrians made good use of the troops released from the eastern front after the separate peace with Russia. And the british were not faring that well against the Ottomans yet.

But they wasted it. First by adding the US to the ranks of the Allies for no good reason. Germany by 1917 still lacked a submarine fleet capable of choking the UK, and the two years of respite it had given the british since 1915 had allowed them do develop countermeasures (depth charges and the hydrophone). And then by splitting their troops across several offensives along the western fronts, instead of hitting , and hitting hard, on one place. Italy might have been knocked out of the war - but the germans pulled out their troops from that front after Caporetto, and then the austrians were incapable of success at any further major offensive, and finally disintegrated an Vittorio Venneto....
In Greece a (comparative) handful of french and british troops, together with the remnants of the serbians, kept pinning central power troops and threatening both communications with the ottomans and vital trade in scarce resources from the balkans - they could and should have been pushed to the sea: evem the ottomans were capable enough to do that in the Dardanelles! But no, instead of hitting the aliies on their weakest points, the germans just had to keep committing their troops to useless offensives in their western front with France...

All throughout the war, the german high command failed again and again on strategy. They miscalculated that Belgium would fold, were caught unprepared when the bergians fought, and wasted days bringing heavy artillery to demolish the forts at Liège. They kept pulling troops from their planned invasion of France until their western wing was too weakened to be able to carry out the original plan. They also chickened out and failed to withdraw from Lorraine, as per the original plan, thus failing to draw the french main force (the french still being committed tho the offensive there) away from Paris into a position where they couldn't redeploy west in time. Finally, they started submarine warfare against the UK without first building a large submarine fleet (the UK actually had more submarines at the start of the war!) and without being fully committed (they backed out of it when faced with the possibility of the US entering the war), thus exposing that british vulnerability without exploiting it, and giving the UK tine to prepare countermeasures.

The Allies, otoh, didn't made nearly as much mistakes. Not pushing for Istanbul was one, but that the one big mistake I can think of.
 
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