What would have happened if France had held the Meuse in 1940?

practically in random order :
from 1933 to 1939 the german army went from minor defense force to the worlds most powerfull fighting force in only six years, 30 Panzer Divisions
although touched upon in a detailed post the number of divisions were 10 and they reached 21 by the time of Barbarossa . Though this doesn't imply a doubling of the combat power of the German tank park . On a formation basis the divisions were divided into two , the norm was to a have a single tank battalion instead of the two provided in the previous scheme . Why Barbarossa happened is some great mystery considering the Germans had more tanks and planes when invading Poland .

the Maginot line did what it was supposed to do ; it stopped a general German attack through the area it defended . There was never any intention of making the line unpenetrable . And it wasn't exactly a line anyhow . Rather it was a group of observation posts acting as tripwires for a limited amount of firebases . Their intention was to delay and attrite and the few cases they were in combat showed the troops in them were hardly cowards . There is one case the exchange ratio of casualties was in favour of the French , at an impressive 40 to 1 . There is an article somewhere that an US author nearly brags how they were destroying the fortifications with ease in 1944 . With Germans in them and the Wehrmacht had famously resorted to flanking the line . Germans in 1940 did engage the line after it was outflanked , to gain its surrender .

the full up solution , the 80 cm cannon was not ready in 1940 . Though the contribution of the line to the German artillery arm was quite profound . Despite all the established narrative about Rommel suddenly discovering the benefits in use of the Acht Komma Acht in a ground combat in Arras , the 88 was meant to be multimission from its service entry in 1936 , especially against fortifications .

De Gaulle was the only [decent general capable of thinking on his feet] the French had
am firmly of the opinion that he was highly ambitious and a major player in the French decision making , first as a mouthpiece of Petain , then as a confidant of the French PM .

I think the last chance for the German High Command to oust Hitler was March 1939
there is this talk of repeated reminders to a group of German high rankers about the benefit of RAF raids to Berlin , where "a fluke hit" could be produced by certain German co-operation , early 1941 would have been excellent . In any case by Wannsee the window of opportunity was largely gone , the conduct of Germans of all stripes against the Bolshevik untermensch eroded even those Red Stripers' own perception of themselves as honourable warriors . Of course the commitment of Germany to total war at last neatly matches with the Junker understanding that there wasn't much chance anymore of convincing people out of their borders about their nobility . Before that the stupid , straight out of city sewers type criminals also known as Nazis were treating the German population with velvet gloves , hurting the German war effort kinda immensely .

and those worthless Nazis knew they were , how to put it , worthy of being targeted . There is a reason for the existence of SS which was groomed to become larger as the war went on ; they could even take on the Wehrmacht if it came to the shove and Nazis used the interlude the SS provided to indoctrinate the rest of country . Wasn't plain sailing ; ı hear in 1944 one in a thousand Germans were punished for their political views . Impressive in a police state with the actual Gestapo ...

The Soviet plans for a war with Germany listed 1944 as the year to attack.
this delayed timeframe is the first that ı have seen but it might well be exactly so , Russians did not underestimate Germans in the same scale as the Western Allies , though one might probably argue that it was also coloured by the May-June 1940 fighting .

my wall to wall thread and this ı have written a lot for the day by my standarts , will add a few more things if ı can .
 
There is one case the exchange ratio of casualties was in favour of the French , at an impressive 40 to 1 .

What battle was it? Such a casualty ratio seems to be a myth.

I didn't know that German infantry used to carry out suicide "Banzai" charges... :rolleyes:

But maybe German training quality decreased so terribly from 1939 to 1940, that they stopped exploiting firepower superiority while fighting against fortifications (see below) and started instead to perform suicidal "Banzai-style" infantry charges using soldiers as cannon meat ???

In fact what really is suicidal, is defending inside fortifications against great enemy odds - as there is no chance to withdraw in such case...

Despite all the established narrative about Rommel suddenly discovering the benefits in use of the Acht Komma Acht in a ground combat in Arras , the 88 was meant to be multimission from its service entry in 1936 , especially against fortifications .

Exactly, they already used Acht Komma Achts against ground targets during the Spanish Civil War and then in Poland 1939.

For example in 1939 in the battle for the Polish line of bunkers near Nowogrod at the Narew, Germans used against bunkers: Luftwaffe air attacks, heavy artillery, explosive charges, AT guns, AA guns of all calibres (including 8,8s), MG and mortar fire on loopholes, and flamethrowers - but according to both Polish and German sources the most devastating* for crews of the bunkers were 8,8cm AA guns and flamethrowers. German artillery also fired many smoke grenades to put down smoke screen while engineers & infantry were crossing the river, to minimize casualties.

*Not only in terms of inflicting most casualties, also because 8,8 cm FlaK firepower badly shook the bunkers (power of these heavy calibre explosions hitting the concrete bunkers, even if not piercing the walls, was still stunning the crews inside and making them almost unable to fight).

In another battle for a group of bunkers - at Wizna - Germans also used tanks. Tanks maybe have not enough firepower to significantly harm bunkers, but on the other hand they can easily get close to the bunkers and block their loopholes so that crews of the bunkers can't carry out fire and engineers with infantry can safely get close to the bunkers to put explosive charges and denotate some of the defenders.

Description of using AA guns (including heavy Achts Komma Achts) at Nowogrod (fragments from Hadamovsky's "Blitzmarsch nach Warschau"):

Spoiler :

"Soon after capturing Pultusk and Rozan German air and ground armed forces proceeded to a joint action along a more northern section of the Narew. Heavy bombers and dive bombers drove the enemy away from their positions in the open field of the Nowogrod at the Narew's bridgehead. The Polish defenders withdrew and established further defence partially in buildings of town of Nowogrod and partially in bunkers behind the Narew. (...)

The fight was heavy and ferocious. This position, decisive for the outflanking of Warsaw, was holding even harder and longer than lines of bunkers at the Mlawa. Heavy batteries of Anti-Aircraft artillery arrived at the first German line and opened fire, aiming at little armored domes of enemy fortifications. Diameter of each dome was just 1 m and height was 1/2 m. Such tiny objects were the targets. Each grenade was hitting the target within a finger's width from others, until finally one of them was piercing the little dome and tearing the defenders inside apart. (...)

Then was the time for the bloody work of infantry to begin, which was crossing the river with contempt of death
[protected by smoke screens put down by artillery - Domen]. Polish bunkers opened flanking fire from those of the tiny domes which had not been destroyed yet. (...)"

Photo - armored dome of one of Polish bunkers at Nowogrod (after the battle):



Some further fragments:

"(...) More to the east in the next bunker its crew defended it with fierce madness. That particular bunker, built-in an old bridge dike, had to be neutralized with flanking fire of Anti-Aircraft guns at side loopholes. A grenade destroyed its armored dome and torn to shreds part of its crew, but those who survived continued to resist and they could not be forced to silence by artillery. Grenade after grenade was exploding on a concrete wall, unable to pierce it, eventually pioneers and infantry jointly detonated the iron armor-plated doors. However, the defenders continued to resist and were killed only after hand-to-hand combat. Near the bunkers they found their modest soldierly grave, marked with a wooden cross and a Polish helmet.

The third bunker, located more to the east, resisted so long and fiercely, until a grenade of a quick-firing AA gun hit the loophole and exploded inside the bunker with terrible power. The iron armor-plated doors leading to the neighbouring interval, torn out of the hinges and twisted, were thrown by explosion to the bedroom of the crew. Straw in the bedroom started to burn, fire rapidly expanded inside the bunker. When we entered, a brave defender lied crosswise the armored doors, as a black, charred mass."


Photo - Nowogrod, crew of German AT gun advances, 2 dead bodies of bunker defenders (the one behind apparently burned by flamethrower):



The dead body in pullover is Lt. Mieczysław Jarzyna (as recognized by his own sister 3 years ago), commander of bunker "U Grobli".

According to accounts of Polish survivors of the battle, when still surviving defenders of "U Grobli" bunker ran out of all ammo, they opened the door of their bunker and attempted to charge to hand-to-hand combat against the Germans. Apparently they didn't manage to charge too far...

======================================

BTW - the ratio of casualties in the battle of Nowogrod at the Narew was more or less like 1:1, and I personally think that it is impressive, considering that there was one German division strengthened by artillery from Corps level and by Luftwaffe, against one battalion + one company, with minimal artillery support...

But of course 1:1 ratio is when we compare Polish losses to actual casualty reports of German 21st Inf.Div. According to myths (memoirs of defenders, books, etc.), ratio would be 9:1 in favour of the Poles, as according to these Germans lost 1500 dead and 3000+ wounded in the battle of Nowogrod.

4500, this would mean that each of Polish defenders killed or wounded some 5+ Germans...
 
Is that also without China? Because I'm going to disagree with you strongly there.
No, that's not without China. China was pretty integral.

I'll get back to everyone else later. I'll have to do some digging to find that old post, re: Britain handling the Axis. I've been through about three computers since then, so it may take a few days, since it only exists here now.
 
Inferior manpower. Inferior production. Inferior natural resources.
Yes, the inferior manpower, production and natural resources of the Axis is a serious problem, but why would it prevent the British from winning?
 
Despite all the established narrative about Rommel suddenly discovering the benefits in use of the Acht Komma Acht in a ground combat in Arras , the 88 was meant to be multimission from its service entry in 1936 , especially against fortifications .

The 88mm Flak (AA) gun was developed in 1939-40. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8.8_cm_Flak_18/36/37/41

The story of Rommel refers to his drive to the Channel, which was flank-attacked by British Mathildas. Since they proved impenetrable to the Panzers´ shells, he resorted to using 88s to stop their counter-attack.

am firmly of the opinion that he was highly anbitious and a major player in the French decision making , first as a mouthpiece of Petain , then as a confidant of the French PM .

You are talking about De Gaulle here, leader of the Free French? Unlike Pétain, he refused to surrender to the Germans. So I´m not sure when he was ´a mouthpiece of Petain´, as you say...
 
The 88mm Flak (AA) gun was developed in 1939-40. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8.8_cm_Flak_18/36/37/41

You badly failed to read your own link. :p

The story of Rommel refers to his drive to the Channel, which was flank-attacked by British Mathildas. Since they proved impenetrable to the Panzers´ shells, he resorted to using 88s to stop their counter-attack.

Which was not any novelty at all.

Yet in 1937 general Ludwig Ritter von Eimansberger expressed his opinion about 88s, stating that these guns have considerable Anti-Armour capabilities. About usage of AA artillery (not just 88s) in Spain vs ground targets says also book "Deutsche kämpfen in Spanien", published in 1939 - translation:

"Since the start of year 1937 AA artillery was being increasingly more and more often exploited to conduct fire against ground targets. Thanks to precise aiming mechanism and considerable range of flat fire these guns were especially suitable for such utilization. (...) Analysis of utilization of Flaks in the last major assault of the Spanish war in Catalonia has proven that only 7% of instances of opening fire were instances associated with Anti-Air defense and in further 93% of instances fire against ground targets was being conducted."
 
Yes, the inferior manpower, production and natural resources of the Axis is a serious problem, but why would it prevent the British from winning?

Are you serious here?

Germany had far superior manpower, production and (arguably) natural resources to Britain alone.

Add to this other Axis states.

When it comes to "Sea Lion" - invasion of Britain indeed most likely didn't have great chances to succeed, but the problem was not within Luftwaffe, nor within Heer (the ground Army) - it was within Kriegsmarine (Navy). Luftwaffe had chances to win the battle of Britain and even to win air supremacy over south England. In fact that was a close victory for the Allies. But even with air supremacy over south England it would be hard for Kriegsmarine to conduct a successful, large scale seaborne invasion with limited resources (including limited means of transport) it had.

During much of the BoB RAF was suffering casualties - especially in manpower - faster than it could replace them. So was the Luftwaffe. But overall capability of replacing losses of the Luftwaffe was bigger than that of RAF. However, Luftwaffe was also suffering bigger losses than Allies. And British losses in manpower could be replaced also by experienced volunteers from other countries, a fact already mentioned by Lord Baal.

As many as 21% of all Allied fighter pilots who fought (and 22% who died) in the battle of Britain, were not British:

Pilots participating in the BoB (in brackets how many of them were killed - remember that apart from killed many were also wounded or captured):

Of the 2367 pilots who took part in the Battle of Britain, 446 were killed. They can be defined by nationality as follows:

United Kingdom - 1878 took part (348 were killed)
Poland - 141 took part (29 were killed)
Canada - 88 took part (20 were killed)
Czechoslovakia - 88 took part (8 were killed)
New Zealand - 73 took part (11 were killed)
Belgium - 26 took part (6 were killed)
Australia - 21 took part (14 were killed)
South Africa - 21 took part (9 were killed)
Free French - 13 took part (none were killed)
Ireland - 8 took part (none were killed)
United States - 7 took part (1 was killed)
Southern Rhodesia - 2 took part (neither were killed)
Palestine - 1 took part (he wasn't killed)

So power of Royal Navy and weakness of Kriegsmarine (especially after Norway) would always be the worst obstacles for a successful invasion.

The British Army, which was at that time small and badly armed (tonnes of equipment were lost in France - including Dunkirk, from which most of soldiers were evacuated, but vast majority of equipment was lost - and people tend to forget about this) was no any real opposition for the Wehrmacht in 1940.

PS: But in Panzer General II I won the "Sea Lion" mission. ;)

====================================

Edit:

Now some numbers to confirm what I wrote above:

British Expeditionary Force irrecoverable equipment losses in France (all causes, captured & abandoned included):

1. Tanks:

Mk VIb - 345
Mk VIc - 62
A-9 - 6
A-9CS - 18
A-10 - 31
A-13 Mk 1 - 31
A-13 Mk 2 - 38
A-13 MkIV - 57
A-13 Mk IVA - 8
Matilda I - 97
Matilda II - 29

Total - 722 tanks lost

2. Armoured cars:

Guy Mk I - 6
Morris CS9 - 39
Scout Cars - 124

Total - 169 armoured cars lost

3. Carriers:

Scout - 491
Bren - 84
OP - 87
Lloyd - 8

Total - 670 carriers lost

4. Guns:

18 pf - 221 out of 237
25 pf - 700 out of 772
4.5'' hb - 103 out of 115
4.5'' ar - 32 out of 32
60 pf - 19 out of 19
6'' hb - 221 out of 221
6'' ar - 13 out of 13
8'' hb - 13 out of 13
9.2'' hb - 27 out of 27
9.2'' ar kol. - 2 out of 2
12'' hb - 4 out of 4
25 mm AT - 383 out of 386
2 pf AT - 580 out of 647
AA guns - 384 out of 421

Total - 2702 artillery pieces out of 2909 lost (= 93% lost)

5. Other equipment:

2'' mortars - 1350
3'' mortars - 250
AT rifles - 6400
pistols - 10000 (10 thousands)
rifles - 180000 (180 thousands)
LMGs - 10700 (11 thousands)

6. Motor vehicles:

motorcycles - 25778
personnel cars - 8834
trucks - 32460
ambulances - 3439
tractors - 2618
trailers - 1551

Total - 74680 (75 thousands) motor vehicles lost

==================================

Replacing these losses would take the British industry a lot of time - at least several long months probably.
 
You are talking about De Gaulle here, leader of the Free French? Unlike Pétain, he refused to surrender to the Germans. So I´m not sure when he was ´a mouthpiece of Petain´, as you say...
The two men had a relationship going back as far as 1912, before either Pétain was The Saviour of the Nation of WWI, nor de Gaulle had yet established himself as the wild young Turk of French military theory of the inter-war years.

The thing is, Pétain decided to be the patron of this promising young officer who already pre-WWI had realised in an upcoming infantry war Pétain, rather a lone voice among instructors at the St Cyr military academy at the time, was talking sense about cover and firepower. Post-WWI part of Pétains patronage extended to overturning the not very good grades de Gaulle had come out of the military academy with in favour of some that would ensure him the kind of career Pétain thought he deserved. (Considering what a lousy job the French army at the time was clearly doing as far as promoting merit, he probably had a fair point.

His patronage also took the form of in 1925 hiring de Gaulle as his personal secretary, and then the views about what followed diverge. The objective was the writing of a book (working titel of "Le soldat" it seems, as it was never written).

De Gaulle only spent a few months on this post, as it transpired that de Gaulle had taken the job thinking he would be writing a book in his own name, presenting his own ideas, and then Pétain would write a preface, as part of selling it - while Pétain apparently had taken de Gaulle on simply as a ghost writer ("nègre" in the less-than-cute French parlance about these things) and would not only put his name on the book, but would freely use any and all of de Gaulle's ideas as his own.

When the positions became clear to the parties, de Gaulle handed in his notice. The two men and their supporters then spent the remainder of the 1920's and the 1930's arguing about the matter. There's apparently a lengthy Pétain-de Gaulle correpondence about it.

Then there also seems to be a bunch of die-hard Pétainists who somehow try to argue that all these things about professional armies and the use of tanks de Gaulle eventually put into his own books in the 1930's was actually Pétain's thinking - not that they are given much consideration by people serious about history. Instead there was a divergence between de Gaulle's views if what the future would require of the French army and the the actual developments Pétain, among others, presided over. In the end de Gaulle's verdict over Pétain became that: "Pétain was a great man who died in 1925" - as it happens the year of their falling out.
 
Are you serious here?

Germany had far superior manpower, production and (arguably) natural resources to Britain alone.

Well, to be fair I believe the original comparison said "British Empire".

Pretty sure that this flips manpower (India) and natural resources (all of them) at least decisively back into the British column.
 
Industrial production was still superior in Germany, Axis & German-occupied territories than in British Empire.

Anyway what really counted was potential in Europe, not somewhere at the end of the world. The fact is that Germany controlled large part of Europe by June of 1941 (before the attack on the USSR). Britain at that time controlled in Europe only British Isles and Malta... And was alone against Axis.

But if you stick to colonial potential - after the fall of France, Vichy France - with its entire colonial empire - also supported Germany.

If Britain had so superior manpower as you claim, why couldn't it do anything about Germans capturing France, Greece, etc.

And both to France and Greece Britain sent its military forces. Why were these forces so small, if Britain had superior manpower, as you claim?

In Africa, since Rommel arrived, British were in defensive and Axis was in offensive - Axis had initiative in Africa for long time.

Pretty sure that this flips manpower (India)

Manpower is worth nothing when you can't arm them.

Plus I also doubt that millions of India's men were so eager (or trained enough - how big was India's standing army?) to go fight in Europe...

By the time of the battle of Britain, British ground Army was actually some 300 - 350 thousands strong, IIRC.

That was a puny force compared to German ground forces, which numbered in millions already in 1939.
 
Yes, the inferior manpower, production and natural resources of the Axis is a serious problem, but why would it prevent the British from winning?

The German economy alone was larger than that of the United Kingdom.

~18 million men served in the Wehrmacht. ~5 million in the British armed forces.

Are we done here?
 
~18 million men served in the Wehrmacht. ~5 million in the British armed forces.

Are we done here?
Only if you're willing to concede that China faced a similar shortage of manpower visa vis Japan.

As for production lets look at that:
Britain Outproduced Germany in tanks in 1941, and 42 (after which they started scaling that back on their own)
Despite focusing on heavy, 4 to 6 engine bombers the British outproduced the Germans in aircraft production in 41, 42 and 43.
And then of course there was the fact that Britain was still producing Naval Warships and Merchant Marine fleets in vast numbers compared to the negligible output of the Germans.
Yeah, they certainly seemed to have the advantage in production capacity, too.
 
You badly failed to read your own link. :p



Which was not any novelty at all.

Yet in 1937 general Ludwig Ritter von Eimansberger expressed his opinion about 88s, stating that these guns have considerable Anti-Armour capabilities. About usage of AA artillery (not just 88s) in Spain vs ground targets says also book "Deutsche kämpfen in Spanien", published in 1939 - translation:

"Since the start of year 1937 AA artillery was being increasingly more and more often exploited to conduct fire against ground targets. Thanks to precise aiming mechanism and considerable range of flat fire these guns were especially suitable for such utilization. (...) Analysis of utilization of Flaks in the last major assault of the Spanish war in Catalonia has proven that only 7% of instances of opening fire were instances associated with Anti-Air defense and in further 93% of instances fire against ground targets was being conducted."

None of which mentions any 88, as they hadn´t been developed yet...

The two men had a relationship going back as far as 1912, before either Pétain was The Saviour of the Nation of WWI, nor de Gaulle had yet established himself as the wild young Turk of French military theory of the inter-war years.

The thing is, Pétain decided to be the patron of this promising young officer who already pre-WWI had realised in an upcoming infantry war Pétain, rather a lone voice among instructors at the St Cyr military academy at the time, was talking sense about cover and firepower. Post-WWI part of Pétains patronage extended to overturning the not very good grades de Gaulle had come out of the military academy with in favour of some that would ensure him the kind of career Pétain thought he deserved. (Considering what a lousy job the French army at the time was clearly doing as far as promoting merit, he probably had a fair point.

His patronage also took the form of in 1925 hiring de Gaulle as his personal secretary, and then the views about what followed diverge. The objective was the writing of a book (working titel of "Le soldat" it seems, as it was never written).

De Gaulle only spent a few months on this post, as it transpired that de Gaulle had taken the job thinking he would be writing a book in his own name, presenting his own ideas, and then Pétain would write a preface, as part of selling it - while Pétain apparently had taken de Gaulle on simply as a ghost writer ("nègre" in the less-than-cute French parlance about these things) and would not only put his name on the book, but would freely use any and all of de Gaulle's ideas as his own.

When the positions became clear to the parties, de Gaulle handed in his notice. The two men and their supporters then spent the remainder of the 1920's and the 1930's arguing about the matter. There's apparently a lengthy Pétain-de Gaulle correpondence about it.

Then there also seems to be a bunch of die-hard Pétainists who somehow try to argue that all these things about professional armies and the use of tanks de Gaulle eventually put into his own books in the 1930's was actually Pétain's thinking - not that they are given much consideration by people serious about history. Instead there was a divergence between de Gaulle's views if what the future would require of the French army and the the actual developments Pétain, among others, presided over. In the end de Gaulle's verdict over Pétain became that: "Pétain was a great man who died in 1925" - as it happens the year of their falling out.

So De Gaulle refused to be a mouthpiece of Pétain.

But if you stick to colonial potential - after the fall of France, Vichy France - with its entire colonial empire - also supported Germany.

If Britain had so superior manpower as you claim, why couldn't it do anything about Germans capturing France, Greece, etc.

And both to France and Greece Britain sent its military forces. Why were these forces so small, if Britain had superior manpower, as you claim?

Some notes here:

- Vichy France was officially neutral (more so than Spain, which, after sending the Blue Division to the Eastern front, chnaged sympathies when the tides appeared to be turning).

- British ´superior manpower´ was mostly in the Royal Navy; traditionally the army was relatively small (they were very lucky to be able to extract the BEF - and additional French forces - from Dunquerque, although most equipment had to be abandoned).

The real superior manpower was ofcourse in Soviet Russia, which, combined with US industrial resources, the Axis could not hope to even compete with.
 
Only if you're willing to concede that China faced a similar shortage of manpower visa vis Japan.

As for production lets look at that:
Britain Outproduced Germany in tanks in 1941, and 42 (after which they started scaling that back on their own)
Despite focusing on heavy, 4 to 6 engine bombers the British outproduced the Germans in aircraft production in 41, 42 and 43.
And then of course there was the fact that Britain was still producing Naval Warships and Merchant Marine fleets in vast numbers compared to the negligible output of the Germans.
Yeah, they certainly seemed to have the advantage in production capacity, too.

Care to support with something ?
 
None of which mentions any 88, as they hadn´t been developed yet...

As I wrote, you badly failed to read your own link. Let's quote some facts from the link you provided:

Prototype 88s were first produced in 1928

Widespread production started with the Nazi rise to power in 1933

Heavy flak production numbers: 8.8cm Flak: pre-war: 2,459

========================================

And here something from outside Wikipedia:

Number of AA guns Germans had on 1 July 1939:

"Number of German Anti-Aircraft guns on 1 July of 1939 was as follows: 20mm - 5230, 37mm - 920, 88mm - 2335, 105mm - 34 (total 8519). Anti-Aircraft reflectors 60 and 150mm numbered 2475. (...) In July of 1939 units of Anti-Aircraft artillery numbered 107,000 soldiers."

And here number of AA guns Germans had on 1 September 1939:

"Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden: 6.072 Stück 2-cm-Flak, 1.030 Stück 3,7-cm-Flak, 2.459 Stück 8,8-cm-Flak, 64 Stück 10,5-cm-Flak" (total 9625)

They "hadn't been developed yet", but Germans already had 2500 of them by the time when the war started. Interesting...

- Vichy France was officially neutral

And that's why it fought against the Allies in Africa, Mediterranean and the Middle East... ?

- British ´superior manpower´ was mostly in the Royal Navy;

You mean superior tonnage, not manpower. That's what I wrote above about the Royal Navy.

The real superior manpower was ofcourse in Soviet Russia, which, combined with US industrial resources, the Axis could not hope to even compete with.

That's why I was arguing that Britain alone - without Soviets and Americans - could not, by any means, defeat Germany. So you agree?
 
So De Gaulle refused to be a mouthpiece of Pétain.
About the size of things. This was Charles de Gaulle after all. It certainly wouldn't have been in keeping with his character and the rest of his biography if he had accepted a job like that. Contrary to what r16 seems to have been insinuating, de Gaulle wasn't going to be a useful idiot to anyone, Pétain included, and the experience of Churchill and Roosevelt during WWII certainly bore that out. In fact, had he been that kind of useful creature to Pétain, he probably would have proven a willing and pliable instrument to the other allied leaders during WWII. Something we know they didn't think him.
 
Only if you're willing to concede that China faced a similar shortage of manpower visa vis Japan.

As for production lets look at that:
Britain Outproduced Germany in tanks in 1941, and 42 (after which they started scaling that back on their own)
Despite focusing on heavy, 4 to 6 engine bombers the British outproduced the Germans in aircraft production in 41, 42 and 43.
And then of course there was the fact that Britain was still producing Naval Warships and Merchant Marine fleets in vast numbers compared to the negligible output of the Germans.
Yeah, they certainly seemed to have the advantage in production capacity, too.

Are you trying to make some sort of argument along the lines of Britain harnessing Indian manpower for an invasion of continental Europe? I do not think that is a realistic scenario to consider.

The production of the German economy vs. the British economy simply isn't up for debate. The Germans made more stuff.
 
And that's why it fought against the Allies in Africa, Mediterranean and the Middle East... ?
You mean when they were attacked by the British and invaded by the British and Americans? I don't know of any offensive operations undertaken by Vichy France.

If Britain had so superior manpower as you claim, why couldn't it do anything about Germans capturing France, Greece, etc.
Because it takes time to bring it to bear. And the British had plenty of time. Just looking at Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa they basically have the same populations.
The Indian army went from 300,000 to 2,500,000 during the war. And plenty of these could be brought to fight the Germans (several divisions served in North Africa and Italy).

In the short term the Germans have most advantages but without being able to invade Britain, it doesn't matter. In the long term the British hold manpower and resource advantages and even with the US neutral they are more than willing to sell goods to the British helping make up a chunk of the production disadvantage.
 
still on posts prior to 18 January , as this is a rich thread with multitude that can be discussed and am such a slow typist .

(2 german to 1 allie plan in number),
The luftwaffe was outnumbered by the Allied air force,
some numerical mumbo jumbo


both Spitfires and Hurricanes were superior ... [but for] ... training difficulties ...
a english former air minister visited Germany before the war and submited a full report on the new models of German Messerchmits and their high maneuverability and speed compared to english and french designs, IT was this man who SAVED England, he also comissed the creation of a new and revolutionary plane The Spitfire that could take on the new and faster german planes.
fight , fight !! in multiple parts from post 15 to 19 .

regarding de Gaulle , ı think it was last summer when ı was involved in a discussion on whether Petain chose to be close to Germans while he sent de Gaulle to England to cover all the bases .

will look up for the Maginot fight , ı saw it first in a Turkish forum and understand it is based on a magazine article .
 
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