Greatest military system of all times

[imperialman]

Also, this explains it better than I had planned on:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kip...#Aid_to_Israel

I don't really think the war was so easy for Israel, it was close to going nuclear and needed a lot of supplies flown in IIRC.

[Leoreth]

Originally Posted by Dachs

I dunno, Hitler made plenty of good decisions in addition to the bad. The "stand fast" order in winter 1941 probably saved the Wehrmacht, the decision to attack Kiev in autumn 1941 cleared Army Group Center's flank and made Typhoon possible, the decision to attack south in 1942 completely circumvented the massive Soviet defenses around Moscow and wrong-footed Stalin and the stavka, the decision to delay Zitadelle gave it a much better chance of success, and so on, and so forth...

And there are instances when you can definitely say "poor performance of individual Italian units had serious operational repercussions" (although this was more the fault of the poor Romanians in URANUS).

I've been always wondering how much insight into the strategic considerations Hitler actually had or if he was mainly motivated by naive/emotional ideas of how "war had to be fought". Short, was Hitler just lucky there?

[BvBPL]

Originally Posted by Ubik01

There is plenty o'discussion about it among all real warmongers: What was the best military system in history. For those who are not familiar with such terms, a "military system" is a form of organization for the army of a given nation, empire etc - any organized and stable state, that is kinda prototyped and used in excess - sometimes even copied by others. A military system is not barely the tradition of a warlike nation - two examples:
The Roman Legion is a military system. The Mongol hordes are not. The Greek hoplite phalanx is a military system. The ravaging Gauls are not.

Obviously it is unlikely that Ubik will respond to this, but to anyone else who wants to take up his banner: can anyone tell me why a military system necessitates a state?

I can understand that the Gauls, Visigoths, and the like can’t really be counted as a military system given the diversity of warlords involved, but I don’t understand why the early Mongol Hordes can’t be counted as a military system or, presumably, why the Sioux couldn’t be counted as well. Both the Sioux and the Mongols had generational traditions of raiding and making war as a primary economic activity, indeed THE primary economic activity in the case of the Sioux. Why should we discount organizations that do not resemble modern states from the roll of military systems? Is there a reason for this?

(Later Hordes probably do resemble states to sufficently fall into Ubik's defination)

[Ajidica]

Errr, the Mongols, at least under Genghis Khan and his immediate sucessors, was better organized then just about anyone prior to it. They were definately better then the Greeks whose military system basicaly consisted of 'lets get a bunch of guys with spears and have then run at a bunch of other guys with spears'.

[Perfection]

Costa Rica.

[Winner]

Originally Posted by imperialman

In 1973, has it done anything that significant since? Besides, I don't imagine fighting a coalition of Arab nations such as Syria, Jordan etc would be very hard in the first place for any country with a military the size and composition of Israel's. Correct me if I'm wrong but didn't the Israeli F-15s integrated into a strike package at a Red Flag ex a couple years back do terribly?

So? By these standards, nobody has done anything significant in warfare since 1945.

Israel created a flexible, innovative war-machine that has outperformed all its adversaries despite overwhelming odds, and it still is a citizen army in many respects. I don't say the Israeli system is applicable elsewhere, just that all things considered, it really stands out as something extraordinary.

For a large country with very different challenges, it's not hard to do good. It takes a small country and/or limited resources to foster brilliance.

[imperialman]

Originally Posted by Winner

So? By these standards, nobody has done anything significant in warfare since 1945.

Israel created a flexible, innovative war-machine that has outperformed all its adversaries despite overwhelming odds, and it still is a citizen army in many respects. I don't say the Israeli system is applicable elsewhere, just that all things considered, it really stands out as something extraordinary.

For a large country with very different challenges, it's not hard to do good. It takes a small country and/or limited resources to foster brilliance.

I'm not doubting their capabilities, I just don't consider them in any way one of the greatest military systems of all time. They rely too much on a foreign power for funding and support and their reputation is built over a win (with heavy assistance) over much less powerful nations last century.

I'd argue, again as I always do, that the Falklands were quite significant but the war happened in the early 80's and that's for another thread and time.

[Leoreth]

Originally Posted by Perfection

Costa Rica.

Costa Rica is an admirable country in so many respects.

[Winner]

Originally Posted by Leoreth

I've been always wondering how much insight into the strategic considerations Hitler actually had or if he was mainly motivated by naive/emotional ideas of how "war had to be fought". Short, was Hitler just lucky there?

Yes. He really didn't have a clue in most situations. His famous "intuition" was a combination of luck and his willingness to take gambles that others were unwilling to even consider. And more luck, like when he met Manstein just in time to change the plan for the war against the West, or when Soviet amateurism turned his mistakes into victories.

When the war was really on, his military incompetence started to show. Later in the war, his obstinate insistence on static defence and a "fight to the last man" led to the German collapse.

[Winner]

Originally Posted by imperialman

I'm not doubting their capabilities, I just don't consider them in any way one of the greatest military systems of all time. They rely too much on a foreign power for funding and support and their reputation is built over a win (with heavy assistance) over much less powerful nations last century.

You mean on repeated victories against enemies which had vast numerical superiority, technological parity, and even more foreign support. "Much less powerful nations"? In which major A-I war did Israel face an enemy that had fewer men, tanks, airplanes, guns, etc.?

And again, if judged by your standards, nobody has have done anything even remotely as significant.

I'd argue, again as I always do, that the Falklands were quite significant but the war happened in the early 80's and that's for another thread and time.

So, Falklands were quite significant, whereas the Six-Day War is just an unimportant footnote that proves nothing? Ah, you're British...

[taillesskangaru]

Originally Posted by Winner

You mean on repeated victories against enemies which had vast numerical superiority, technological parity, and even more foreign support. "Much less powerful nations"? In which major A-I war did Israel face an enemy that had fewer men, tanks, airplanes, guns, etc.?

1948

Nevertheless, whatever your views on Israel, its military history has been quite impressive, probably more so than any other state post-1945.

[imperialman]

Originally Posted by Winner

You mean on repeated victories against enemies which had vast numerical superiority, technological parity, and even more foreign support. "Much less powerful nations"? In which major A-I war did Israel face an enemy that had fewer men, tanks, airplanes, guns, etc.?

Okay there's no need to respond in that tone, I had already admitted I don't know that much about the Israeli military. My point was simply just that victory against those countries (power isn't simply number of equipment types or number of men etc), given the composition and training of any force such as Israel's isn't something that can give them the status of one of the greatest military machines of all time. I just don't think a largely conscript force that seemingly came relatively close to defeat (hence the talk of nuclear options) in 1973 is a candidate for the thread titles question. Certainly not without a shadow of doubt.

Originally Posted by Winner

And again, if judged by your standards, nobody has have done anything even remotely as significant.

So, Falklands were quite significant, whereas the Six-Day War is just an unimportant footnote that proves nothing? Ah, you're British...

I didn't say that at all, in any way. Please don't put words in my mouth and imply I'm some sort of ignorant nationalist! I simply countered the idea that by my logic little of any military significance happened since 1945 if Israel wasn't included, not it was more/less important. Look, I really don't understand why you appear to be getting annoyed at me for criticising Israel.

[MilesGregarius]

Originally Posted by BvBPL

Obviously it is unlikely that Ubik will respond to this, but to anyone else who wants to take up his banner: can anyone tell me why a military system necessitates a state?

I can understand that the Gauls, Visigoths, and the like can’t really be counted as a military system given the diversity of warlords involved, but I don’t understand why the early Mongol Hordes can’t be counted as a military system or, presumably, why the Sioux couldn’t be counted as well. Both the Sioux and the Mongols had generational traditions of raiding and making war as a primary economic activity, indeed THE primary economic activity in the case of the Sioux. Why should we discount organizations that do not resemble modern states from the roll of military systems? Is there a reason for this?

(Later Hordes probably do resemble states to sufficently fall into Ubik's defination)

I'd say Ubik01 has a limited understanding of the Mongol "hordes".

A large part of their success was based on how well drilled and organized they were. They famously had a decimal organization from the "squad" level (arav - 10 warriors) through to the "division" (tumen - 10,000). Individual warriors were expected to have multiple relief mounts, and entire units were said to be mounted on horses of the same color. Unlike a "horde" of barbarians, the Mongols trained in maneuvering and fighting as units, be that unit an arav, a zuut, a minghan or a tumen.

Warriors were split from their native tribes into different units to weaken tribal loyalties and to foster loyalty to the army as a whole. Promotion was also merit-based, allowing a commoner such as Subodei to climb the ranks and even outrank princes of the blood in military matters - highly unlikely if no military system existed.

The Mongols had established doctrines for different tactical and strategic concerns, and had specialists for reconnaisance, siege weaponry, and baiting their enemies to break ranks and charge. Additionally, the Mongol had established supply, communications, and intelligence gathering networks.

As far as a military system goes, the Mongol system was as sophisticated and efficient as anything between Rome and the rise of Britain, France, and Prussia in the 18th Century.

[Winner]

Originally Posted by imperialman

Okay there's no need to respond in that tone, I had already admitted I don't know that much about the Israeli military. My point was simply just that victory against those countries (power isn't simply number of equipment types or number of men etc), given the composition and training of any force such as Israel's isn't something that can give them the status of one of the greatest military machines of all time. I just don't think a largely conscript force that seemingly came relatively close to defeat (hence the talk of nuclear options) in 1973 is a candidate for the thread titles question. Certainly not without a shadow of doubt.

Oh, if my replies sound sarcastic, don't take it personally - I've spent too much time on this forum and it has left me scarred for life...

I think the fact that IDF is largely a conscript force is one of the most amazing aspects of it. To achieve this level of competence with a reservist force deserves to be noted with admiration.

But there are other things. Israeli forces have always been great at finding cleverly improvised solutions to problems that a military of a larger nation would probably deal with using brute force. Israeli officers have been excellent at leading their men, and generally morale in the IDF has always been very solid. All things considered, I think Israel has managed to create a very, very good military system that has proven its worth in many different conflicts.

(About 1973 - Israel didn't really face total defeat in the Yom Kippur war. AFAIK only Dayan considered nukes, and that because he suffered something of a mental breakdown during the early phases of the war).

I didn't say that at all, in any way. Please don't put words in my mouth and imply I'm some sort of ignorant nationalist!

That was not my intention, I was joking. Brits usually like to point out the Falklands

I simply countered the idea that by my logic little of any military significance happened since 1945 if Israel wasn't included, not it was more/less important. Look, I really don't understand why you appear to be getting annoyed at me for criticising Israel.

As I said, I've spent too much time on this forum.

[Dachs]

Originally Posted by FriendlyFire

Hitler also was deluded not to equip hes army with winter equipment and hes soldiers paid the price. He encirclement did gut the soviet forces in army group south which was another of Stalins mistakes not to break out of the encirclement. This put Moscow out of reach of army group center.

Hold fast orders might have worked in 41 but these doomed Germany when they were repeated in Stalingrad and through out the rest of the war

Failure to acquire winter equipment wasn't a Hitler decision. It was part of the general German logistical breakdown. Not really his fault. The Wehrmacht probably could not have attacked in 1941 with better logistical preparation - a future offensive would probably have to be postponed.

The assertion that Guderian's "southward turn" prevented the Nazis from launching Typhoon early and reaching Moscow before the winter is false. Guderian's destruction of the Southwestern Front around Kiev eliminated an extremely powerful force that could outflank Army Group Center (and which had been building up in August for that very purpose), and furthermore gave the German forces around Smolensk time to rest and recuperate after the bloody engagements there earlier in August. Far from being a diversion from Typhoon, it was the necessary precondition for it. In addition, the halt around Smolensk gave Stalin and the stavka time to organize another fruitless counterattack which further attenuated the forces guarding the Moscow approaches.

Hitler's order to "stand fast" in late 1941 is actually almost unique in the Great Patriotic War. After 1942, he frequently permitted Wehrmacht forces in danger of encirclement to withdraw, and generally gave his approval for the vaunted "elastic defense" proposals that Manstein and others put forward. The decision not to retreat from Stalingrad wasn't really an error, because Sixth Army was not merely fighting at Stalingrad for Stalingrad: it was guarding the flank of Army Group A in the Caucasus, and had Paulus been ordered to retreat at some point during the fall, the forces further south would've been almost certainly cut off and destroyed. The failure of BLAU was a consequence of its very nature: an operation along two strategic axes (Stalingrad and Baku) that probably did not possess the resources to succeed in either - but so was its initial success.

An argument that Paulus could have broken the Sixth Army out of Stalingrad had he been permitted to do so is ridiculous. For illustration, I'll compare it to something else well-known in the annals of modern European warfare: the encirclement of Marshal Bazaine's Imperial French forces at the fortress of Metz in August 1870. Following a series of battles that numbered among the bloodiest and largest in European history up to that point - Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte-St. Privat - Bazaine's vaunted Army of the Rhine had been forced back into the Metz fortifications. The Germans promptly left an army of observation around the fortress and took the majority of their army to deal with Marshal MacMahon and Napoleon III's Army of Chalons, which was marching to Bazaine's relief. That campaign ended on September 2, with the Army of Chalons penned up against the Belgian border, briefly attempting a violent breakout attempt of its own - the famous Battle of Sedan - and ultimately forced to surrender. The argument goes that, had Bazaine roused himself from his torpor and tried to make contact with Napoleon, the French could have perhaps won the day. But such an argument presupposes that the Germans guarding Metz - which included some of their best troops, albeit some of the most-bloodied ones, and which were commanded by one of the few German commanders suited to competent independent command - would not have simply pursued them, even if the French did manage to break out. Most likely, the French would have been thrown back into their fortifications. And if Bazaine's troops had managed to escape, disorganized from the breakout attempt, they would have been brought to battle once more somewhere west of Metz by their erstwhile jailers, and comprehensively defeated.

So it is with Stalingrad. Realistically, the Soviet ring of steel around the Sixth Army was far too strong for the Sixth Army - deprived now of supplies, except the trickle that came in from Luftwaffe air-drops - to even attempt a breakout. But let's say they did. The much more mobile Communists would almost certainly have simply brought in even more troops and crushed the Hitlerites on the plains west of Stalingrad. It was not unreasonable for Hitler to presume that a hold-fast order was most appropriate. For one thing, again, Army Group A had to be rescued from the Caucasus, and the Sixth Army, even when it was sacrificed, bought Kleist's panzer spearheads and mountain troops critical time. For another thing, Paulus' troops had a much greater power of resistance in the bombed-out ruins of Stalingrad than they did on the open steppe west of the city, and would last much longer while the Wehrmacht planned a rescue. If the rescue failed, well, there it was. Realistically, Sixth Army was doomed as soon as URANUS started. Hitler's orders to hold on in the city certainly saved Army Group A, and gave Sixth Army itself a puncher's chance of survival as well.

Originally Posted by Leoreth

I've been always wondering how much insight into the strategic considerations Hitler actually had or if he was mainly motivated by naive/emotional ideas of how "war had to be fought". Short, was Hitler just lucky there?

There is no good answer to that question.

Honestly, though, I'm not sure if the distinction even matters.

Originally Posted by Ajidica

They were definately better then the Greeks whose military system basicaly consisted of 'lets get a bunch of guys with spears and have then run at a bunch of other guys with spears'.

Um, which Greeks are we talking about here?

Originally Posted by Winner

Yes. He really didn't have a clue in most situations. His famous "intuition" was a combination of luck and his willingness to take gambles that others were unwilling to even consider. And more luck, like when he met Manstein just in time to change the plan for the war against the West, or when Soviet amateurism turned his mistakes into victories.

I think that this sort of viewpoint comes mostly from an over-reliance on Hitler's marshals' memoirs, in which they sought to exculpate themselves of military failure by scapegoating the conveniently-dead and generally-reviled Führer. The Wehrmacht didn't lose - it was driven to defeat by Hitler's stupid decisions. Strikingly, the higher military officers of Nazi Germany sang a different tune when things were going well, and Hitler was feted as a strategic genius - even when one assumes that everybody who took part in such an operation would want to take credit for it, especially under the disorganized patronage-reliant Nazi regime of "working 'toward' the Führer".

It's rather similar to the First World War. The imperial army didn't lose the war - it had a war-winning plan (history article plug) but the incompetent Moltke failed to carry it through properly. The imperial army didn't lose the war - it was that bloodthirsty lunatic Falkenhayn's fault for pursuing a strategy of attrition instead of a proper Vernichtungsschlacht. The imperial army didn't lose the war - it was stabbed in the back by the civilian government and the mutinying soldiers at Kiel. Anything to preserve the image of the unbeatable German military - even if all those things were prima facie false, and everyone who had served in the war at OHL knew it.

Like I said earlier, I don't really care about whether Hitler made the decisions he did out of lucky ignorance, incompetence, or hidden military genius. It doesn't really matter. It's like, did Alexander launch his famous charge at Gaugamela out of an innate understanding of the Schwerpunkt of the Iranian army - of the vaunted coup d'oeil - or did he charge at Darayavahush III's position out of personal pique, displaying no more military genius than the anger-crazed Incredible Hulk? Surely it doesn't matter - not that we'll ever find out anyway. I do, however, care that the correct reasons for the course of the Great Patriotic War are made properly clear, because that is history, and damn if Hitler isn't one of the key reasons the Nazis did so well for so long.

[Winner]

Originally Posted by Dachs

I think that this sort of viewpoint comes mostly from an over-reliance on Hitler's marshals' memoirs, in which they sought to exculpate themselves of military failure by scapegoating the conveniently-dead and generally-reviled Führer.

Maybe. Or they were right about it.

The Wehrmacht didn't lose - it was driven to defeat by Hitler's stupid decisions. Strikingly, the higher military officers of Nazi Germany sang a different tune when things were going well, and Hitler was feted as a strategic genius

Well, under a totalitarian regime like the one Hitler had built, what would you expect? Dictators like to take all the credit for victories wherever possible. Strangely, they're not nearly as eager to accept responsibility for defeats.

It's rather similar to the First World War. The imperial army didn't lose the war - it had a war-winning plan (history article plug) but the incompetent Moltke failed to carry it through properly. The imperial army didn't lose the war - it was that bloodthirsty lunatic Falkenhayn's fault for pursuing a strategy of attrition instead of a proper Vernichtungsschlacht. The imperial army didn't lose the war - it was stabbed in the back by the civilian government and the mutinying soldiers at Kiel. Anything to preserve the image of the unbeatable German military - even if all those things were prima facie false, and everyone who had served in the war at OHL knew it.

I think you are in serious danger of mixing the two wars too much.

I do, however, care that the correct reasons for the course of the Great Patriotic War are made properly clear, because that is history, and damn if Hitler isn't one of the key reasons the Nazis did so well for so long.

Well, that was never a question, considering there would be no Nazis in power without Hitler to begin with.

I think it's telling that the more Hitler intervened in the way the Germany army waged war, the worse the war went. It's ironic that the reverse was true in the USSR, and correspondingly the Red Army was doing better and better.

[MilesGregarius]

Originally Posted by Ajidica

Errr, the Mongols, at least under Genghis Khan and his immediate sucessors, was better organized then just about anyone prior to it. They were definately better then the Greeks whose military system basicaly consisted of 'lets get a bunch of guys with spears and have then run at a bunch of other guys with spears'.

Originally Posted by Dachs

Um, which Greeks are we talking about here?

Whatever the virtues of the phalanx (and they were considerably more sophisticated' than lets get a bunch of guys with spears and have then run at a bunch of other guys with spears'), the Greeks didn't really have a comprehensive military system until the Macedonian combination of Companion cavalry with phalangites. The Greeks didn't really integrate their cavalry, missile troops, or light troops into an effective system with the phalanx, nor were their logistics particularly well developed. In light of that, there can be little doubt that the Mongols were better organized than the Greeks of popular imagination at Thermopylae or of Xenephon's Anabasis.

[Dachs]

Originally Posted by Winner

Maybe. Or they were right about it.

Funny, that's not what serious scholarship since, oh, the nineties, when the Soviet archives started to be opened, says.

Originally Posted by Winner

Well, under a totalitarian regime like the one Hitler had built, what would you expect? Dictators like to take all the credit for victories wherever possible. Strangely, they're not nearly as eager to accept responsibility for defeats.

But Hitler's regime wasn't "totalitarian" in any meaningful sense of the word. It was really the world's worst combination, of Middle Byzantine-style redundant bureaucracies and feudal Western European-style reliance on one's connection to the monarch. If you wanted to get ahead, you had to take credit for the things you did right, and things that other people did right, and so on. How else do you think Göring acquired so much power? Hitler wasn't intrinsically unreasonable about that sort of thing - just look at the discussions leading up to and during the Kursk campaign. The man wasn't a caricature, and treating him like one is the antithesis of historical discussion.

Originally Posted by Winner

I think you are in serious danger of mixing the two wars too much.

No, I'm just following guys like Zuber, Zabecki, Glantz, and Foley on this. The German army of the First World War was absolutely in continuity with that of the Second, especially its higher officers. Hell, the ultimate document attempting to exculpate the imperial military from its role in defeat, the German official history of the war, was publishing volumes on 1918 in 1944. The exculpatory tradition is there - even if it's not the exact same men doing the exact same thing for the exact same reasons. The pernicious legacy of 1870, as it were.

Originally Posted by Winner

Well, that was never a question, considering there would be no Nazis in power without Hitler to begin with.

I think it's telling that the more Hitler intervened in the way the Germany army waged war, the worse the war went. It's ironic that the reverse was true in the USSR, and correspondingly the Red Army was doing better and better.

But neither one of those things is true. Hitler certainly didn't approach things in 1940 in a more hands-off way than he did in 1944 - in 1944, arguably, he was even less connected to the overall situation in terms of following along in campaigns and issuing directives. And Stalin sure as hell was just as involved in the planning for the siege of Berlin and the Hungarian offensives as he was in directing the failed and disjointed counteroffensives of July and August 1941.

[Dachs]

Whoop, doublepost.

Originally Posted by MilesGregarius

Whatever the virtues of the phalanx (and they were considerably more sophisticated' than lets get a bunch of guys with spears and have then run at a bunch of other guys with spears'), the Greeks didn't really have a comprehensive military system until the Macedonian combination of Companion cavalry with phalangites. The Greeks didn't really integrate their cavalry, missile troops, or light troops into an effective system with the phalanx, nor were their logistics particularly well developed. In light of that, there can be little doubt that the Mongols were better organized than the Greeks of popular imagination at Thermopylae or of Xenephon's Anabasis.

Perhaps - although I would disagree on the date, and push it into the Peloponnesian War (the Korinthian War at the latest), as it certainly didn't have to do with the Maks. But, um, the Maks were basically Greeks, and if you don't agree with that, then the various Successor states that expanded on the combined-arms concept were Greeks, and if you don't agree with that, then the states of southern Greece contemporary with the Successors, who also employed "Makedonian"-style tactical systems and had elements of advanced logistical networks - the armies of Aratos and Kleomenes III - were absolutely Greeks.

Hell, he's right if we're talking about the Bronze Age Achaioi or whatever, but it's kind of meaningless to compare those to the Činggisid Mongols, isn't it? (It's only slightly less meaningless to compare Hellenistic armies to them, but whatever.)

(Incidentally, it's kind of silly to compare the army of Xenophon's Anabasis to any integrated force. The Ten Thousand weren't supposed to be a self-contained field army, unlike the forces of Demosthenes in Aitolia or their own countrymen a few years later with Agesilaos in western Anatolia, both of which employed light infantry and cavalry in close coordination with the main body - at least, as close as a preindustrial army can get. The Greeks at Kounaxa were a specific kind of mercenary, hired for a specific job in part of Kurush's army. Hell, the Swiss pikemen of the sixteenth century weren't an integrated field force, but they weren't supposed to be, either.)

[imperialman]

Originally Posted by Winner

Oh, if my replies sound sarcastic, don't take it personally - I've spent too much time on this forum and it has left me scarred for life...

I think the fact that IDF is largely a conscript force is one of the most amazing aspects of it. To achieve this level of competence with a reservist force deserves to be noted with admiration.

But there are other things. Israeli forces have always been great at finding cleverly improvised solutions to problems that a military of a larger nation would probably deal with using brute force. Israeli officers have been excellent at leading their men, and generally morale in the IDF has always been very solid. All things considered, I think Israel has managed to create a very, very good military system that has proven its worth in many different conflicts.

(About 1973 - Israel didn't really face total defeat in the Yom Kippur war. AFAIK only Dayan considered nukes, and that because he suffered something of a mental breakdown during the early phases of the war).

That was not my intention, I was joking. Brits usually like to point out the Falklands

As I said, I've spent too much time on this forum.

I think I may have over-reacted a bit, I came back to these forums after nearly a year of absence (the whole "server is too busy" thing became endemic and I my contributions here fell away) so I may need to hone my sarcasm detector a bit more!