Originally posted by Kryten
It would be impolite of me to ignore Simon Darkshade, so here are my (admittedly brief) replies:- 
"The major threat to the battleship of that era was the torpedo bomber, and they ceased to exist shortly after the war".
Not quite. The side/waterline armour of a battleship can be made so thick that it can withstand torpedo strikes, be they torpedoes from aircraft or from destroyers. The Bismarck for example was scuttled by her own crew, and not by the dozens of torpedoes that the Royal Navy destroyers pumped into her.
However, the same cannot be done to the upper decks, or the ship would be top heavy. This left battleships vulnerable to verticle strikes by Dive Bombers....and a Dive Bomber is just one way of delivering a warhead to a target (guided missiles are of course another way).
"The jet aircraft and anti-ship missiles of today are not designed to penetrate armour, or attack a large, well protected target."
This is true, because warships today do not have thick armour.
However, if they could penetrate such thick armour 60 years ago, then they could easily develop such weapons today if they needed to. At the moment, there isn't the need. But if thickly armoured warships came back into fashion, then so would armour penetrating warheads....and at much cheaper cost.
(Look at tank development; better armour is countered by better guns & shells)
"One is not driven by nostalgia, nor inertia (an argument reminiscent of that wonderful sci-fi book 'The Future of War'), but by examining current needs and deficiencies, and in the longer term going for the qualitative jump over the enemy."
I have not read 'The Future of War', but I would like to. Could you tell me who the author is?
Basically, this whole thread boils down to this:-
Do you trust the findings of modern military analysts and planners, or have they made a mistake by ignoring the potential uses of battleships? I am sure that all the arguments that are proposed here, both pro and anti, have gone through their minds. And they have access to far more information than we laymen will ever have.
I myself am inclined to trust them. If, from WW2 onwards, they have decided that battleships are too vulnerable, not cost effective, and their role can be better performed by other means, then I assume that they know what they are talking about.
I (and they) could be wrong of course. 
Impolite, and bad for your health.
1.) The majority of battleships damaged and/or sunk were so made by torpedos. The dive bomber, and its modern equivalent, the PGM, was not as effective against the battleship because of its defensive weaponary, improvements in damage control, and other factors enhancing the defensive.
2.) They couldn't penetrate the armour back then; the IJN did use converted 16" shells as heavy bombs, but they needed to get close. Further, such development is not easy, given it has been left to lie for so many years; the Soviets encountered such difficulties in the 1980s.
The battle between the sword and the shield is not permanently in favour of the sword, and armour is but the last passive measure of defence available to the battleship.
3.) By a couple named Friedman; it's postulations are along similar lines to thine own at certain points, but were very and as it turned out to be, overly optimistic in terms of the development of new weapons systems, upon which the crux of their argument lies.
4.) Given that these are the same analysts who spawn the abomination of Stryker and wish to replace all heavy units with it, and who believe a faceted U-Boat can serve as an instrument of power projection, no.
I am not inclined to believe them given the course of action and policy since WW2, and the myriad problems and petty pusillanimous perversions that have gone on in that time.
There are many analysts and thinkers on the matter, and one is aware of them to the extent that one does not consider oneself quite lay, as such. McNamara had access to more information than many, but still made many errors in regards to the F-111; Truman's post war Defence department had access to all sorts of plans, information and the like, and their conception of the future of war was quite simply wrong.
Of the three factors listed, the only one that is of any validity is cost. A battleship gives a lot more capability and protection, but needs a big crew. The one factor that was taken for granted in their previous incarnation is thus seemingly a problem for them now. But one is of the view that if it is important enough to the nation, then the monies and men can be found. Considering the references to wastage of money in defence earlier, funding could be quite easily found.
I am not of the view that they should be put into service solely as command ships; this is the particular view advanced by a chap named Carlton Meyer from g2mil, IIRC, and he has his own opinions, beliefs and positions as regards to the make up of the fleet, and does not see any need for full BBG conversion. I, on the other hand, am of the view that they should fill the roles of fleet flagships, arsenal ships, naval gunfire support vessels, surface strike vessels, and other such roles all in one.
This is not a case of putting all eggs in one basket, but getting the most out of a versatile opportunity and shipframe.
A battleship can afford to go right in to surf city, as it does have armour, and self defence capabilities that can be enhanced. It is the only platform afloat that can stay that way, and operational, after being hit by Exocet type cruise missiles; it was designed to receive multiple hits from 2000+ lb shells, and to take a heck of a lot of damage.
A destroyer or cruiser does not have this passive protection, and thus needs to invoke the tyranny of distance, and hope that small ERGM projectiles that are not yet in production, let alone working service, do any NGFS jobs.
But there is a problem with this stand off philosophy; the failure of the V-22 puts a big gap in OMFTS and its over the horizon philosophy; LCACs and AAVs are still very vulnerable to low tech cheap threats.
Guns have not been replaced by cruise missiles, and will not be.
OIF was perhaps the most high tech war yet, but still involved unsexy heavy bombers dropping dumb bombs, naval gunfire support, tanks firing at tanks, and the poor bloody infantry going in on foot with smallarms.
I don't recall anyone here saying that all assets should be placed on one platform, or that battleships should operate alone, or that they should replace other units in the fleet. Rather, they should fill currently existing gaps at the same time as enhancing the overall lethality and capability of the fleet and the military as a whole.
Commercial cargo ships are needed for other purposes, even more so in this era, and do not have protection, nor radar, nor counter battery capability. That is why the arsenal ship idea collapsed.
Being underwater is not the protection it is thought to be; that and the stealth of submarines are a similar protection that the bombers of Mitchell and Douhet's dreams had. Countermeasures can be taken, and would build upon current strengths.
Further, and importantly, there are very significant moral, psychological and spiritual dimensions to warfare. As much as men across the ages have tried to turn it into a science, it remains an art. Sun Tzu says, among other things, that it is better to win a battle by avoiding it, and gives importance to maintaining the tao of the nation.
Power projection, flying the flag and intimidation are still important; one makes the comparison between DD-Xs/LCS et al and U-Boats for a reason - they are very similar notions. Small, decent offensive systems, but if found, they are dead. They can deny an ocean or brown water littoral zone to the foe, but it is not in their nature to control it and defend it; they are an offensive system that relies upon not being seen as its protection. There are situations when this is not appropriate, and something rather different is needed.
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