Originally posted by Kryten
Excellent input Simon Darkshade....I although at times I wondered if we were still speaking the same language, what with ERGM's, NGFS's, OMFTS's, LCAC's..... 
(Fear not: I dug out my old Tom Clancy factual books and managed to translate them all. 
)
Just a couple of points:-
Yes, all ships would be escorting and protecting each other. So container ships with mobile Cruise Missile launchers would be nicely tucked away and relatively safe inside the centre of a Task Force, as indeed are the Carriers and any troop ships.
But surely the main question is the future role of large warships in a post 'Cold War' world, where there is just one sole superpower, with no serious threat to it's dominant navy. If Soviet Russia, or Communist China, or some other country or allience were a naval rival, then yes, every naval techological advantage/vessel/role would need to be covered.
But I can see the logic of 're-scaling' and 're-sizing' modern fleets to fit this new world, a world in which big naval battles are a thing of the past.
An historical example (although probably inaccurate), would be that of the ancient Roman fleets. When threatened by the Carthaginian & Macedonian navies, the Romans built huge Quinqueremes/Hexeres/Hepteres/Octeres/Deceres (if anyone is interested in ancient warfleets, see HERE 
). But once these other fleets had disappeared, the Romans reverted to much smaller lighter and faster Liburnian galleys, just to keep the pirates under control, and to protect their commerce.
Are we not entering a similar period in history?
Are big expensive battleships neccessary to 'project power inland'?
Or can the job be done in other cheaper ways?
1.) Putting all the ships together does enable AEGIS to be concentrated, but is rather catastrophic for leakers and for its achilles heel, namely a concentrated swamping barrage.
There are two further issues on this point - the politics of such a choice, and the advantages of splitting fire. Would the Navy, or any armed service or large byzantine institution willingly give up the raison d'etre of their ships to a converted civilian vessel? If it worked, this would mean the distinct possibility of their own fiefs being further cut. Whilst such an assymetric notion has certain elements of advantage, it would never be countenanced.
Secondly, the advantage of splitting a fleet force between a battleship element, and a carrier element further back is that it creates more targets, dividing fire, and lessening the effect of swamping. Being further in, battleships can act as stalking horses for such ASM/SSM fire, and be able to take multiple hits. This allows other elements of the force the strategic space to maneuver and strike according to their own capabilities, thus overall enhancing both the offensive and defensive hitting power of the fleet.
2.) Ah, the good old notion of shaping capabilities to what is the threat right now. On one level, nice and common sense. On another level, in the context of history, not quite so. It has been the mistake of the US and many other powers to downgrade capabilities once a war is won, which does create a hollow force. When a conflict comes around again, recreating capability is not a quick process. An alternative is to take the victory dividend, and use it to surge so far ahead that it does not cater to the strengths of prospective foes.
The current war is but yet young, and will consist of the whole range of types of conflict intensity. There are also emerging, albeit as yet potential, threats from a number of other sectors, some of which going the whole way to high intensity. By enhancing capabilities that are beyond the pale of even any potential competitor; their current developments are being shaped by what is being put in place now, and these arguably cater to the enemies strength. But a vessel that would have the impact of HMS Dreadnought, and making all previous 'capital ships' obsolete is an appealing one; a vessel which turns all previous conventional naval warfighting wisdom on its head, and forcing all potential opponents into developing means of dealing with it to the exclusion of addressing other capabilities. A mixed approach emphasising all strengths and capabilities is the surest route to victory with the least cost in blood and treasure; a tactical analogy is that of keeping the foeman pinned down with artillery and machine gun fire from all directions and angles, so that they have no path of least resistance to advance along.
3.) It is not just to project power in the littoral zones, or to control the blue water zones of the sea, but also to project power and control the zones of the mind. The most successful battle or war is that which does not require fighting, and this can be achieved through a whole range of assymetric means.
And the Romans were not a maritime power on rank with the US; they did not have two oceans to control, and vital interests in the other oceans and seas to protect.
As for a battleship being easy to sink with modern weaponary, one is reminded of Sergei Gorshkov's nice quote on the matter.
