I bring you an article which made me think about what would be the case today if the first Gulf War didn't happen. I shudder to think that the autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq under US protection would never have happened and many more deaths would have happened inside Iraq. And....if the US did the same thing and invaded Iraq this year, we would have had a much tougher fight on our hands....
The article is by Jihad Al Khazen from Dar Al Hayat, a newspaper in Beirut. It was published on Friday, the 19th.
Dar Al Hayat
This does show that Hussein wasn't all that well liked by other Arabs as well, especially for his actions that wound up killing a lot of Arabs.
I do wonder whether Hussein would still be in power if he didn't invade Kuwait, or withdrew. Maybe it would lead to another Iraq-Iran War since he wouldn't have had the blow that he suffered in '91 nor the handcuffs on his operations thereafter.
All I can say is, although the first Gulf War led to a lot of deaths, I'm glad things took this course because it saved more lives after 1991 now that Hussein did not have his large army, nor his north to govern and could not continue on the path he was on in 1990. Also, it meant that US support for him ended, which is a great thing too.
But I can't help but wonder what would have happened....
The article is by Jihad Al Khazen from Dar Al Hayat, a newspaper in Beirut. It was published on Friday, the 19th.
Dar Al Hayat
Ayoon wa Azan (The Man Who Started In A Hole And Ended In A Hole)
Jihad Al Khazen Al-Hayat 2003/12/19
What would have happened if the Iraqi forces had retreated from Kuwait before the world was destroyed, instead of just Basra? Had they retreated, we would not have seen an American soldier playing around with Saddam Hussein's hair and beard, and searching with a torch for weapons of mass destruction in his mouth.
I wrote in this column on 16/10/1990: the major horror scenario for Washington in the past two weeks is that Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait. The reason is obvious, since the United States had rallied the world against him, and gathered 200,000 soldiers, 1,000 planes, and 70 warships to confront him. So if he suddenly withdraws, the whole reason for this mobilization would be cancelled and the Iraqi military forces would remain safe.
I admit that the idea crossed my mind, and I became certain of it after hearing it from Prince Khaled bin Sultan, leader of the joint forces back then. In the end, Saddam Hussein faced 800,000 soldiers and did not retreat, and what happened, happened.
In the weeks preceding the battle to liberate Kuwait, my colleagues at Al-Hayat and myself repeated our calls for withdrawal, since it seemed clear to all that Iraq would be destroyed if it decided to fight. And on 4/11/1990, I wrote: Today, most Arabs don't want war, but the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait without a fight, and the return of the legitimate government in Kuwait. And if President Saddam Hussein opts for peace, he will save Iraq before Kuwait, and preserve many lives that have no rational or valid reason to be wasted. The article ended with a statement saying that Kuwait's invasion was a mistake that would become two if it was maintained.
I repeated my call on 9/11/1990 when I wrote: what is required at this point, after the accumulation of Arab losses that will be doubled if war occurs, is for the Iraqi regime to realize that it has committed a mistake by invading Kuwait, that this mistake accounts for the entry of foreign forces to the region, and the only way to repair this mistake is by stopping it, and not by doubling it through stubbornness. The best time to fix the mistake is today, yesterday even, since it is a virtue to acknowledge one's mistake.
With the stubbornness of the Iraqi president, it was obvious that things were moving towards war. And I wrote on 21/11/1990: The Americans could not threaten the Iraqi President with war, and he could not scare them with the specter of Vietnam. And since the entire world insists on the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimacy, while the Iraqi President is insists on remaining in Kuwait, then it is most probable that these mutual scaring celebrations will end in a logic of war, which President Mitterrand warned of one day. The continuous mobilization of soldiers on both sides means that the logic of war will eventually prevail over negotiations
At the time, those opposing a foreign military presence in the Gulf talked about an Arab settlement, and I wrote on 8/12/1990 that no Arab solution existed. I invited President Arafat, who was close to Saddam Hussein, to convince him of withdrawing. I said: The only Arab solution, if any, is for the Iraqi forces to retreat from Kuwait, and this solution lies is in the hands of the Iraqi president only. Perhaps he could ask for guarantees and conditions, and maybe negotiations will lead him where he wants to get in the next few weeks.
It cannot be possible for an Arab who fought Palestine's occupation and opposed it year after year to accept in Kuwait what he opposed in Palestine. This is the only link between the two cases, and it is a link that cannot be dismissed by any Palestinian loyal to the cause of his country and his nation.
On 3/1/1991, I concluded my article with this paragraph: nobody will die if Iraq decides to retreat now, and maybe even, it can find a way to achieve some of its demands. But I don't think that any withdrawal will happen considering the prevailing absence of rationality and logic; Iraq invaded Kuwait and has insisted on making a link with the Palestinian cause, which would have been possible had it occupied a place that is Jewish or Israeli, such as New York. But occupying Kuwait is like kidnapping the son of some man, and demanding another man to pay his ransom.
I repeated my call on 11/1/1991, writing: the only acceptable and possible peace is a peace in which Kuwait would be a free and sovereign state once again, and this kind of peace will not take place unless the international community deploys extensive efforts, particularly Arab countries, to convince Iraq that the only solution possible is Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.
If Iraq withdraws, it will preserve its army and its people; in the end, it is the only party responsible for the decision of war or peace, and no one shares its responsibility except those countries that assisted it in its wrong-doing, and encouraged it on moving forward, without assessing that part of the mistake would be paid by their people along with Iraq, unless the logic of reason wins over at the last moment.
I would like to point out here that my colleagues and I were writing our opinions, and stating what was crystal clear. I greatly benefited from the fact that Prince Khaled bin Sultan was leading the war, since the information I obtained from him were first-hand sources, the very information that any Ph.D. student would be looking for to ascertain their validity.
I felt the lethal end near when Saddam Hussein refused the American warning of 7/1/1991 in Geneva, and did not retreat before the given deadline. He went into a loosing war that had no reason to be fought except the fatal mixture of ignorance, crime, arrogance and pride.
I wrote on 17/1/1991: we are writing while the losses are big, but still identified. Tomorrow or the day after it, a war might erupt which results cannot be assessed. It will inevitably end with Iraq's defeat, and Arabs will bitterly taste their victory, because they tried their best to avoid a confrontation, and sent a call after another for the Iraqi president to go back to reason, but he refused all calls from the brothers, and was obstinate about the unjust. So what remains for us, is to pray God to be merciful on the people of the region.
I still pray for the same thing, after 12 years or more, since Saddam Hussein was a disaster for which all Iraqis and Arabs paid the price. If a new Arab system manages to prevent the rise of a new Saddam Hussein, we will have started moving in the right direction. As for the man who started in a hole and ended in a hole, his punishment will remain less severe than what he sowed with his own hands, and he will remain an example for what a ruler must not be.
This does show that Hussein wasn't all that well liked by other Arabs as well, especially for his actions that wound up killing a lot of Arabs.
I do wonder whether Hussein would still be in power if he didn't invade Kuwait, or withdrew. Maybe it would lead to another Iraq-Iran War since he wouldn't have had the blow that he suffered in '91 nor the handcuffs on his operations thereafter.
All I can say is, although the first Gulf War led to a lot of deaths, I'm glad things took this course because it saved more lives after 1991 now that Hussein did not have his large army, nor his north to govern and could not continue on the path he was on in 1990. Also, it meant that US support for him ended, which is a great thing too.
But I can't help but wonder what would have happened....