2. Tehran is not a microcosm of Iran.
One reason why Ahmadinejads 2005 election took analysts and observers by surprise is the
fact that Tehran is not a microcosm of Iran. Similar to urbanites around the world, Tehrans
population is generally more progressive, more informed, and more politicized than the rest
of the country.
Rather than rely on official state television as its sole news source, Tehran boasts much
higher rates of Internet penetration, satellite television viewership, and newspaper
readership. Moreover, political discontent in the capital is exacerbated by exhausting traffic,
suffocating air pollution, and high inflation. This sense of alienation was apparent in the
2005 presidential election, as first-round voter turnout in Tehran was only 33% (as opposed
to 62% nationwide).
Outside of Tehran, Iranians are similarly dissatisfied with the status quo, but they are far less
politicized. Political discussion is usually centered on the lack of viable employment or the
high cost of meat and onions rather than a lack of political and social freedoms. This
presents a growing dilemma for journalists and analysts covering Iran.
Though Tehran is the countrys political heart and soul (where the 1979 Revolution took
place) and deserves the lions share of the focus, national elections are increasingly being
decided outside of Tehran, given the capitals low voter turnout. While the seeming gulf
between middle-class north Tehran and working-class south Tehran was emphasized during
the elections, more difficult to reconcile for Iran watchers is the gulf between Tehran and
the rest of the country.
3. Ahmadinejad has failed to deliver on campaign promises, but his fate is uncertain.
Ahmadinejad has failed to deliver on his lofty electoral pledges, namely that he would put
the oil money on peoples dinner tables. On the contrary, since his inauguration in August
2005 the country has experienced massive capital flight, a precipitous drop in foreign
investment, rampant inflation, and increased unemployment.
4
There are clear signs that his popularity is fading. In last Decembers municipal elections the
presidents political allies were trounced by more moderate and pragmatic politicians. Absent
any drastic occurrence (i.e. a military attack on Iran), this is a trend that should likely
continue in the March 2008 parliamentary elections, as well as the June of 2009 presidential
elections, when Ahmadinejad is up for re-election.
Aware that he lacks support among the urban middle and upper classes, however,
Ahmadinejad has courted economically disenfranchised Iranians in far-off provinces,
promising loans and debt relief. Cognizant of the fact that he lacks favor among the
countrys elitetechnocrats, business mangers, journalists, academics and even senior
clericshe has aimed to curry favor with the countrys paramilitary groups, such as the
bassij, and attempted to co-opt the countrys top military force, the Revolutionary Guards,
by granting them lucrative construction and development projects.
So while popular opinion in Tehran and other urban areas is not sympathetic to
Ahmadinejad, the electoral behavior of the bassij and the IRGC, as well as the opinions of those residing outside the capital, will play an important but unpredictable role in deciding
his fate.