Aung San Suu Kyi gets her sentence and MFA Singapore is happy

[aelf]

We're dealing with an authoritarian dictatorship that can do whatever it wants and has done exactly that.

I don't think the Burmese junta is like the Khmer Rouge, you know. It's still reprehensible, though.

Its now playing nicely and I'm inclined to believe that's because its realized that its position is unstable at best and untenable at worst. Something that the literature and Burma watchers have been hinting at for some time, how else do you explain its recent change of behaviour?

Why is it playing nice all of a sudden now?

In any case they don't seem to realize that the regime has given her such a lenient sentence for a reason and an obviously important one.

Perhaps it's playing nicer because it's expecting less and less tolerance from the international community, even from its remaining friends. Why can that not be the case?

In any case, really sentencing her to 3 years of hard labour would make her virtually a martyr. We know how dangerous one of those can be, right?

No, probably not. But building up links prior to his death will make dealing and reconciling with his successor much easier. Any transition to democracy will only happen at the sufferance of the Junta and not a whit before -- barring some massive shift in the military's position which is in FSB territory.

I never implied there was. I did say that words are a waste of time and effort in this case. I also said that if Singapore was so inclined it could use the regimes riches to good effect against it when the time is right. If for instance the regime was in the process of toppling with the odds looking lopsided Singapore at the instigation of the United States could probably tip the scales to flight instead of fight.

I don't see why you can't condemn the regime now and then offer an olive branch to a new one when this one passes.

And you're an economist, so why is it not the case that not offering any resistance to bad behaviour will only mean allowing it to continue? If you don't show your willingness to punish non-cooperation, then non-cooperation can just go on. I think credibility, not tolerance, is more important.

There's no reason why Singapore would want to keep supporting a tottering regime and plently or reasons why it would want to please America and the next government all at the same tide. It'll pick the winner.

No, Singapore gets Burmese money and resources. It will probably stay a US ally regardless.

 

[Masada]

I don't think the Burmese junta is like the Khmer Rouge, you know. It's still reprehensible, though.

It's committing genocide. It starved its own population deliberately. Massacred the opposition. I really don't see much else it hasn't done short of killing a large swathe of its citizens- wait its done that!

Perhaps it's playing nicer because it's expecting less and less tolerance from the international community, even from its remaining friends. Why can that not be the case?

What's the international community going to do that it hasn't done? It isn't going to invade and it won't ever graduate to anything beyond "Bad Burma!" for the next decade at least.

In any case, really sentencing her to 3 years of hard labour would make her virtually a martyr. We know how dangerous one of those can be, right?

If I were in their shoes I would have disappeared all her close confidants to cut her of from the internal base. I would have then begun to 'pressure' the still existent party leadership before co-opting the more amenable and replacing the reluctant. That's probably overkill considering the oppositions collapsing party structure which is run by a near dead old guard and relies on a symbol stuck in some golden palace, whose going to die sometime soon all of her own accord taking her own party down with her. It isn't the Junta's fault that the collective fortunes of the opposition movement have been tied to her person for so long, it actually benefits them.

I don't see why you can't condemn the regime now and then offer an olive branch to a new one when this one passes.

If you corner them, they will fight back and hard. If you give them an escape route it will be that much easier for them to give up. Simply because they won't be risking losing their lives to the mob.

And you're an economist, so why is it not the case that not offering any resistance to bad behaviour will only mean allowing it to continue? If you don't show your willingness to punish non-cooperation, then non-cooperation can just go on. I think credibility, not tolerance, is more important.

Short of invading Burma there is nothing that can be done. It isn't hard to deduce that our present course of action isn't working, is never likely to work and is hurting the ordinary Burmese who have nothing to do with the regime! There is nothing we can do but wait for some sort of crisis to hit before throwing our conserved diplomatic, economic and potentially military weight into the problem. In any case diplomatic and economic isolation favor the regime, they reduce the resources and freedom of movement of potential competitors to its power.

No, Singapore gets Burmese money and resources. It will probably stay a US ally regardless.

The other solution has a far better pay-off in the long run. The current one is a pittance of what could be achieved under a functioning Burma and anyone with an iota of gray mass will figure that out rather quickly.

 

[aelf]

This will simply go on and on, so I'll keep it short.

It's committing genocide. It starved its own population deliberately. Massacred the opposition. I really don't see much else it hasn't done short of killing a large swathe of its citizens- wait its done that!

I still don't think it's in the same league as the Khmer Rouge, for reasons you have given yourself. It's not as rogue (heh heh) as that.

The other solution has a far better pay-off in the long run. The current one is a pittance of what could be achieved under a functioning Burma and anyone with an iota of gray mass will figure that out rather quickly.

Well, two things that I've already said. First, all the cajoling done by ASEAN countries hasn't really accomplished that much. There just isn't much that can be done either way until Myanmar opens itself up. I can scarcely believe that you assume that these people would just turn into nice guys all of sudden if no one's yelling at them. That's not how pseudo-totalitarian regimes work. Why are you not defending the Islamic Republic of Iran, for that matter? Or, better yet, how about the DPRK? Do you recommend trying to 'bribe' them into submission as well? Looks like the Burmese might be looking to go nuclear now too, by the way. And if you're only talking about post-opening up, then it stands to reason that we should support the opposition, who will be likely to come to power when the day comes. Unless you think that there will be a much more liberal and democratic government headed by the military.

Second, I've already repeatedly pointed out that Singapore isn't in this because of a grand diplomatic strategy, although sometimes they like to think that's the case. Singapore is pretty heavily invested in Myanmar. If the junta falls, then there's a very good chance that it will lose all that. Pragmatic, yes, but not in the humanitarian way that you are trying to paint.

 

[Masada]

I still don't think it's in the same league as the Khmer Rouge, for reasons you have given yourself. It's not as rogue (heh heh) as that.

It would be if it needed to be. Rational state and all that

I can scarcely believe that you assume that these people would just turn into nice guys all of sudden if no one's yelling at them. That's not how pseudo-totalitarian regimes work.

I've never said they will. I've said it'll give us more room of maneuver in the long term. Simply because our short and long term policy options are invasion and nothing else. There is nothing else we can do on the diplomatic or economic front!

Why are you not defending the Islamic Republic of Iran, for that matter?

I support rapprochement with Iran as well. It also makes perfect sense at a geo-political level.

Or, better yet, how about the DPRK?

Exactly the same policy.

Do you recommend trying to 'bribe' them into submission as well?

It isn't bribery. It's simply a means of expanding our options past invasion which is all we have at this moment.

Looks like the Burmese might be looking to go nuclear now too, by the way.

Our embargoes and diplomatic pressure are working, by giving it a reason to acquire nuclear weapons, fancy that!

And if you're only talking about post-opening up, then it stands to reason that we should support the opposition, who will be likely to come to power when the day comes. Unless you think that there will be a much more liberal and democratic government headed by the military.

I'm not talking about supporting the regime far from it. I'm merely noting that our current policy options are continuing to offer moral support through economic blockade and the odd diplomatic missive while hope gets gunned down in the streets. If we adopt a policy which gives us leverage then maybe just maybe we can use it at the opportune moment. At the moment if any of the heads of state of Iran, Burma or North Korea up and died we would have no means of influencing the outcome at all, we can't embargo stuff already embargoed and we can't send anymore diplomatic missives toilet paper.

 

[aelf]

I'm not talking about supporting the regime far from it. I'm merely noting that our current policy options are continuing to offer moral support through economic blockade and the odd diplomatic missive while hope gets gunned down in the streets. If we adopt a policy which gives us leverage then maybe just maybe we can use it at the opportune moment. At the moment if any of the heads of state of Iran, Burma or North Korea up and died we would have no means of influencing the outcome at all, we can't embargo stuff already embargoed and we can't send anymore diplomatic missives toilet paper.

Carrot and stick, right? Stopping the stick can be the carrot when the time comes. Isn't that ruthlessly pragmatic enough?

I also question what sort of leverage and result anyone is getting by staying friendly with the junta. I suppose access to the country to distribute aid when a massive disaster hits, I give you that. But, still, that didn't happen fast enough.

Bottom line is I agree much more with the policy that some other ASEAN members have (i.e. always react cautiously) than with Singapore's (i.e. kiss their butt and offer the occasional token lecture while trying to furtively insert praises even there).

 

[Shaihulud]

I don't mind the support of Myanmmar by Singapore if it was for us to gain a leverage over them, what I find reprehensible is Singapore allowing Burmese drug lords to set up shop in Singapore, and possibly funneling drugs to the rest of the World. This from a country that hangs people for traficking drugs.

 

[REDY]

Disgusting but not unusual.

 

[Masada]

Carrot and stick, right? Stopping the stick can be the carrot when the time comes. Isn't that ruthlessly pragmatic enough?

You can only hold out the invasion card for so long before it loses all meaning -- America being embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan and all don't help either.

I also question what sort of leverage and result anyone is getting by staying friendly with the junta. I suppose access to the country to distribute aid when a massive disaster hits, I give you that. But, still, that didn't happen fast enough.

I don't care about the regime in the least. I care about getting the means to hit them back when the time is right and not because the West decided that protecting human rights is best served by starving people to death.

Bottom line is I agree much more with the policy that some other ASEAN members have (i.e. always react cautiously) than with Singapore's (i.e. kiss their butt and offer the occasional token lecture while trying to furtively insert praises even there).

Singapore might be spineless but they have the most influence over the Junta in ASEAN. I don't believe they'll act on their own but I do believe that with the correct application of diplomatic pressure they can be induced to do the right thing when the time is right.

 

[aelf]

You can only hold out the invasion card for so long before it loses all meaning -- America being embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan and all don't help either.

I'm not talking about invasion. I'm talking about the diplomatic isolation. Reward for reforms can be the gradual ending of that.

I don't care about the regime in the least. I care about getting the means to hit them back when the time is right and not because the West decided that protecting human rights is best served by starving people to death

I'm not talking about a general embargo either. Targeted sanctions (e.g. on arms and freezing of assets) are more like my kind of things. As well as restrictions on official travel and support for the opposition.

But I do agree that there should be some countries who opt for a slightly different strategy. But, like I said, Singapore doesn't really have that in mind. And I don't think anyone needs to go to the extent that Singapore does unless their interests are tied up with the regime.

Singapore might be spineless but they have the most influence over the Junta in ASEAN. I don't believe they'll act on their own but I do believe that with the correct application of diplomatic pressure they can be induced to do the right thing when the time is right.

I don't think the difference is a whole lot. It seems that ASEAN has to act in concert to apply significant pressure. You may assume there are some backroom things headed by Singapore, of course, but there's no reason to suppose that the relatively closer relations make a big difference. It's not a case of China and NK, because in that case China hold NK's lifeline.

 

[Masada]

I'm not talking about invasion. I'm talking about the diplomatic isolation. Reward for reforms can be the gradual ending of that.

I'm struggling to think of an occasion where that has actually worked.

I'm not talking about a general embargo either. Targeted sanctions (e.g. on arms and freezing of assets) are more like my kind of things. As well as restrictions on official travel and support for the opposition.

See your agreeing with me. The more room to maneuver the better your responses can be when the Junta takes a turn for the worse.

But I do agree that there should be some countries who opt for a slightly different strategy. But, like I said, Singapore doesn't really have that in mind. And I don't think anyone needs to go to the extent that Singapore does unless their interests are tied up with the regime.

It could have a considerably payoff in the long run like I've shown.

I don't think the difference is a whole lot. It seems that ASEAN has to act in concert to apply significant pressure. You may assume there are some backroom things headed by Singapore, of course, but there's no reason to suppose that the relatively closer relations make a big difference. It's not a case of China and NK, because in that case China hold NK's lifeline.

Singapore holds the lifeline of the Junta's elite. If it was hitting the fan and Singapore threatened to confiscate their assets if they didn't leave peacefully, you can bet they'll choose the security of life overseas instead of being ripped apart by the mob if it goes pearshaped.

 

[aelf]

I'm struggling to think of an occasion where that has actually worked.

I have no idea, but I'm sure history can give some examples. I just don't have the information on my fingertips.

Singapore holds the lifeline of the Junta's elite. If it was hitting the fan and Singapore threatened to confiscate their assets if they didn't leave peacefully, you can bet they'll choose the security of life overseas instead of being ripped apart by the mob if it goes pearshaped.

Not going to happen, frankly. And if you're suggesting that the best way to gain leverage over a rogue state is to set yourself up as the holder of the lifeline of the regime, well, you have to forgive me if I think that's stretching credulity. I just don't think that sort of devious plotting translates well to reality.

 

[Masada]

I have no idea, but I'm sure history can give some examples. I just don't have the information on my fingertips.

That isn't reassuring.

Not going to happen, frankly. And if you're suggesting that the best way to gain leverage over a rogue state is to set yourself up as the holder of the lifeline of the regime, well, you have to forgive me if I think that's stretching credulity. I just don't think that sort of devious plotting translates well to reality.

Some event happens which looks likely to topple the Junta. What possible benefits would Singapore gain from supporting the regime when it can? If it doesn't support the regime by threatening to expropriate the funding then it will only raise the ire of any possible democratic successors, the United States and ASEAN. If it does threaten to expropriate the funding it will gain the gratitude of any democratic successor, the United States and ASEAN and if should that fail it will still be up the expropriated funds with a chance to renew trade after some time -- dictatorial regimes under embargo can't be choosers.

That Singapore has been trading with the regime is irrelevant, the regime would have continued on in the absence of Singaporean trade, that it can achieve a good end by virtue of bad trade is possible. That isn't what I'm suggesting in the least but it could be used to end the regime at an appropriate time if the right pressure is applied.

 

[aelf]

Some event happens which looks likely to topple the Junta. What possible benefits would Singapore gain from supporting the regime when it can? If it doesn't support the regime by threatening to expropriate the funding then it will only raise the ire of any possible democratic successors, the United States and ASEAN. If it does threaten to expropriate the funding it will gain the gratitude of any democratic successor, the United States and ASEAN and if should that fail it will still be up the expropriated funds with a chance to renew trade after some time -- dictatorial regimes under embargo can't be choosers.

That Singapore has been trading with the regime is irrelevant, the regime would have continued on in the absence of Singaporean trade, that it can achieve a good end by virtue of bad trade is possible. That isn't what I'm suggesting in the least but it could be used to end the regime at an appropriate time if the right pressure is applied.

What I'm talking about is the principle. You're saying that it's convenient that Singapore has been trading with Myanmar and this could be useful. First, I don't know if it will indeed be made use of. Secondly, I don't think the principle of dealing with rogue states should be to trade and placate them until such a time when threatening to reverse the policy would be useful.

So on one hand, saying that in this case it's good that Singapore is trading with Myanmar might be too presumptuous. I'm don't think even experts here can tell how far Singapore is willing to go to jeopardise the regime and its own investments and trade for humanitarian reasons. OTOH, trying to draw lessons from this case is not very useful either, since placating and trading with rogue regimes without question doesn't sound like a very good policy to pursue. While there might be pragmatic long-term reasons for doing so, it's only going to be taken as sponsoring the regime. I don't think that is very beneficial for a country's reputation and credibility, not just among governments, but among ordinary people both in the world and in the rogue state. Not very practical on balance.

Therefore, as I said, I much prefer the general ASEAN policy of reacting cautiously to Singapore's overall policy towards Myanmar. As for (Western) liberal democratic countries, they do have credibility to maintain, so I say they should go with targeted sanctions.


PS: Oh, besides, trading extensively with rogue states might create a situation where you'd be unwilling to cut it off later due to economic reasons, which is what seems to be happening with Singapore.

 

[thekaje]

Yo Masada, who is that chick in your avatar?

 

[Masada]

What I'm talking about is the principle. You're saying that it's convenient that Singapore has been trading with Myanmar and this could be useful. First, I don't know if it will indeed be made use of.

I don't know if it'll be used either, but I'm not much enamored of principles which allow innocents to starve, the economy to jump off a cliff and the Junta to use hunger as a weapon.

See my problem with the current paradigm which includes your views is that while it might start off small, targeted travel visa bans and the like, it will almost inevitably change into increasingly draconian provisions because the cost of such things are so minor for the regime.

Even if it translates into a full embargo, it nearly always ends up benefiting the regime by giving it another weapon to use: hunger. You can see it again and again used as a means of societal control, often not overtly but there always exists that possibility.

Its also a nifty means of converting a large portion of your population into dependents of the state, Burma has welded the military and civilian state apparatus's tightly to their bosom by distributing monopolies, privileges and the like which raise them above the majority of the population. Nobody will willingly side against the state for fear of losing those privileges, it also brings your interests broadly speaking into line with the interests of the state. If the state succeeds you get more, if it fails you run the risk of getting nothing.

Secondly, I don't think the principle of dealing with rogue states should be to trade and placate them until such a time when threatening to reverse the policy would be useful.

It hasn't worked for Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan or a host of other 'rogue states'. It never worked for Iraq, Nicaragua or a host of other states which required military intervention to deal with. I can't think of a single authoritarian dictatorship in the Burmese mold which has ever been toppled by incremental use of the stick, if anything it makes it easier to deal with. See trade is a brilliant means of bringing about prosperity independent of the state and severing that dependency on the states largess, it's also a brilliant means of absolutely screwing a country in one hit when you need to.

The problem I have with the selective use of the stick is that it gets so darn small after a while -- once you arrive at the embargo state there isn't much else you can do. Your options are war. The other unfortunate tendency that arises from copious use of the stick is a wariness to whoever is using it, Iran is the perfect example, it stands to gain so much from opening up to the United States, it loses it single greatest threat, it gains a valuable ally against the Sunni's who pose another threat and it stands to gain a valuable Shiite ally in Iraq. At present its getting one and only partially and not the other two which are far more valuable. Why? Because the United States beat the nation to much in the past, any attempt at rapprochement is almost always going to be assumed to be some American trick like the many before it.

If you take the opposite tact and use the carrot as the first instrument of choice then you don't have those problems. The stick only grows larger as the consequences of disobedience grows. If you opened up trade with Burma tomorrow you can almost guarantee that corruption by officials will circumvent state monopolies and the established state institutions. It will also resuscitate the economy and with time it will free the people of dependence upon the state. As time goes on and the integration and benefits that trade entails grows the stick will progressively grow larger. The Junta will also lose a major source of its legitimacy, it will not longer be able to claim that a large existential threat from foreigners exists with quite the same force that it does today. If in time the forces acting against the regime begin to grow and threaten to break out then ASEAN or whoever can step in and threaten to use a much larger stick than it could otherwise have used.

PS: Oh, besides, trading extensively with rogue states might create a situation where you'd be unwilling to cut it off later due to economic reasons, which is what seems to be happening with Singapore.

The hurt is spread out across multiple countries though. In any case its been done before with Iraq, Iran and the like without any significant consequences. Conversely the hurt on the country thus ostracized is an order of magnitude larger than the hurt dealt to the multiple nations it was trading with.

Yo Masada, who is that chick in your avatar?

Bic Runga.

 

[aelf]

I don't know if it'll be used either, but I'm not much enamored of principles which allow innocents to starve, the economy to jump off a cliff and the Junta to use hunger as a weapon.

See my problem with the current paradigm which includes your views is that while it might start off small, targeted travel visa bans and the like, it will almost inevitably change into increasingly draconian provisions because the cost of such things are so minor for the regime.

Even if it translates into a full embargo, it nearly always ends up benefiting the regime by giving it another weapon to use: hunger. You can see it again and again used as a means of societal control, often not overtly but there always exists that possibility.

Its also a nifty means of converting a large portion of your population into dependents of the state, Burma has welded the military and civilian state apparatus's tightly to their bosom by distributing monopolies, privileges and the like which raise them above the majority of the population. Nobody will willingly side against the state for fear of losing those privileges, it also brings your interests broadly speaking into line with the interests of the state. If the state succeeds you get more, if it fails you run the risk of getting nothing.

It hasn't worked for Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan or a host of other 'rogue states'. It never worked for Iraq, Nicaragua or a host of other states which required military intervention to deal with. I can't think of a single authoritarian dictatorship in the Burmese mold which has ever been toppled by incremental use of the stick, if anything it makes it easier to deal with. See trade is a brilliant means of bringing about prosperity independent of the state and severing that dependency on the states largess, it's also a brilliant means of absolutely screwing a country in one hit when you need to.

The problem I have with the selective use of the stick is that it gets so darn small after a while -- once you arrive at the embargo state there isn't much else you can do. Your options are war. The other unfortunate tendency that arises from copious use of the stick is a wariness to whoever is using it, Iran is the perfect example, it stands to gain so much from opening up to the United States, it loses it single greatest threat, it gains a valuable ally against the Sunni's who pose another threat and it stands to gain a valuable Shiite ally in Iraq. At present its getting one and only partially and not the other two which are far more valuable. Why? Because the United States beat the nation to much in the past, any attempt at rapprochement is almost always going to be assumed to be some American trick like the many before it.

If you take the opposite tact and use the carrot as the first instrument of choice then you don't have those problems. The stick only grows larger as the consequences of disobedience grows. If you opened up trade with Burma tomorrow you can almost guarantee that corruption by officials will circumvent state monopolies and the established state institutions. It will also resuscitate the economy and with time it will free the people of dependence upon the state. As time goes on and the integration and benefits that trade entails grows the stick will progressively grow larger. The Junta will also lose a major source of its legitimacy, it will not longer be able to claim that a large existential threat from foreigners exists with quite the same force that it does today. If in time the forces acting against the regime begin to grow and threaten to break out then ASEAN or whoever can step in and threaten to use a much larger stick than it could otherwise have used.

Wait, all I'm getting from you is the notion that nothing should be done to deter rogue states from doing whatever they want. Sometimes you seem to posit this state of affairs where everything could be reversed when "crap hits the fan" and that would be winningly effective in convincing the regime to open up. When does the "crap hit the fan"? Was Nargis not enough? Which country with leverage did anything more than to force out concessions that were too little and too late? And do you think that all the international outrage didn't play a part in facilitating the concessions anyway? After all, there is a price for being a rogue state, a price that is not paid when there is a ready supply of states willing to cooperate.

At other times, you seem to be extolling the virtues of trade, even invoking humanitarian reasons. But, you see, I already said that I'm not a fan of wholesale embargoes. Besides, general prosperity do not equal political liberalisation. In fact, it is more likely to be the other way round. Your scenario only makes sense if we assume 100% true trickle-down economics. You mentioned corruption, but you forgot to mention that proceeds from free trade would go mostly to the pockets of the elite and officials who are already in power in such situations. To assume that the people would greatly benefit under a lopsided set up that massively favours those who are already at the top in the country seems rather ridiculous. This is why right wingers sometimes amuse me by trying to invoke the name of the people. The beggar in the street gets a few more bones to pick when an extra truckload of food goes to the rich man's house, and a profound change, we are to believe, has taken place.

So, with those things in mind, what seems to be the recommendation you make when it comes to dealing with brutal regimes: Nothing at all. Do nothing and hopefully when the proverbial crap hits the fan, your threats, if you ever make them, will mean something. Or worse, throw money at these regimes and hope that something will happen.

You say that targeted embargoes are weak. They probably are. But nothing short of invasion, as you say yourself, is going to have a quick and profound impact, and we can't even be sure if the impact would be good or bad. As an alternative, you suggest a long-term view, but which is a strategy with assumptions that are extremely weak themselves. I don't think there's any certainty whichever way you go, so I'd rather stick to a balanced approach that maintains credibility - neither a sweeping measure that hurts the people nor a tolerant face that is ready to excuse almost anything in view of a long-term plan that I'm not even sure the policy makers are committed to. A credible approach that makes our stance known is I think the best one on the whole, especially with regards to other situations in the world now and in the future. Respectability is still preferable to obsequiousness.

The hurt is spread out across multiple countries though. In any case its been done before with Iraq, Iran and the like without any significant consequences. Conversely the hurt on the country thus ostracized is an order of magnitude larger than the hurt dealt to the multiple nations it was trading with.

So why is it that Singapore has no mind to have that happen? Like I said, Singapore's policy is driven by economic not diplomatic reasons.

And you mention Iraq and Iran. What had been accomplished with those countries?

 

[Masada]

I'll write a detailed response tonight, since I don't quite think you get what I'm saying.

 

[aelf]

I'll write a detailed response tonight, since I don't quite think you get what I'm saying.

Actually I think I do. You're saying that the more trade, the more dependence, and the more serious the threat of an embargo would be in the future. You also suggest that more trade will increase prosperity and decrease the people's dependence on the state, leading to a much greater chance of political liberalisation.

However, what I'm questioning your assumptions. First, there is no evidence to show that countries with closer ties with the junta (such as Singapore) had a significant enough leverage to influence its decisions very effectively in the last major crisis. And it did take the whole of ASEAN, so I'm not sure how much role Singapore's leverage had despite the country's supposed grip on the junta's lifeline. Some people just don't seem to give a crap what cards you hold. If it means either a painful economic blow or the discrediting of the regime enough to possibly undermine its rule, they would choose the first and deal with the people's economic woes with force. That's what happened in the aftermath of Nargis. And it would also be time to pull out the "look at the evil foreigners" card that you allude to. They're not stupid. They know how to play the game.

Second, I don't agree that greater volume of trade would lead to a greater chance of political liberalisation if the distribution of wealth in the country is bad. It might even make the elite richer and poor ever more dependent.

Well, do you think that all those diplomats haven't got a clue? Observe their language. There's usually some talk about sending a clear signal what the international community's stance is. That has to do with credibility. If you're credible, it makes it less likely that rouge states would try to push the envelope because they know we don't take too much crap, and it also makes them more likely to trust that you'd accommodate if they're willing to cooperate. If you're eager to please, then they would just try and try, and by the time you wise up to their tactics, it might be too late to prevent major damage. Surely Appeasement taught the world that, if nothing else. But, at the same time, it doesn't mean that engaging with rogue states is appeasement. That's why I advocate caution not hostility, and resolve not obsequiousness.

 

[Masada]

I seem to have been laboring under the assumption that you understood something of the internal workings of the Junta, something which has since proved to be false. I'll respond to you second post tomorrow night, you'll note that I've already covered a few factual points of your second argument here.

Wait, all I'm getting from you is the notion that nothing should be done to deter rogue states from doing whatever they want.

Your method has failed every day since 1989 and has absolutely nothing left to give us but war!

Sometimes you seem to posit this state of affairs where everything could be reversed when "crap hits the fan" and that would be winningly effective in convincing the regime to open up. When does the "crap hit the fan"? Was Nargis not enough?

No. It was manifestly not enough because their still in power despite the "international condemnation big stick approach" which had all the weight of toilet paper.

Which country with leverage did anything more than to force out concessions that were too little and too late? And do you think that all the international outrage didn't play a part in facilitating the concessions anyway?

I'm sure the Rohingya, Karen and all the other ethnic minorities of Burma are praising "international outrage" daily. But lets continue believing that ASEAN has some sort of power over Burma, it doesn't, it can't invade and won't backup its demands with force. King Bhumibol Adulyadej does however have influence over Burma, he directly interceded with the Junta and they listened because they owed him. It was enough to allow international aid to flow into the country.

After all, there is a price for being a rogue state, a price that is not paid when there is a ready supply of states willing to cooperate

That's why your approach is so fundamentally flawed. In a perfect world everyone would band together to denounce Burma in collective angst, it would ignore them, and continue on with its merry way like it has been since 1989. Unless the stick is big enough there's no reason for Burma which has already hit rock-bottom to care anymore. It literally cannot sink much further than it already has and it knows it.

At other times, you seem to be extolling the virtues of trade, even invoking humanitarian reasons.

The reasons are primarily humanitarian. The potential to use it as weapon is secondary.

But, you see, I already said that I'm not a fan of wholesale embargoes.

Your a fan of toilet paper. It hasn't worked for twenty years why should it start working now?

Besides, general prosperity do not equal political liberalisation. In fact, it is more likely to be the other way round. Your scenario only makes sense if we assume 100% true trickle-down economics.

I never mentioned political liberalization at all, I didn't even allude to it.

You mentioned corruption, but you forgot to mention that proceeds from free trade would go mostly to the pockets of the elite and officials who are already in power in such situations. To assume that the people would greatly benefit under a lopsided set up that massively favours those who are already at the top in the country seems rather ridiculous.

That's the point but you don't seem to get it!

This is why right wingers sometimes amuse me by trying to invoke the name of the people. The beggar in the street gets a few more bones to pick when an extra truckload of food goes to the rich man's house, and a profound change, we are to believe, has taken place.

What would you do for the people? Send them toilet paper.

So, with those things in mind, what seems to be the recommendation you make when it comes to dealing with brutal regimes: Nothing at all. Do nothing and hopefully when the proverbial crap hits the fan, your threats, if you ever make them, will mean something. Or worse, throw money at these regimes and hope that something will happen.

What new international pressure would you bring against the regime? Nothing because everything humanely possible has been done against it. That's ignoring the fact that you still don't understand my argument in the least.

As an alternative, you suggest a long-term view, but which is a strategy with assumptions that are extremely weak themselves.

The problem is you haven't understood anything I've said at all. I'm forced to concede the point that you simply do not understand how Burma's Junta functions or its underlying institutional problems. You assume that my assumptions are weak without understanding in the least what I'm assuming about the regime's nature.

I don't think there's any certainty whichever way you go, so I'd rather stick to a balanced approach that maintains credibility - neither a sweeping measure that hurts the people nor a tolerant face that is ready to excuse almost anything in view of a long-term plan that I'm not even sure the policy makers are committed to. A credible approach that makes our stance known is I think the best one on the whole, especially with regards to other situations in the world now and in the future. Respectability is still preferable to obsequiousness.

This is all I'm seeing:

Hi, I'm aelf and I'm committed to doing nothing about Burma. I'll retain my international respectability by subscribing to a system which has failed comprehensively for twenty years in a multitude of cases. But that's fine because I trust that the problem will be worked out somehow... somewhere... someway even though we have no links to any of the important actors in Burma!

 

[aelf]

I seem to have been laboring under the assumption that you understood something of the internal workings of the Junta, something which has since proved to be false. I'll respond to you second post tomorrow night, you'll note that I've already covered a few factual points of your second argument here.

Well, I'll wait for your reply, since you haven't fully responded to what I think a good stance is.

But you seem to be saying that you understand the internal workings of the junta well. An amazing claim, it seems to me. Unless you're at least a diplomat who has had experience with Myanmar, I don't know on what basis you claim to know well how the junta works. I did offer you evidence from what happened in the last major crisis. Singapore's influence wasn't exactly decisive, so I don't know what evidence you have for the effectiveness of Singapore's policy as opposed to ASEAN's as a whole, the latter which you have derided.

May I also remind you that I think there's no easy solution. You say that targeted sanctions have never worked. Well, in reality it's hard to say what will work and what will not when we're dealing with rogue states. With the DPRK pretty much back to its old ways, I struggle to see how a policy of cooperation (more like a policy of collaboration if what you're looking at is Singapore's policy with regards to Myanmar) can ensure anything either. I'm not against détente, obviously, but it takes two hands to clap. We probably won't get anything as long as ultra-conservatives remain in power and haven't lost the will to rule. They're not brutal for nothing.

In the end, what I'm advocating is the avoidance of collaboration with the regime and the maintenance of credibility, since there is no guarantee whichever way you go. A somewhat Kantian perspective, I suppose. Funnily enough, many countries seem to agree. Maybe they all need to fire their diplomats.