I thought this book might interest people. It was written by a guy at the U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE in 1985. The entire book is online:
EDIT: Actually this is an English translation in 1985 of a classic French military text written in 1961 by a veteran of French wars.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp#16
Here is an interesting section:
8. Errors in Fighting the Guerilla
The basic weapon of modern warfare, particularly in the cities, is terrorism, supported by a special organization. In the countryside, there is an old method of combat that has proved itself in the past and has been taken over and adapted to conditions of modern warfare: It is guerrilla warfare, which is rooted in terrorism.
The guerrilla and terrorism are only one stage of modern warfare, designed to create a situation favorable to the build-up of a regular army for the purpose of eventually confronting an enemy army on the battlefield and defeating him.
The goal of the guerrilla, during what can be a long period of time, is not so much to obtain local successes as it is to create a climate of insecurity, to compel the forces of order to retire into their most easily defensible areas. This results in the abandonment of certain portions of territory that the guerrillas are then able to control. At the beginning of hostilities, the guerrillas show themselves only in minor but violent actions, which they carry out by surprise but with care to avoid losses.
Dispersion is a necessary part of their defense. Their subsequent regrouping and transformation into large, regularly organized units is not possible until they have acquired absolute control of a vast area in which they are able to secure the substantial material aid necessary for the establishment, training, and enlistment of a regular army.
The appearance of regular units in certain regions does not mean the end of the guerrilla. He will continue actively wherever the establishment of regular units has not been carried out. Regular units and guerrilla bands will cooperate closely to try to bring about a situation favorable to the engagement of the enemy army in a decisive fight to annihilate it.
modern warfare, like classical wars of the past, will definitely end only with the crushing of one of the two armies on the battlefield, or by capitulation of one side to the war aims of the opponent.
The origin, evolution, and efficacy of the guerrilla are well known. Many authors have studied him, particularly in the various theaters of operation of World War II. He was unquestionably a success in Russia, France, and Yugoslavia. In China and Indochina, it was possible to lead him to a final victory over well-equipped regular modem armies. In Algeria, despite his meager resources of personnel and materiel, he has for years fought a French army that has not succeeded in eliminating him.
There are those who think that, to defeat the guerrilla, it is sufficient to fight him with his own weapons; that is, to oppose the guerrilla with the counterguerrilla. In a way, this is what we tried to do in Indochina and then in Algeria. But the guerrilla's weapons and those of a regular army are quite different, even opposed, in a number of respects.
To attempt to employ guerrilla tactics that we ourselves do not have or cannot put to use is to condemn ourselves to neglect those that we do possess and that can have a definite, useful application.
I believe that the errors committed and the failures sustained flow in large part from confusion between the guerrilla's potential and that of a regular army. For brief intervals in Indochina, we were able to play the part of the counterguerrilla against the Vietminh, and even that of the guerrilla. This experience illustrated the difference between the potential of the guerrilla and of the regular army soldier.
At the time that the French Army occupied Than-Uyen on the right bank of the Red River, to the north of NghiaLo in Thai country, the town and its airfield were defended by a fortified post atop a rocky peak, held by one regular company reinforced by some partisans. But its security was rather chancy, even around the immediate approaches of the town, and on numerous occasions the Vietminh were able to open fire on the planes parked on the airfield.
After the fall of Nghia-Lo, the town of Than-Uyen, which had been evacuated by air-lift, was occupied by the Vietminh.
Then, in October, 1953, native maquisards from the right bank of the Red River, recruited from among people who had remained loyal to us, were able with their own resources to reoccupy the Pbong-Tho region and its airfield, to launch a successful raid on Lao-Kay, and, finally, to seize Than-Uyen and hold it for seven months, deep behind enemy lines. When observers came back to the town, they were struck by the fact that the fortified post had not been reoccupied and the airfield was never guarded. Nonetheless, security was tighter than the previous year when French troops held the position.
The regular troops had observed the airfield and its immediate approaches from the fortified post. Outside of a quite limited circle of vision, they were blind, particularly at night when they missed everything. The Vietminh, who knew the limits of this circle, were able to harass us easily.
Our maquisards, recruited from among and living in. the midst of the local population, watched not the airfield, but rather the Vietminh themselves. They placed their agents everywhere-in units of the Vietminh, in every village, in every house, and on all the trails of the area. The entire population was responsible for watching the enemy, and nothing could escape its observation. When the maquisards signaled us that the area was free, our planes were able to land without risk on the airfield, to which it was unnecessary to give close protection.
The support of the population is essential to the guerrilla. In particular, it prevents him from being taken by surprise, a vital factor for success in combat. As long as this support is not withdrawn from him, we cannot surprise him, unless he commits some blunder, which is unlikely if he is well trained and battle-hardened.
This is the reason why methods currently employed against guerrillas-such as military outposts, autonomous commando groups or patrols detached from such posts, isolated ambushes, and wide-ranging sweeps-only rarely achieve the hoped-for results, and then usually by accident.
Military outposts, installed at great expense in areas to be pacified, are in general not successful. Often the villages they surround are as well controlled by our enemies as villages quite distant.
Outposts are usually placed at communications junctions that must be held to secure heavy equipment. They cause the guerrillas no trouble because there is no need to take them. Armed bands can freely circulate in the large areas between the outposts, and can organize and control the population without interference. A few cleverly planned terrorist attacks can suffice to subject the inhabitants to their will.
In addition, the disposition of the outposts is an open book to our enemies, who observe them at their leisure. They miss nothing.
The only usefulness of the outposts is the obligation they create for us. To maintain them forces us to open and keep up roads, to protect supply convoys during the course of long hauls, and in general to carry on military activity in which we would not indulge if it were not for the outposts.
To break the feeling of isolation, which is not long in coming, the more active or experienced outposts send out patrols rarely exceeding about sixty men (two platoons) in strength. Certain sectors even make use of specially trained commandos of company strength. Their mission is to patrol day and night a predetermined sector by a variety of routes, with the objective of creating a sense of insecurity in the guerrillas surrounding the post and of reassuring the people by their presence.
The populace sees the commandos or patrols passing through, and often views them sympathetically. But the patrols always pass too quickly to destroy the organization the rebels have set up in each village to terrorize the inhabitants and to bend them to their will-the fund collectors, organization leaders, lookouts, etc. As long as this structure is not demolished, the population's fear will remain the same and the task of pacification can make no headway.
Away from their outposts or bases, the commandos or patrols are unable to subsist for long-a few days at best, just time enough to use up the rations they can carry. They cannot live off the land, because they do not have at their disposal the resources the guerrillas use. The guerrilla bands have inhabitants to guide them, an organization that prepares their bivouac each day, sees to their provisioning, and assures their security.
The commandos move about blindly, guided only by the reconnaissance elements they send ahead. At night, even with sentinels nearby, their security is precarious at best. Physical and mental wear and tear come rapidly.
In addition, they are unable to vary their itinerary as much as they would like, particularly on the trip back and if the terrain is difficult. They cannot escape the observation of the inhabitants and the lookouts, who are able to analyze their habits quickly. They will shortly realize that a patrol on a certain path will not leave it-sometimes by force of habit, often because it has no way of getting out. Nothing will happen as long as our enemies are unable to bring together sufficient forces for an attack. But when this time comes, they will make the best of it.
Patrol action, unwearyingly attempted by military men who still believe it possible to beat the enemy on his own ground, is often rewarded by serious failures; at best, it never produces convincing results.
That is why outposts, when first established, attempt to carry out some external activity, but then pull in their horns and never try again.
For the same reasons, isolated ambushes do not accomplish anything. Usually they are betrayed before they take place and come to nothing; at other times, they actually do us harm.
Pursuit commandos or isolated ambushes are combat operations the guerrilla can employ with the backing of the population and when he has a support organization on the spot. As long as we are unable to resort to the same methods, we will achieve only mediocre results, which are disproportionate to the risks run and the efforts demanded from the soldiers.
* Frequently, in fact, it is decided a priori that a given operation not last more than a short, predetermined time-several days, for example.
Large-unit sweeps, conducted with conventional resources within a framework similar to that of conventional warfare, and invariably limited in time,* temporarily disperse guerrilla bands rather than destroy them.
A normal operation of this type usually consists in the attempted surprise encirclement of a well-defined zone in which guerrillas are thought to be located, while mobile elements conduct a mopping-up operation. Despite the ingenuity, even mastery, which some commanders have demonstrated in moving their units about, these operations are always the same.
Surprise, that essential factor of success, is practically never realized. As we have seen, the people among whom our troops live and move have as their mission the informing of the guerrillas, and no movement of troops can escape them. The noose is never completely tightened. The troops charged with the mop-up operations are always too few in number to search a vast and difficult terrain in which the dispersed bands are able to disappear during the brief operation.
Traditionally attracted by the purely military aspect of warfare-that is, by the pursuit and destruction in combat of guerrilla bands on the ground-operational commanders invariably hope to succeed in maneuvering them like regular units and to gain a rapid and spectacular success. They have httle interest in the less noble task, however essential, of subtle work with the population and the destruction of the clandestine organization that enables guerrilla bands to survive despite local defeats the forces of order periodically inflict.
Only a long occupation of the countryside, which will permit police operations among the people analogous to those carried out in the cities, can succeed.
The certainty of never running the risk of a clear defeat, such as an equally armed opponent could inflict upon us, enables any military commander to conduct some sort of operation. Even if guerrilla bands are not destroyed, at least geographical objectives are secured within the prescribed time, and a few dead rebels will always balance the account. If, moreover, a few arms are recovered, the operation, which has been carried out like a normal peacetime maneuver, then assumes an air of battle and victory sufficient to satisfy a commander who is not too exacting.
EDIT: Actually this is an English translation in 1985 of a classic French military text written in 1961 by a veteran of French wars.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp#16
Here is an interesting section:
8. Errors in Fighting the Guerilla
The basic weapon of modern warfare, particularly in the cities, is terrorism, supported by a special organization. In the countryside, there is an old method of combat that has proved itself in the past and has been taken over and adapted to conditions of modern warfare: It is guerrilla warfare, which is rooted in terrorism.
The guerrilla and terrorism are only one stage of modern warfare, designed to create a situation favorable to the build-up of a regular army for the purpose of eventually confronting an enemy army on the battlefield and defeating him.
The goal of the guerrilla, during what can be a long period of time, is not so much to obtain local successes as it is to create a climate of insecurity, to compel the forces of order to retire into their most easily defensible areas. This results in the abandonment of certain portions of territory that the guerrillas are then able to control. At the beginning of hostilities, the guerrillas show themselves only in minor but violent actions, which they carry out by surprise but with care to avoid losses.
Dispersion is a necessary part of their defense. Their subsequent regrouping and transformation into large, regularly organized units is not possible until they have acquired absolute control of a vast area in which they are able to secure the substantial material aid necessary for the establishment, training, and enlistment of a regular army.
The appearance of regular units in certain regions does not mean the end of the guerrilla. He will continue actively wherever the establishment of regular units has not been carried out. Regular units and guerrilla bands will cooperate closely to try to bring about a situation favorable to the engagement of the enemy army in a decisive fight to annihilate it.
modern warfare, like classical wars of the past, will definitely end only with the crushing of one of the two armies on the battlefield, or by capitulation of one side to the war aims of the opponent.
The origin, evolution, and efficacy of the guerrilla are well known. Many authors have studied him, particularly in the various theaters of operation of World War II. He was unquestionably a success in Russia, France, and Yugoslavia. In China and Indochina, it was possible to lead him to a final victory over well-equipped regular modem armies. In Algeria, despite his meager resources of personnel and materiel, he has for years fought a French army that has not succeeded in eliminating him.
There are those who think that, to defeat the guerrilla, it is sufficient to fight him with his own weapons; that is, to oppose the guerrilla with the counterguerrilla. In a way, this is what we tried to do in Indochina and then in Algeria. But the guerrilla's weapons and those of a regular army are quite different, even opposed, in a number of respects.
To attempt to employ guerrilla tactics that we ourselves do not have or cannot put to use is to condemn ourselves to neglect those that we do possess and that can have a definite, useful application.
I believe that the errors committed and the failures sustained flow in large part from confusion between the guerrilla's potential and that of a regular army. For brief intervals in Indochina, we were able to play the part of the counterguerrilla against the Vietminh, and even that of the guerrilla. This experience illustrated the difference between the potential of the guerrilla and of the regular army soldier.
At the time that the French Army occupied Than-Uyen on the right bank of the Red River, to the north of NghiaLo in Thai country, the town and its airfield were defended by a fortified post atop a rocky peak, held by one regular company reinforced by some partisans. But its security was rather chancy, even around the immediate approaches of the town, and on numerous occasions the Vietminh were able to open fire on the planes parked on the airfield.
After the fall of Nghia-Lo, the town of Than-Uyen, which had been evacuated by air-lift, was occupied by the Vietminh.
Then, in October, 1953, native maquisards from the right bank of the Red River, recruited from among people who had remained loyal to us, were able with their own resources to reoccupy the Pbong-Tho region and its airfield, to launch a successful raid on Lao-Kay, and, finally, to seize Than-Uyen and hold it for seven months, deep behind enemy lines. When observers came back to the town, they were struck by the fact that the fortified post had not been reoccupied and the airfield was never guarded. Nonetheless, security was tighter than the previous year when French troops held the position.
The regular troops had observed the airfield and its immediate approaches from the fortified post. Outside of a quite limited circle of vision, they were blind, particularly at night when they missed everything. The Vietminh, who knew the limits of this circle, were able to harass us easily.
Our maquisards, recruited from among and living in. the midst of the local population, watched not the airfield, but rather the Vietminh themselves. They placed their agents everywhere-in units of the Vietminh, in every village, in every house, and on all the trails of the area. The entire population was responsible for watching the enemy, and nothing could escape its observation. When the maquisards signaled us that the area was free, our planes were able to land without risk on the airfield, to which it was unnecessary to give close protection.
The support of the population is essential to the guerrilla. In particular, it prevents him from being taken by surprise, a vital factor for success in combat. As long as this support is not withdrawn from him, we cannot surprise him, unless he commits some blunder, which is unlikely if he is well trained and battle-hardened.
This is the reason why methods currently employed against guerrillas-such as military outposts, autonomous commando groups or patrols detached from such posts, isolated ambushes, and wide-ranging sweeps-only rarely achieve the hoped-for results, and then usually by accident.
Military outposts, installed at great expense in areas to be pacified, are in general not successful. Often the villages they surround are as well controlled by our enemies as villages quite distant.
Outposts are usually placed at communications junctions that must be held to secure heavy equipment. They cause the guerrillas no trouble because there is no need to take them. Armed bands can freely circulate in the large areas between the outposts, and can organize and control the population without interference. A few cleverly planned terrorist attacks can suffice to subject the inhabitants to their will.
In addition, the disposition of the outposts is an open book to our enemies, who observe them at their leisure. They miss nothing.
The only usefulness of the outposts is the obligation they create for us. To maintain them forces us to open and keep up roads, to protect supply convoys during the course of long hauls, and in general to carry on military activity in which we would not indulge if it were not for the outposts.
To break the feeling of isolation, which is not long in coming, the more active or experienced outposts send out patrols rarely exceeding about sixty men (two platoons) in strength. Certain sectors even make use of specially trained commandos of company strength. Their mission is to patrol day and night a predetermined sector by a variety of routes, with the objective of creating a sense of insecurity in the guerrillas surrounding the post and of reassuring the people by their presence.
The populace sees the commandos or patrols passing through, and often views them sympathetically. But the patrols always pass too quickly to destroy the organization the rebels have set up in each village to terrorize the inhabitants and to bend them to their will-the fund collectors, organization leaders, lookouts, etc. As long as this structure is not demolished, the population's fear will remain the same and the task of pacification can make no headway.
Away from their outposts or bases, the commandos or patrols are unable to subsist for long-a few days at best, just time enough to use up the rations they can carry. They cannot live off the land, because they do not have at their disposal the resources the guerrillas use. The guerrilla bands have inhabitants to guide them, an organization that prepares their bivouac each day, sees to their provisioning, and assures their security.
The commandos move about blindly, guided only by the reconnaissance elements they send ahead. At night, even with sentinels nearby, their security is precarious at best. Physical and mental wear and tear come rapidly.
In addition, they are unable to vary their itinerary as much as they would like, particularly on the trip back and if the terrain is difficult. They cannot escape the observation of the inhabitants and the lookouts, who are able to analyze their habits quickly. They will shortly realize that a patrol on a certain path will not leave it-sometimes by force of habit, often because it has no way of getting out. Nothing will happen as long as our enemies are unable to bring together sufficient forces for an attack. But when this time comes, they will make the best of it.
Patrol action, unwearyingly attempted by military men who still believe it possible to beat the enemy on his own ground, is often rewarded by serious failures; at best, it never produces convincing results.
That is why outposts, when first established, attempt to carry out some external activity, but then pull in their horns and never try again.
For the same reasons, isolated ambushes do not accomplish anything. Usually they are betrayed before they take place and come to nothing; at other times, they actually do us harm.
Pursuit commandos or isolated ambushes are combat operations the guerrilla can employ with the backing of the population and when he has a support organization on the spot. As long as we are unable to resort to the same methods, we will achieve only mediocre results, which are disproportionate to the risks run and the efforts demanded from the soldiers.
* Frequently, in fact, it is decided a priori that a given operation not last more than a short, predetermined time-several days, for example.
Large-unit sweeps, conducted with conventional resources within a framework similar to that of conventional warfare, and invariably limited in time,* temporarily disperse guerrilla bands rather than destroy them.
A normal operation of this type usually consists in the attempted surprise encirclement of a well-defined zone in which guerrillas are thought to be located, while mobile elements conduct a mopping-up operation. Despite the ingenuity, even mastery, which some commanders have demonstrated in moving their units about, these operations are always the same.
Surprise, that essential factor of success, is practically never realized. As we have seen, the people among whom our troops live and move have as their mission the informing of the guerrillas, and no movement of troops can escape them. The noose is never completely tightened. The troops charged with the mop-up operations are always too few in number to search a vast and difficult terrain in which the dispersed bands are able to disappear during the brief operation.
Traditionally attracted by the purely military aspect of warfare-that is, by the pursuit and destruction in combat of guerrilla bands on the ground-operational commanders invariably hope to succeed in maneuvering them like regular units and to gain a rapid and spectacular success. They have httle interest in the less noble task, however essential, of subtle work with the population and the destruction of the clandestine organization that enables guerrilla bands to survive despite local defeats the forces of order periodically inflict.
Only a long occupation of the countryside, which will permit police operations among the people analogous to those carried out in the cities, can succeed.
The certainty of never running the risk of a clear defeat, such as an equally armed opponent could inflict upon us, enables any military commander to conduct some sort of operation. Even if guerrilla bands are not destroyed, at least geographical objectives are secured within the prescribed time, and a few dead rebels will always balance the account. If, moreover, a few arms are recovered, the operation, which has been carried out like a normal peacetime maneuver, then assumes an air of battle and victory sufficient to satisfy a commander who is not too exacting.
