British-German Alliance Pre WW1?

Zardnaar

Deity
Joined
Nov 16, 2003
Messages
20,684
Location
Dunedin, New Zealand
Was this ever discussed between the British and Germans? Say from 1871-1914. I seem to recall that it was mentioned but one of the German foreign ministers went off the deep end and screwed it up.
 
It was discussed. It was never really likely. It wasn't the fault of any particular British or German administration for failing to achieve some kind of formal diplomatic tie.
 
It was discussed. It was never really likely. It wasn't the fault of any particular British or German administration for failing to achieve some kind of formal diplomatic tie.

Though Wilhelm didn't help with his general boorishness and erratic behavoiur.
 
What Dachs said. My Euro textbook also believe the German naval expansion program wasn't helping matters. Britain was of the opinion "What do they need a Navy for unless they intent to challenge us?" which didn't help relations.
 
The naval program certainly contributed to the problem; the British, as usual, were paranoid of anything that could even theoretically stand up to them on the high seas, while the Germans were, as usual, pissed off that the British got to do whatever the hell they wanted without anybody ever saying anything about it. Very general and broadly speaking, of course.
Though Wilhelm didn't help with his general boorishness and erratic behavoiur.
Most of that nonsense happened after the supposed "best point in time" for an alliance had long passed, and ended up being irrelevant to alliance discussion (but not, of course, to the overall rise in tensions). One could make a similar pointless statement about Edward VII. :p
 
The naval program certainly contributed to the problem; the British, as usual, were paranoid of anything that could even theoretically stand up to them on the high seas, while the Germans were, as usual, pissed off that the British got to do whatever the hell they wanted without anybody ever saying anything about it. Very general and broadly speaking, of course.

Most of that nonsense happened after the supposed "best point in time" for an alliance had long passed, and ended up being irrelevant to alliance discussion (but not, of course, to the overall rise in tensions). One could make a similar pointless statement about Edward VII. :p

But who's to say that there wouldn't have been a second opportunity if he had been half-way polite. At the time the public opinion and press were generally sympathetic to Germany. The royal house were also a German family (and still are). Governments would have probably been against, but could have been swung even then with enough public pressure.
 
But who's to say that there wouldn't have been a second opportunity if he had been half-way polite. At the time the public opinion and press were generally sympathetic to Germany. The royal house were also a German family (and still are). Governments would have probably been against, but could have been swung even then with enough public pressure.
Public opinion and the press aren't particularly accurate gauges of the intentions of the foreign ministry of fin de siècle European states. Former ethnicity of the royal family of basically any state isn't really, either. Does anybody seriously think that the "Willy-Nicky" telegrams actually meant anything?

At any rate, an agreement with Germany wouldn't really have solved Britain's problems. Colonially, the French were a potential threat; the Siam crisis, the Fashoda crisis, and Morocco all indicated that coming to terms with France would be much less costly than opposing her everywhere and anywhere. What could Germany do to hurt British colonies? The road to reconciliation that the French and Russians picked - colonial agreements as a prelude to Europe-wide security cooperation - was unavailable to the Germans, who would have to compromise on essential security principles as a precondition of any agreement with the UK.

The German foreign ministry, on the other hand, rightly refused to play the card that would secure a British alliance - a joint agreement with Russia, whereby the Germans would take the lead on land and the British at sea and in Central Asia. The German foreign ministry was wary of the UK's preconditions - the Germans were to be forced to guarantee all British colonial possessions, most of which the Germans didn't care about - and were to be expected to fight the majority of any war, and suffer the majority of the casualties. Now, it's certainly true that the Germans could have taken the agreement and attempted to build on it, wringing better terms out of the British at a later date by playing Micawber. Most of the German foreign office at the time considered that to be an overly risky game plan, especially after the major crisis of 1887 brought the UK and most of the Continent to the brink of war. I can't honestly say that they were particularly wrong in viewing things that way.

Too, it's not necessarily certain that any Anglo-German alliance or even a Haldanesque naval agreement would have done much to contribute to a lower likelihood of war. Outside of the usual issue of butterflies, it ignores the entire narrative of 1912-1914. Most descriptions of prewar foreign policy focus on the Anglo-German antagonism and naval arms race, which climaxed in 1912. They then skip to the Balkan Wars and continue on as if tensions were still going up between everybody in a straight line. But Anglo-German relations were actually improving after the failure of the Haldane agreement. After the 1912 elections, German naval spending decreased, and despite Tirpitz's entreaties to the Reichstag, by the end of the year everybody - including Winston Churchill - had recognized that Germany had more or less given up the arms race. In the Middle East, Anglo-German tensions over the Berlin-Baghdad railroad were dissipated by a joint agreement that divided the leadership of the railroad company between German, French, and British members of the board of directors. At the same time, the entente with Russia in particular (and to a much lesser degree, France) was looking shaky in light of the Balkan Wars, which Russia had explicitly ignited. Most contemporary predictions for 1914 were that Anglo-German cooperation, and certainly a form of détente, were on the horizon. To me, that suggests that Britain's semiformal ties to France and Russia didn't contribute as much to the start of war as other factors (foremost in my mind at least is the Irish Home Rule Crisis and the impending civil war in the British Isles).
 
The German foreign ministry was wary of the UK's preconditions - the Germans were to be forced to guarantee all British colonial possessions, most of which the Germans didn't care about - and were to be expected to fight the majority of any war, and suffer the majority of the casualties.

Was that really the issue? The Germans seemed to be aware that they were inevitably going to confront Russia. I thought the problem was that the Germans (particularly von Bülow) thought the British were an untrustworthy ally so long as it were the case that Germany couldn't threaten them with anything, hence the (bizarre) theory that naval build-up would drag Britain to the negotiating table.
 
Was that really the issue? The Germans seemed to be aware that they were inevitably going to confront Russia.
Not during the 1890s, especially the early 1890s, which is when the most serious Anglo-German alliance proposals were put forward. Things didn't switch from "semi-ally" to "inevitable foe" overnight.
LightSpectra said:
I thought the problem was that the Germans (particularly von Bülow) thought the British were an untrustworthy ally so long as it were the case that Germany couldn't threaten them with anything, hence the (bizarre) theory that naval build-up would drag Britain to the negotiating table.
But the fact that Germany couldn't threaten them with anything was probably a factor - because the fact that America, France, and Russia could threaten the UK played a role in the British decisions to come to terms with all of those powers between 1894 and 1907. The Germans, perhaps not unreasonably, figured that the British would come to terms with them if they were to gain something concrete out of it, namely an end to Germany's military threat to Britain.
 
Though Wilhelm didn't help with his general boorishness and erratic behavoiur.

Well, some people would have you believe that he was just missundaztood.
 
Were there ever any thoughts of a German alliance with the US?
Briefly, I think. Once they realized we weren't going to help them they started sending overtures to Mexico, although I can't remember how far they got.
 
Briefly, I think. Once they realized we weren't going to help them they started sending overtures to Mexico, although I can't remember how far they got.

IIRC The telegrams were intercepted by the British and passed on the the Americans - part of the reason they joined the war.

But to answer the OP with the British response of the time: (to paraphrase) "Why should we help make the strongest nation in Europe stronger?"
 
Balance-of-power thought like that is why the war started in the first place. :shake:
 
Balance-of-power thought like that is why the war started in the first place. :shake:

Not really. It was the misunderstanding of the BOP principle by European leaders at the time. Bismark *had* been doing a pretty good job of keeping the peace
 
Not really. It was the misunderstanding of the BOP principle by European leaders at the time. Bismark *had* been doing a pretty good job of keeping the peace
There's no such thing as a "balance of power principle".

Besides, how did the Bismarckian system in any way resemble a "balance" of power? What the hell does a "balance of power" even mean?
 
Not really. It was the misunderstanding of the BOP principle by European leaders at the time. Bismark *had* been doing a pretty good job of keeping the peace
BoP is an incorrect principle. It was disproven 20 years ago. And it had nothing to do with Britain's decision to enter the war anyway. Besides, France and Russia were both more powerful than Germany, so the argument would be incorrect even if it was truly Britain's reason for entering the war.

EDIT: Crosspost with the birthday boy.
 
Briefly, I think. Once they realized we weren't going to help them they started sending overtures to Mexico, although I can't remember how far they got.

Well on the German side I think it was a pretty much unilateral action by Zimmerman, and th Mexicans dismissed it out of hand, knowing they'd be for the chopping block, with no way for Imperial Germany to help.
 
Top Bottom