There's no such thing as a "balance of power principle".
Besides, how did the Bismarckian system in any way resemble a "balance" of power? What the hell does a "balance of power" even mean?
Uh, kind of? If you have a reeeally selective view I guess. Why?But hasn't Americas strength generaly been in war the fact we don't really need to keep troops for home defense?
No, we never did catch Pancho Villa.Ajidica said:If we did have an expedition into Mexico, the vigilante groups would have been a problem. Did we ever catch Pancho Villa?
It was essentially a catchphrase that amounted to a "scientific" cover for any policy the foreign ministry wished to pursue at the time. Even when it was sincere, the British belief that Europe was inevitably and invariably divided into armed camps that frequently went to war with one another, and that Britain could prevent any one from becoming stronger by lending its weight to the weaker side, arguably made war more likely than less. Take a look, for instance, at Palmerston's policy over Belgium in 1830.Well considering that English/British foreign policy was decided using it for centuries (only really abandoned by Gladstone) I beg to differ.
I am incredibly uninterested in reading a Wikipedia link that doesn't really describe the situation. Why don't you explain why the European system from 1871 to 1890 was peaceful (assuming, of course, that you ignore the Balkans) and why that was due to some supposed "balance of power"? Preferably in your own words.Gangor said:
It was just an idle observation. Basicaly having to fight a war at home in territory perfect for vigilantes and guerilla wars with a relativly undefined border would have sucked up a fair bit of troops and (if we went to war) distracted us from Germany.Uh, kind of? If you have a reeeally selective view I guess. Why?
Hence why we pulled out before we fought the Germans.It was just an idle observation. Basicaly having to fight a war at home in territory perfect for vigilantes and guerilla wars with a relativly undefined border would have sucked up a fair bit of troops and (if we went to war) distracted us from Germany.
I'm not knowledgable on the specifics, but my assumption had always been that peace was not the reason for the British pushing their Balance of Power Policy, but merely a justification.Balance-of-power theory doesn't ever explain why wars don't or do happen, unfortunately. It's not a very useful formulation for that. The saner neorealists - and for this I almost miss Winner - don't even try to argue this, and instead state that a balance is something that naturally forms, and doesn't actually explain anything. This isn't very helpful either, but at least it, unlike the realist formula of "balance of power stops wars", is unfalsifiable.
That's very much how the British train of thought went. Unfortunately, it's also unnecessarily confrontational.I'm not knowledgable on the specifics, but my assumption had always been that peace was not the reason for the British pushing their Balance of Power Policy, but merely a justification.
It always seemed more intent on keeping anyone from challenging Britain. Their interests were primarily outside of Europe, so keep the continental powers focussed on each other and from growing too much stronger and you keep them from threatening you.
I realize I am playing a what-if game, but if Mexico started conducting guerrila raids along our border, would we have entered the western front in time to demoralize the Germans? I remember reading that with the Eastern Front troops freed up, Germany had the resources to break the trench stalemate, but not enough to deal with American re-inforcements.Hence why we pulled out before we fought the Germans.
I realize I am playing a what-if game, but if Mexico started conducting guerrila raids along our border, would we have entered the western front in time to demoralize the Germans? I remember reading that with the Eastern Front troops freed up, Germany had the resources to break the trench stalemate, but not enough to deal with American re-inforcements.
Thats more of what I meant. Germany could have forced france into a surrender, but not with fresh American troops arriving by the boatload.more that the prospect of fighting another major power, let alone one with fresh troops pouring in by the thousands was undoable
Thats more of what I meant. Germany could have forced france into a surrender, but not with fresh American troops arriving by the boatload.
Ajidica said:Thats more of what I meant. Germany could have forced france into a surrender, but not with fresh American troops arriving by the boatload.
Thats more of what I meant. Germany could have forced france into a surrender, but not with fresh American troops arriving by the boatload.
I don't think so, considering the Germans made a big push just before the Americans arrived on the scene, and it failed...not so much that they could have taken France if America stayed out
Dunno about that. Zabecki (2006) makes a good argument that the British troops could conceivably have been pushed off the Continent, through artillery interdiction of the Hazebrouck chokepoint if nothing else. Not that that relies on Americans being there/not being there, but the Spring Offensives didn't necessarily have to end in a strung-out, overstretched, demoralized German Army.The Spring Offensive would have failed much as it did anyway.