QUESTION OF: The effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium
SUBMITTED BY: Latvia
DISARMEMENT COMMISSION, SUB-COMMISSION 1:
Guided by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as well as the Geneva Convention and the Hague Declarations; and following the recommendations of past resolution 62/30 of 5th December 2007,
Aware of the many uses of depleted uranium (thereafter referred to as DU) in both civilian contexts such as: counterweights in aircraft, radiation shields in medical therapy machines and containers for the transport of radioactive materials; as well as the military uses which includes but is not limited to: both the jacket and penetrator components of armour piercing rounds or shells and the armour of main battle tanks,
Concerned that the toxicity and radioactivity of DU is not yet fully understood, and that its potential impact on human health and the environment at large is not known to any degree of certainty,
Acknowledging the research done by UN organisations into the risks posed by DU weapons, such as Ian Fairlie’s 2008 report ‘The health hazards of depleted uranium’, and the United Nations Environment Program’s (UNEP) ‘Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment’ in the former Yugoslav Republic in 2002,
Noting that the main danger of DU is not from radioactivity, but from the toxicity associated with heavy metals, and that these can be absorbed by the body as DU forms gaseous oxides when it combusts on impact with its target,
Emphasising that while it is regrettable that DU ammunition is used, some nations feel that it is in their best interest to have the capability to deploy armour piercing rounds, and that alternative alloys which could be used to replace DU are also toxic,
Taking account of the worries associated with DU voiced by many non-governmental organisations, such as: Campaign against Depleted Uranium (CADU), International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW), Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Veterans for Peace and others, as well as many member states,
Further Noting that the only countries who have openly stated that they use DU ammunition are the USA and the UK; but that Russia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and China also have stocks of DU armaments,
Also aware that DU is a by-product of refining uranium to either produce electricity or nuclear weapons, and as such that there is a large amount of it in storage facilities around the world, not always in secure or safe locations,
Abiding by the principle of scientific precaution, whereby the use of substances whose effects are not fully known should be reduced to a minimum,
1. Intends to clarify existing UN treaties by legalising the use of DU armaments in the understanding that they are a crucial tool of modern warfare and to prevent member states from using it would compromise their security and possibly undermine UN peacekeeping missions around the world, but limits the legality of its use to:
a. Situations where all other conventional armaments would fail to achieve their objectives,
b. Ordinance with a calibre larger or equal to 25mm, so that less of it is used, it is more easily cleaned up and to limit its use to anti-vehicle and anti-building rather than anti-personnel weapons,
c. Targets further away than 250m from urban environments or civilian populations thereby limiting the risk of DU oxides being inhaled by non-combatants,
d. Either direct-fire weapons or smart weapons thus reducing the likelihood of DU ammunition going astray,
e. Constitute part of armour plating to where it is surrounded by ‘safe’ metals, such as steel alloys, to prevent direct contact with DU where ever possible;
2. Asks for the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to set up a body of inspectors, named the Advisory Technical Evaluators on Armaments and Munitions (ATEAM), to be imbedded in armies of nations that use DU ammunitions: to ensure that they follow the guidelines set out in clause 1., by inspecting military depots and reviewing cases where the use of DU was authorised, and with powers to name-and-shame non-compliers and to recommend sanctions to the UN Security Council if member states consistently defy the aforementioned guidelines, and calls on member states to co-operate with the UNODA in this regard;
3. Calls for all member states who have used DU ammunition to clear up sites where they have been used, in a similar fashion as landmines, cluster bombs and other unexploded ordinance are dealt with post conflict, by doing the following, with the help of the UN, nongovernmental organisations and the relevant local authorities:
a. Removing the remains of any ordinance that contained DU as well as any vehicles or buildings that were destroyed by it, and any damaged vehicle which contained DU parts,
b. Testing the soil, water and air of said locations for chemicals or a high radioactive count which could be harmful to humans or the environment; and to address the cause of this if possible, and to fence around the areas to prevent civilians wandering into them if not;
4. Advises all member states who have stocks of DU (not just those who currently use it as part of their armaments) to carefully reconsider the storage mechanism used and communicate between each other possible improvements; as the current method of storing them in steel containers (prone to corrosion) in open air sites poses both a security risk and an environmental risk, as the DU is a potential terrorist target and the form in which it is stored, uranium hexafluoride, is highly toxic;
5. Urges member states and the UN to conduct research, and to share between each other (by means of bilateral agreements) experimental data and analysis on the following, as a multilateral approach to scientific research is more likely to be fruitful:
a. The harmful effects of DU in terms of its toxicity and radioactivity, and its various carcinogenic, teratogenic, mutagenic and endocrine-disturbing effects, and to do this by conducting:
i. Epidemiological studies on past and current conflict zones where DU armaments have been used,
ii. Biological and chemical experiments within the laboratory,
b. Other possible alloys that are contain less or no DU but retain the necessary density and strength to be used either as the penetrator of armour piercing rounds, or in battlefield armour;
6. Further calls for a yearly convention, named the United Nation’s Symposium on Uranium Studies, Hazards and Innovations (UNSUSHI), to take place from 6th to 9th of August in Hiroshima for the following to be discussed between member states:
a. New research and discoveries that have been made in the fields described in clause 5., so that nations are kept informed and that science can be put to the best practical use by the greatest number of people in the shortest delay possible,
b. Reports made by ATEAM on any state that has violated the guidelines set out by the resolution, with emphasis on clause 1, or who has failed to provide them with the necessary information or access to any facility related to DU,
c. A full redraft of the resolution in 2016; in order for the latest information to be taken into account and to keep pace with rapidly changing technology in warfare so that the UN does not fall behind.
