Does morality work without a deity?

So basically, the definition of deity is one that creates morality?

Why can't we become deities?
 
If you define a deity to be the sole source of morality, then of course you're going to then claim that morality can't exist without that deity. It's just a simple deduction based on the premises which you have yourself created.

If I defined the Earth and only the Earth to contain life, whether that's true or not, I would then have to conclude that without the Earth being in existence, life wouldn't exist anywhere in the universe.

The faulty conclusion relies on the faulty assumption, but there is some logical consistency nevertheless.
 
It is not a tool, nor a concept. It is a control mechanism built into the way the universe functions. Humans just happen to be the part of the universe that relates to morality.
 
So basically, the definition of deity is one that creates morality?

Why can't we become deities?

I think that's a property rather than a definition - so a watering can is a vessel that stores water, but that isn't the definition of a watering can. After all, the gods of most ancient religions had at best an ambiguous position with relation to morality, and the gods of most modern ones need at least a couple of words beginning with 'omni' for them to 'count'.
 
If one holds to evolution, the default stance would place morality as utilutarian. Then you have to define how it is not. I think that God's view on the matter, is God allowed humans to act in a moral framework instead of forcing morality on them. If one rejects God, they are going to have to come up with some interesting reasons why we even need it. Can anyone prove that we do not need morality? I hold that we do not need it, thus it is not utilitarian. It is not a part of evolution, thus not a tool. It is natural and part of the design incorporated in the universe itself. My conclusion is that it gives us access to the being that created the universe. Anything else is just a human grasping at why we need or have morality. Not that I have any more proof to offer than the next human on the matter, just proving that it is still a free choice to accept any person's view on the topic.
 
All right, we could even dwelve into ethical systems other than consequentialism as well. Deontology, perhaps? Or virtue theory?
Hell yeah, whatever you need bro!

I have a warm place in my heart for Kant's Categorical Principle. Whoever read what I wrote so far in this thread will see the influence of John Stuart Mill as well.
I figured Mill would be prominant, the emphasis on liberty shows through.

I don't think there is one. Bits and pieces are taken to form the whole, and everything contributes. And though I am predominantly an utilitarian, I don't think any system work alone, and different ethical modalities may contribute to a cohesive system.
Have you heard of Parfit's Triple Theory? I bet you'd love it. I'm looking into it myself. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_What_Matters

I feel that this mashup I am proposing, while solves not the problems with the ethical theories individually conceived, does alleviate the criticisms to both in application. How we know right and wrong? Through the cogent experience of that is pleasurable/useful and harmful (utilitarian); once known, setting this as a value or rule, as the scale dictates, of mandatory observance (deontology) prevents that cold calculation of results makes us loose perspective (thus the idea of electing human centrality).
Yeah, you sound like someone who would really like Parfit.

Really? All I have to do is solve the "repugnant conclusion"?
Hey, we can't make too it easy can we?

I will answer you, but don't expect a solution... If I had it, I'd probably be a world-renowned philosopher.
Of course, I'm not expecting that. But I would expect that you'd have thought of it and loved that you shared your ideas.

Anyway, I think of this as an inadequacy of language to represent what is really going on; kind like those drawings that try to represent the curvature of space-time before matter as a sheet where you put a bowling ball over. There is no way to represent a four-dimensional hole coming from all directions, our cerebral acuity breaks down trying to visualize it, so we make due with crude representations.
The problem really only exists as we try to represent "quantities of happiness" algebraically/trigonometrically - what I understand, and acknowledge as important in a quest for a precise description of ethics - but I am not sure this discussion even is proper because I don't know we can "quantify" happiness at all to fit in our graphs.

Nonetheless, I think we can exist with some impurity in our concepts. Just like math does not break down because there are infinities bigger than other infinities, something that sounds nonsensical (but can happen because math is a language, a construct, not a part of the structure of the universe), utilitarianism does not break down because we caught an very abstract way to enact a seemingly nonsensical result.

Such is the nature of human constructs, they are always tarnished by our frailties.
Well I definitely appreciate that utilitarianism is useful. But truth doesn't contradict truth. The should of course be a satisfactory resolution. The analogy of relativity is apt, perhaps utilitarianism is the equivalent of newtonian mechanics. Works in some sitations but needs to be taken to the next level.

Regards :).
Regards :).

I think the best way around the utility monster is simply to point out that opinions change when the facts change - if there were a utility monster, utilitarianism would be unable to respond to it, but there isn't.
I'm not sure there isn't already utility monsters. One thing to note is many consider humans to be utility monsters relative to other animals. I don't think that's necessarily wrong. It also could mean with the arrivial of new technology that augmented humans or AIs could become utility monsters. Right now humans have strong limits as to what they can experience. When those limits can be shattered, we will need to rethink how morality works.

Well, that actually isn't an factual statement.

It reveals the other problem of Utilitarianism: You have no actual way of measuring or converting human happiness.

What is the conversion ration of a junkie getting their fix to someone not getting their cellphone stolen?

Can you actually prove your happiness comes anywhere close to that felt by a serial rapist catching his latest victim?

Also, remember that while you can doubt the Utility Monster, there are people who are demonstrably Utility Traps: It's almost certainly unethical to aid someone suffering from Chronic Depression, because they're likely to see strongly diminished returns on happiness.
It's not that utilitarianism doesn't have methods. It's just that there seems to be no consensus on the correct one.

Good points, well presented. Mill had the argument about 'higher pleasures' and it being better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, or Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied - though I can't really get behind that one; it sounds far too much like snobbery to me.
I think it's an important distinction. And I think it might relate to Nietzsche's Master Morality versus Slave Morality. One idea I had is the idea that redundant pleasures count less than novel pleasures. That is, it is better to eat an apple today then and orange tommorow even if it's just as pleasurable to eat an apple both days. Similarly it is better to have a person who only eats apples and a person who only eats oranges then two people who only eat apples even if they have the same amount of pleasure.

If one holds to evolution, the default stance would place morality as utilutarian. Then you have to define how it is not. I think that God's view on the matter, is God allowed humans to act in a moral framework instead of forcing morality on them. If one rejects God, they are going to have to come up with some interesting reasons why we even need it. Can anyone prove that we do not need morality? I hold that we do not need it, thus it is not utilitarian. It is not a part of evolution, thus not a tool. It is natural and part of the design incorporated in the universe itself. My conclusion is that it gives us access to the being that created the universe. Anything else is just a human grasping at why we need or have morality. Not that I have any more proof to offer than the next human on the matter, just proving that it is still a free choice to accept any person's view on the topic.
So when you say utilitarian are you refering to utilitarianism or merely usefulness?

In my view, there is a large amount of literature detailing why humans (and other animals) have a sense of morality and why it's useful (from the perspective of reproductive success). Having that moral sense is needed to maximize fitness because acting ethically is vital to getting by in social situations. When you claim it is not a tool, you are ignoring the evidence.

Whether or not that sense of morality is merely an emotional prediliction or if moral statements have actual truth values is certainly debatable (and an area of active debate). But saying that the origin of a sense of morality isn't accountable by evolution ignores the current state of science.
 
I'm not sure there isn't already utility monsters. One thing to note is many consider humans to be utility monsters relative to other animals. I don't think that's necessarily wrong. It also could mean with the arrivial of new technology that augmented humans or AIs could become utility monsters. Right now humans have strong limits as to what they can experience. When those limits can be shattered, we will need to rethink how morality works.

Yes, I think the example of a reverse utility monster was a valid one, and certainly gave me pause for thought.

I think it's an important distinction. And I think it might relate to Nietzsche's Master Morality versus Slave Morality. One idea I had is the idea that redundant pleasures count less than novel pleasures. That is, it is better to eat an apple today then and orange tommorow even if it's just as pleasurable to eat an apple both days. Similarly it is better to have a person who only eats apples and a person who only eats oranges then two people who only eat apples even if they have the same amount of pleasure.

Is there a rational basis for that, though? The problem I have with Mill's argument is that he's introduced another 'we hold this truth to be self-evident' that really isn't self-evident at all. I can accept as at least reasonable the general principle of utility, but the notion of 'higher pleasures' isn't so intuitively reasonable. Are you arguing that variety has an enjoyment factor in and of itself, and therefore anyone who enjoys eating an apple just as much as eating an orange will enjoy eating both more than just eating one? Or are you arguing that a set of different activities which sum to the same utility is superior to a set of identical activities which make the same total?
 
Have you heard of Parfit's Triple Theory?

Is that the theory that only 3 chords are required for a song?

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Is there a rational basis for that, though? The problem I have with Mill's argument is that he's introduced another 'we hold this truth to be self-evident' that really isn't self-evident at all. I can accept as at least reasonable the general principle of utility, but the notion of 'higher pleasures' isn't so intuitively reasonable. Are you arguing that variety has an enjoyment factor in and of itself, and therefore anyone who enjoys eating an apple just as much as eating an orange will enjoy eating both more than just eating one? Or are you arguing that a set of different activities which sum to the same utility is superior to a set of identical activities which make the same total?
The latter. It has to do with the nature of utility summation. Let's say we invent a duplication machine that can produce exact replicas of persons. Compare the following two scenarios.

Scenario 1:
Bob comes to the lab and sleeps overnight.
We give bob a nice steak
Bob goes to sleep, we duplicate him in his sleep
Bob and his duplicate go on their merry way

Scenario 2:
Bob comes to the lab and sleeps overnight we duplicate him in his sleep but we don't tell him
We give bob and his duplicate identical steaks - they have the exact same experience, and the same experience as scenario 1
Bob goes to sleep and his duplicate go to sleep
Bob and his duplicate go on their merry way

A niave utilitarian will claim that because two steak eating experiences exist scenario 2 has twice the utilty as scenario 1. My claim is because these experiences are identical they only count once and that scenario 1&2 have identical goodness.

We can apply this principle to two similar but not identical experiences where the common components of the experiences only count once and the divergent components count twice.
 
I see. So does that mean that it's better to feed Bill once and Bob once than it is to feed Bob twice? If so I agree with you - I think the duplication machine has made the question complicated, because it's not immediately obvious which side that actually falls into.

EDIT: That said, I'm not sure that it is better to feed Bob and Bill today than to feed Bob today and tomorrow.
 
i never thought valka would be an aristotelian
Neither did I. Would you care to explain this, please, since I gave up about halfway through a very long article on Aristotle, to see what you might have been talking about...
it's not precisely aristotelian, but having analytic, a posteriori virtue ethics is something along the lines of aristotle's philosophy.
Still waiting for an explanation that doesn't require me to take a course in philosophy first, in order to understand it.
 
I figured Mill would be prominant, the emphasis on liberty shows through.

Yeah, well, I think liberty of thought is quintessential to any kind of morality. Without freedom to choose, morality is stale, just a word.

Have you heard of Parfit's Triple Theory? I bet you'd love it. I'm looking into it myself. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_What_Matters

(...)

Yeah, you sound like someone who would really like Parfit.

No, first time I heard of it, but you are right, save the mention on contractualism, his thesis is exactly what I have defended.

I will try to make an effort to read his book, as I am not entirely seeing how contractualism fits here, save for the duty to follow what is contracted, as the classic Hobbesian argument in the Leviathan does not gives standards for the social contract itself, and the rule to obey the contract is meta-contractual. Seems to me that a mix of deontology and consequentialism would explain that role. It is a great idea to explain power legitimacy, but morality itself?

Have you already read the book? Do you know what exactly contract theory brings to the discussion on morality?

Hey, we can't make too it easy can we?

Is it moral to make it that hard, though? ;)

Of course, I'm not expecting that. But I would expect that you'd have thought of it and loved that you shared your ideas.

I'm afraid I disappointed there, I doubt I had brought much new to the table.

Well I definitely appreciate that utilitarianism is useful. But truth doesn't contradict truth. The should of course be a satisfactory resolution. The analogy of relativity is apt, perhaps utilitarianism is the equivalent of newtonian mechanics. Works in some situations but needs to be taken to the next level.

One thing that I want here is to keep things in perspective. The question of the thread was "if morality was possible without a deity". I think I did an adequate job at demonstrating it is.

Entering the realm of a complete, flawless moral theory is truly well beyond and above my league, and people much smarter than me also have not complete this task so far.

I would love, though, to see the many critics of utilitarianism to bring fourth their own views, I think other theories are somewhat lacking in description in this thread so far. I am not saying this just due to the criticism to the idea I defended, I really want to know more of the other options.

Regards :).
 
What Gods are there for us to mistreat and how do we do that? Or are you just including Gods in case any spring into existence in the future for us to consider?

The vast majority of moral systems have proper behaviour towards gods. If they existed, then they get moral consideration. One can even play the odds, like we do with fish sentience. We don't know, but we don't think we have to be careful.
 
Those secular nations do not acknowledge the existence of gods - but, I think, if Zeus appeared among us tomorrow, British and Canadian law would still hold it illegal to steal from him. Admittedly, we might not use the same punishments as Greek law did to the last person who tried that.
 
That's true I suppose, eventually (laws would have to be changed, etc.), but if aliens landed and seemed intelligent, we wouldn't steal from them either, although it would take some while for new laws to be written to give Gods and/or aliens person status. It would likely end up in the courts for many years.

So I guess I do disagree - initially Gods wouldn't have legal standing, because they are not legally persons. It would need to be written into the law - you'd need a precedent, etc.
 
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