Fighting crime in California

Tycho Brahe

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Can any of you guys help me out here?

I was recently presented with this figure on the development of various crimes in California.

In `94 California passed the “3 strikes law” witch aparantly had great effect.
But what happened in 1980? Why does most of the curves break en that year?

 

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Pacman Fever.
 
It seems from your chart that the crimes started going down in 1993, one year BEFORE the three strikes law passed, and as early as 1992 for murder and aggravated assault.
 
Pass a 1 strike law!
 
and burglary suffered no effect from that law, from the chart at least.
 
This is a wild theory but...

I know that the same people will committ a large % of the crimes...so while crime could be high it could be committed by the same person.

So maybe the crime rate rising slowed in 1980 because many of these people were put behind bars, then slowly raised as they were let out....
 
California is a state of sinners and homosexuals and they will pay for their crimes
 
Crusader9's right. ;)

Freakonomics. Read it. Understand. Be enlightened. Come back. Rejoice with us.
 
Maybe Californian criminals didn't want to make a President from their state look bad?

I don't really have any idea why.
 
It seems from your chart that the crimes started going down in 1993, one year BEFORE the three strikes law passed, and as early as 1992 for murder and aggravated assault.
Ruh roh. Perhaps they heard about the proposed law and got scared ahead of time?

This smacks of "the surge worked" or "Reagan was responsible for ending the Soviet threat".

"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." Mark Twain

http://www.macrimeanalysts.com/articles/historyofcrimeanalysis.pdf

The 1990s brought a renaissance in crime analysis, characterized by new ideas, new funding, and hundreds of new crime analysis programs all over the country. The decade opened with a re-dedication to the basic principles of problem-solving and crime prevention, in the form of a book called Problem-Oriented Policing by University of Wisconsin Professor Herman Goldstein (who, not coincidentally, served as O. W. Wilson’s Executive Assistant at the Chicago Police Department from 1960 to 1964). It’s difficult to gauge the long-term impact of a book written only ten years ago, except to say that a web search for the term “Problem-Oriented Policing” returns 1,560 pages; that thousands of agencies have adopted POP programs and principles; and that it would be extremely difficult to find someone in the
field of law enforcement who is not familiar with the concept.

Problem-oriented policing describes a set of procedures that seek to make police operations more effective by focusing on the crime problem rather than the crime incident, and by funding ways to eliminate root causes before the problems themselves develop. As Goldstein himself explains:
In handling incidents, police officers usually deal with the most obvious, superficial manifestations of a deeper problem—not the problem itself. They may stop a fight but not get involved in exploring the factors that contributed to it…They may investigate a crime but stop short of exploring the factors that may have contributed to its commission, except as these are relevant to identifying the offender…The first step in problem-oriented policing…calls for recognizing that incidents are often merely overt symptoms of problems.4

The implications for crime analysis are self-evident: for problems to be solved, they must first be identified and analyzed—the job of the crime analyst.

Crime analysis…is a base on which police can build in meeting much wider and deeper demands for inquiry associated with problem-oriented policing. In a police agency in which individual officers may not know what has occurred outside the areas in which they work or during periods when they
are not on duty, crime analysis has been the primary means for pooling information that may help solve crimes…Problem-oriented policing actually provides an incentive to make much more effective use of the data typically collected as part of crime analysis.

1990 also provided one other boon to the profession of crime analysis: the establishment of the International Association of Crime Analysts, founded by a group of analysts seeking to share information and ideas, advocate for professional standards, and provide educational opportunities. The IACA has sponsored an annual conference for analysts in various cities across the country for the last twelve years. Although the emphasis of these conferences has been on training, the most significant benefit revolves around the network and information and idea sharing opportunities that present themselves when hundreds of analysts come together.

The 1990s brought a new font of federal funding from the COPS office, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Institute of Justice. The COPS office opened its doors in 1994, after President Clinton’s State of the Union pledge to add 100,000 police officers to America’s streets, and to re-deploy other officers in community policing roles. Many crime analysis programs found funding for positions and equipment with this money. Several of state crime analysis associations were established during this period, including the Massachusetts Association of Crime Analysts in 1997.
 
When it comes to the three strikes law thing, it's important to know that there was a US-wide decrease in crime during the same period of time.
 
The impact in the 80's is Reagan's "war on drugs".
 
dude, it's spell as California (title)


Edit: Ok, you corrected it
 
The impact in the 80's is Reagan's "war on drugs".

Which didn't really start until midway through his second term:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Reagan

Midway into his second term, Reagan declared more militant policies in the War on Drugs. He said that "drugs were menacing our society" and promised to fight for drug-free schools and workplaces, expanded drug treatment, stronger law enforcement and drug interdiction efforts, and greater public awareness.[147][148]

On October 27, 1986, Reagan signed a drug enforcement bill that budgeted $1.7 billion dollars to fund the War on Drugs and specified a mandatory minimum penalty for drug offenses.[149] The bill was criticized for promoting significant racial disparities in the prison population, because of the differences in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine.[149] Critics also charged that the administration's policies did little to actually reduce the availability of drugs or crime on the street, while resulting in a great financial and human cost for American society.[150] Defenders of the effort point to success in reducing rates of adolescent drug use.[151][152]

First Lady Nancy Reagan made the War on Drugs one of her main priorities by founding the "Just Say No" drug awareness campaign, which aimed to discourage children and teenagers from engaging in recreational drug use by offering various ways of saying "no." Mrs. Reagan traveled to 65 cities in 33 states, raising awareness about the dangers of drugs and alcohol.[153]

The graphs also appear to be headed downward the year before he even took office. I bet if you look closely enough that the real reasons for the decline didn't have anything more to do with Reagan's reactionary policies than the 3 strikes decision had on the reduction of crime.

EDIT: From the same report I quoted above:

In the late 1970s, the many disparate crime reduction and crime prevention programs were united
under the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). Crime analysis was one of four facets of
the ICAP program, and it was ICAP that first identified the four “types” of analysis—crime analysis,
intelligence analysis, investigative analysis, and operations analysis. ICAP and its various state
counterparts, such as California’s CCAP (Career Criminal Apprehension Program), are responsible for
the development of a number of crime analysis units in many agencies, particularly in California and
the southwest. Massachusetts had two agencies with ICAP programs—Cambridge and Quincy—both of
which retained their crime analysis units after LEAA funding disappeared.

LEAA and ICAP gave a needed boost to the profession, but they were not to last. Analysts who began
their careers during this period recognize the Carter administration for the dissolution of the LEAA.
LEAA lost the last of its funding in 1982, and its programs were transferred to the Office of Justice
Assistance, Research, and Statistics until 1984, when they were adopted by the Office of Justice
Programs, which still exists today.

The loss of the LEAA and other means of federal funding led to a lean period in which few new crime
analysis programs (outside of states such as California, where state funding was available) were
initiated. Many analysts hired with LEAA money found themselves out of a job—only those units that
had been brought under their agencies’ permanent budgets were safe.
 
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