In 1945 an American planning staff estimated that the invasion of Japan would cost between 250,000 and 500,000 casualties. After the war, some politicians casually made this "half a million dead" and later "a million dead." In any event, any estimate of casualties includes killed, wounded and missing. The original estimates were a not-unreasonable figure based on recent American experience with fanatical Japanese defenders of Saipan, the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and one that a postwar examination of Japanese plans for the defense of the home islands tends to bear out. There was no indication that the Japanese would fight any less strenuously if their home islands were invaded. Indeed, it was a safe bet that the fighting would have been even more costly.
The Japanese consistently demonstrated a marked reluctance to surrender, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. The American people, in light of Germany's surrender in May 1945, were eager to get the war in the Pacific over with as soon as possible. The voters were making this wish quite clear to their elected officials and the chief among these, Truman, was listening intently. He had been told that a blockade of Japan might have to go on for a year or more before Japan finally gave in. The American people would have none of this and wanted something done. Nuclear weapons were simply another incentive for the Japanese to surrender, and no one was sure they would be any more persuasive than the recent fire bomb raids (which killed more people than the atomic bombs).
In August 1945, as far as the U.S. could tell, Japan was not going to surrender without further encouragement. Considering that the Japanese Army was still making plans and moving troops for the defense of Honshu when the Emperor ordered a surrender, even Hiroshima and Nagasaki weren't enough encouragement for some people.
The Japanese consistently demonstrated a marked reluctance to surrender, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. The American people, in light of Germany's surrender in May 1945, were eager to get the war in the Pacific over with as soon as possible. The voters were making this wish quite clear to their elected officials and the chief among these, Truman, was listening intently. He had been told that a blockade of Japan might have to go on for a year or more before Japan finally gave in. The American people would have none of this and wanted something done. Nuclear weapons were simply another incentive for the Japanese to surrender, and no one was sure they would be any more persuasive than the recent fire bomb raids (which killed more people than the atomic bombs).
In August 1945, as far as the U.S. could tell, Japan was not going to surrender without further encouragement. Considering that the Japanese Army was still making plans and moving troops for the defense of Honshu when the Emperor ordered a surrender, even Hiroshima and Nagasaki weren't enough encouragement for some people.