Originally posted by Richard III
I just started doing the page-by-page plow (as opposed to the skim) of "Downfall" last night, and I must correct myself slightly. The earlier poster (was it Knowltok? Knowltok2? Knowltok667?) was, according to the compelling evidence offered in "Downfall," correct in arguing that the firebombings of The really were on the grey area, considering that the USAAF guys really did understand that civilian casualties would be a consequence, but the targeting was at least initially (I haven't got to summer 1945 yet) designed to take out industrial capacity in mixed-use residential/industrial areas.
What are you curious about, the firebombing raids?
When the USAAF started Strategic bombing of Japan, first from bases in China and then the Marianas, strike photos showed that the high winds over Japan (a unique wheather condition found only here) were causing the bombs to miss badly.
This, coupled with an assessment of Japan's industrial capability, which stated that much of it was decentralized, IE farmed out to little factories and such, showed that daylight precision bombing ala Europe wouldn't work in Japan.
Doolittle and LeMay, the senior air officers decided that a new approach was needed, and hit upon low level aera firebombing.
The benifit was first, at low level, more payload could be carried (the B-29s where stripped of almost all defensive guns to lighten them, as Japan had no effective night fighters), second, aera firebombing would hit all the "cottage industries" producing war material, and like Britain's RAF, they realized that destroying worker's homes would disrupt production more effectively then trying to hit the big industrial combines.
There were moral arguments about these tactics, but they realized, as I was saying about the A-bombs, that the only way to defeat Japan by airpower would be to get their hands dirty, so this plan was enacted.
In the last 6 months of the war, something like 85% of Japan's cities were gutted by firebombs, and Japan couldn't stop it.
What isn't generally known, however, was the campaign was on it's last legs, 20th AF crews and planes were worn out, amunition stocks were exausted, and replacement parts in extremly short supply.
LeMay seny Hap Arnold (comander USAAF) a report that said he could not sustain air operations passed August 20th, 1945.
LeMay also knew that after "Fatman" and "Litle Boy" there wouldn't be another A-bomb ready for dropping untill december at the earlist.
All of this means that Japan would get a lull, a window of several months to recover untill the strategic campaign could continue.
This was yet another compelling reason for the A-bomb strikes to be carried out, it was a use it or lose it situation.
Some excellent books on this campaign:
Winged Victory by Geoffrey Perret
Point of no return by WH Morrison
Bombers over Japan by Keith Wheeler
B-29 Superfortress at war by David Anderton
Saga of the Superfortress: The Story of the B-29 and the 20th Air Force by Steve Birdsall
Total war: Causes and courses of the second world war by Peter Calvocoressi
The B-29 Campaign against Japan: The Japanese dimention by Alvin Coox (Extremly hard to find)
The B-29, the A-bomb, and the Japanese Surrender by Herman Wolk.
If you like, I can dig up more books on Japan's last days.
PS Alcibiaties, I'm supposedly on your side in this debate but you're not convincing me... maybe try a little more sugar and a little less piss?
This was never a debate, simply because the other side isn't plausible.
That is what I have been saying all along.
I see many misinterpretations have survived more then 50+ years, and still find voice in idealists.
They must learn to place themselves in the postion of the combatants before passing judgements about what is sick and what isn't.
If any leader made a decision that spared the lives of his enemy
but cost the lives of his own forces would be a criminal, not a humanatarian.(sp?)
) slander. You're all capable of far better.
