Iran busted; secret enrichment facility

[Camikaze]

False dichotomy. You think prestige/influence doesn't have any bearing on it at all?

Well, yeah, but that wouldn't be the functional purpose of the weapons.

By the same token, shouldn't the Iranians have cause to at least question the efficacy of nuclear weapons in providing a deterrent if they haven't prevented wars between Pakistan and India or Israel and its neighbors?

Yeah, probably. But it would certainly provide more of a deterrent than not having nukes. I mean, in the current situation, Iran has a very limited deterrence ability, but if they were to have nukes, and have been posturing that they would use them, then the deterrence factor would be a lot higher, thereby providing greater security, at least from their point of view. But that doesn't mean that the system would be infallible.

 

[Camikaze]

Funny, nukes didn't do the trick for Israel, apparently - it got attacked many times, even though it possessed nuclear weapons.

Therefore, if Israeli nukes don't deter its enemies from attacking it, what makes these enemies think that if they had nuclear weapons, it would be any different?

Nukes themselves don't deter a conventional attack, that's now almost a rule.

I'm sure Iran would feel a lot more secure had they nuclear weapons in their possession. It may not actually work, but it would give a much higher sense of security. But I don't think the program is rational in the first place, so meh.

And there's a difference between Israeli deterrence and Iranian deterrence. Israel has repeatedly denied they have nuclear weapons, and have never threatened to use any. Iran, however, has long expressed its desires to attack Israel, even if they have denied the possession of nuclear weapons themselves. So Israeli deterrence through nukes has not been successful because they haven't been putting out there as a threat; they having been actively using the weapons they have to put off attacks. Iran, on the other hand, probably would, and that would (or at least should) make Israel (or America) think twice before attacking them. Another thing is that in Israel's conflicts, there hasn't been the need for Israel to use nukes. They have always won anyway. Iran, on the other hand, would probably come out of a conflict with Israel second best, meaning that they would rely on nuclear weapons more so if they actually wanted victory.

Or maybe they'd realize that nuclear weapons are just expensive toys which are of little value without spending huge sums of money which could be better used elsewhere.

I doubt it. Seeing as they don't actually have any nuclear weapons at the moment, they probably wouldn't realise the folly of their program through an Israeli attack, but would think, "we were attacked because we didn't have nuclear weapons to deter/defend ourselves with".

If the Iranian leaders were a bit more in contact with reality, they'd simply give up on the nuclear program (I don't mean they'd disassemble the facilities, they'd just freeze it) and invest the money in conventional weapons, especially anti-air and anti-ship missiles. That would make them much safer than few nukes which are just inviting an attack and making them the target Nr. 1 for Israel and the West.

But to expect such rationality from an Islamist regime would be stretch, I admit that.

I agree, but that doesn't change what most likely is the reality of the situation.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

Well I think it is possible that the overall geopolitical strategy in the Middle East for United States and its allies is to have Afganistan remain as a narco-state while Iraq being a competitive Oil exporting nation. Iran relations I believe is to be somewhat a quasi-Cold War affair to last for at least for a few more years till the time maybe when everyone will have to accept Iran as a another Nation with a nuclear arsenal.

 

[Arwon]

Cami, why would Iran be "bound" to put more funds into a nuclear weapons program? I'm uncertain as to how set on acquiring nuclear weapons the Iranian leadership is, what insights have you to speak so dogmatically about their aims?

I was talking about the train bombings in '04 and the subsequent victory of Zapatero et al. in the elections, hence withdrawal from Iraq. Somewhat facetiously.

Oh yeah, I forgot about that. Hah.

 

[Dachs]

Well, yeah, but that wouldn't be the functional purpose of the weapons.

How are you differentiating between the two?

Yeah, probably. But it would certainly provide more of a deterrent than not having nukes. I mean, in the current situation, Iran has a very limited deterrence ability, but if they were to have nukes, and have been posturing that they would use them, then the deterrence factor would be a lot higher, thereby providing greater security, at least from their point of view. But that doesn't mean that the system would be infallible.

Anybody who isn't induced to leave Iran alone by the Iranian state's ability to interdict a large quantity of the world's oil supply or its sizable conventional military is not going to be scared off by Iranian nuclear weapons.

 

[Camikaze]

How are you differentiating between the two?

Prestige isn't what the nuclear weapons would be physically used for. That would be more of a large positive benefit in addition to the functional ability of the nuclear weapons to, you know, nuke things.

Anybody who isn't induced to leave Iran alone by the Iranian state's ability to interdict a large quantity of the world's oil supply or its sizable conventional military is not going to be scared off by Iranian nuclear weapons.

If Israel and America aren't afraid of Iranian nuclear weapons, what are they complaining about?

 

[Dachs]

Prestige isn't what the nuclear weapons would be physically used for. That would be more of a large positive benefit in addition to the functional ability of the nuclear weapons to, you know, nuke things.

In a world where state use of nuclear weapons is as unlikely as it is...

If Israel and America aren't afraid of Iranian nuclear weapons, what are they complaining about?

So Israel is discussing an attack on the Iranian nuclear program as a precursor to attack on the rest of the country?

 

[Masada]

Prestige isn't what the nuclear weapons would be physically used for. That would be more of a large positive benefit in addition to the functional ability of the nuclear weapons to, you know, nuke things.

... except that nobody is prepared to use them, unless your implying that Iran is, and if you shouldn't that be the very reason you don't want them to have them?

If Israel and America aren't afraid of Iranian nuclear weapons, what are they complaining about?

Why is Iran building them if the cost of invasion is so prohibitive?

 

[Camikaze]

In a world where state use of nuclear weapons is as unlikely as it is...

... except that nobody is prepared to use them, unless your implying that Iran is, and if you shouldn't that be the very reason you don't want them to have them?

If no-one is prepared to use them, what is the point of an Israeli attack on Iran in the first place? Isn't Israel's whole argument under the assumption that Iran having nuclear weapons would be a bad thing, because they'd use them?

So Israel is discussing an attack on the Iranian nuclear program as a precursor to attack on the rest of the country?

No, I was just wondering what the reasoning behind Israel attacking Iran is, if they aren't actually scared of Iran having nuclear weapons, as you seemed to suggest. If they aren't going to be scared off by Iranian nuclear weapons, what's the rush in attacking them?

Why is Iran building them if the cost of invasion is so prohibitive?

The invasion of Iran?

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

So Israel is discussing an attack on the Iranian nuclear program as a precursor to attack on the rest of the country?

That is a strange argument. Attacking someone before they attack you.

Let's say someone slowly pulls a 9 mm pistol by the time after someone else had already pulled a pistol a few short time ago. Can you say that the person who pulled the gun last is at fault here?

 

[Winner]

I'm sure Iran would feel a lot more secure had they nuclear weapons in their possession. It may not actually work, but it would give a much higher sense of security. But I don't think the program is rational in the first place, so meh.

Yeah, but that belief is based on irrational feelings and hypocrisy (they've been using proxies to attack Israel for decades, so what makes them think that if they got nukes, Israel would suddenly stop defending itself?).

Even if they had few operational nukes, it wouldn't make them any more secure. It only make a first strike by Israel or the West more likely.

And there's a difference between Israeli deterrence and Iranian deterrence. Israel has repeatedly denied they have nuclear weapons, and have never threatened to use any. Iran, however, has long expressed its desires to attack Israel, even if they have denied the possession of nuclear weapons themselves. So Israeli deterrence through nukes has not been successful because they haven't been putting out there as a threat; they having been actively using the weapons they have to put off attacks.

Actually, Israel has never really denied the possession of nuclear weapons. As for its doctrine, Israel made it quite clear that if certain conditions were met, nukes would be used. In 1973, Syria and Egypt gambled that Israel would not use them - but we can argue that nuclear war was avoided only because Israeli conventional forces were able to stop the Syrian assault in the Golan Heights. If the Syrians had got through and advanced into Israel proper...

Iran, on the other hand, probably would, and that would (or at least should) make Israel (or America) think twice before attacking them. Another thing is that in Israel's conflicts, there hasn't been the need for Israel to use nukes. They have always won anyway. Iran, on the other hand, would probably come out of a conflict with Israel second best, meaning that they would rely on nuclear weapons more so if they actually wanted victory.

And how would it work, exactly? Even if Israel suddenly bombed them (conventionally), would they launch nukes and thus commit a suicide? I doubt that. In reality, they don't need nukes, because nukes could only be used in a veeeeeeery special case, and in any case it would be the end of Iran.

If I was an Iranian leader, I'd fist try to get off the American/Israeli radar - end the nuclear program, invite IAEA and perhaps some EU observers to confirm the program has been frozen. Then I'd use the money to modernize my military, especially the AA defenses and anti-ship offensive capabilities. That would make my enemies much more worried than some vague threat of nuclear suicide.

Since pursuing nuclear weapons program is so against Iranian interests, it leads me to believe that the real reason behind the program is the need to placate the IRGC and other radical elements inside the regime. They want nukes because of the prestige and because they believe that with them in their arsenal, they could pressure Israel much more than today. But that belief is completely unrealistic.

I doubt it. Seeing as they don't actually have any nuclear weapons at the moment, they probably wouldn't realise the folly of their program through an Israeli attack, but would think, "we were attacked because we didn't have nuclear weapons to deter/defend ourselves with".

Or "we were attacked because we didn't have proper Anti-Aircraft defenses, let's focus on these first before we try to restart the nuclear program."

 

[Dachs]

If no-one is prepared to use them, what is the point of an Israeli attack on Iran in the first place? Isn't Israel's whole argument under the assumption that Iran having nuclear weapons would be a bad thing, because they'd use them?

I dunno why the Israelis don't want the Iranians to have nuclear weapons. If I were them, it'd be to deny an oppositional power any sort of advantage, soft power or hard. But I'm not them.

No, I was just wondering what the reasoning behind Israel attacking Iran is, if they aren't actually scared of Iran having nuclear weapons, as you seemed to suggest. If they aren't going to be scared off by Iranian nuclear weapons, what's the rush in attacking them?

But that logic doesn't apply to Israel, who clearly harbors no plan for attacking Iran normally yet will threaten an attack on a nuclear-armed or presumptively nuclear-armed Iran. So obviously Israel isn't interested in removing a deterrent to something it has no intention of doing, i.e. attacking Iran.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

To me, I find that the thread lack the discussion of the possibility of maybe Isreal's (and Iran's) foreign policy on each other is entirely caused by their own domestic problems. That the regimes in both Nations find that they need no solution on building a bridge for better relations between the two countries since both of them need an external threat so that they can manipulate the fears of their own citizens by whatever reason for whatever purpose.

It seems that hypothesis is neglected by what may be smokes and mirrors created by both regimes.

 

[Winner]

Equating Israeli parliamentary democracy with Iranian semi-theocracy is ridiculous, which is perhaps why nobody wants to respond.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

Equating Israeli parliamentary democracy with Iranian semi-theocracy is ridiculous, which is perhaps why nobody wants to respond.

You forgot that in Iran, it has also a parliamentarian elements in their constitution.

 

[Camikaze]

Yeah, but that belief is based on irrational feelings and hypocrisy (they've been using proxies to attack Israel for decades, so what makes them think that if they got nukes, Israel would suddenly stop defending itself?).

Even if they had few operational nukes, it wouldn't make them any more secure. It only make a first strike by Israel or the West more likely.

Again, I didn't say it was rational. It isn't really a matter of thinking that Israel will stop defending itself so much as a matter of assuring that Israel will not attack. If they have nukes, then the assumption is that they are less likely to be attacked (and if you want to take the cynical view, would therefore be able to destroy Israel with a reduced threat of being attacked themselves), and that is a fair assumption, and works in just the same way as any other nation's nuclear deterrence does, even if it may not be reality.

As for it only making a first strike more likely, that may be true, but it also comes with the problems created for Israel due to that first strike. Conventional attacks on Israel would be bound to follow, for starters, and as discussed earlier, IMO Israel would have worse long-term security, with the cycle of violence only worsening, and Iran accelerating its nuclear program. Iran would probably be of the opinion that this would be of more long-term benefit to it, that is, they would probably think that through Israel would suffer more through a first strike on Iran than Iran would. By this logic, whilst Iran would still not want to be attacked, they probably consider it an acceptable risk in their efforts.

Actually, Israel has never really denied the possession of nuclear weapons. As for its doctrine, Israel made it quite clear that if certain conditions were met, nukes would be used. In 1973, Syria and Egypt gambled that Israel would not use them - but we can argue that nuclear war was avoided only because Israeli conventional forces were able to stop the Syrian assault in the Golan Heights. If the Syrians had got through and advanced into Israel proper...

Okay, they haven't denied, they've just not confirmed.

And how would it work, exactly? Even if Israel suddenly bombed them (conventionally), would they launch nukes and thus commit a suicide? I doubt that. In reality, they don't need nukes, because nukes could only be used in a veeeeeeery special case, and in any case it would be the end of Iran.

It works the same way as any nuclear weapons deterrence. I'm hesitant to quote mutually assured destruction on you, because I'm sure you'll catch me out on it, but that is effectively what it is. I don't think Iran is under any illusions that the use of nuclear weapons by them would be suicide, but their acquisition of nuclear weapons means that the situation for Israel changes from one where the use of nuclear weapons on Iran would not have ridiculously adverse effects to one in which the use of nuclear weapons by Israel would likewise constitute suicide. And the same goes for conventional attacks by Israel, to a degree. Although it is unlikely, if Iran has nuclear weapons, an Israeli attack on Iran will mean there is a possibility of Israel being destroyed. And that very remote possibility would surely prevent any attack. At least from Iran's logic, it would, and from Israel's logic too, actually, given that they want to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons due to this fear.

If I was an Iranian leader, I'd fist try to get off the American/Israeli radar - end the nuclear program, invite IAEA and perhaps some EU observers to confirm the program has been frozen. Then I'd use the money to modernize my military, especially the AA defenses and anti-ship offensive capabilities. That would make my enemies much more worried than some vague threat of nuclear suicide.

If Israel was more worried, wouldn't an attack be more likely?

Since pursuing nuclear weapons program is so against Iranian interests, it leads me to believe that the real reason behind the program is the need to placate the IRGC and other radical elements inside the regime. They want nukes because of the prestige and because they believe that with them in their arsenal, they could pressure Israel much more than today. But that belief is completely unrealistic.

And if the real need for nuclear weapons is to placate the real leadership, that means that any Israeli attack is even more likely to lead to an acceleration of the program. If the leadership cannot see now that nuclear weapons are not a good idea, then they aren't going to after an attack by Israel before those weapons are acquired. So, they would demand the acceleration of the nuclear weapons program based on false logic. Which means that an attack by Israel would be futile, and would only lead to worse long-term security. Even if that is through the idiocy of the Iranian leadership, it is true nonetheless.

Or "we were attacked because we didn't have proper Anti-Aircraft defenses, let's focus on these first before we try to restart the nuclear program."

I thought you just said that the nuclear weapons program was irrational? If decision making is so devoid of logic, then what makes you think this will happen in the event of an Israeli attack?

But that logic doesn't apply to Israel, who clearly harbors no plan for attacking Iran normally yet will threaten an attack on a nuclear-armed or presumptively nuclear-armed Iran. So obviously Israel isn't interested in removing a deterrent to something it has no intention of doing, i.e. attacking Iran.

I'm not sure I'm quite following you here. Are you saying that Israel isn't interested in preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons unless it is planning on attacking them anyway?

To me, I find that the thread lack the discussion of the possibility of maybe Isreal's (and Iran's) foreign policy on each other is entirely caused by their own domestic problems. That the regimes in both Nations find that they need no solution on building a bridge for better relations between the two countries since both of them need an external threat so that they can manipulate the fears of their own citizens by whatever reason for whatever purpose.

It seems that hypothesis is neglected by what may be smokes and mirrors created by both regimes.

I would've thought that in Israel's case, it would be more a matter of politicians being aggressive to garner the support of the populace, who are probably quite fearful, rather than politicians being aggressive to shape public opinion.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

Well I have to say that you (I mean you Camikaze) do know for sure to not take neither side of the coin since if one does take either side, then you are more likely to be misled into thinking that one is being irrational toward the other side when in fact both are most likely being irrational altogether.

The only solution I can think of is removing both regimes. To do that, has to be something where communications from both party wanting to remove their own respective regime out and place it with a more reasonable regime for to create a better relation with one another for future generation. Old men has to die with their silly ideologies being buried with them.

 

[Dachs]

I'm not sure I'm quite following you here. Are you saying that Israel isn't interested in preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons unless it is planning on attacking them anyway?

No. I stated that nuclear weapons need not be for use as either offensive or deterrent weapons, but that their possession yielding prestige and/or influence could be an aim in itself. (This is largely the same reasoning, by the way, for the construction of the Imperial German Hochseeflotte. Its commanders - who lobbied most strongly for its expansion - never intended to use it in warfare for offensive purposes, did not believe that its existence would deter war with other states - far from it, they frequently worried about British 'Copenhagens' - but did wish to increase both their own personal power and prestige within the state and German prestige abroad, and use that prestige to secure colonies and to help assuage domestic opponents within the state...)

Anyway, back on topic. You then claimed that prestige was not the primary aim (and deterrence is unlike that how exactly?) and that nuclear weapons were in fact a valid deterrent because an enemy who was theoretically interested in attacking Iran would be less likely to attack Iran if Iran were to control nuclear weapons. I then countered by saying that anybody who was already interested in attacking Iran would not be less likely to do so if they had nuclear weapons, based on their preexisting economic and military capabilities to do damage to opponents. You then asked why Israel and the United States would be worried about nuclear weapons if they don't significantly add to the Iranian deterrent.

Obviously they wouldn't be, if Iran were constructing nuclear weapons solely for deterrent purposes as you've indicated, because Israel certainly has evinced no interest in attacking Iran outside of Iran's flirtation with nuclear weapons acquisition/manufacture, and the United States' administration, obviously an unlikely group to be bandying about an invasion of Iran project, would have a similar lack of interest in destroying an Iranian deterrent to an attack neither of them would ever make. Clearly, therefore, the weapons program would not be used either solely or even primarily for deterrent purposes...otherwise states that would have no interest in seeing an Iranian deterrent eliminated wouldn't care. Yet those states are threatening, in turn, military action on the one hand and further diplomatic consequences of an undetermined nature on the other.

Hence my point. To return to the quoted post, that is exactly what I am saying: if the nuclear weapons are a deterrent, Israel won't care to remove them, because Israel doesn't need to worry about a deterrent to do something they don't already want to do.

 

[Camikaze]

Oh, I getcha now. I was just a little confused as to what you were saying. But I must disagree. It would seem that they wouldn't be interested in removing a deterrent to an attack that they aren't going to perpetrate, but then it would also seem that Iran would not use nuclear weapons for anything but deterrent (or prestige, which would have the same effect on Israel). So whilst Israel must think that Iran would use the weapons for offensive purposes (hence the perceived need to destroy the nuclear weapons program), that view isn't really grounded in reality. There is no reason why Iran would use them as an offensive weapon, other than sheer lunacy, which, while being more likely coming from Iran, is still a preposterous idea.

And if they do want to use the weapons for an offensive purpose, that would seemingly remove all possibility of the nuclear program being discontinued after an Israeli attack, something that would surely make the want for offensive action even greater. So Israel, in that case would be in a lose-lose-lose situation, whereby they could either face the risk of being nuked in the near future, or attack Iran's facilities, only leading to a more determined effort in the future, resulting in the same situation, or institute a state of perpetual war whereby all Iranian efforts to do anything are met with attack after attack, which would be very costly to not only Israel, but to the world.

 

[Winner]

Again, I didn't say it was rational. It isn't really a matter of thinking that Israel will stop defending itself so much as a matter of assuring that Israel will not attack. If they have nukes, then the assumption is that they are less likely to be attacked (and if you want to take the cynical view, would therefore be able to destroy Israel with a reduced threat of being attacked themselves), and that is a fair assumption, and works in just the same way as any other nation's nuclear deterrence does, even if it may not be reality.

No, it absolutely doesn't work in the same way. Unless you have something with which you can deter your enemies in the "transitional phase" (until your nuclear arsenal is advanced enough to be useful), then your nukes will not deter attack, but invite it.

It is obvious why - so long as Israel can realistically believe it can take out all Iranian nukes/nuclear facilities before they get a chance to use them, it will do it. If Iran had a strong and working AA defenses, that any Israeli air strike would become impossible and the country would have to resign on resolving the problem with force.

Ergo, building nuclear weapons without having an adequate conventional forces to deter a preventive attack is a dangerous and potentially suicidal gamble.

As for it only making a first strike more likely, that may be true, but it also comes with the problems created for Israel due to that first strike. Conventional attacks on Israel would be bound to follow, for starters, and as discussed earlier, IMO Israel would have worse long-term security, with the cycle of violence only worsening, and Iran accelerating its nuclear program.

Wrong on both accounts.

1) Israel believes that any potential increase in terrorist activity resulting from its strike against Iran would be less threatening than nuclear Iran. It's a matter of choosing the lesser evil. Terrorism is something Israel has faced for decades and the Israelis are reasonably confident they can handle it. On the other hand, they can't handle the possibility of being attacked by nuclear weapons. Israel is a tiny country compared to Iran. Even a single nuclear warhead could cripple the country, whereas it would take dozens of them to disrupt Iran in the same way, and even then there would be another hundreds of millions of hostile Muslims to take advantage of Israeli weakness.

Simply put, Israel sees nuclear weapons in the hands of regimes like Iran as an existential threat.

2) Iran could not accelerate its nuclear program if its major military facilities were destroyed. It would take at least another decade for Iranians to get back to the point where they were interrupted.

Iran would probably be of the opinion that this would be of more long-term benefit to it, that is, they would probably think that through Israel would suffer more through a first strike on Iran than Iran would. By this logic, whilst Iran would still not want to be attacked, they probably consider it an acceptable risk in their efforts.

I fail to see how being attacked and having their long-term investments wiped out could be beneficial for Iran. Israel, on the other hand, would not sustain any damage except for some inevitable political fallout (to which it is also used to).

It works the same way as any nuclear weapons deterrence. I'm hesitant to quote mutually assured destruction on you, because I'm sure you'll catch me out on it, but that is effectively what it is.

No. Nuclear deterrence as a concept means that the thing that's being deterred is a nuclear attack. If Iran was attacked conventionally, its nukes would be useless because using them in response would be a suicide.

I don't think Iran is under any illusions that the use of nuclear weapons by them would be suicide, but their acquisition of nuclear weapons means that the situation for Israel changes from one where the use of nuclear weapons on Iran would not have ridiculously adverse effects to one in which the use of nuclear weapons by Israel would likewise constitute suicide.

As I explained - until Iran attains effective 2nd strike capability, its nuclear weapons will only invite an Israeli first strike. MAD only work if both countries' arsenals can survive a surprise first strike.

For Iran, effective 2nd strike capability is still decades off. Until then, it will be vulnerable.

And the same goes for conventional attacks by Israel, to a degree. Although it is unlikely, if Iran has nuclear weapons, an Israeli attack on Iran will mean there is a possibility of Israel being destroyed.

Israel would be be hit hard, sure, but Iran would cease to exist - literally. I don't think that even the most fanatical Islamists in Iran would be stupid enough to respond to a conventional attack in this way. And it's one more reason why Israel would attack with an overwhelming strength as soon as possible - to prevent any retaliation.

And that very remote possibility would surely prevent any attack.

No, it would invite even stronger attack.

At least from Iran's logic, it would, and from Israel's logic too, actually, given that they want to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons due to this fear.

We're moving in circles. I am afraid you don't quite understand how nuclear deterrence/strategy works.

If Israel was more worried, wouldn't an attack be more likely?

No, for two reasons - stronger AA defenses would make air strikes less possible; and since anti-aircraft missiles are not a weapon which threatens Israel's existence, it would have no reason to attack.

On the other hand, nuclear weapons are not a defensive weapon, and they do threaten Israel's existence, ergo Israel would be compelled to attack preventively.

And if the real need for nuclear weapons is to placate the real leadership, that means that any Israeli attack is even more likely to lead to an acceleration of the program. If the leadership cannot see now that nuclear weapons are not a good idea, then they aren't going to after an attack by Israel before those weapons are acquired. So, they would demand the acceleration of the nuclear weapons program based on false logic. Which means that an attack by Israel would be futile, and would only lead to worse long-term security. Even if that is through the idiocy of the Iranian leadership, it is true nonetheless.

Again, you can't accelerate something when it is destroyed. Iran would have to rebuild the whole nuclear infrastructure, and that would take at least a decade during which many things could change.

I thought you just said that the nuclear weapons program was irrational? If decision making is so devoid of logic, then what makes you think this will happen in the event of an Israeli attack?

Explained above - it's irrational to put yourself in a danger because of a nuclear program which won't give you any clear advantage. If you have a strong conventional deterrent, building nuclear weapons is a less risky strategy (even though you don't really need nukes then).