Justify the continued existance of the US Senate

How badly does the US Senate suck?


  • Total voters
    45

Perfection

The Great Head.
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Other then the fact that taking away power from any branch of the government is absolutely impossible, why should the US Senate still exist? What actual value does it give anymore?

I say, scrap it!
 
I second this motion.

The real value of the Senate is as a slower branch of government to check anything happening too quickly in the House, thus dramatically slowing down the Legislature. Really this is the job of the Supreme Court not of some second legislating body. Which due to its antiquated rules allows a few individuals from small unimportant states grandstanding to harm the entire process.
 
The only reason it existed was to throw the small states a bone, when they complained they weren't getting as much representation as the bigger states, wasn't it some kind of compromise? My history memory is failing...

Sometimes I wonder why it exists too, is a HoR not enough?. And sometimes I wonder if states themselves even need to exist anymore..
 
The only reason it existed was to throw the small states a bone, when they complained they weren't getting as much representation as the bigger states, wasn't it some kind of compromise? My history memory is failing...

Sometimes I wonder why it exists too, is a HoR not enough?. And sometimes I wonder if states themselves even need to exist anymore..
Yeah it was some trick to keep the nation from falling apart before it was a nation. Now it is a nation, it ain't gonna fall apart. The Senate can go now.
 
It still provides a valuable function. If it weren't there to slow down government action, you'd have wild swings in policy every time the House changed hands.
 
They are a bunch of old farts who still think it is 1890. A four term limit should be imposed to prevent old senile fools from being elected.
 
Just give us a dictator and be done with it.

Down with the Senate! Down with the old farts!

Liberty can only be established when old farts from the Senate no longer wield the power over the nation that they have.
 
They are a bunch of old farts who still think it is 1890. A four term limit should be imposed to prevent old senile fools from being elected.

I wouldn't mind that. One reason our government is so dysfunctional is you get lifers in there who never have to go back and get a real job and live with the consequences of their legislative actions.
 
It's part of the Federative pact, meaning it is supposed to represent the States, while the House representes the people as whole (or at least that's how it's supposed to work over here).

Naturally, if you don't believe in Federation and would rather have a more centralized national executive, you would favor getting rid of the Senate. If you like the Federative model keeping it is a good idea.
 
Maybe the Senate should be elected. America is the land of the free, the home of equality and opportunity and the Mother of Democracy, right?
 
The problem, if you ask Tom Daschle, is money. This article from The New Yorker casts light on the issue.

Personally, I think the solution is to make the Senate less democratic. Going back to the old system--election by state legislatures--makes money less of a factor for the Senators themselves (although perhaps more of a factor for the legislatures, but that wouldn't be the Senators' problem, now would it?). Furthermore, if you allow for states to have confirmation elections--i.e. legislature elects in, say, September, people confirm in November--you have a reasonable system that might very well result in the obviation of term limits. And since you're amending the Constitution at this point anyway, you might as well insert more general provisions to allow federal and state campaign regulation for both House and Senate, as well as state legislatures (thus killing the reason that the Senate was made popularly elected in the first place).

I'll justify the Senate thusly: The United States is a federation. Nobody doubts this. The American model is essentially the British model circa 1776 (or earlier), with three innovations (besides the very institution of a written constitution itself): the hereditary king is replaced by the elected president; the executive's ministers may not be drawn from the legislature; and the nobility is abolished. Please note that in this period, many British political commentators took pride in the structure of the British regime, as it resembles (although it is hardly the same as) the classical Aristotelian polity or mixed regime--a combination of democracy (the Commons), aristocracy (the Lords), and monarchy (the Crown).

With monarchy (the President) and democracy (the House of Representatives) taken care of in the United States, the difficult question was aristocracy. (I'll take this opportunity to admit that I'm sort of putting words in the Framers' mouths; though their decisions were influenced by this thinking, they rarely ever discussed it as such, preferring instead to discuss with reference to the British system). The House of Lords stood for the Establishment in Britain, and while there were plenty of pro-Establishment MPs in the Commons, there were also a fair number of radicals. Suffrage for the House was already much broader and fairer than for the British Commons (rotten boroughs, etc., etc., were virtually unknown), so it was likely to be more radical. Not that all the Framers thought radicalism was bad, but almost all of them did consider the Establishment worth representing in the legislature. The question was: who is the American establishment? Who are the American nobility?

In a word, the state governments.

They have institutional continuity (like a peerage). They last forever (like a peerage, theoretically). Unlike a peerage, they have to deliberate before making a decision--but this is better from the standpoint of the Framers, since it decreases the rashness of states--and thus of Senators--even further. Once it was realized that states are effectively lords, it was only a question of how to distribute the Senators. Distributing them evenly was the eminently-practical Ben Franklin's idea, killing the small states' complaints with the same stone.

The upper house of a federation's legislature is--or at least ought to be--representative of the components of the federation. That's why--as annoying as it is--the Senate must remain more or less as-is.
 
I voted bad bad bad bad bad, only because that seemed to be the least biased response.

Overall, I feel that the US Senate is necessary for fair and balanced power sharing within the legislative branch.

Ahem. USA #1.
 
USA #1? Is this a humorous meme going around or do people actually believe this when they write that?
 
USA #1? Is this a humorous meme going around or do people actually believe this when they write that?

Both actually, though it depends on the person
 
Most state legislatures are full of idiots. Last thing we need is to have them picking Senators...you think we have a bunch of morons in DC now, just wait until we lower the collective IQ of the group electing the Senators.
 
I'll justify the Senate thusly: The United States is a federation. Nobody doubts this. The American model is essentially the British model circa 1776 (or earlier), with three innovations (besides the very institution of a written constitution itself): the hereditary king is replaced by the elected president; the executive's ministers may not be drawn from the legislature; and the nobility is abolished. Please note that in this period, many British political commentators took pride in the structure of the British regime, as it resembles (although it is hardly the same as) the classical Aristotelian polity or mixed regime--a combination of democracy (the Commons), aristocracy (the Lords), and monarchy (the Crown).

With monarchy (the President) and democracy (the House of Representatives) taken care of in the United States, the difficult question was aristocracy. (I'll take this opportunity to admit that I'm sort of putting words in the Framers' mouths; though their decisions were influenced by this thinking, they rarely ever discussed it as such, preferring instead to discuss with reference to the British system). The House of Lords stood for the Establishment in Britain, and while there were plenty of pro-Establishment MPs in the Commons, there were also a fair number of radicals. Suffrage for the House was already much broader and fairer than for the British Commons (rotten boroughs, etc., etc., were virtually unknown), so it was likely to be more radical. Not that all the Framers thought radicalism was bad, but almost all of them did consider the Establishment worth representing in the legislature. The question was: who is the American establishment? Who are the American nobility?

In a word, the state governments.

They have institutional continuity (like a peerage). They last forever (like a peerage, theoretically). Unlike a peerage, they have to deliberate before making a decision--but this is better from the standpoint of the Framers, since it decreases the rashness of states--and thus of Senators--even further. Once it was realized that states are effectively lords, it was only a question of how to distribute the Senators. Distributing them evenly was the eminently-practical Ben Franklin's idea, killing the small states' complaints with the same stone.

The upper house of a federation's legislature is--or at least ought to be--representative of the components of the federation. That's why--as annoying as it is--the Senate must remain more or less as-is.

What you have done here is to largely provide a description of the American system of governance, with reference to British government (circa the 18th century). It was very interesting. But it is not the same as a justification. You have provided neither practical nor moral reasons as to why the Senate is a valuable institution.

At a push, there are two undeveloped ideas as to why that could be. The first is that the Senate represents the Establishment. You put forward no reasons as to the value of this other than that the framers thought it useful. Questions naturally arise; What is the Establishment? Why did they think it needed representing? Does it still need representing? If so, are the states the best vehicle with which to represent it? So on and so forth.

The second is that any federation ought to have a chamber which represents the constituent parts of said federation. Again this isn't really justified; is that a moral or practical 'ought'? Certainly one could say that most (all?) federal states have a chamber whose power is linked to the federal nature of said state, but it does not necessarily follow that they should. Even if it did you then go on to make what I think is a very bold claim; that this means the senate should remain 'more or less as-is'.

If we take a look at federal chambers across the world we see nowhere a state of affairs which gives quite the same amount of power to states as institutions as does the US senate. In Canada we see a wholly appointed senate which functions mainly as a revising chamber; a place of 'sober second thought'. In Germany we see a subordinate chamber in which representation is directly linked to state population. In India we see a similar system of proportional representation in which the upper House can be effectively overridden by the lower house. So on and so forth; the fact that the US senate is on par, if not more powerful, than the House of Representatives is an anomaly in the world of federal states. Certainly one needs a lot more justification before deciding that that anomaly is benign!
 
You've got senators, you need a senate. Can't have senators hanging out in a grocery store.. unless they're there to buy fruit.
Which would be more productive than what they do now.
 
Most state legislatures are full of idiots. Last thing we need is to have them picking Senators...you think we have a bunch of morons in DC now, just wait until we lower the collective IQ of the group electing the Senators.

The legislatures themselves need fixing, not least by lifting some of the absurdly short term limits (three terms--six years!--in the MI House!). The main reason legislatures tend to be idiots is that they tend to be inordinately young and inexperienced; you spend a few years in the legislature, get term limited, and then try to hop either into county government or Congress (that's how it works in MI anyway). I don't much care for term limits in legislatures--legislatures are supposed to be relatively level-headed and deliberate, and the best way to get that is to have well-established members who've been working together long enough that they can ignore partisan and regional preconceptions and actually get things done. If there are to be term limits, they have to be long: no less than, say, sixteen years (which is why I wouldn't be terribly opposed to a 24-year limit on US Senators). Fresh legislators, especially at the state level, tend to be unaware of the ins and outs of politicking at that level, making them easy to push around for interests outside their constituents and the legislature. They also tend to be a bit less willing to overlook partisan labels and regional loyalties and form partnerships across the aisle and across the state. More established types will have some cross-party friendships and will know how to say "no" to lobbyists when necessary (they're still just as likely to say "yes," but they bargain harder, and in any case that can be handled in other ways).

Speaking of state legislatures, another region that they're idiots is that they mindlessly mimic the structure of the federal government. Ever since Reynolds v. Sims put the kibosh on interestingly-structured state senates, there has been no reason to include them. All state senates today are simply miniature versions of the lower house, usually with longer terms. In other words, they are effectively redundant. There should be precisely zero state senates in the United States. There are in fact forty-nine. (Technically, Nebraska's unicameral legislature is a state Senate--NE abolished its House in the '20s--but let's not split hairs, shall we?)

There are other ways to get that "aristocratic"--which in most states means "regional"--element in the government, the best way being through the executive. Several states have historically experimented with plural executives, the most notable being the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. The legislature was unicameral. Each of Pennsylvania's then twelve counties, plus the capital city of Philadelphia, elected a member of the Supreme Executive Council, which collectively exercised executive power. The Council elected a primus inter pares president, who in effect frequently had more power than the rest of the council members.

You could probably do this in New York (where the Senate is notoriously difficult to manage), although instead of thirteen counties you could do it regionally. The regions are obvious: either a straight-up Upstate/Downstate division, or two Upstate (since Western and Eastern Upstate are a bit different) and one Downstate. Then, either go for a three-person executive (who would collectively exercise the current powers of the governor) or a larger, cabinet-style one: several members elected from each region; they choose a governor-equivalent or p.i.p leader, and then he doles out cabinet-type positions (given the current structure of NY government, most of these would have to be created from scratch).

Another way to do a plural executive would be to revert to British-style parliamentary government, and then require that the Cabinet be drawn in equal measure from the well-identified regions of the state. Since Michigan is already the eleventh province of Canada, I'll use my home state as an example.

The (unicameral) legislature elects the Governor from its own. The governor then selects the cabinet. If the cabinet is, say, ten people, then it's two representing districts in the southeast (Metro Detroit), two from districts in mid-Michigan, two from the Saginaw Bay/Thumb region, two from West Michigan, and two from Northern Lower MI and the UP. Forbidding the Secretary of State and Attorney General (the two most powerful Cabinet positions here) from both being from the southeast would also help.

I must emphasize: all this is a product of [wiki]Reynolds v. Sims[/wiki]. This was, all and all, a good decision: neither the South nor indeed most states could be trusted to come up with a fair system for representation in an upper house. While I'm not sure the effect of Board of Estimate v. Morris on the collective-governor system, a regionalized-cabinet system ought to pass constitutional muster.
 
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