As for Napoleon, I can understand him being on the list, but not for the Grand Army. IIRC, prior to building that his military forces were based around small, swift units, not the huge lumbering masses of soldiers that were prevalent in other European armies at the time. Going big slowed him down; a major mistake. After that he just kept losing.
Not exactly, Napoleon's Grand Army or armies saw action from 1805 onwards, and in 1805 they outmarched, outfought and trounced Austria/Russia. The grand army basically consisted of individual Corps which consisted of all 3 arms, plus reserve formations such as the I. Guard, Oudinot's combined Grenadier units and Heavy cavalry formations. An excellent expample of the Corps ability was Davout in the 1806 campaign where he alone faced off against the 50,000 men of the Prussian army with just 27,000 of his own whilst Napoleon with some 90,000 of the French army fought the remainder, only some 47,000. Davout not only held the Prussians all day, but when the day came to an end threw back their army into dissaray and drove them from the field with help from a tardy Benadotte. This also matches your comment on the bigger european armies being clumsy.
Whilst this matches your theory about the smaller formations, it was the way in which these operated under the Grand Army system that made them excel. Alone and unco-ordianted they would more often than not be seperated and defeated in detail. Napoleon's system of march allowed them to advance on the enemy quickly and each be in support of the other. This enabled the army to quickly concentrate at specific points as the enemy were located. Without this ability, disaster would be likely, for example had a lesser man than Davout fought the above battle, unsupported he would have been crushed. Napoleon also made excellet use of Berthier, his incomparable chief of staff which helped hold the army together.
Also the system usually performed well even with larger armies, what often failed the system was the inconcistency of it's commanders. Take Auerstadt, the battle mentioned above, an even larger victory could have been achieved, but for the stubborn attitude of Bernadotte, who was supposed to be in support of Davout but arrived very late in the battle. At least one of the penninsula battles was lost due to the reluctance of French commanders to co-operate and unite against Wellington. Some of the 1813 battles could have been greater victories but for the problems Napoleon's subordinates caused.
So to me, it was the combination of the excellent corps system coupled with the excellence of the Grand Army in bringing the Corps together to fight the enemy that made the armies sucessfull across europe.