Bear in mind that that resulted from a deliberate choice - the Soviets chose to emphasize quantity over quality, believing that the savings which resulted from not equiping thier tanks with the best available technology would be more then made up by using the extra resourses to produce more tanks. Were they wrong? It's actually hard to say. Recent experiances sugest that the training and morale of troops are actually more important then technological factors (ie, the Vietnam War, the Yom Kippur War, The Falklands, etc). Interestingly, the US Army's 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is equiped and fights as a Soviet pattern motor rifle regiment as the opposing force at the National Training Center, and it aparently normally beats it's opponents. This sugests that Soviet doctrine and weaponry was fundamentally sound, and could have proved sucessful if the Soviets had entered a war with well trained personel led by good officers. The first Gulf War provided remarkably few lessons for the employment of armor or indicators of the relative quality of tanks. As early as WW2 it was clear that any force which enjoyed air domanance over it's oponents was almost impossible to defeat, with armoured formations in open terrain being extreamly vunerable to air attack. Similarly, the importance of crew training was also understood to be important. Given the massive disparity in training and logistical support between the US and Iraqi Armues, it's likely that the US would have scored an easy victory if it's forces had been using T-72s and the Iraqis had had the M1s.