Neville Chamberlain Re-examined

French position was different from English one. French generally knew that they should act, but they werent prepared to do it without Great Britain. If would British support French, such war would not occur.
English havent only fear, they also saw Germany as not enemy. Their diplomats were ignorant about countries in Central Europe and Balkans and generally were accepting that some Versailles boarders should be restored if status quo will remain on Western boarders. But at one point it was enough. When French had serious problems and Germans had Rhineland and Bohemia, it was unstoppable change balance of power.
What is often ignored is completely western resignation on competing with Germany in trade in Central Europe and Balkans before war.
 
I don't have a problem to accept the relative strong army of Czechoslovakia in 1938 depicted in this thread or their will to fight.
Still I have to wonder how Germany could take the rest of it just like that in March 1939. Were they simply too surprised? Did they hope for another compromise? I don't get it.
 
SiLL said:
Still I have to wonder how Germany could take the rest of it just like that in March 1939

The Czechoslovakian armies plans were predicated on a defensive war operating from a very strong defensive positions. They lost that and consequently were caught majorly out of position with an army that had no defensive terrain to even the odds. Strategically it was all in Germany's favor - a quick clear shot across relatively flat terrain with excellent roads. It also doesn't help that Czechoslovakia lost its industrial heartlands.
 
Czechoslovakia after Munich was collapsing state. By all - economics, democracy and military means.
 
I don't have a problem to accept the relative strong army of Czechoslovakia in 1938 depicted in this thread or their will to fight.
Still I have to wonder how Germany could take the rest of it just like that in March 1939. Were they simply too surprised? Did they hope for another compromise? I don't get it.

Masada explained it partially, but the plan was to fight on the borders and delay the Wehrmacht as long as possible to give Western allies time to strike against the exposed Western frontier. The plan was a folly since the French has absolutely no will to do that, but they of course kept the Czechs ensured that they'd come to their aid (they lied, yes). Czechoslovakia had even built large and well-equipped modern airbases which were meant to host Allied fighters once the war would begin.

If Wehrmacht wasn't stopped in the border regions (Sudeten Germans would suffer heavily due to the fighting), the plan was to gradually withdraw to the 2nd and 3rd line of fortifications deeper in the interior, while maintaining strong rear guard action and flexible defense. Eventually if everything failed, the Czechoslovak forces would withdraw to Slovakia and maintain its resistance in the difficult terrain until the West defeats Germany.

Now you can see why Czechoslovakia in 1939 couldn't hope to resist. I's fortification lines were gone, its morale crushed, Slovakia was increasingly rebellious and the Western Allies had betrayed it. It was believed that if the Czech president refused to cave to Hitler's pressure, the Luftwaffe would launch terror raids against Czech cities and massacre tens of thousands of people.

And since the Czechs are not Poles who always go into hopeless battles to get killed, we accepted the inevitable. The pro-democratic minded politicians were already in exile, literally hoping for a big war so that they could maintain hope for some sort of liberation.

The Czechoslovakian armies plans were predicated on a defensive war operating from a very strong defensive positions. They lost that and consequently were caught majorly out of position with an army that had no defensive terrain to even the odds. Strategically it was all in Germany's favor - a quick clear shot across relatively flat terrain with excellent roads. It also doesn't help that Czechoslovakia lost its industrial heartlands.

It lost a good part of its industry, but not the "heartlands". Sudeten German regions were mostly rural with only few bigger cities and important industries.

Much more crippling was the severing of important railroads which made life very difficult economically for the rump Czechoslovakia.
 
Winner said:
It lost a good part of its industry, but not the "heartlands". Sudeten German regions were mostly rural with only few bigger cities and important industries.

I should have said it all but lost its heartlands, you lost the strategic depth to maintain them in the face of invasion.

Winner said:
Much more crippling was the severing of important railroads which made life very difficult economically for the rump Czechoslovakia.

Your country was in trouble anyway. Silly frogs. :(
 
One thing that should be stressed - after Munich, Czechoslovakia (the remnants of it) wasn't a democracy anymore. Many political groups were banned and the shock of the betrayal led to almost complete discrediting (-tment? What the hell is the proper English form?) of liberal democracy and pro-Western leanings. The new government was trying hard to appease Germany in any way possible. Liberal parties were banned, critics of Nazism removed from offices, nationalists in non-Czech parts of the country were give more breathing space etc.

It was an agony which is seldom really discussed in history lessons, unfortunately. We should probably be grateful that Hitler was such an idiot that he broke the Munich agreement. If he hadn't done it, we would probably have been bullied into joining the war on Germany's side like Hungary or Romania.

In the end, we'd be on the losing side which would make the prospect of getting the Sudeten regions back completely unrealistic.
 
French position was different from English one. French generally knew that they should act, but they werent prepared to do it without Great Britain. If would British support French, such war would not occur.
English havent only fear, they also saw Germany as not enemy. Their diplomats were ignorant about countries in Central Europe and Balkans and generally were accepting that some Versailles boarders should be restored if status quo will remain on Western boarders. But at one point it was enough. When French had serious problems and Germans had Rhineland and Bohemia, it was unstoppable change balance of power.
What is often ignored is completely western resignation on competing with Germany in trade in Central Europe and Balkans before war.
Just a slight correction; The French Government knew it should act. After all, as a continental power, France had a lot more to fear from a revitalised Germany than Britain did. But the French people were just as stupidly naive about the wole thing as the British public was.

I distinctly remember reading a biography of Daladier once, which mentioned that when he arrived back in Paris after signing the Pact, he expected a chorus of boos. Instead, he received cheers, which prompted him to turn to once of his aides and refer to the gatherin as "a bunch of fools," or somes-uch.
 
Just a slight correction; The French Government knew it should act. After all, as a continental power, France had a lot more to fear from a revitalised Germany than Britain did. But the French people were just as stupidly naive about the wole thing as the British public was.

I distinctly remember reading a biography of Daladier once, which mentioned that when he arrived back in Paris after signing the Pact, he expected a chorus of boos. Instead, he received cheers, which prompted him to turn to once of his aides and refer to the gatherin as "a bunch of fools," or somes-uch.

Of course he got cheers. Most of those people remembered the the horrors of WW1. Why should France pursue another world war over 20 year old Czechoslovakia?

Its easy not to be niave when you have hindsight.
 
Of course he got cheers. Most of those people remembered the the horrors of WW1. Why should France pursue another world war over 20 year old Czechoslovakia?

Its easy not to be niave when you have hindsight.
Funny, Daladier seemed to have the right idea, despite not having that whole "hindsight" thing. If Daladier had stuck to his guns there'd have been no Munich Pact, Hitler would have invaded Czechoslovakia, France would have declared war on Germany, and the world would be very different. There'd likely be 6 million more Jews, for one thing.

Anyone who didn't see the threat Germany posed was a naive fool, pure and simple. Whether peasant or Prime Minister. It was blindingly obvious that Germany was a threat, and any rational leader would have taken care of it.
 
Ah but then we are back the beginning where it is implied we care about Czechoslovakia
 
Ah but then we are back the beginning where it is implied we care about Czechoslovakia
Screw Czechoslovakia, the people should have seen a war on their own borders brewing. Whenever the Germans get uppity, they invade France. Just a matter of time now, too.
 
Anyone who didn't see the threat Germany posed was a naive fool, pure and simple. Whether peasant or Prime Minister. It was blindingly obvious that Germany was a threat, and any rational leader would have taken care of it.

It is blindingly obvious to me that Russia is a threat, that Iran is a threat, that radical Islam is a threat, that Pakistani instability is a threat, but the world seems to be pretty resigned to these threats.

I imagine it was similar in the 1930s. "But they, the Hitler guy just talks, it's a stuff he needs to say to keep his approval ratings high. Oh yes, he's not nice at the Jews, but that's not really our problem. So what that he annexed Austria? They were Germans too and they welcomed the Anschluss, so what can we do? Czechoslovakia - what the heck is that? If the Germans want to be part of Germany, they have a right to that, self-determination, remember?"

There is a reason for the Godwin law - comparisons with pre-WW2 appeasement are so fitting because the world has obviously failed to learn its lessons from it.
 
It is blindingly obvious to me that Russia is a threat, that Iran is a threat, that radical Islam is a threat, that Pakistani instability is a threat, but the world seems to be pretty resigned to these threats.
I suggest you get your eyes checked. You appear to have only one working eye.

I imagine it was similar in the 1930s. "But they, the Hitler guy just talks, it's a stuff he needs to say to keep his approval ratings high. Oh yes, he's not nice at the Jews, but that's not really our problem. So what that he annexed Austria? They were Germans too and they welcomed the Anschluss, so what can we do? Czechoslovakia - what the heck is that? If the Germans want to be part of Germany, they have a right to that, self-determination, remember?"
Unfortunately, that's exactly what people thought. Including many Germans. But heads of state should know better.

There is a reason for the Godwin law - comparisons with pre-WW2 appeasement are so fitting because the world has obviously failed to learn its lessons from it.
Actually, I think the world has gone overboard. Mention negotiation nowadays, you're automatically an 'appeaser.' Like appeasement is always a bad thing, anyway. It's a useful tool of state. You just have to know when to use it, and when not to.
 
Actually, I think the world has gone overboard. Mention negotiation nowadays, you're automatically an 'appeaser.' Like appeasement is always a bad thing, anyway. It's a useful tool of state. You just have to know when to use it, and when not to.

Definitely. That's why I argue for negotiations most of the time. The problem is that negotiations shouldn't be a synonym for "total surrender to enemy's demands", in which case the term "appeaser" becomes proper.

For example, if the only outcome of the talks with Russia about it's aggression in Georgia is "OK, keep what you conquered and we'll forget about it", it's appeasement.

The most important lesson we should have learned is that caving in to the aggressor will only make him more aggressive.
 
Definitely. That's why I argue for negotiations most of the time. The problem is that negotiations shouldn't be a synonym for "total surrender to enemy's demands", in which case the term "appeaser" becomes proper.

For example, if the only outcome of the talks with Russia about it's aggression in Georgia is "OK, keep what you conquered and we'll forget about it", it's appeasement.

The most important lesson we should have learned is that caving in to the aggressor will only make him more aggressive.
The problem in the Georgian case is ability. The EU can't do a damn thing to stop Russia, and Russia knows it. Likewise, Russia can't risk a confrontation in the West, so they're just posturing. That's not really appeasement, that's just old school great power politics. But theoretically, I agree with you.
 
The problem in the Georgian case is ability. The EU can't do a damn thing to stop Russia, and Russia knows it. Likewise, Russia can't risk a confrontation in the West, so they're just posturing. That's not really appeasement, that's just old school great power politics. But theoretically, I agree with you.

EU is in a much stronger position than Britain/France were vis-a-vis Germany in 1938 or 1939. Economically speaking, EU could ruin Russia in a matter of year of sanctions.

It will obviously not do it, but not because it can't. This is why we can say EU's or American actions are bordering on appeasement.
 
Screw Czechoslovakia, the people should have seen a war on their own borders brewing. Whenever the Germans get uppity, they invade France. Just a matter of time now, too.

I guess that for their next go at it they'll ally with the russians first, and try to remain allied. So you know what to watch for!
They must have learned something from the previous two attempts, right? :D
 
I guess that for their next go at it they'll ally with the russians first, and try to remain allied. So you know what to watch for!
They must have learned something from the previous two attempts, right? :D
One truism about the Germans: they never learn something from failures. :p
 
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