lovett
Deity
- Joined
- Sep 21, 2007
- Messages
- 2,570
That sort of indirect judgement about benefit, with hindsight, is not at all what we should be measuring when we consider the costs and benefits of a crime.
The benefit is what the criminal would have had to pay (or give up, in time perhaps) for the education, which we can call what the state has to pay above its incarceration costs. Further benefits are entirely dependent on the criminal's subsequent actions, and therefore not a consequence of the crime.
I find it rather disingenuous to misinterpret my meaning in this way.
We could, for example, say that because the criminal is subsequently hunted down and beaten by an enraged victim his crime hasn't benefitted him. But actually, he still got the pleasure or money. He has simply also been the victim of another crime.
If you won't allow me to split lives into separate actions then I see no need for any sort of justice system except to judge people once they're dead.
I'm not sure that the divisions you are making are valid. That is to say, I don't see why you are considering one part of a directly predictable causal chain, but not the rest.
When considering rehabilitation we are not considering indirect benefits in hindsight. We are using foresight; we're are trying to predict the affect of a program on a convicts subsequent actions. The very thing in question are those subsequent actions, and we want to ensure those actions are broadly benign. There is a direct causal chain here:
1) Perpetrator commits a crime.
Which has the effect:
2) Perpetrator get's convicted and sentenced.
Which has the effect:
3) Perpetrator serves his sentence
Which, if said sentence is rehabilitative in nature (and works) has the effect:
4) Perpetrators acts differently.
which has the effect:
5) Society and the perpetrator benefit.
We can see that event 1 has caused event 5; the perpetrator has benefited from his crime. And the crucially relevant thing here is the role of sentencing in this causal chain. The entire point of a rehabilitative sentence is that the perpetrator act differently in future, and this is inextricably linked with the perpetrator benefiting from his crime. That's why this reasoning doesn't imply we have to have some power of omniscience ( or hindsight) before judgment; the perpetrator benefiting is directly predictable.
It seems to me that you want to say that we should treat 4 and 5 as a completely separate causal chain. That when sentencing we should only consider a time frame encapsulating 1, 2 and 3. I don't think this division is valid precisely because 4 and 5 are directly dependent 2. And dependent in a predictable and solid way. The intention at 2 was to cause 5.
This leads to the dilemma my hypothetical was meant to expose. We could consider sentencing as a moral 'turning point'. What we do here is morally right or morally wrong. If we think that a perpetrator should never benefit from his crime, we can't bestow a rehabilitative sentence at 2. Because it is quite clear that so doing will change the perpetrators patterns of action such that he benefits; it will lead to effect '5'. That means that in the former hypothetical we would prefer the punitive sentence in which the perpetrator is not rehabilitated, and continues to behave criminally and both he and society suffer.
The problem here is that if justice means 'everyone gets what they deserve' we have a situation in which the people as a whole (I.e society) are suffering undeservedly. We have not achieved just outcomes, and certainly have not achieved socially optimal outcomes. By imposing a punitive sentence at 2 we have acted 'unjustly', because the entirely predictable outcome of our sentence is that society suffers; someone gets undeservedly bad results.
That's why I'd contend that considering 1,2 and 3 alone is insufficient. That to achieve a just outcome (and isn't this what we want?) we must consider 4 and 5. Consequently a rehabilitative sentence is desirable.
As a brief aside, I'm not sure how you would go about defining 'benefit' in your example. The entire usage of a rehabilitative sentence using education seems to presuppose that the criminal would not himself have chosen to become more educated. The criminal does not see education as inherently valuable; he does not see it as a benefit. He does not enjoy it in itself - it has no intrinsic benefit to him.So we couldn't declare it a benefit without appealing to the effects of education (vis a vis future earning etc), because in a very real way it isn't beneficial otherwise. And thus one really does accept that the wider causal affect of a sentence are important; including those on society. And unless we call it a benefit we can't justify a presumption against education being part of sentencing. This seems to lead to something a catch 22; to call education unjust because it's beneficial we have to we have to accept that our conception of justice includes events past prison. And by so doing we are lead to the conclusion that education is just because it's beneficial.