[RD] Russia Invades Ukraine: Eight

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Numbers may be higher than real losses, to what point I don't know, but those reports number variations usually match the numbers of visually confirmed losses variation.

That's the deadliest day of the war so far.
 
May be the deadliest week.

Summary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (from November 23 to November 29, 2024)​


From November 23 to 29, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carried out a massive and 32 group strikes with high-precision air, sea, land-based weapons and strike unmanned aerial vehicles on energy facilities that support the operation of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine, industrial enterprises producing strategic military products, as well as the infrastructure of military airfields, assembly and storage sites for unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned boats, arsenals, ammunition depots, deployment sites of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, foreign instructors, technical specialists and mercenaries.

In addition, two launchers with experimental Grom-2 ballistic missiles were destroyed, as well as a launcher and a transport-loading vehicle of the Ukrainian anti-ship complex Neptune. All targets of the high-precision strikes were achieved.

During the week, units of the North group of forces continued to destroy formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region. Air strikes, unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery fire damaged the manpower and equipment of two tank, five mechanized, two airborne assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a marine brigade and four territorial defense brigades. In the Kharkov direction, units of a mechanized, motorized infantry, two airborne assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a territorial defense brigade and a border detachment of the Border Service of Ukraine were defeated.

Over the course of a week, in the area of responsibility of the North force group, the enemy's losses amounted to 2,420 servicemen, 10 tanks, 32 armored combat vehicles, including a US-made Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, two German-made Marder armored vehicles and a German-made Fuchs armored personnel carrier, 105 vehicles, three HIMARS multiple launch rocket system launchers and two US-made MLRS, as well as 20 field artillery guns.

As a result of active operations, units of the "West" force group liberated the settlement of Kopanki in the Kharkiv region. The manpower and equipment of five mechanized, airborne brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a marine brigade, two territorial defense brigades and a national guard brigade were defeated. 28 counterattacks by assault groups of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were repelled.

The enemy lost more than 3,150 servicemen, two tanks, 13 combat armored vehicles, including three M113 armored personnel carriers made in the United States, 28 vehicles and 18 field artillery pieces, including six 155 mm howitzers made by NATO countries. Ten electronic warfare stations and 21 field ammunition depots were destroyed.

The units of the Southern Group of Forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions, defeated the formations of four mechanized, motorized infantry, mountain assault, two airmobile, airborne assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a marine brigade and a territorial defense brigade. They repelled eight counterattacks by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The enemy's losses amounted to over 2,790 servicemen, five combat armored vehicles, 19 automobiles, 10 field artillery guns, eight of which were of Western manufacture. Eight field ammunition depots were destroyed.

Units of the "Center" group of forces, as a result of decisive actions, liberated the settlements of Novaya Ilyinka and Vorovskoye of the Donetsk People's Republic. The manpower and equipment of seven mechanized, infantry, two ranger brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a marine brigade, three territorial defense brigades and a national guard brigade were defeated. 53 enemy counterattacks were repelled.

Over the course of a week, the losses of Ukrainian armed forces in this area amounted to over 2,910 servicemen, two tanks, seven armored combat vehicles, 31 vehicles, and 27 field artillery pieces.

Units of the "East" group of forces, as a result of active actions, liberated the settlement of Razdolnoye of the Donetsk People's Republic. Formations of two mechanized, mountain assault, artillery brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and six territorial defense brigades were defeated. Eight counterattacks of assault groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were repelled.

The enemy lost up to 960 troops, six tanks, including two Leopards made in Germany, four armored combat vehicles, 25 cars and 14 field artillery pieces.

Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated the manpower and equipment of two mechanized, infantry brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, four territorial defense brigades and a national guard brigade. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 390 servicemen, 23 vehicles, five field artillery guns, including three 155 mm M777 howitzers made in the USA.

Over the course of a week, 34 Ukrainian servicemen were taken prisoner on the contact line, of which 17 surrendered in the Kursk direction.

Air defense systems shot down a long-range Neptune guided missile, ten US-made ATACMS operational-tactical missiles, 15 French-made Hammer guided air bombs, a US-made JDAM, two US-made HIMARS rockets, and 353 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles.
 

Lots of people were proposing ceasefires, he said, but without a mechanism to prevent Russia from attacking again, ceasefires were simply too dangerous.

Only NATO membership, he said, could offer that kind of guarantee.

The Ukrainian president has already said that he thinks the war could end in the coming year if Ukraine’s allies show sufficient resolve.

Reports suggest that discussion of the so-called West German model (NATO membership offered to a divided country) has been going on in Western circles for more than a year.

But no formal proposals have yet been made.
 
Moderator Action: Perhaps we need a break from this for a couple of days. Closed for now.
 
Now open.
 
Story on the internet about North Korean elite forces taking a village in the Kursk region and killing many Ukrainians. Is it true? If true, does it demonstrate the strong combat ability of North Korean infantry, or the weak ability of the Russians?
 
Village to the south of Sudzha was indeed liberated. Don't know about North Koreans, might be just Asian-looking soldiers which used to be "Buryats" in Ukrainian reporting, now may become "North Koreans".
 

One Of Ukraine’s Sport Plane Strike Drones Flew Right Over Someone’s Head To Blow Up A Police Base In Grozny​

One of Ukraine’s far-flying sport plane drones struck what may have been a Russian special police base in Grozny, around 600 miles from the front line in Ukraine, on or just before Sunday.

It was the latest in a series of long-range strikes by Ukrainian-made Aeroprakt A-22 propeller-drive sport planes that the Main Intelligence Directorate in Kyiv has modified into one-way attack drones since early this year.

Ranging as far as 800 miles with extra internal fuel in addition to their remote guidance systems and explosive payloads, the $90,000 A-22s have struck—among other targets—a drone factory, a missile research facility and a naval base crowded with warships.

The Grozny raid, which at least two people recorded on their smartphones—one from just feet away—revealed some new details about the improvised attack drone, one of several deep-strike weapons that Ukrainian forces have developed in the 34 months since Russia widened its war on Ukraine,

For one, the drone that struck the purported police base appeared to feature opaque plugs covering the normally transparent glazing around the 1,300-pound A-22’s cockpit, which can accommodate two people in its manned configuration.

It’s also possible the drone once had a registration number on its tail. One of the videos of the Sunday strike seems to depict a patch of paint over the number. That might indicate that the intelligence directorate is sourcing used A-22s for its drone program rather than taking all the airframes directly from the Aeroprakt factory in Kyiv.

The hit on the apparent police base, which may support the violent occupation of eastern and southern Ukraine, produced a billowing fireball, but didn’t produce the avalanche of debris one might expect from a purpose-made deep-strike munition such as a British-built Storm Shadow cruise missile.

Where a Storm Shadow boasts a tandem warhead—one to open a gap in the target, a second to explode inside—the A-22 appears to carry a simpler unitary warhead. Moreover, a Storm Shadow or similar missile travels at 600 miles per hour, lending it greater penetrative power. By contrast, an A-22—which sacrifices speed for range—maxes out at around 125 miles per hour.

A lack of penetration might not matter as long as the target is flimsy. It certainly does matter when the target is armored or underground.

That explains why Ukraine continues to strike softer but more distant targets with its sport plane drones while aiming its Storm Shadows and similar SCALP-EG and Neptune cruise missiles at harder and closer targets such as buried command bunkers.
 

Keep Ukraine Out of Talks to End Its War​

The Trump administration needs to engage Moscow and avoid, at first, involving Kyiv.

The incoming Trump administration seems genuinely committed to finding peace in Ukraine. Whether it’s capable of the extremely complicated diplomacy required is a very different question. One issue that will have to be decided at the very start of the process is at what stage, and on what issues, Ukraine should be involved in the process. The issue is more fraught than has generally been acknowledged.

The first and most fundamental goal of the talks (as in all such negotiations) will be for each side to clearly establish, on the one hand, its vital interests and absolute and nonnegotiable conditions and, on the other hand, what points it is prepared, in principle, to compromise on. It may be, of course, that the nonnegotiable positions of the three sides are fundamentally opposed and incompatible. If so, peace negotiations will inevitably fail, but we will not know this until these issues have been explored.

The three parties involved are Ukraine, Russia and the United States. The initial stages of the negotiations, however, should be between the United States and Russia. It goes without saying that certain aspects of an eventual agreement will require Ukraine’s full assent, and that without this assent a settlement isn’t possible. These aspects include the terms of a ceasefire, the nature and extent of any demilitarized zones, and any constitutional amendments guaranteeing the linguistic and cultural rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine. U.S. negotiators will have to be fully cognizant and respectful of Kyiv’s views on Ukraine’s vital interests.

Given certain categorical—and entirely legitimate—Ukrainian positions, a number of key issues seem to be a priori off the table, and if Russia insists on them, no agreement will be possible. The most important initial task of Gen. Kellogg and his team will therefore be to discover whether the Russian government regards these conditions as nonnegotiable, or whether Moscow is prepared to compromise on them if the Trump administration is prepared to compromise on wider issues.

The first nonnegotiable issue from Ukraine’s and the U.S.’ point of view is Ukrainian and Western legal recognition of Russia’s claimed annexations, as opposed to an acceptance of the fact (already accepted in public by President Zelenskyy) that Ukraine cannot recover these territories on the battlefield and therefore has to accept the reality of Russian possession, pending future negotiations.

Russian experts have suggested to me that Moscow will not, in fact, insist on this in talks, because in addition to Ukraine and the West, China, India, and other key Russian partners would also refuse the very suggestion. They said that Moscow hopes for a situation like that on the island of Cyprus, where no country but Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but talks have lasted 50 years with no result.

The second nonnegotiable issue is Putin’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the territory it still holds in the four provinces of Ukraine that Russia claims to have annexed. This is absolutely unacceptable to Kyiv, and should be to Washington, too. Ukraine should not be encouraged and helped by Washington to batter itself to pieces in a hopeless effort to drive Russia from the territory it controls, but it cannot be asked by Washington to give up more territory without a fight. The Ukrainian government will doubtless make this clear to the Trump administration, and its view must be accepted as definitive by the United States as well.

However, certain other basic questions are not up to Ukraine to decide. They are chiefly up to the United States, and it is the U.S. administration that will have to negotiate them. Central Russian proposals in the ultimatum issued before the war were for new agreements with the United States and NATO not relating to Ukraine.

Today, key aspects of the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian armed forces depend on the United States, since it is only the United States that can provide Ukraine with long-range missiles and the intelligence to guide them. The question of which Western sanctions to lift or suspend as part of a deal with Moscow is also up to the United States and EU.

Ukraine can, of course, ask to join NATO, but the decision of whether to accept a new member lies not with that country but with the existing members—and each of them has a veto on the issue. A U.S. administration could take the lead, but it will be up to Washington to decide how much influence to use with, and pressure to put on, other members, and it cannot simply override the likely vetoes of Hungary and Turkey—or perhaps of France, if Marine Le Pen is the next president.

The question of what Western security guarantees can and should be given to Ukraine as part of a settlement is also not up to Ukraine to answer. President Zelenskyy has suggested the deployment of troops from European NATO members, which has been echoed by certain Western officials and commentators and is reportedly being discussed between President Macron of France and the Polish government.

However, everything that I have heard from Russians tells me that this is just as unacceptable to Moscow as NATO membership itself and would therefore make agreement impossible. Moreover, European countries would agree to send their troops only if they had an ironclad guarantee from Washington that the United States would intervene if they were attacked. This, in effect, punts the decision back to Washington—not Kyiv, and not Brussels, Warsaw or Paris.

Above all, Russia’s motives for launching this war extend beyond Ukraine to the whole security relationship between Russia and the West, led by the United States. They include the demand for military force restrictions (which would have to be reciprocated on the Russian side) and some form of European security architecture in which vital Russian interests would be taken into account and future clashes avoided.

It may be that either the Putin administration or the Trump administration—or both—will refuse to compromise and that talks will accordingly collapse. Testing this, however, will be an extremely complex and difficult process, requiring patience and diplomatic sophistication on both sides. It would be extremely foolish to expect either Russia or the United States to put all their cards on the table at once.

Because this process will be so difficult, the sad but unavoidable truth may be that if Ukraine takes part in the talks from the start, progress toward a settlement will become completely impossible. Every prospective compromise will immediately be leaked and will cause a firestorm of protest in Europe, in Ukraine, in the U.S. Congress, in the U.S. media, and perhaps even from Russian hardliners.

The United States has been the essential and irreplaceable supporter of Ukraine in this war, not only because of the aid that it has given but because European countries would not have given their aid without U.S. encouragement and backing. American citizens have, in consequence, been faced with great costs and considerable risks, and wider U.S. interests have been endangered. This gives U.S. citizens the right to expect their government to take the lead in trying to negotiate an end to the Ukraine war—especially since it is the only government that can.

 
Today, key aspects of the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian armed forces depend on the United States, since it is only the United States that can provide Ukraine with long-range missiles and the intelligence to guide them.
wrong

 
lol
 
But Trump promised to end the war in 24 hours!
 
But Trump promised to end the war in 24 hours!
Maybe he'll achieve it by keeping both Ukraine and Russia out of the peace talks, just talking to himself.
 
But Trump promised to end the war in 24 hours!

What are the odds, that Trump imagines that he can pressure Putin into a peace deal by threating to equip Ukraine with 'incredible, fantastic US-made weapons', just like he would simultaneously threaten Zelensky with no future US military aid, should he reject Trump's peace deal proposal?
 
But Trump promised to end the war in 24 hours!
Judging by the situation on the frontline and desertion rates in Ukrainian army, he would save Ukraine if he could keep his promise :)

And there are reports from Ukrainian sources that desertion rate has doubled last month.
 
But Trump promised to end the war in 24 hours!
And that he would do so before even taking office!
What are the odds, that Trump imagines that he can pressure Putin into a peace deal by threating to equip Ukraine with 'incredible, fantastic US-made weapons', just like he would simultaneously threaten Zelensky with no future US military aid, should he reject Trump's peace deal proposal?
Trump has stated outright that he won't commit to abandoning Ukraine, because he believes, likely correctly, that continuing to support Ukraine is the only way to maintain any leverage on Russia to be used to pressure an end to the war.

Zelensky already knows that if the US withdraws aid Ukraine will fall. Putin is also aware that Russia can't overrun Ukraine as long as the US keeps arming/aiding them...

The other variable is the EU/UK suddenly stepping in to fill the void left by the US... which is being actively discussed, but seems unlikely to happen.
 

Top Russian general accused by Kyiv of chemical weapons crimes is killed by bomb in Moscow​

A top Russian general accused by Ukraine of being responsible for the use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian troops has been assassinated in Moscow using a bomb hidden in an electric scooter, Russian investigators said on Tuesday.

Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, who was chief of Russia's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops, was killed outside an apartment building on Ryazansky Prospekt along with his assistant, Russia's Investigative Committee, which probes serious crimes, said in a statement.


https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...osion-moscow-russian-media-report-2024-12-17/
 
Story on the internet about North Korean elite forces taking a village in the Kursk region and killing many Ukrainians. Is it true? If true, does it demonstrate the strong combat ability of North Korean infantry, or the weak ability of the Russians?

not surprising, there are different reports depending on the source.

Now, it could also be buryats, or any other asian ethnic minority that are the most expendable/untrained soldiers Russia can sent for meat grinding assaults. But the Ukrainian were surprised.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/16/north-korea-casualties-ukraine-russia/

The White House has assessed that North Korean soldiers have moved “to the front lines … to be actively engaged in combat operations,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Monday.

[...]

The Ukrainians knew the troops moving across battlefields in Kursk weren’t Russians because the groups were too large, soldiers said. Russian troops typically move in smaller formations and stick close to tree lines to reduce their chances of being struck by Ukrainian firepower. But these troops, seemingly unafraid of enemy weapons hovering just overhead, moved in the open.

“The North Koreans are running across the fields, and there are so many of them. They don’t understand what’s happening,” said a Ukrainian drone unit commander deployed to Kursk who goes by the call sign Boxer. “I don’t know if they don’t understand what’s going on or if the Russians are deliberately sending them like that. I can’t say.”

The commander, who spoke on the condition that he be identified only by his call sign to discuss operations openly, said the assault began Saturday. The next day, more troops moved in the same way.

“FPV drones, artillery and other weapons struck them because they were moving in the open field. You can imagine the result,” he said. “We were very surprised, we had never seen anything like it — 40 to 50 people running across a field. That’s a perfect target for artillery and Mavic [drone] operators. Russians never ran like that.”

[...]

“Immediately, FPV drones, bombers — everything that could fly — was sent their way,” he said. The troops didn’t run from drones, instead “shooting at them.”

Others “just keep moving, and many of them are killed,” he said. “They’re different from the Russians, who have learned to run or hide from drones, only shooting at them from cover. The [North] Koreans just shoot indiscriminately, standing there firing.”

In one attack, Artem was flying a drone at night when he identified three soldiers by their heat signatures on a thermal camera. He and his fellow troops expected to kill just one — but because the other two didn’t respond quickly, they hit all three.

“It was a bizarre experience. For me, it was the first time it felt like playing a computer simulator on easy mode,” he said.

[...]

In one video shared to Telegram and reviewed by The Post, Russians and a North Korean soldier appear to sit in a military dugout describing a drone attack. “Maybe we should kill him and grab his rifle?” one soldier says in Russian and laughs.

Then, a soldier speaking in a North Korean dialect begins to discuss the attack. “The drone, the drone just keeps on flying!” one says. Then the two soldiers mimic drone noises to each other. “That’s right — like BAM BAAAAM!” the soldier says. The Post was not able to verify the precise location where the video was filmed.
 
The question of what Western security guarantees can for military force restrictions (which would have to be reciprocated on the Russian side) and some form of European security architecture in which vital Russian interests would be taken into account and future clashes avoided.
"Western" means European Union and United States, right? Can't just negotiate with the US.

"Security architecture" is an euphemism for which countries the US and Europe allows Russia to subjugate as vassal states, both politically and economically. Nothing to do with how many troops on each side of the border.

It's the EU that "messes" with Russia's vassals, not the US, right?
 
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