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tl;dr summary: a team of scientists in the Netherlands created a strain of H5N1 influenza virus (which has an average 60% mortality rate among humans, comparable to Ebola) that spreads just as easily as normal seasonal flu. Apparently it wasn't even hard. They used the new dangerous virus for testing on lab animals to determine how easy it is for H5N1 to mutate into a pandemic form.
Article 1:
Article 2 (a better one):
Questions for discussion:
1) Should such research be even done? In civilian facilities? With a rather minimum security? What if some nutjobs broke in, stole samples of the virus, or the infected animals, and used it as a doomsday bio-weapon?
2) If it's so easy to recombine influenza strains in order to create deadly forms of it, how come no terrorist group has done it yet? Are the jihadist too stupid to do this, or do they just need more time?
3) Has this story been hyped (oh yes).
4) What preparations have you made, if any, to survive the inevitable "big" influenza pandemic that will kill hundreds of millions of people worldwide and bring our civilization near collapse? (loaded question, I know)
Article 1:
Spoiler :
Deadly man-made strain of H5N1 bird flu virus raises controversy
A group of scientists are trying to publish a paper on how they created a new flu virus that could wipe out all humanity. The study that produced the virus is the subject of raging controversy, with some scientists saying it should never have been done.
Concern about the threat of the virus is heightened by the realization of the damage it could do if it is accidentally released from the laboratory or it gets into the hands of people who may want to use it for mischievous purposes.
The research study has raised a debate on the limits of scientific freedom, especially in cases of "dual-use research," that is, studies with potential public health benefit but which could also be adapted for mischief, such as bio-warfare.
Daily Mail reports the new deadly virus is the genetically modified version of H5N1 bird flu virus. The new virus, however, is much more infectious than the original H5N1 strain, and if accidentally released could spread across the globe in a short time.
According to Science Insider, the study that led to creation of the virus was an international research project to understand the avian flu virus better.
Virologist Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center, Netherlands, led the team of scientists who discovered that only five mutations to the H5N1 bird flu strain could turn it to a deadly virus that can cause a pandemic. Ron Fouchier and his group conducted tests of virulence of the strain on ferrets, which are often used in influenza research because they have respiratory systems similar to the human.
Another group of virologists working on the same virus at the University of Wisconsin in collaboration with others at the University of Tokyo arrived at result similar to Fouchier's.
The international effort really was designed to answer a question that has caused flu virus experts sleepless nights: Has H5N1 any potential to trigger a pandemic? The question came up after the virus decimated poultry flocks on three continents but caused only a few deaths among humans. Some scientists had argued that the virus is unable to trigger a pandemic because adapting to a human host will affect its ability to reproduce. Fouchier now says the result of their study has shown that the opinion that H5N1 cannot cause a pandemic is wrong.
When some of Fouchier's colleagues heard of the work, a debate arose whether such research work should have been done in the first place. According to Science Insider, Richard Ebright, Molecular biologist at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersy, said the work should never have been done. He said:
"The creation of a pandemic virus has been the classical example of dual-use research concern the past decade...It's remarkable that the NSABB is discussing it in 2011."
Fouchier defends himself, saying that he consulted widely before submitting his paper. But his critics counter, saying he consulted too late because by the time he was consulting his study had already been done and the dangerous virus had already been created.
According to Mark Wheelis of the University of California, Fouchier's work is a good example of, "the need for a robust and independent system of PRIOR review and approval of potentially dangerous experiments...Blocking publication may provide some small increment of safety, but it will be very modest compared to the benefits of not doing the work in the first place."
According to Daily Mail, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is reviewing the papers written by Fouchier's team and the Wisconsin-Tokyo team. NSABB, being an advisory board, is not empowered to stop the scientists from publishing but most other researchers in the field are convinced that the research paper should not be published and that the result should be suppressed altogether.
Chairman of NSABB Paul Keim, according to Science Insider, says the group will issue a statement on the matter very soon and will make recommendations about similar research in the future. Keim said:
"We'll have a lot to say [in our report and recommendations]...I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one...I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."
Paul Kleim agrees that Fouchier's work highlights the need for upfront review of dual-use studies before they begin. Keim said:
"The process of identifying dual use of concern is something that should start at the very first glimmer of an experiment...You shouldn't wait until you have submitted a paper before you decide it's dangerous. Scientists and institutions and funding agencies should be looking at this. The journals and the journals' reviewers should be the last resort."
Science Insider reports, however, that NSABB had advised against mandatory reviews of such studies in 2007 because most countries don't have the necessary formal mechanism to review studies before they start.
In spite of the concerns about the creation of the deadly virus, some experts say the work is of significant application in medicine. According to Michael Osterhol, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota,
"These studies are very important..[the researchers] have the full support of the influenza community...because there are potential benefits for public health. For instance, the results show that those downplaying the risks of an H5N1 pandemic should think again."
Michael Osterholm says a compromise could be to publish only a part of the entire work with some part reserved only for those who must know. According to Osterholm, caution is essential in the situation because,
"We don't want to give bad guys a road map on how to make bad bugs really bad."
Source
Article 2 (a better one):
Spoiler :
Scientists Brace for Media Storm Around Controversial Flu Studies
ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS—Locked up in the bowels of the medical faculty building here and accessible to only a handful of scientists lies a man-made flu virus that could change world history if it were ever set free.
The virus is an H5N1 avian influenza strain that has been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets, the animals that most closely mimic the human response to flu. Scientists believe it's likely that the pathogen, if it emerged in nature or were released, would trigger an influenza pandemic, quite possibly with many millions of deaths.
In a 17th floor office in the same building, virologist Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center calmly explains why his team created what he says is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make"—and why he wants to publish a paper describing how they did it. Fouchier is also bracing for a media storm. After he talked to ScienceInsider yesterday, he had an appointment with an institutional press officer to chart a communication strategy.
Fouchier's paper is one of two studies that have triggered an intense debate about the limits of scientific freedom and that could portend changes in the way U.S. researchers handle so-called dual-use research: studies that have a potential public health benefit but could also be useful for nefarious purposes like biowarfare or bioterrorism.
The other study—also on H5N1, and with comparable results—was done by a team led by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the University of Tokyo, several scientists told ScienceInsider. (Kawaoka did not respond to interview requests.) Both studies have been submitted for publication, and both are currently under review by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which on a few previous occasions has been asked by scientists or journals to review papers that caused worries.
NSABB chair Paul Keim, a microbial geneticist, says he cannot discuss specific studies but confirms that the board has "worked very hard and very intensely for several weeks on studies about H5N1 transmissibility in mammals." The group plans to issue a public statement soon, says Keim, and is likely to issue additional recommendations about this type of research. "We'll have a lot to say," he says.
"I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one," adds Keim, who has worked on anthrax for many years. "I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."
Some scientists say that's reason enough not to do such research. The virus could escape from the lab, or bioterrorists or rogue nations could use the published results to fashion a bioweapon with the potential for mass destruction, they say. "This work should never have been done," says Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute who has a strong interest in biosecurity issues.
The research by the Kawaoka and Fouchier teams set out to answer a question that has long puzzled scientists: Does H5N1, which rarely causes human disease, have the potential to trigger a pandemic? The virus has decimated poultry flocks on three continents but has caused fewer than 600 known cases of flu in humans since it emerged in Asia in 1997, although those rare human cases are often fatal. Because the virus spreads very inefficiently between humans it has been unable to set off a chain reaction and circle the globe.
Some scientists think the virus is probably unable to trigger a pandemic, because adapting to a human host would likely make it unable to reproduce. Some also believe the virus would need to reshuffle its genes with a human strain, a process called reassortment, that some believe is most likely to occur in pigs, which host both human and avian strains. Based on past experience, some scientists have also argued that flu pandemics can only be caused by H1, H2, and H3 viruses, which have been replaced by each other in the human population every so many decades—but not by H5.
Fouchier says his study shows all of that to be wrong.
Although he declined to discuss details of the research because the paper is still under review, Fouchier confirmed the details given in news stories in New Scientist and Scientific American about a September meeting in Malta where he first presented the study. Those stories describe how Fouchier initially tried to make the virus more transmissible by making specific changes to its genome, using a process called reverse genetics; when that failed, he passed the virus from one ferret to another multiple times, a low-tech and time-honored method of making a pathogen adapt to a new host.
After 10 generations, the virus had become "airborne": Healthy ferrets became infected simply by being housed in a cage next to a sick one. The airborne strain had five mutations in two genes, each of which have already been found in nature, Fouchier says; just never all at once in the same strain.
Ferrets aren't humans, but in studies to date, any influenza strain that has been able to pass among ferrets has also been transmissible among humans, and vice versa, says Fouchier: "That could be different this time, but I wouldn't bet any money on it."
The specter of an H5N1 pandemic keeps flu scientists up at night because of the virus's power to kill. Of the known cases so far, more than half were fatal. The real case-fatality rate is probably lower because an unknown number of milder cases are never diagnosed and reported, but scientists agree that the virus is vicious. Based on Fouchier's talk in Malta, New Scientist reported that the strain created by the Rotterdam team is just as lethal to ferrets as the original one.
"These studies are very important," says biodefense and flu expert Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. The researchers "have the full support of the influenza community," Osterholm says, because there are potential benefits for public health. For instance, the results show that those downplaying the risks of an H5N1 pandemic should think again, he says.
Knowing the exact mutations that make the virus transmissible also enables scientists to look for them in the field and take more aggressive control measures when one or more show up, adds Fouchier. The study also enables researchers to test whether H5N1 vaccines and antiviral drugs would work against the new strain.
Fouchier says he consulted widely within the Netherlands before submitting his manuscript for publication. The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), which funded the work, has agreed to the publication, says Fouchier, including officials at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. (NIH declined to answer questions for this story.) Now, Fouchier is eagerly waiting for NSABB's judgment.
Osterholm says he can't discuss details of the papers because he's an NSABB member. But he says it should be possible to omit certain key details from controversial papers and make them available to people who really need to know. "We don't want to give bad guys a road map on how to make bad bugs really bad," he says.
But some scientists say the board's debate comes far too late, because the studies have been done and the papers are written. "This is a good example of the need for a robust and independent system of PRIOR review and approval of potentially dangerous experiments," retired arms control researcher Mark Wheelis of the University of California, Davis, wrote to ScienceInsider in an e-mail. "Blocking publication may provide some small increment of safety, but it will be very modest compared to the benefits of not doing the work in the first place."
Scientists have long discussed whether to have mandatory reviews of dual-use studies before they begin, and given the global risks, some have even argued for some international risk assessment system for pandemic viruses. For instance, a proposal by four researchers from the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland would have classified Fouchier's work as an "activity of extreme concern" that would have required international pre-approval.
But NSABB advised against such mandatory systems in 2007, and most countries don't have formal mechanisms in place to review studies before they start. (In the United States, it's "recommended" that researchers ask an institutional review board for advice if they think a study raises concerns.) Fouchier's study was greenlighted in advance by the Dutch Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), but that only means the panel is satisfied with safety procedures at Fouchier's lab, explains chair Bastiaan Zoeteman; it's not COGEM's job to decide whether a study is desirable. NIH didn't give the funding proposal a special review either, says Fouchier.
"The creation of a pandemic virus has been the classical example of dual-use research of concern the past decade," says Ebright. "It's remarkable that the NSABB is discussing it in 2011."
Keim agrees about the need for reviews up front. "The process of identifying dual use of concern is something that should start at the very first glimmer of an experiment," he says. "You shouldn't wait until you have submitted a paper before you decide it's dangerous. Scientists and institutions and funding agencies should be looking at this. The journals and the journals' reviewers should be the last resort."
NSABB does not have the power to prevent the publication of papers, but it could ask journals not to publish. Even Ebright, however, says he's against efforts to ban the publication of the studies now that they have been done. "You cannot post hoc suppress work that was done and completed in a nonclassified context," he says. "The scientific community would not stand for that."
Questions for discussion:
1) Should such research be even done? In civilian facilities? With a rather minimum security? What if some nutjobs broke in, stole samples of the virus, or the infected animals, and used it as a doomsday bio-weapon?
2) If it's so easy to recombine influenza strains in order to create deadly forms of it, how come no terrorist group has done it yet? Are the jihadist too stupid to do this, or do they just need more time?
3) Has this story been hyped (oh yes).
4) What preparations have you made, if any, to survive the inevitable "big" influenza pandemic that will kill hundreds of millions of people worldwide and bring our civilization near collapse? (loaded question, I know)
Exactly. But look beyond the hype. 
where does the 60% mortality come from? Not from the articles I am sure. The second one even specifically states that the original strain had likely a lower mortality rate since only the severe cases were ever reported and the new strain while as lethal to ferrets doesn't even state how lethal it is to these animals.
