While this does encourage China to develop its own alternatives to western products, I don't see it being in any way a net positive for China. Even if the alternatives were to become popular in China - and some, such as Baidu for search, already are - it would be a much more difficult battle internationally, and there is a lot of export market share to be lost. And the precedent for success internationally is hard to find - off the top of my head, the only example that comes to mind as developed in China and popular internationally is TikTok. Maybe there's a Tencent program or two that counts as well, but if you exclude Tencent/Alibaba acquisitions, there's not a lot. Hardware-wise, the chances may be better. But there was already the chance to use domestic Chinese semiconductor chips in preference to ARM/Intel/MIPS based designs. This adds a little incentive to do that more, but again doesn't have much impact on the chances of that hardware succeeding internationally. As for myself, I agree with Perfection. I'd be suspicious of any Chinese phone given their government's proclivity towards surveillance, but Huawei has had a disproportionate amount of smoke around them, and their network hardware only raises the concerns. On the network hardware side, I think it makes a lot of geopolitical sense that the U.S. is pushing NATO allies to not use Huawei equipment to build out their networks - it's kind of like asking NATO allies in the Cold War not to build out their TV or radio networks with Soviet equipment, if the USSR had been more export-oriented. Even if the current software on the routers is perfectly harmless, what's to prevent Huawei from pushing out a malicious, spying, or censorship-inducing update at the request of the Chinese government? This also gets back to the reason why, although I'm very much anti-Trump, I'm somewhat supportive of the trade war with China. There's the Huawei-based network buildouts. And the espionage, both domestically (surveillance state), industrial (stealing trade secrets), and quite possibly diplomatically (what Takhisis mentioned, which I have not read as much about... but there's certainly a lot of favor-currying going on with infrastructure build-out in developing countries). And finally, last but not least, the required technology transfers. Essentially, saying that if you want to do business in China, you have to share your trade secrets with a local Chinese firm. This isn't just the things that are actually required to do the job - e.g. you need a certain amount of knowledge to set up a factory to make something - but the crown jewels themselves. Usually, a few years down the line, you wind up with a suspiciously similar domestic Chinese competitor, which usually also has preferential status from the government. If China were ideologically similar to the U.S., perhaps you could turn a blind eye and say it's a clever way for them to accelerate their technology development. But combined with the espionage, surveillance, and non-democratic Communist Party control, and I'd be legitimately disappointed in the U.S. government if the trade war ended with only a "we'll buy more American products" and not also a "we'll stop requiring technology transfers". And I should note the technology transfers are not targeting just the U.S. The European Chambers of commerce released a report just last week complaining about the same thing, and noting that twice as many companies reported being compelled to transfer technology as just two years before.