1) The child would not inherit the car as Person A does not possess legal registration or proof of ownership of the vehicle. It would be returned to Person B or reclaimed by local government for auction or scrapping.
2) If the child has proof... sure. Maybe. I'm not sure on the legal precedent for this.
3) I'm a little unclear on the legal precedent on this as well, but I don't think either child would get to claim the car once it was determined the car was stolen and that both the criminal who stole it and the victim it was stolen from have died.
Answering your hypothetical does highlight a point that I think I didn't do a good enough job in conveying. Your questions are based on the assumption that at least one generation in the equation is alive during the implied crime/aggression. If someone is alive during what happened, reparation/reallocative justice is fine in my eyes. Even in your Nazi artwork example I could be swayed to being okay with it, because presumably the people who are fighting for ownership are people who were alive when it happened. My main point on the subject of reparations over slavery is that nobody alive today was alive during when slavery was legal and widely practiced. You're paying reparations to people who didn't suffer the oppression directly. They might be suffering from the after-effects but that's a different problem that isn't remotely addressed by a reparation act.
Thanks for your answers. They are a little different to what I was suspecting (and unfortunately, I thought there was a better conceptual argument you were shooting for).
I perhaps should've been clear when I posed the hypothetical that I was concerned with moral questions, because the legal answers are clear - person B and their descendants will be able to get the car back, assuming person B hasn't disinherited their child. In the basic scenario outlined, it's implicitly assumed that the child will succeed to the rights of person B. That's a basic aspect of property rights - they don't perish when their holder does, and the right of person B to the car will continue through their estate and to their nominated beneficiary. Keep in mind that the concept of property rights incorporates choses in action, i.e. legal claims generally.
So I wasn't quite expecting you to say that the child wouldn't be able to get the car back, because I wasn't anticipating that your point was an attack on property rights more broadly (a position which probably has more affinity for support for reparations than opposition). Rather, I was expecting you to acknowledge that which is acknowledged by the legal system - the right to compensation and obligation for restitution do not evaporate upon the happenstance of a party's death, and it's not generally considered a reward or punishment for that right and obligation to be sustained. The
reward aspect makes sense if you're of the opinion that wealth shouldn't be inherited, but that still leaves the punishment side of the equation.
The better argument that I was anticipating you would make (because I think it's probably the only really coherent argument), is that you're siding with Hart rather than Radbruch and Fuller. That is, you're taking the legal positivist position that German descendants shouldn't be forced to return Jewish-owned paintings, because there wasn't actually anything illegal about the expropriation of that property; it was entirely in accordance with the law of the Third Reich. On the other hand, theft is, by definition, illegal, and there is a legal cause of action to which the victim's descendants can properly succeed. Similarly, it would be said by a strict legal positivist that, reprehensible though slavery was, it was
legal. Therefore there isn't any cause of action to which the descendants of slaves can properly succeed, nor any liability that can be traced through to the descendants of slave-owners, or the descendants of the beneficiaries of slavery more broadly.
The answer of Radbruch and Fuller is that it's misleading to say that slavery was 'lawful', because the concept of 'law' contains an inner morality; there may have been statutory authorisation for the expropriation of Jewish property under the Nazi regime, but that alone does not make it lawful, when it runs counter to the fundamental elements of the very concept of law. Likewise, we might consider that slavery was never truly
lawful, and a proper chose in action may now be recognised as having accrued in slaves. Of course, the considerations which play a part in supporting statutes of limitation would deny the utility in attempting to directly trace those property rights through to individual descendants today, so instead it's rational to engage in a more general form of compensation, which in any case is likely to be more beneficial for all parties involved, in that it can be tailored to redressing particular disadvantages that have arisen.
The problem with adopting a legal positivist viewpoint in this argument seems to me to be that it ignores that the primary rationale for reparations isn't actually legal. We can, by analogy to legal principle, derive a moral obligation on the party of society to engage in some form of restitution, but our primary concern really isn't about maintaining fidelity to law by finding a pragmatic substitute to honouring technically existing legal rights; it's about the moral obligation itself. Although Hart would say that persecution of the Jews under Nazi Germany was perfectly
legal, he would also certainly argue that a moral responsibility devolved upon the German successor states to attempt some form of compensation. That is, the moral obligation that is suggested by the view that slavery was never truly legal, and gave rise to a right to compensation on the part of slaves, is equally acknowledged from a legal positivist perspective.
But you don't appear to be driving at that particular distinction, as your reply to the German hypothetical might have suggested. In that case I think you're just incorrect - the concepts of rights and duties in our society demonstrably extend beyond the shelf-life you attribute to them.
You left out that person C could be jailed for possession of stolen property. Which is sort of the problem. Somebody buys a car, or a watch, or a houseplant and unwittingly commits a crime we have provisions to not only right the wrong but outright punish them. Yet start suggesting that people who benefit from the stealing of peoples' lives and liberty should be in any way inconvenienced and people lose their minds.
I don't want to exclude the possibility that US law is off the wall completely, but the basis common law principle is that the liability of person C to account to person B (who initially had legal title to the car) is dependent upon whether person C is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If they satisfy those criteria, then civilly person B will be stuck with monetary compensation from person A, and person C won't have the necessary mens rea for any criminal offence.