US's Nuclear Bombings of Japan.

Of course they were building more. But the bombs were crude, virtually untested save the Trinity prototype, and being painstakingly assembled one by one from scratch in a laboratory by physicists (not by factory workers on an assembly line).

With the invasion scheduled for November, the limited trickle of bombs was hardly a trivial factor.
 
Verbose - there's no certainty in warfare. The Americans, assuming that they dropped the atomic weapons to obtain unconditional surrender ASAP (a reasonable assumption given available documentation), had no obligation to accurately predict every possible outcome before comign to that decision. No one can do that, and if that was required before acting, no one would ever be allowed to act.
No of course there isn't, and of course no such obligation existed at the time.

The message can't be that the bombs couldn't be justified. They could, they were. It's just that all these justifications by necessity had to, and has to, proceed from certain sets of assumptions. Add to that how we know that man is a kind of "rationalising animal". Humans can justify a great many things, and have, under differing circumstances.

Since dropping the bombs closed off a great many other possible avenues of development and choices, from both sides, by the act of deploying the bombs, the US acted AS IF a specific set of circumstances were somehow self-evident and necessary. The problem with history is that we know that isn't how it works. The possibility of things turning out different never goes away. (Unless one is a believer in historical determinism maybe.)

In the end, the point I think I might want to make, is that the bombs certainly could be justified, just not in such a fashion as to positvely prove their use was actually necessary, and make them uncontroversial.

This question keeps popping up with a certain regularity precisely becuase that was a decisions fraught with all kinds of implications, and certainly not uncontroversial.

It is of course perfectly possible to build an historical understanding of the thought processes and risk analysis of the US wartime leadership landed with the job of deciding what to do with this weapon, once they had it. And from that kind of understanding it's not that hard to grasp how they saw things, and what they feared under the circumstances, and even be sympathetic towards them. It's just that the decision to use the nukes was one of these turning points that was completely open, being unprecedented, meaning also that it's not obvious the people involved had ANY good choices — and they certainly had NO uncontroversial ones to make. The controversy still sticks to the decision.

I'd like my history to manage to take those kinds of things into account. It might require regarding the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings to be thought of as tragic historical events, for the US as well as Japan. And we're perhaps not so used to historical narratives of the tragic variety, certainly not in US WWII history — at least not when it's the US winning.
 
Of course they were building more. But the bombs were crude, virtually untested save the Trinity prototype, and being painstakingly assembled one by one from scratch in a laboratory by physicists (not by factory workers on an assembly line).

With the invasion scheduled for November, the limited trickle of bombs was hardly a trivial factor.
Only if an invasion had turned out to be necessary in the end.

(I'm also not entirely convinced the US in 1945, with Japan hemmed into and cut off in its home islands, wouldn't have had enough leeway to rework any kind of schedule like that if it had so desired.)
 
Militarily, the US could have bombed and starved Japan to death rather than invade. But politically, the rapid advance of the Soviet Union and the well-known-by-then atrocious state of hundreds of thousands of allied prisoners of war, civilian internees and forced laborers would have forced the US to end the war ASAP.
 
Militarily, the US could have bombed and starved Japan to death rather than invade. But politically, the rapid advance of the Soviet Union and the well-known-by-then atrocious state of hundreds of thousands of allied prisoners of war, civilian internees and forced laborers would have forced the US to end the war ASAP.


Let's be honest. The rush to end the war, on every front, was mostly driven by the pending division of spoils among the victors. The Soviets were willing to sacrifice troops to establish territorial claims, and the US wasn't.
 
Militarily, the US could have bombed and starved Japan to death rather than invade. But politically, the rapid advance of the Soviet Union and the well-known-by-then atrocious state of hundreds of thousands of allied prisoners of war, civilian internees and forced laborers would have forced the US to end the war ASAP.

Well considering that the US was already firebombing Japanese cities before the nukes were dropped, many Japanese cities were already in a state of economic chaos. Governments can sometimes choose to look the other way despite impeding domestic economic collapse, which was appearing more likely before the nukes were dropped, the question becomes for how long.
 
I doubt conventional bombing would have worked simply because it's never appeared to work in any other context at ending wars (I realize the small sample size and simplistic logic is concerning). I would suggest what made the atomic bomb different is the apparent simplicity it took to carry it out. To an outsider who didn't know how difficult it was to make an atomic bomb, it would appear a single bomber with a single bomb could destroy an entire city. Truman threatened to bomb every city in Japan this way. The Empire could actually reasonably believe he was carrying out his threat. That's different from the fire bombings which the Japanese well-knew the resources and risk involved in carrying out the task.
 
What did Japan in was the blockade rather than the bombings.

The Japanese leadership knew they were done for. The drama to play out was whether the group minded to "accept the unthinkable" would be allowed to make peace/surrender, or if the national-suicide-rather-than-submission crowd would carry the day.

It's just not possible to know for certain how it would have ended if one changes a parameters of how it actually went down. But then the problem is that it ALSO means there's no way of deciding if the bombs really did all they're supposed to have done in the end. We can't make experiments in history. All we really do is present accounts that form a kind of interpretative probabilisitc narratives.

The nukes over Japan are one of these instances where the situation is very much open to interpretation, meaning the counterfactual reasoning involved is barely out of view at the best of times. And it works like that because it was a fundamentally controversial decision. It just can't be laid to rest by some kind of authoritative decision about the meaning and significance of the event. It's if one thinks that's what should happen — the US was right, any other decision would have been horrendous, end of story — that one is likely to end up frustrated by it all. (And going the other way and wanting to chisel in stone that US was wrong, probably Evil, is also not going to fly very well.)

It makes it all good for discussion though.
 
At that point Japan didn't have any nukes to retaliate neither did japan have an anti nuclear system either..
 
At that point Japan didn't have any nukes to retaliate neither did japan have an anti nuclear system either..

At that point "anti-nuclear system" would have consisted of intercepting the appropriate B-29 before it got where it was going.
 
This "cutting it fine" attitude seems to be a propaganda issue which in my humble opinion stems from the thing that Japan had surrendered by the nukes started going around .

and ı am supposed to be proof reading after posting . It's supposed to mean "... had surrendered by the time..." It does certainly imply that the Japanese had given up before Hiroshima .


a r16 thing ; ı don't think the proof would be conclusive according to the discipline of history in the current situation .
 
Naval blockade, total trade sanctions, bombings of all major industrial sites and Japan has to surrender, just a matter of time and without the use of Atom. Would take longer and perhaps be more costly but would eventually work, or would it? Unless they went communist and get declarations of imminent help from Soviets/China, that would take a revolution first though, and there's not much love for either empire in Japan.
 
Naval blockade, total trade sanctions, bombings of all major industrial sites and Japan has to surrender, just a matter of time and without the use of Atom. Would take longer and perhaps be more costly but would eventually work, or would it?

Sure but why would that route have been at all preferential to what was achieved in two weeks with the two atom bombs?
 
By the time the Allies got around to Japan after V-E Day, the American people were war-weary and eager to resume their pre-war lives. There's heavy pressure on the American leadership to wrap up the war quickly and return the GIs to their normal lives.

What daft suggests simply won't fly. Also Truman was now the president; doubt he could pull the American public along to drag the war on for a few more years.
 
I really can't believe that Japan actually got nuked like that. Hiroshima and Nagasaki both got a nuked with an atomic bomb, but at that point the nukes weren't as big as the nukes that exist now. The H bomb is about 10 times more powerful. That's why the A bomb was considered a little boy since the H bomb was a lot more powerful.
 
Both bombs were totally unnecessary. The oft knee jerk response of saving American lives is nonsense and highly in dispute by historians. By that time the Allies had laid waste a weapons of mass destruction effort to utterly annihilate countless Japanese civillians to penalize the Japanese. It wasn't just the monsterous things that happened by the Japanese like Bataan and Nanking, but the monsterous use of the captured enslaved female prisoners that formerly were enslaved to the Japanese and then not freed but used by Australians and Americans gleefully. There were disclosures about that from the year 2000 and beyond. Do you have any idea how many rapes happened on Okinawa and Japan by the Allies? It was horrific and slave prostitution by those Comfort women now enslaved to service Allied servicemen in the Pacific (they earned the equivalent of a dime per day and couldn't leave and were riddled with STDs with some as young as 13!) was sanctioned by the Brass who provided medicines and paid off people to keep quiet. It's a terrible scandal in American history.

You can't say that Guernica is a war crime and then wholesale firebomb civillians as a tactic. Sorry it won't fly. At the very least the second bomb was entirely unnecessary.

The nutty projections of Japanese resistence were garbage. They were abjectly broken and there were almost nil incidents of uprisings after conceeding. What happened on Okinawa was the last stand, and largely by civilians including grade school boys with bamboo spears.

I'm sick of the parrotting that the nukes were in any way justified. It's repeating just nonsense. Do you have any idea how many historians boycotted the Enola Gay exhibit due to the unfounded political propaganda that was represented? Do you have any idea how many generals went on record that the atomic bombs were unnecessary?

They were tests used to scare the Soviets, and what did that accomplish when the Soviets had their own bombs shortly thereafter? Truman even makes a big deal about saying that he was desirious of seeing Stalin's response when he announced the bombs.

How about reading a history book sometime instead of just accepting some old propaganda from 1945? This is the Civilization forum which would make me think chockful of amateur historians.

Are you aware that the Japanese put out feelers to the Soviets to surrender and that Truman shut this down by using the Bombs? He didn't want a surrender to communists. He want a big win because the American people were tired and broke and wanted a big show. He'd been lied to by his advisors that they could churn out lots and lots of bombs, and he wanted to test some. Of course the number of bombs produced was totally wrong and so the idea the military could use these was nutty.

Do you know they wanted to use tactical nukes in Korea? It was an absurd policy we're still paying the price for today. It made nothing better and created a terrible arms race, most recently with a plan to allow Iran to make them in ten years.
 
The Japanese feelers to the Soviets were for the Soviets to act as intermediary (before they declared war on Japan) in negociating peace, and the soviets themselves put that down (because they wanted to join the war).

They were not an attempt to surrender to the Soviets.

Much of the rest of your post is full of similar misinterpretation (though some of it also raise valid points about atrocities the allies DID commit)
 
No! I said they put out feelers to the Soviets to surrender. Re-read my post. Truman didn't want to empower the communists any more than they already were by being involved in WW2. He loathed them.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan#Attempts_to_deal_with_the_Soviet_Union
"Attempts to deal with the Soviet Union

Naotake Satō
On June 30, Tōgō told Naotake Satō, Japan's ambassador in Moscow, to try to establish "firm and lasting relations of friendship." Satō was to discuss the status of Manchuria and "any matter the Russians would like to bring up."[45] Well aware of the overall situation and cognizant of their promises to the Allies, the Soviets responded with delaying tactics to encourage the Japanese without promising anything. Satō finally met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on July 11, but without result. On July 12, Tōgō directed Satō to tell the Soviets that:

His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland.[46]

The Emperor proposed sending Prince Konoe as a special envoy, although he would be unable to reach Moscow before the Potsdam Conference.

Satō advised Tōgō that in reality, "unconditional surrender or terms closely equivalent thereto" was all that Japan could expect. Moreover, in response to Molotov's requests for specific proposals, Satō suggested that Tōgō's messages were not "clear about the views of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war," thus questioning whether Tōgō's initiative was supported by the key elements of Japan's power structure.[47]

On July 17, Tōgō responded:
Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind ... Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender.[48]

In reply, Satō clarified:
It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the imperial family].[49]

On July 21, speaking in the name of the cabinet, Tōgō repeated:

With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms.[50]

American cryptographers had broken most of Japan's codes, including the Purple code used by the Japanese Foreign Office to encode high-level diplomatic correspondence. As a result, messages between Tokyo and Japan's embassies were provided to Allied policy-makers nearly as quickly as to the intended recipients.[51]"

And your post is extremely vague. If you feel it's in error point out the error. I'll be happy to supply sources. This indicates clearly that Japan was ready to surrender prior to the use of the atomic bombs. They were broken. They expected a surrender. There's no indication of a fear of mass uprising, nor a plan to cause a mass uprising by civilians in order to oppose an American landing. It's nonsense to think otherwise, just tired unproven propaganda. In addition I intentionally included that the cyphers had been broken. The Americans knew everything that was being communicated through military channels and fully knew how broken the Japanese were at this late portion of the war. They were starving. Malnourishment was commonplace. They had no infrastructure to mount a resistance movement by then.
Attempts to deal with the Soviet Union

http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm
A long list of diverse military leaders who felt the atomic bomb was unnecessary and/or a political decision. Do you think for a second these distinquished men would risk American soldiers, airmen, and sailors lives? Of course not. They knew the bomb wasn't needed and the nightmare Invasion scenario was nonsense.
Spoiler :

American Military Leaders Urge President Truman
not to Drop the Atomic Bomb
•The Joint Chiefs of Staff never formally studied the decision and never made an official recommendation to the President. Brief informal discussions may have occurred, but no record even of these exists. There is no record whatsoever of the usual extensive staff work and evaluation of alternative options by the Joint Chiefs, nor did the Chiefs ever claim to be involved. (See p. 322, Chapter 26)


•In official internal military interviews, diaries and other private as well as public materials, literally every top U.S. military leader involved subsequently stated that the use of the bomb was not dictated by military necessity.




Navy Leaders



(Partial listing:

See Chapter 26 for an extended discussion)


•In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff--and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff--minced few words:

[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . .

n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. (See p. 3, Introduction)
Privately, on June 18, 1945--almost a month before the Emperor's July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used--Leahy recorded in his diary:


It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression. (See p. 324, Chapter 26)


•Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated in a public address given at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945:

The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 329, Chapter 26) . . . [Nimitz also stated: "The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan. . . ."]
In a private 1946 letter to Walter Michels of the Association of Philadelphia Scientists, Nimitz observed that "the decision to employ the atomic bomb on Japanese cities was made on a level higher than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (See pp. 330-331, Chapter 26)



•Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:

The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. (See p. 331, Chapter 26)


•Time-Life editor Henry R. Luce later recalled that during a May-June 1945 tour of the Pacific theater:

. . . I spent a morning at Cavite in the Philippines with Admiral Frank Wagner in front of huge maps. Admiral Wagner was in charge of air search-and-patrol of all the East Asian seas and coasts. He showed me that in all those millions of square miles there was literally not a single target worth the powder to blow it up; there were only junks and mostly small ones at that.

Similarly, I dined one night with Admiral [Arthur] Radford [later Joint Chiefs Chairman, 1953-57] on the carrier Yorktown leading a task force from Ulithi to bomb Kyushu, the main southern island of Japan. Radford had invited me to be alone with him in a tiny room far up the superstructure of the Yorktown, where not a sound could be heard. Even so, it was in a whisper that he turned to me and said: "Luce, don't you think the war is over?" My reply, of course, was that he should know better than I. For his part, all he could say was that the few little revetments and rural bridges that he might find to bomb in Kyushu wouldn't begin to pay for the fuel he was burning on his task force. (See pp. 331-332, Chapter 26)


•The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:

Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.

During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in the country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out. (See pp. 225-226, Chapter 18)


•Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to 1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), replaced Bard on the Interim Committee after he left government on July 1. Subsequently, Strauss repeatedly stated his belief that the use of the atomic bomb "was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. . . ." (See p. 332, Chapter 26) Strauss recalled:

I proposed to Secretary Forrestal at that time that the weapon should be demonstrated. . . . Primarily, it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate. . . . My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a good place--satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomaria [sic] trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomaria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood. . . . I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest . . . would [have] laid the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they had been matchsticks, and of course set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities, their fortifications at will. . . . (See p. 333, Chapter 26)


•In a private letter to Navy historian Robert G. Albion concerning a clearer assurance that the Emperor would not be displaced, Strauss observed:

This was omitted from the Potsdam declaration and as you are undoubtedly aware was the only reason why it was not immediately accepted by the Japanese who were beaten and knew it before the first atomic bomb was dropped. (See p. 393, Chapter 31)


•In his "third person" autobiography (co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated:

The President in giving his approval for these [atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials. (See p. 327, Chapter 26)


•Private interview notes taken by Walter Whitehill summarize King's feelings quite simply as: "I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it." (See p. 329, Chapter 26; See also pp. 327-329)


•As Japan faltered in July an effort was made by several top Navy officials--almost certainly including Secretary Forrestal himself--to end the war without using the atomic bomb. Forrestal made a special trip to Potsdam to discuss the issue and was involved in the Atlantic Charter broadcast. Many other top Admirals criticized the bombing both privately and publicly. (Forrestal, see pp. 390-392, Chapter 31; p. 398, Chapter 31) (Strauss, see p. 333, Chapter 26; pp. 393-394, Chapter 31) (Bard, see pp. 225-227, Chapter 18; pp. 390-391, Chapter 31)




Air Force Leaders



(Partial listing:

See Chapter 27 for an extended discussion)


•The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a New York Times reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:

The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air. (See p. 334, Chapter 27)
In his 1949 memoirs Arnold observed that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." (See p. 334, Chapter 27)



•Arnold's deputy, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, summed up his understanding this way in an internal military history interview:

Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it. (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
Eaker reported that Arnold told him:


When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion. (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
[Eaker also recalled: "That was the representation I made when I accompanied General Marshall up to the White House" for a discussion with Truman on June 18, 1945.]



•On September 20, 1945 the famous "hawk" who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:

said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war." He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
The text of the press conference provides these details:


LeMay: The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.
The Press: You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?

. . .

LeMay: The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.

(See p. 336, Chapter 27)

On other occasions in internal histories and elsewhere LeMay gave even shorter estimates of how long the war might have lasted (e.g., "a few days"). (See pp. 336-341, Chapter 27)



•Personally dictated notes found in the recently opened papers of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman describe a private 1965 dinner with General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, who in July 1945 commanded the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and was subsequently chief of staff of U.S. Air Forces. Also with them at dinner was Spaatz's one-time deputy commanding general at USASTAF, Frederick L. Anderson. Harriman privately noted:

Both men . . . felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used. (See p. 337, Chapter 27)
Harriman's notes also recall his own understanding:


I know this attitude is correctly described, because I had it from the Air Force when I was in Washington in April '45. (See p. 337, Chapter 27)


•In an official 1962 interview Spaatz stated that he had directly challenged the Nagasaki bombing:

I thought that if we were going to drop the atomic bomb, drop it on the outskirts--say in Tokyo Bay--so that the effects would not be as devastating to the city and the people. I made this suggestion over the phone between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and I was told to go ahead with our targets. (See p. 345, Chapter 27)


•Spaatz insisted on receiving written orders before going forward with the atomic bombings in 1945. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Thomas Handy, Marshall's deputy chief of staff, recalled:

Well, Tooey Spaatz came in . . . he said, "They tell me I am supposed to go out there and blow off the whole south end of the Japanese Islands. I've heard a lot about this thing, but my God, I haven't had a piece of paper yet and I think I need a piece of paper." "Well," I said, "I agree with you, Tooey. I think you do," and I said, "I guess I'm the fall guy to give it to you." (pp. 344-345, Chapter 27)
In 1962 Spaatz himself recalled that he gave "notification that I would not drop an atomic bomb on verbal orders--they had to be written--and this was accomplished." (p. 345, Chapter 27)

Spaatz also stated that


The dropping of the atomic bomb was done by a military man under military orders. We're supposed to carry out orders and not question them. (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
In a 1965 Air Force oral history interview Spaatz stressed: "That was purely a political decision, wasn't a military decision. The military man carries out the order of his political bosses." (See p. 345, Chapter 27)



•Air Force General Claire Chennault, the founder of the American Volunteer Group (the famed "Flying Tigers")--and Army Air Forces commander in China--was even more blunt: A few days after Hiroshima was bombed The New York Times reported Chennault's view that:

Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. . . . (See pp. 335-336, Chapter 27)




Army Leaders



(Partial listing:

See Chapter 28 for an extended discussion)


•On the 40th Anniversary of the bombing former President Richard M. Nixon reported that:

[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off. . . . (See p. 352, Chapter 28)


•The day after Hiroshima was bombed MacArthur's pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary:

General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster [the bomb]. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. . . . (See p. 350, Chapter 28)


•Former President Herbert Hoover met with MacArthur alone for several hours on a tour of the Pacific in early May 1946. His diary states:

I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria. (See pp. 350-351, Chapter 28)


•Saturday Review of Literature editor Norman Cousins also later reported that MacArthur told him he saw no military justification for using the atomic bomb, and that "The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." (See p. 351, Chapter 28)


•In an article reprinted in 1947 by Reader's Digest, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers (in charge of psychological warfare on MacArthur's wartime staff and subsequently MacArthur's military secretary in Tokyo) stated:

Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war." (See p. 352, Chapter 28)


•Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, 1945 chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section, subsequently recalled in a military history interview: "[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia. . . ." (See p. 359, Chapter 28)


•Brigadier Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the officer in charge of preparing MAGIC intercepted cable summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview:

we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs. (See p. 359, Chapter 28)


•In a 1985 letter recalling the views of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy elaborated on an incident that was

very vivid in my mind. . . . I can recall as if it were yesterday, [Marshall's] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question . . . the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of a military decision. (See p. 364, Chapter 28)


•In a separate memorandum written the same year McCloy recalled: "General Marshall was right when he said you must not ask me to declare that a surprise nuclear attack on Japan is a military necessity. It is not a military problem." (See p. 364, Chapter 28)


•In addition:

- On May 29, 1945 Marshall joined with Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal in approving Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's proposal that the unconditional surrender language be clarified (but, with Stimson, proposed a brief delay). (See pp. 53-54, Chapter 4)

- On June 9, 1945, along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall recommended that a statement clarifying the surrender terms be issued on the fall of Okinawa (June 21). (See pp. 55-57, Chapter 4)

- On July 16, 1945 at Potsdam--again along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs --Marshall urged the British Chiefs of Staff to ask Churchill to approach Truman about clarifying the terms. (See pp. 245-246, Chapter 19)

- On July 18, 1945, Marshall led the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in directly urging the president to include language in the Potsdam Proclamation allowing Japan to choose its own form of government. (See pp. 299-300, Chapter 23)


•In his memoirs President Dwight D. Eisenhower reports the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used:

During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. . . . (See p. 4, Introduction)


•Eisenhower made similar private and public statements on numerous occasions. For instance, in a 1963 interview he said simply: ". . . it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (See pp. 352-358, Chapter 28)



Massive firebombing of Japan. This is one of the largest war crimes against civilians in world history. It utterly broke them and made the atomic bombs unnecessary. They were in no shape to mount a resistance movement.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_raids_on_Japan
Spoiler :
Allied forces conducted many air raids on Japan during World War II, causing extensive destruction to the country's cities and killing anywhere from 241,000 to 900,000 people. During the first years of the Pacific War, these attacks were limited to the Doolittle Raid in April 1942 and small-scale raids on military positions in the Kuril Islands from mid-1943. Strategic bombing raids began in June 1944 and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. Allied naval and land-based tactical air units also attacked Japan during 1945.

The United States military air campaign waged against Japan began in earnest in mid-1944 and intensified during the war's last months. While plans for attacks on Japan had been prepared prior to the Pacific War, these could not begin until the long-ranged B-29 Superfortress bomber was ready for combat. From June 1944 until January 1945, B-29s stationed in India staged through bases in China to make a series of raids on Japan, but this effort proved unsuccessful. The strategic bombing campaign was greatly expanded from November 1944 when bases in the Mariana Islands became available as a result of the Mariana Islands Campaign. These attacks initially targeted industrial facilities, but from March 1945 were generally directed against urban areas as much of the manufacturing process was carried out in small workshops and private homes. Aircraft flying from Allied aircraft carriers and the Ryukyu Islands also frequently struck targets in Japan during 1945 in preparation for the planned invasion of Japan scheduled for October 1945. During early August 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were struck and mostly destroyed by atomic bombs.

Japan's military and civil defenses were unable to stop the Allied attacks. The number of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns assigned to defensive duties in the home islands was inadequate, and most of these aircraft and guns had difficulty reaching the high altitudes where B-29s often operated. Fuel shortages, inadequate pilot training, and a lack of coordination between units also constrained the effectiveness of the fighter force. Despite the vulnerability of Japanese cities to firebombing attacks, the firefighting services lacked training and equipment, and few air raid shelters were constructed for civilians. As a result, the B-29s were able to inflict severe damage on urban areas while suffering few losses.

The Allied bombing campaign was one of the main factors which influenced the Japanese government's decision to surrender in mid-August 1945. However, there has been a long-running debate over the morality of the attacks on Japanese cities, and the use of atomic weapons is particularly controversial. The most commonly cited estimate of Japanese casualties from the raids is 333,000 killed and 473,000 wounded. There are a number of other estimates of total fatalities, however, which range from 241,000 to 900,000. In addition to the loss of mostly civilian life, and in contrast to the low Allied casualties, the raids caused extensive damage to Japan's cities and contributed to a large decline in industrial production.
 
Historians boycott the Enola Gay exhibition
http://www.historians.org/publicati...2003/historians-protest-new-enola-gay-exhibit
Spoiler :
A group of historians and activists has delivered a petition challenging the National Air and Space Museum's proposed exhibit of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress used in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The museum had earlier announced plans to display the restored and fully assembled aircraft at its new Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center at Dulles International Airport, which will also feature other aviation artifacts too large for the main facility on the National Mall—such as the Space Shuttle Enterprise, an SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft, and the Dash 80 prototype of the Boeing 707.

The new exhibit, scheduled to open in December 2003, will, as a NASM press release (available at http://www.nasm.si.edu/events/pressroom/releases/110703.htm) notes, identify the Enola Gay as the aircraft that "dropped the first atomic weapon used in combat" and describe the B-29 as "the most sophisticated propeller-driven bomber of World War II," but will not otherwise explore the historical context of Hiroshima or nuclear weapons.

The Committee for a National Discussion of Nuclear History and Current Policy charges that the proposed exhibit will be "devoid not only of historical context and discussion of the ongoing controversy surrounding the bombings, but even of basic information regarding the number of casualties." (See the "introductory letter" on the committee's web site at http://www.enola-gay.org.) The committee's Statement of Principles (also available on the web site) declares that displaying the Enola Gay as a technological achievement reflects "extraordinary callousness toward the victims, indifference to the deep divisions among American citizens about the propriety of these actions, and disregard for the feelings of most of the world's peoples." A number of historians signed the statement, which was delivered to Smithsonian officials on November 5. Among the many other signatories are several prominent activists, authors, and other public figures including Noam Chomsky and Robert Jay Lifton; authors E.L. Doctorow, Daniel Ellsberg, Jonathan Schell, and Kurt Vonnegut; writer-producer Norman Lear; actor, director, and activist Martin Sheen; and filmmaker Oliver Stone.

The petition asks Smithsonian Institution Secretary Lawrence Small and NASM's director, General John R. Dailey, USMC (Ret.), to meet with scholars to plan an exhibit that places the aircraft in historical context. It also asks the museum to cosponsor a conference on the history of nuclear weapons. The petition says that should the museum fail to respond, "we will join with others in this country and around the world to protest the exhibit in its present form and to catalyze a national discussion of critical nuclear issues."

A statement issued by the National Air and Space Museum in response to the petition, (see http://www.nasm.si.edu/events/pressroom/releases/110703.htm) notes that "this type of label is precisely the same kind used for other airplanes and spacecraft in the museum." Museum officials believe that the text "does not glorify or vilify the role this aircraft played in history" but rather conforms to the museum's congressionally mandated mission to "memorialize the national development of aviation and space flight."

The current controversy continues the acrimonious debate about exhibiting the Enola Gay that began in 1994. In that year curators at the Air and Space Museum planned to exhibit the aircraft, situating it in the context of the use of strategic bombing, the end of World War II, and the beginning of the cold war. The exhibit would have been a departure for the museum, which had focused until then on celebrating technological achievements. Veterans' groups such as the Air Force Association, as well as Congress and the media, strongly objected to the proposed exhibit script, which they perceived as an attack on America's conduct during the war. Facing calls for a congressional investigation and budget cuts, the museum revised the script, eliminating most discussion of debates about whether to use the bomb. A group of historians protested that the "historical cleansing" of the proposed script was "unconscionable.[since] the exhibit will no longer attempt to present a balanced range of the historical scholarship on the issue; . . . . a large body of important archival evidence on the Hiroshima decision will not even be mentioned; and . . . the exhibit will contain assertions of fact which have long been challenged by careful historical scholarship."1 The museum canceled the plans for a contextual exhibit, and merely displayed the fuselage of the Enola Gay with minimal text. The controversy revealed the emotional resonances that the bomber could strike even as a museum artifact.


Truman used the bomb to shock the Soviets, not Japan
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/30/books/did-we-need-to-drop-it.html
Spoiler :
But, Mr. Alperovitz argues, Truman and his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, were struck by the notion that ending World War II without dropping the atomic bomb would not have brought added strength to American diplomacy against the Soviet Union in Europe. More than in the earlier book, Byrnes is the villain of this piece. Mr. Alperovitz insists that a decision not to drop the bomb could actually have bolstered American diplomatic objectives in Asia -- for example, by helping to create the atmosphere for a more harmonious postwar American-Soviet relationship. He criticizes Truman for failing to issue a more explicit warning to Japan about the bomb and for attacking Hiroshima rather than a nonurban target, as his Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, had suggested.

As evidence of the link between the bomb decision and diplomacy toward Moscow, Mr. Alperovitz points to Truman's postponement of his Potsdam meeting with Stalin and Churchill until July 1945, when the new weapon would have been tested. At Potsdam, after hearing about the first successful detonation in New Mexico, Truman turned suddenly more truculent. According to Stimson, Churchill marveled that the President "was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting." Truman confided to his crony and reparations negotiator Edwin Pauley that the bomb "would keep the Russians straight." Mr. Alperovitz argues that "the U.S. feeling of cheerfulness rather than frustration" over differences with the Soviets at Potsdam "makes little sense unless one realizes that top policy makers were thinking ahead to the time when the force of the new weapon would be displayed

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn7706-hiroshima-bomb-may-have-carried-hidden-agenda.html
Spoiler :
[The US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was meant to kick-start the Cold War rather than end the Second World War, according to two nuclear historians who say they have new evidence backing the controversial theory.

Causing a fission reaction in several kilograms of uranium and plutonium and killing over 200,000 people 60 years ago was done more to impress the Soviet Union than to cow Japan, they say. And the US President who took the decision, Harry Truman, was culpable, they add.

"He knew he was beginning the process of annihilation of the species," says Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University in Washington DC, US. "It was not just a war crime; it was a crime against humanity."

According to the official US version of history, an A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and another on Nagasaki three days later, to force Japan to surrender. The destruction was necessary to bring a rapid end to the war without the need for a costly US invasion.



But this is disputed by Kuznick and Mark Selden, a historian from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, US. They are presenting their evidence at a meeting in London on Thursday organised by Greenpeace and others to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the bombings.

Looking for peace

New studies of the US, Japanese and Soviet diplomatic archives suggest that Truman's main motive was to limit Soviet expansion in Asia, Kuznick claims. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union began an invasion a few days after the Hiroshima bombing, not because of the atomic bombs themselves, he says.
According to an account by Walter Brown, assistant to then-US secretary of state James Byrnes, Truman agreed at a meeting three days before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima that Japan was "looking for peace". Truman was told by his army generals, Douglas Macarthur and Dwight Eisenhower, and his naval chief of staff, William Leahy, that there was no military need to use the bomb.

"Impressing Russia was more important than ending the war in Japan," says Selden. Truman was also worried that he would be accused of wasting money on the Manhattan Project to build the first nuclear bombs, if the bomb was not used, he adds.

Kuznick and Selden's arguments, however, were dismissed as "discredited" by Lawrence Freedman, a war expert from King's College London, UK. He says that Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima was "understandable in the circumstances".

Truman's main aim had been to end the war with Japan, Freedman says, but adds that, with the wisdom of hindsight, the bombing may not have been militarily justified. Some people assumed that the US always had "a malicious and nasty motive", he says, "but it ain't necessarily so."
 
Ah, I misread your post. My apology.
 
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