Joij21
🔥Hail Satan!🔥
Russia has missle for 2-3 more strike ©
No it doesn't. This is mere projection.
Russia has missle for 2-3 more strike ©
No it doesn't. This is mere projection.
No one really knows how many they have.
Russia will never really completely run out of tanks, missiles etc because of new production.
I operate under a puritanical empirical paradigm when it comes to this war. Unless something is used then it doesn't exist.
For Russia to prove it has that many missiles then it should expend all those missiles in a single day long barrage.
What strategy is there in holding things in reserve rather than burning through it as fast as you possibly can and inflict the maximum possible damage you can to your enemy before they can rebuild?
PR/narrative reasons. Whenever sonething goes wrong launch what you have.
Normally you combine it with airstrijes but Russias incapable of Desert Storm type tactics.
From what i gather it's not like they have much choice but to love their Roy Soleil and court officers, dissidents are quickly rooted out and put to jail. Uncle Vladimir's polonium tea may get into your tap water if you don't shut it.And Russians still love Putin & Lavrov?
[IMG alt="Airburst fuse"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...st-fuse/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
The miniature laser proximity fuse recovered from a Ukrainian munition
UAV Developer via Telegram
A post on Tuesday 3rd by Russian blogger UAV Developer reveals a new Ukrainian secret weapon: a drone bomb fuze with a laser sensor to measure the distance to a target.
“Anyone who has had a laser tape measure knows what I'm talking about,” says UAV Developer, noting that it can trigger the bomb at any desired stand-off from the target.
UAV Developer describes it as a simple device with no technological magic. But experience dating back to WWII shows just how effective this type of airburst weapon can be. And, he notes, Russia’s bureaucratic acquisition system prevents them getting anything similar.
Master Blasters
[IMG alt="PTM3"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...09/PTM3/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Russian approaches a PTM-3 mine dropped by a drone
Ukraine MoD
The Ukrainians have displayed a rare talent at creating new fuzes for old weapons. The most celebrated example is the Johnny or Jonik fuze fitted to Soviet-era PTM-3 anti-tank mines. The original fuze is a simple pressure switch which only works when tank track drives over it. The Johnny fuze adds a magnetometer and an accelerometer. The magnetometer will trigger the mine when a large metal object is close, so the mine will go off when tank tracks go either side of it without making contact. The accelerometer means that any attempt to move the mine sets if off.
Twitter/X analyst Roy has documented several other new fuzes associated with drone mines, with time delays and magnetic or other sensors. Drones plant these weapons on roads well behind enemy lines. “Ukraine has been systematically mining Russian logistical routes up to 15km deep for months with various anti-vehicle mines,” Roy told me. “They do so at night with heavy drones, where they should be very effective at destroying light vehicles, until presumably cleared the next day.”
The laser fuze is a step up in sophistication. While it could be used for an off-route mine, it is a type associated with direct strikes on targets both in the air and on the ground, a variant of the classic proximity fuze.
The Most Secret Weapon
[IMG alt="MK53_fuze"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...53-fuze/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Mark 53 proximity fuze from the 1950s showing the complex construction
U.S, Navy
As a paper on U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command notes, the proximity fuze ranks with radar and the atomic bomb as one of the outstanding secret weapons of WWII. It was so secret that it could not be referred to by name but was instead called the VT or ‘Variable Time’ fuze to give a misleading idea of how it worked.
A shell which can sense the target and explode nearby is more effective than one which only explodes on contact. It is hard to hit a moving aerial targets, so a shell that explodes whenever it is within lethal range is a huge improvement. Against ground targets, a shell which explodes when it hits the dirt wastes most of its explosive force digging a crater, and most of the shrapnel is wasted. Airbursts that shower the ground below with fragments are far deadlier.
The original solution to this was the time delay fuze which detonated so many seconds after firing. This worked when a barrage was being fired and gunners had time to adjust the timing. For anti-aircraft fire it created a narrow zone where the time-delay airbursts went off and firing had to be judged exactly to catch the target in that window.
The proximity fuze solved the problem by emitting a radio pulse and detecting the return. A miniature radar rangefinder, it could be set to explode at a given distance from the target. Against aircraft it was considered to be at least four times as effective and was credited with saving thousands of lives in the Pacific theater by downing Japanese kamikazes
When proximity fuzes were later used on ground targets the effect was devastating. They proved notably effective at the Battle of the Bulge. Eisenhower was so impressed he worried what might have happened if the enemy had developed proximity ammunition first: “If the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proven exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.”
Radar proximity fuzes are still widely used, but they are expensive and complicated to manufacture. The U.S. Army’s M734A1 Multi-Option Fuze for Mortars fuze for 60mm mortar bombs costs $213 according to the Army’s ammunition budget. Ukrainian drone makers need something simpler they can make themselves.
Laser Weapon
Cheap, rugged solid-state lasers mean you can now get a laser measure for under $20 and Ukrainian engineers seem to have applied the same technology.
“An ATmega328 microcontroller, voltage booster, MOSFETs - everything is standard,” says UAV Developer. “What is worth paying attention to - the [Ukrainians] are absolutely right on the path of electrifying ammunition.”
He notes that the fuze also has a backup contact detonator in case the laser system fails.
[IMG alt="M-Weapons-1-HT-Win11-crop-2000x1125"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...00x1125/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Artillery shells with proxmity fuzes proved highly effective in the Battle of the Bulge in WWII.
U.S, Army
This does not come as a complete surprise. Previously Ukrainian developers approached the Brave1 defense technology accelerator with plans for an airburst fuze for drone bombs. This weighs a couple of ounces, is compatible with a variety of grenades and other munitions, and can be set to explode at 6-10 feet above the ground. Crucially, it costs less than $40 and can be made in Ukraine. This device, or something similar may now be in production thanks to Brave1. Like the drones themselves, it is likely assembled by hand in small workshops from imported commercial components.
Meanwhile, UAV Developer notes in a second post, Russia does not have anything like the laser proximity fuze or the Johnny because the people running the procurement process are, he says, morons.
UAV Developer says he knows of at least four cases where people brought products similar to the Johnny fuze to the Russian Ministry of Defense but were rejected because the bureaucrats did not like complex electronic systems, however reliable.
“The difference between a moron and a non-moron is the lack of understanding of the essence of things around them and the lack of desire to understand them,” says UAV Developer. “All these programs and demonic transistors scare him.”
The result is that the Ukrainians have Johnny and “100-500 types of detonator” while Russians have “a stick with a toggle switch and happy idiots.”
He notes that some small independent Russian outfits like drone makers Ovod are capable of building advanced, effective systems, but UAV Developer despairs of the military establishment.
While the new Ukrainian device may not meet Pentagon standards for reliability, ruggedness and security, it provides a valuable new capability. These fuzes will make antipersonnel strikes by drone bombs and FPVs considerably more lethal. They are also likely to be used on the new interceptor drones to give a greatly improved chance of a kill. And Ukrainian engineers will be working on the next project to leverage cheap, powerful, easily -available electronics.
There’s a road underpass on the eastern edge of Selydove, a town in eastern Ukraine just south of Pokrovsk—the latter, a key Ukrainian stronghold—that’s fast becoming the locus of the brutal fighting in the town.
On Wednesday, a pair of Russian armored vehicles dropped off their infantry at the underpass—and promptly got blasted by a Ukrainian T-64 tank firing from just a few yards away. A day later, the crew of a similar Ukrainian tank—or maybe even the same one—pulled off a daring heist at the same underpass.
The tankers discovered an abandoned Russian T-72 tank—and stole it.
This is not the first time Ukrainian forces have nabbed an intact but abandoned Russian T-72. In April, Ukrainian troops from the 12th Azov Brigade staged a three-day operation to swap out the batteries in an immobilized T-72 and drive it across the eastern no-man’s-land to the safety of Ukrainian lines around Terny.
What’s special about the Thursday heist is that it mostly occurred under armor. Selydove is an extremely dangerous place right now as the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army closes in, aiming to flank Pokrovsk. So the Ukrainian tankers towed away the T-72 using their own T-64 as the tractor.
A drone from the Ukrainian national guard’s Kara-Dag Brigade was watching when, on Thursday, that T-72 rolled up to the underpass and sheltered amid the wreckage from Wednesday’s skirmish in the same location.
The up-armored, camouflaged Russian tank fired at least one 125-millimeter round at something to the north. And then, shockingly, the three crew bailed out of the 46-ton tank. At least one Ukrainian first-person-view drone targeted the fleeing Russian tankers.
It’s unclear why the Russians abandoned their undamaged T-72. It’s possible the vehicle suffered some kind of mechanical failure—perhaps an engine problem. In any event, the tank was a ripe prize for anyone brave enough to recover it.
Battlefield conditions favored an under-armor recovery. In the April heist, the sheer density of buried mines made the no-man’s-land extremely dangerous for armored vehicles from either side: it was safer, although hardly safe, to send soldiers on foot to fetch the abandoned T-72—albeit only at night.
But mines are apparently less of a threat in Selydove. The Kara-Dag Brigade’s 42-ton T-64s have been roaming the town with unusual freedom, even in broad daylight—perhaps compensating for an extreme shortage of infantry that has vexed the entire Ukrainian military in recent months.
The T-64’s three crew spotted the unoccupied Russian T-72 and rushed into action. The drone continued to observe as, under the cover of a smoke screen, the Ukrainians attached a towing cable to the T-72. A video montage released by the Kara-Dag Brigade ends with the T-64 dragging the T-72 away to the west—toward the main Ukrainian line.
Losing one tank won’t doom Russia’s 11-month offensive along the axis from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk. By the same token, the Ukrainians nabbing one tank won’t save Pokrovsk or surrounding towns from destruction and capture by a Russian field army that’s four times bigger than the local Ukrainian garrison.
But Thursday’s tank heist is still a win for Ukraine. Perhaps most importantly, it’s a morale-booster—a demonstration of the kind of courage and ingenuity the Ukrainians will need to eventually win the ongoing battle for Pokrovsk.
Under The Cover Of Smoke, A Ukrainian Tank Crew Pulled Off A Daring Heist At A Notorious Selydove Underpass—And Stole A Russian T-72
Under The Cover Of Smoke, A Ukrainian Tank Crew Pulled Off A Daring Heist At A Notorious Selydove Underpass—And Stole A Russian T-72
The Ukrainians are infamous tank thieves.www.forbes.com
[IMG alt=" "]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...&crop=5120,2400,x0,y223,safe&width=1440[/IMG]
Via social media
Every day, Russian warplanes lob as many as a hundred KAB glide bombs at Ukrainian troops and cities. The 25-mile-range bombs, some as heavy as three tons, are among the most devastating weapons in Russia’s 30-month wider war on Ukraine—and a crucial factor in Russia’s advances in eastern Ukraine this year.
Now Ukraine is preparing to fight back—with its own glide bombs. A recent video shot by the crew of a Ukrainian air force Sukhoi Su-27 fighter depicts an air force Sukhoi Su-24 bomber carrying a prototype gliding munition under its wing.
Not content to lob American-made JDAM-ER and French-made Hammer glide bombs, the Ukrainians clearly intend to arm their jets with locally made bombs, as well. Air force brigadier general Serhii Holubotsov announced back in June that the service was developing a new glide and guidance kit to transform Soviet-vintage unguided bombs into precision munitions. The test flight on that Su-24 was an important step in the new weapon’s development.
With its wings and tail-mounted rocket booster, the presumably GPS-guided bomb looks a lot like a Hammer. It’s possible the Ukrainians actually copied the French weapon. A quick boost from a solid-fueled rocket is how a 550-pound Hammer ranges as far as 40 miles.
The Ukrainian air force obviously is happy with the Hammer’s range and precision; it’s obviously unhappy with the supply of the bomb. France pledged to provide just 50 Hammers a month—far too few to match the roughly 3,000 KABs the Russians drop all along the 700-mile front line every month, even after taking into account the JDAM-ERs Ukraine gets from the United States.
If Ukraine can establish local production of the new bomb, it might begin to catch up to Russia’s own glide-bombing campaign. The new bomb would join a growing portfolio of made-in-Ukraine munitions that includes the Neptune cruise missile, the new Palianytsia “missile drone” and a host of one-way attack drones—including at least two models of pilotless sport plane that can fly a thousand miles with an explosive payload.
In building its own precision munitions, Ukraine frees itself from total reliance on fickle allies for key military capabilities. Local production is also a way for Ukraine to circumvent its allies’ restrictions on how and where Ukrainian forces can use foreign-made munitions. Most critically, the Americans prohibit the Ukrainians from firing U.S.-supplied precision ballistic missiles at targets inside Russia—targets that include the air bases supporting the Russian glide bombers.
That’s the idea. But it’ll remain that—an idea—until the air force fully tests the new bomb and factories tool up to build the weapon. The Ukrainian air force has armed several warplane types with American and French glide bombs, including Su-24s, Su-27s and Mikoyan MiG-29s. All three types could eventually carry the new Ukrainian bomb.
[IMG alt="Russian Army engineers set the PMM-2M pontoon floating bridge"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...&crop=2621,1228,x0,y449,safe&width=1440[/IMG]
MOSCOW, RUSSIA - 2021/08/24: Russian Army engineers set the PMM-2M pontoon floating bridge during ... [+]
SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
Bridging a river is widely regarded as one of the most difficult tasks in military operations. The Ukrainians know these challenges well, having little success in crossing the Dnipro River near Kherson. Over the past few weeks, the Russians have been facing similar difficulties while attempting to build pontoon bridges across the Seim River in Kursk Oblast, after Ukrainian forces destroyed the original bridge to disrupt Russian supply lines. However, the Russians are now discovering that this challenging process is further complicated by the Ukrainians’ use of advanced drones to target and destroy these pontoon bridges.
The complexity of river bridging is multi-faceted. A river presents a natural obstacle with strong currents, deep water, and unstable banks. Building a bridge strong enough to support military vehicles, including trucks and armor, requires specialized engineer units. Yet, the true difficulty comes from the enemy on the far side. If the opposing force controls the far bank, they can engage exposed bridging units with direct fire. Even if the bank is secured, forward observers can still direct artillery strikes on the vulnerable bridge. Once constructed, the bridge becomes a natural choke point, and without proper coordination, vehicles crossing it are susceptible to attacks, as evidenced in May 2022 on the Siverskyi Donets River, where the Russians lost an entire Battalion Tactical Group.
[IMG alt="Destruction of Bridge in Kursk Region"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...g&crop=2000,937,x0,y160,safe&width=1440[/IMG]
In this image released by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Sunday, August 18, 2024, smoke rises from ... [+]
Associated Press
Despite these challenges, military units train extensively to establish temporary bridges under hostile conditions, with specialized engineer teams able to construct them in just hours. They then coordinate forces to execute the "wet-gap crossing" swiftly and effectively. While these tactics are effective against traditional counter-bridging threats, they are proving to be very vulnerable to drone strikes. Indeed, the integration of drones into Ukrainian counter-bridging operations is making the Russian task of establishing a military bridge nearly impossible.
Drones have provided the Ukrainians with several new capabilities that traditional direct and indirect fires do not offer. Drone strikes, especially those involving loitering munitions, are more accurate than artillery. Moreover, Ukrainian forces do not need to be near the bridge, reducing their exposure to Russian fire. Drones can also maintain constant surveillance over a river, quickly identifying the start of a bridging operation. As drones become more accurate, able to carry larger payloads, and fly for longer durations, their effectiveness in counter-bridge operations will further increase.
The most common defense against enemy attacks during bridging operations is the use of obscurants, such as smoke screens. However, drones are now equipped with advanced sensors, many of which can see through these obscurants. For instance, infrared cameras can penetrate smoke and fog, making a bridge, whose temperature differs from the surrounding water, easy to detect. Additionally, new sensors are also using radio frequency sensing for tracking a military vehicle’s radio signal, allowing a drone to pinpoint the bridging unit’s location as it approaches the river.
[IMG alt="Ukrainian destruction of Russian bridge in Kursk Region"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...&crop=2150,1007,x0,y163,safe&width=1440[/IMG]
In this image provided by the press office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, a strategically ... [+]
Ukrainian Defence Ministry Press Office
Russian counter-drone systems offer very limited protection for their bridging units. The Russia military relies on electronic warfare systems that block drones from receiving control signals. Meanwhile, Ukraine is leveraging its commercial sector to develop increasingly autonomous drones, equipped with advanced computer vision algorithms for targeting. Identifying a river is straightforward, and a preprogrammed flight path can guide a drone along its course. From there, a bridge, which has sharp features relative to a moving body of water, can be easily detected by the drone’s algorithms, allowing it to operate with minimal human intervention.
The threat posed by Ukrainian drones to Russian bridges has significant implications for the broader theater of war. In the short term, if Russian forces cannot replace destroyed bridges with temporary ones, they risk losing critical supply routes. This would deprive their units, especially in southern Ukraine, of vital equipment, particularly artillery. In the long term, the inability to bridge rivers limit maneuverability on the battlefield, severely limiting offensive operations.
While obstacles like minefields have heavily influenced the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, natural obstacles, especially rivers, present even greater challenges. Both militaries possess the capability to rapidly construct bridges, but the use of advanced technologies, particularly drones, in counter-bridging operations has made sustaining these bridges in combat conditions nearly impossible.
In the first 11 days of September Russia has launched more than 400 Shahed attack drones at Ukraine. The rate of attacks is increasing; August saw almost 800 Shahed attacks in total, the highest this year. Russia is ramping up production of its long-range weapons and specifically targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in an attempt to freeze the country into submission this winter. At the same time Shahed attack profiles are changing to make them more effective.
Ukraine is fighting back. Not just with its own growing campaign of long-range drone attacks, but by switching tactics to fight the evolving Shahed threat with both kinetic and electronic means.
High Altitude Threat
The Shahed-136 is an Iranian design, and Russia initially imported complete drones from Iran. Later the drone parts were supplied by Iran and assembled in Russia, now they are manufactured under license at a giant new facility in Alabuga. The Shahed-136 had a seven-foot wingspan and cruises at a leisurely 115 mph with a distinctive sound which has led to the nickname ‘moped’.
[IMG alt="Iranian-Shahed-Drones"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...-Drones/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Iranian-made Shahed-136 '
Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images
Shaheds previously approached at very low altitude to avoid air defence radar. Some reports suggested the drones flew along river valleys to stay out of sight. In response Ukraine developed an innovative drone detection system: a countrywide array of thousands of networked microphones mounted on poles. These listen out for the Shahed’s engine sound, and a central air defence system correlates microphone data to track the route of each drone and calculate its likely target.
Mobile air defence groups with machine guns and automatic cannon then move into position to intercept the Shaheds. Data is supplied via tablet computers, and the groups use thermal imaging night sights; the weapons may be from the 1950s but they are guided by modern technology. With many men at the front, some groups are composed of female volunteers.
[IMG alt="Air Defense Of Kyiv Region; Protection Of The Sky"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...The-Sky/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Ukrainian mobile defense unit with a German-supplied Gepard vehicle; kill marks show they have downed five Shaheds
But in recent months the Shaheds have started crossing Ukraine at high altitude and only descending over the target.
“Shaheds changed their tactics and fly over Ukraine at a height of 2 kilometers and often at 4-5 km [ 0ver 15,000 feet]. This is intended to avoid being hit by the mobile fire groups,” says Ukrainian analyst Serhii Flash in a recent post on his Telegram Channel.
Russian analyst “Russian Engineer” notes in his Telegram channel that the higher altitude attacks also mean the drones are too high to be picked up by acoustic sensors.
“It is necessary to increase the flight altitude by a certain amount, so that machine guns and MZA MTFs [mobile air defence groups] cannot reach them,” says Russian Engineer. “Only interception by missiles, both from air defense systems and from aviation, remains. Which in general plays into our hands, since the increased consumption of anti-aircraft missiles reduces the effectiveness of air defense.”
Stocks of air defence missiles like Patriot and Iris are extremely limited, and are conserved for ballistic missiles and other major threats rather than small drones. So Ukraine has changed tactics.
Aircraft Versus Drones
Ukraine’s Air Force has become a key player in the counter-drone campaign. The old prop planes mobilized to shoot down reconnaissance drones may not be able to catch Shaheds, but other types can.
Videos show Ukrainian helicopters shooting down Shaheds, and this now appears to be a standard tactic. High-flying drones are picked up by air defence radar and the Mi-8 helicopter is able to fly alongside while a door gunner blasts it with a machinegun. Mi-24 helicopter gunships are also used for this role, shooting down the drones with the 23mm cannon.
These encounters have been compared with an earlier drone campaign: the V-1 ‘Doodlebugs’ launched at Britain in 1944-45. Many of the V-1s were intercepted and shot down by Spitfires and other air defence aircraft. As they flew in a straight line the Doodlebugs were easy targets, but the risk was that the aircraft which shot one down might be damaged by the explosion of the 1,000-pound warhead. Pilots leaned to nudge the V-1 using a wingtip causing it to crash before it reached its target.
Ukrainian jet fighters also bring down Shaheds. A video from August 30 shows a MiG-29 shooting down a Shahed with an R-73 air-to-air missile at a range of about a mile.
These missions carry some risk. The first American-supplied F-16 loss in Ukraine occurred during a major Russian attack, though not as a direct result of enemy action. The details are not known, but it is likely that pilot Oleksiy Mes, callsign ‘Moonfish’, was killed by friendly fire. Deconfliction is not a trivial challenge when enemy drones and cruise missiles are sharing airspace in a fast-moving situation. (A video of an F-16 shooting down a Shahed with cannon fire circulating on social media appears to come from a video game. This would be a risky tactic in real life because of the risk of debris).
These tactics seem to have been successful. A report published in August indicated that the rate of shooting down Shaheds had risen into 91% in a six-month period, compared to 80% in the previous six months.
Interceptor FPV drones, which have recently brought down large numbers of Russian reconnaissance drones, lack the range and speed to tackle Shaheds. It seems highly likely that Ukrainian engineers are working on this challenge. Success could mean a dramatic shift in the drone war.
Directionless Drones
At the same time alternative means of stopping Shaheds also seem to be working even when they are not shot down. Recently we have seen increasing numbers of Shahed going off-piste and missing not only their targets but the country they were launched at.
3 of the Shaheds launched on the night of 11th September reportedly looped around and ended up over Russia. During August, at least 12 Shaheds entered the airspace of Belarus, where some were intercepted by fighters. At least one Shahed flew over Polish territory on 26th August. On 7th September, Romania scrambled fighters as a Shahed crossed over the border. On 9th September Latvian authorities confirmed that a Russian Shahed had crashed on their soil, hundreds of miles from Ukraine.
Some of these incidents may be due to the quality control issues that plague Russian manufacturing. The Alabuga factory employs the cheapest possible labor and build quality appears low. But many may be sent off course by electronic warfare. In February we described the nationwide Pokrova system designed to spoof drone satellite guidance systems and this appears to be just one of many such efforts. Ukrainian drones now rely on optical guidance systems which follow landmarks on the ground below, and the Russians may seek similar alternatives. Back in March some downed Shaheds were found with cameras as well as modems, indicating that the drones were evolving.
The Shahed barrage continues and is likely to get heavier. Ukraine will continue to tighten its defenses and achieve even higher kill rates, though a steady supply of Western air-defence missiles (and air-to-air missiles for F-16s) will be crucial.
In the long term though the best approach is likely to be to “kill the archer, not the arrow” –use long-range weapons to attack launch sites, storage and production facilities and stop the drones first.
The deaths of two seasoned Russian drone operators in Ukraine have stirred a frenzy among pro-Kremlin military bloggers, who say the specialists were sent to fight as regular infantrymen.
In a video recorded before their deaths, both operators said they were assigned to a suicide mission with an assault unit as punishment for arguing with their commander.
The clip of the specialists — Dmitry "Goodwin" Lysakovsky and Sergei "Ernest" Gritsai — was published posthumously, appearing on Friday on the Telegram channel "North Wind."
The footage has since circulated widely on Russian Telegram channels, which identified the soldiers as members of the 87th Rifle Regiment fighting near Pokrovsk in Donetsk.
Lysakovsky and Gritsai accused their new commander, Igor Puzyk, of disbanding their drone squad after they quarreled with him and filtering their team members into infantry platoons.
They further alleged that Puzyk had facilitated drug trafficking in his unit and falsely reported battlefield gains under his command.
Lysakovsky recorded a separate video message in which he profusely criticized Puzyk and claimed that the commander was being influenced by a soldier who kept ties with Ukrainian intelligence.
"Lies is an absolute norm," Lysakovsky said, per a translation by Estonian analyst WarTranslated.
A very curious incident occurred for Russians in the Pokrovsk direction. We've all heard when Russians send specialists like UAV operators and tankmen into meat assaults. In this case, one operator recorded a video before his death...1/ pic.twitter.com/b893g7mF3w
— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) September 13, 2024
"I'm recording this in case I don't come back from assault, and only then this message will have any weight," Lysakovsky added.
He later said in another video that he was about to leave to "storm" with his infantry unit and called on Russian men not to join the war.
"Your task is to die here so that the regiment commander, reporting to the higher-ups, looks good," he said. "These are his personal serfs."
These two videos featuring him were also published by "North Wind" on Friday.
Past Russian media reports suggest that Lysakovsky was well-known even before the Ukraine war, writing that he was a lawyer and financier who was fighting for the Donetsk People's Republic, a separatist faction in Ukraine, as early as 2014.
He became the head of the DPR's aerial reconnaissance unit by 2016, per a report that year by Kommersant, which said he was charged with corporate raiding in Moscow.
As for Gritsai, Russian military bloggers who claimed to personally know him reported that he was a career officer.
In their joint video complaint, the two men said they complied with their commander's orders because they had taken an "oath to the Motherland."
Russian backlash and an official response
The footage sparked an outcry over the weekend among Russian military bloggers, many of whom independently reported that the two men had been killed in battle.
Part of the backlash stems from assessments by on-the-ground pundits that Lysakovsky and Gritsai had been two of the best drone operators at the frontline.
Several posted screenshots of Russian text messages, in which Lysakovsky asked for help with transferring out of his unit.
"There are no supplies, no maps, no plans of minefields. Nothing," Lysakovsky wrote in a message dated September 10.
Dozens of Russian commentators have blasted the circumstances of the deaths, with some calling for a ban on assigning specialists like snipers or drone operators to infantry assaults.
"The very fact of repurposing an effective UAV reconnaissance crew into assault infantry in the current conditions is, to put it mildly, sabotage," wrote Russian pro-Kremlin journalist Alexander Kots.
The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed the deaths of Gritsei and Lysakovsky on Sunday, writing that it would investigate their demise.
The probe would be run under the "personal control" of Viktor Goremykin, a deputy defense minister, and Valery Gerasimov, the chief of Russia's armed forces, the ministry said in its statement.
Some of the furor has calmed since the announcement. However, several prominent bloggers continued expressing concern over what they say is a rising occurrence of Russian commanders wasting valuable specialists on frontal assaults.
Political commentator Svyatoslav Golikov wrote that the problem had become "systematic" in the military due to manpower shortages on the battlefield.
"This particular issue will be sorted out. But only because it raised a fuss," wrote the Telegram channel Two Majors.
The Russian Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent outside regular business hours by Business Insider.
Pokrovsk, the city near which Lysakovsky and Gritsai were deployed, has been a focal point and a source of much bloodshed on Ukraine's eastern front.
Russian troops have been pushing hard to take the logistics hub in recent months, nearing the outskirts of the city after weeks of slow advance.
In May 2023, HUR chief Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov promised to “destroy Russian war criminals anywhere in the world they may be.”
In the last few weeks, Ukraine has deployed new FPV interceptors which have been bringing down Russia reconnaissance drones in large numbers. A video compilation by the Wild Hornets group on August 28th showed 115 intercepts by their drones, roughly matching the total downed in the entire previous year. A follow up video on September 10th showed another 53 intercepts.
There is little Russian drone operators can do against this onslaught. There are few tactical options; the drones have powerful cameras, but they are aimed downwards and the operator has no situational awareness. They cannot see what is happening around their aircraft and FPV attacks come literally out of the blue.
Their only recourse has been making their aircraft less conspicuous. Or just hurling insults at their enemies.
Aerial Camouflage
[IMG alt="Cammo drone 2"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...drone-2/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Without camouflage, drones are easier to spot
Wild Hornets
The history of camouflage paint jobs on aircraft goes all the way back to WW1. A white or black aircraft is easy to spot in an empty sky or against clouds and the French were the first to start painting their Nieuport fighters a uniform blue-grey to make them less visible. Hiding was impossible, but the right color scheme could reduce the spotting distance
A variety camouflage patterns followed. Typically the underside was colored light gray or blue for optimal invisibility against the sky, while the upper surface typically had a green and brown camouflage pattern to make them less obvious from above.
[IMG alt="Spitfire_-_Season_Premiere_Airshow_2018_(cropped)"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...ropped-/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
WWII spitfire with camouflage scheme
Airwolfhound Wikimedia Commons
By the Cold War radar was a bigger threat than visual detection and camouflage was largely abandoned. A notable exception was the F-117 Nighthawk stealth attack aircraft, which was painted flat black as it operated at night and its small radar signature made visual observation mores significant.
The Russians have reinvented some of the camouflage techniques of the past. While most of the drones brought down by interceptors are still the standard pale grey, some are sporting new color schemes.
Zala drones in particular have mottled green and brown wings, a modern version of the old ‘sand and spinach’ which blends effectively with the patchwork of fields below and may make it harder to interceptors to track them.
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This 'dazzle pattern' makes it harder to judge the size and shape of the drones
Wild Hornets
A deceptive pattern of black and white triangles seen on another Zala is a more ingenious solution. This is reminiscent of the dazzle camouflage for warships developed by British artist Normal Wilkinson in WW1. Raher than trying to make the ship inconspicuous, Wilkinson’s irregular patterns broke up the outline of the vessel and made it difficult to judge the angle and hence the direction it was travelling. This was mainly intended to confuse the view from a periscope. A submarine commander needed to allow the right amount of lead when firing a torpedo into a moving ship’s path, and the errors induced by the dazzle paint scheme should make a ship a harder target.
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WWII U.S. navy motor torpedo boat with dazzle camouflage
Getty Images
Interception videos show that it can take several efforts for an FPV to hit a drone. By making it harder to estimate distance and bearing, the dazzle pattern might be more effective than green and brown. Last year some Russian warships were seen with a variant on the dazzle scheme, possibly to confuse the machine vision of surveillance satellites or uncrewed kamikaze boats.
One Supercam drone had dazzle patterning on one wing. Again, this may be intended to make the shape of the drone more difficult to assess, possibly so the interception aim point was offset to cause less damage.
When You Can't Fight, Swear
[IMG alt="ID stickers roundels"]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...oundels/960x0.jpg?format=jpg&width=1440[/IMG]
Ukrainian drone operators are advised to use WWII-style roundels to identify their planes
Serhii Sternenko
Most of the Russian drones though still have their original color scheme, but telling friend from foe is not always easy. Drone fundraiser Serhii Sternenko advises Ukrainian drone teams to mark their planes with blue and yellow stickers so they can be identified as friendly. Deceptive stickers have not yet been seen on Russian drones.
What we are seeing are though is wing graffiti. This is positioned to be read from above, so the only person who will ever see it is the interceptor drone operator.
Increasingly, these are being used to hurl insults.
“Whoever shoots this down is a f****r,” runs the text (in Russian) on one in blue paint.
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"Whoever shoots this down..." Russian drone operators sending a message to their opponents
Wild Hornets
Another one is more terse, simply stating “M**********R” (in Russian) in letters laid out in strips of tape.
Others suggest that Russian fatalism may be starting to take hold, as in the case of a drone with “F*****d” (In Russian) written on one wing, a comment which proved prophetic. (Thanks to Samuel Bendett for specialty translation assistance)
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A concise one-word summary of this drone's condition in a sky filled with interceptors.
Wild Hornets
Russian discussions on military Telegram channels suggest that their recon drones need jammers – tricky, as self-jamming would be an issue – or at least rearward-facing cameras. No doubt there will be further evolutions and some kind of defensive measures, armament or escort will emerge. Wild Hornets are already raising funds for new high-speed interceptors to tackle more challenging targets.
For the present, those Russian reconnaissance drones appear to be sitting ducks, and all they can fire back with are obscenities.
Update 17th September: In a new approach, this downed Russian drone is shielded by protective Nordic runes which evidently did not work either. Maybe we will see Orcish next. (The hand with knife has been adopted as a way of proving that an image shows a drone downed and captured by Ukrainian forces.)
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Drone protected with magical runes
Ukraine MoD
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A car with the words "Children" written on it is seen with bullet holes in the windscreen on April 06, 2022, in Bucha, Ukraine. (Photo credit: Chris McGrath/Getty Images)
Getty Images
On September 17, 2024, during a session at the International Bar Association’s annual conference in Mexico City, Andriy Kostin, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, confirmed that his team collects evidence of and investigates Russia’s crime of genocide against Ukrainians. He explained that they are looking into the abductions of Ukrainian children to Russia, but also the destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage linked to Ukrainian identity, among others. He also indicated that his team is investigating mass killings, such as those in Bucha, as a crime of genocide.
The crime of genocide is an international crime that is defined in Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). Apart from the perpetration of the prohibited acts, to meet the legal definition of genocide, a protected group is to be targeted (whether ethnic, racial, national, or religious group and with a specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. Because of the requirement of a specific intent, the determination of the crime of genocide is not easy. However, looking at recent years, there have been several situations where the elements of the crime are there and in some cases - the evidence was put to test and resulted in convictions of several individuals for their involvement in genocide (as in the case of the Yazidi genocide).
As Mr Kostin correctly identified, Russia’s crimes against children are one of the prohibited acts in the Genocide Convention, namely of “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” Reports suggest that after being abducted and transferred to Russia, Ukrainian children are subjected to indoctrination at schools, and some are subjected to adoptions by Russians. As Mr Kostin summarized, Russia abducted Ukrainian children in an “attempt to steal our future.”
The International Criminal Court (ICC) considered the treatment of Ukrainian children to amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity and issued arrest warrants for two individuals most responsible for the crimes - Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russia’s Child Commissioner. At this stage, it is unclear whether further charges will be considered - including for their involvement in genocide.
Another person speaking at the IBA session was Liev Schreiber, an actor, and humanitarian. Liev co-founded BlueCheck Ukraine, a non-governmental organization which has been identifying, vetting and fast-tracking funding to more than 28 frontline organizations providing emergency services to Ukrainian people. During the session, he mentioned his work supporting Ukraine, whether with BlueCheck Ukraine or advocating for the return of Ukrainian children. In February 2024, Liev Schreiber addressed the U.N. Security Council during the first-ever closed-door session with Ukrainian children abducted during Russia’s invasion. He called upon States to take all necessary steps for a safe return of all Ukrainian children taken by Russia: “In the face of all these injustices, trauma, and human rights violations, there is perhaps no more basic and fundamental definition of human security than for a child not to be separated from their parents. We are here today to raise awareness and to confront the horrific reality that thousands of Ukrainian children have been torn from their families and forcibly deported to the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, and also to take necessary steps to foster their safe return and reunification with their families, consistent with international law.” As the evidence of the atrocities perpetrated by Russia continues to be collected, it is crucial that the evidence is considered against all international crimes - including war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. Only by addressing the crimes for what they are, it will be possible to secure justice and accountability and help to prevent similar atrocities in the future. As evidence of genocidal atrocities committed by Putin is mounting, it is crucial that national and international actors continue to engage on the issue - for victims and survivors, and for future generations of Ukrainians.