Who are History's 10 greatest military leaders ?

Fun fact, Prior to mpescatori's post, the word "Peasant" appears three times in this 27 pages discussion: Once in the context of Jean D'Arc's social station, one discussing Mongol extermination tactics, and once describing the make up of the army of Mao Tse-Tung.

Why he felt the need to point out that Napoleon was not a peasant, and why we are discussing this 'fact', I can't comprehend.
 
Steph said:
I disagree. Most of the officers were some kind of nobility before the revolution.

Correction, he didn't even have a title just a name (which he changed). Hardly noble in the sense of big estates and actual social distinction. Only the poor and indignant nobility seem to have joined the military and that includes second and third sons. Because, I too can use wikipedia:

Napoleon's noble, moderately affluent background and family connections afforded him greater opportunities to study than were available to a typical Corsican of the time

Also, his father was a profligate gambler who was constantly short of money... he had better opportunities because of his name and not any preponderance of cash.
 
I am sorry but I MUST disagree with the lot of you (which is not a rude expression but correct contemporary Queen's English).

Keeping in mind that (I presume) you all write from North America, whereas I write from Europe... where the Aristocracy has been ruling on and off for the last 3000 years+++...

...in the old days, the 1st born in a noble family would receive the title and the responsibility to administer title, land and fiefdom (which meant applying taxes and enforcing the law, either the King's law or his own);
...similarly, the 2nd born would more often than not be educated to become a diplomat or a high-ranking Man of the Cloth, i.e. until some 100 years ago the son of a peasant would become a priest at 18 and remain such the rest of his life, the son of a noble would become a priest at 18 and become a Mopnsignor by 30, Bishop by 40, Cardinal by 50 if not even earlier;
...the 3rd born and the rest would become military, or scholars, the only way they could stay within the confines of their own lot (the aristocracy) marry proper girls (daughters of aristocrats) and father more junior aristocrats etc.

All in all, to use yet another British expression, once the ol Earl died,
- the 1st born would become the new earl,
- the 2nd born was possibly already a Monsignor or Bishop and celebrated his own brother's "crowning"
- the 3rd born would provide military escort etc. to his own brother the Earl, who would grant him the title of "The Honourable ... ... ..." as his own junior brother.

True, there were Officers coming from the bourgeoisie, but they were by definition limited to the Infantry and the Engineers, or to the Surgeons Corps (see Dr. Darwin), but they rarely made it beyond the rank of captain without a war, and major even with war decorations.

Please, do not look at the history of the USA as if it were the history of the world, the USA are but 300 years old including all its history as British Colonies.

By contrast, Julius Caesar was of the family and dynasty of the "Gens Juliae", essentially the US equivalent of direct blood lineage to the Pilgrim Fathers; similarly, Von Moltke, Von Clausewitz, in truth any general (not Captain through the ranks, but commanding general) was fair and square from the aristocracy, because at the end of the day he had, by right of his own Commission and rank, the right to seek audience to the King. No Monarch would ever grant such a right to a commoner.

Commonfolk generals ?

Garibaldi was one, and Spartacus was another. ing David when he served under King Saul as the Captain of the Guard (=General Commanding the Army) They commanded through sheer charisma, often lacked outright military education, to which they compensated by proving quick learners on the field and cunning planners before combat.
Of these three, Garibaldi was given a "thank you very much" treatment and sent off to grow old on an island; King David died an apparently honorable death (but the Bible wouldn't have it any other way) and Spartacus was eventually defeated and crucified.
Hannibal ? An aristocrat of the Barca dynasty.
Leonidas ? Elected King of Sparta to fight off the Persians
Costantine ? Born of a low-ranking, 2nd rate Clonel of the Roman Imperial Army, he set off a full scale mutiny and fortunately (for him) proved a better leader in the field to his "Emperor-designate" counterpart... but most of his alleged victories are artifact.

You are all welcome to come and visit Italy, France, Spain, Germany, England and see what 3000 years of history leave as heritage and cultural legacy.

As for myself, I am but 5th consecutive generation military, borne from, you guessed it, a rich but obscure 3rd born...
 
Only the poor and indignant nobility seem to have joined the military and that includes second and third sons
Wellesley? Suvorov? They may not have been the richest, but they weren't exactly poor.
I am not as knowledgable about France, but beyond the firstborn son, they were not looking at a large inherritance, even in fairly wealthy families. Hence they join the military looking for spoils of war and potential titles to be earned. The second-born joining the priesthood provides support and social position for him, while (as I have been told) keeping him safe in case something happens to the heir and he becomes the eldest son.

In fact the poor nobles rarely got to higher ranks in, at least, Britain since they couldn't afford to purchase the rank. And as far as I am aware this existed for all European powers except (possibly) Russia and Prussia prior to the French Revolution.
 
In my opinion, the top 10 generals and military leaders would probably be (in no order):

10: Leonidas, although he lost, struck a large dent within the Persian Army and made it possible for the rest of the Greek City States able to defeat the Persians.

9: Eisenhower and Zhukov. I cannot decide which of these guys was a better general since they both largely contributed to the fall of the 3rd Reich. Eisenhower led the US, UK, Canadian and French forces alongside other generals while Zhukov led the Red Army in the east against full regiments and freshly built machines.

8: Benedict Arnold. Although not technically a general, he was directly responsible for victory at the Battle of Saratoga, which allowed the USA an alliance with France. His commanding general, Horatio Gates, was only in position from being the congress's lapdog, and led his soldiers to one of the worst defeats in US history. When Benedict defected to Great Britian, he was given poorly trained rabble and yet he still took over a few towns. Had he been given trained soldiers, I'd probably be British right now.

7: Napoleon Bonaparte. Although he was the Emperor of France, he would often lead the French Army to victories. He could have won the Napoleonic War if he had taken over the British Isles before invading Russia.

6: Genghis Khan Temujin. Although he had generals such as Subatai, he was the grand visionary of the Mongol Horde and led a small group of conflicting clans into one of the largest empires in history spanning from China to Hungary.

5: Sun Tzu. The first post didn't say that the military leaders had to be direct leaders. Sun Tzu wrote the Code of War, which still affects training today. He also built an academy that trained the best of the best.

4: Spartacus. He led a rebellion of slaves and gladiators and was really hard to take down. Even after Roman Soldiers were sent, he was still gaining victories, when the best of the best was sent, he then lost.

3: Julius Caesar. He was not only the Consul of Rome, he also led the army against the Gallic tribes and later against other Romans, to victory.

2: Shaka Zulu. He was the leader of a unified Zulu nation that would later gain victories against the British Empire with Bronze Age weapons. Isandlwhana is an especially well known example of Tank vs. Spearman.

1: Alexander the Great. When you have a leader with the word 'Great' in his name, capitalized, then he was good. He was the leader of the Macedonian Empire and the general of the Macedonian armies. He led the Macedonians against the Persians with many victories despite overwhelming odds. It has also been theorized that Alexander the Great's army could have defeated early Gunpowder era armies of the same size.
 
10: Leonidas, although he lost, struck a large dent within the Persian Army and made it possible for the rest of the Greek City States able to defeat the Persians.

It does not take much to figure out that a narrow pass is the best place to defend against a large army. All he did was lead soldiers there and fight to the death. It does not take a legendary general to do that.


He could have won the Napoleonic War if he had taken over the British Isles before invading Russia.

He had no chance of conquering Britain. His navy was crushed at Trafalgar. Besides this has already been discussed on this thread. There was no real chance that Napoleon could successfully invade Britain at any point in his campaign.


4: Spartacus. He led a rebellion of slaves and gladiators and was really hard to take down. Even after Roman Soldiers were sent, he was still gaining victories, when the best of the best was sent, he then lost.

Spartacus was defeated by Crassus who could hardly be called the "best of the best." He could not even hold a candle to Julius Caesar or even Pompey for the matter.


It has also been theorized that Alexander the Great's army could have defeated early Gunpowder era armies of the same size.

Source?
 
7: Napoleon Bonaparte. Although he was the Emperor of France, he would often lead the French Army to victories. He could have won the Napoleonic War if he had taken over the British Isles before invading Russia.

How pray tell would he have done that?

1: Alexander the Great. ... It has also been theorized that Alexander the Great's army could have defeated early Gunpowder era armies of the same size.

I lol'd.
 
Hello LightSpectra, and thank you for your analysis.

I agree wholeheartedly with you, although you did omit two interesting and often unmentioned details:

1) Napoleon was NOT an unnoticed Corsican peasant ! May I quote from wikipedia:
"Napoleon was born in Corsica to parents of noble Italian ancestry and trained as an artillery officer in mainland France"
The truth of the matter is Corsica was donated by the Republic of Genoa to France a short time before Napoleon was born. Had Genoa enjoyed better fortune, Napoleon would have been born a Genoese, not a Frenchman (although even in this day and age most Corsicans grimace at the thought of being described as "french") and quite possibly joined the Genoese Navy rather than the French Army (and there would have been no Empereur, no French takeover of Europe, no Restoration at the Congress of Vienna in 1815).
This is also confirmed by the fact that "the little Corse" (as he was called by his comrades) was admitted ato the Military School in Marseilles as a Cadet in the French Imperial Artillery, from where he graduated at the age of 16. Had he not been of noble descent, he would have never been admitted to the Artillery; the borgeoisie were only admitted to the infantry and the engineers - only aristocrats were admitted to the cavalry and artillery, because only in those two Corps were subaltern Officers allowed a horse.

2) Napoleon's military genius became evident during the French Revolution when he embraced the cause of the Revolutionaries, and invented "manoeuvre of artillery fire"; before napoleon, each Division was composed of a number of Infantry and cavalry Regiments, and a few Artillery batteries; Napoleon regimented those batteries and exploited their effect by concentrating the fire of his artilelry all on one specific target, then on another specific target, and so on. He was also the first to determine the importance of "artilelry tables", that is, pre-made calculations set in a booklet which allowed the commander of a battery to determine powder charge, elevation and other parameters in order to fire quickly and effectively on any one target, as long as battery and target were on the same map. This meant his "Regiment d'Artillerie" could fire two, three quick salvos onto one target, and within very few minutes (which, in those slow-moving days, were lighting quick) steer all his guns on another target.

Napoleon lost at Waterloo because, among things, the ground was muddy and his explosive shrapnel rounds would go "plop!" in the mud rather than bounce and explode.

I'd say there were bigger factors than that. Still, it can hardly be held against him that he lost Waterloo. It's an injustice that Waterloo has become a synonym for failure when Napoleon was working against the odds from the get-go. What's amazing to me is that if the Prussians had been held off as Napoleon wanted but his subordinate could not execute, that battle could have ended much differently.
 
The Hundred Days was an utterly insane idea from the get-go. Napoleon's plan was to use his two armies to defeat five separate armies before they could link up and overwhelm him with sheer numbers. Not only had he never accomplished such a feat before (the greatest he had ever done was the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign, which was three armies), but this was after the Allies' military reforms that put them on equal footing with the French, after they had weeded out all their incompetent commanders and learned from their blunders, and after they had denied France of any possible resource advantage she could've summoned.

I maintain that Napoleon is the greatest military commander to ever live, but it's almost undeniable that he became sloppy and overconfident after Austerlitz. (Though even then, he was still highly formidable.) I've also heard other reasons why his skill peaked at 1805. His workaholic attitude allowed him to micromanage everything, but that dwindled as he got older and had a son. Also, the size of the campaigns he was managing had grown so large that his personal decisions started to have a lesser effect on the grand picture.

Which is to not even consider the times when his subordinates failed; especially Soult (of whom Wellington said, "he never seems to me to know how to handle troops after the battle had begun") and Ney (who failed to capture the routed Allies at Bautzen), who although weren't terrible commanders, often made critical blunders that ended up losing the campaign for the French.

Today is also the 195th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, by the way.
 
In my opinion, the top 10 generals and military leaders would probably be (in no order):

10: Leonidas, although he lost, struck a large dent within the Persian Army and made it possible for the rest of the Greek City States able to defeat the Persians.

Erm, not really. The Hot Gates was essentially the 4th century version of a publicity stunt.

9: Eisenhower and Zhukov. I cannot decide which of these guys was a better general since they both largely contributed to the fall of the 3rd Reich. Eisenhower led the US, UK, Canadian and French forces alongside other generals while Zhukov led the Red Army in the east against full regiments and freshly built machines.

Both were mediocre at best. By no means extraordinary, especially Zhukov. If you want a good Red Army commander, look for Mikhail Tukhachevsky.
7: Napoleon Bonaparte. Although he was the Emperor of France, he would often lead the French Army to victories. He could have won the Napoleonic War if he had taken over the British Isles before invading Russia.

And invaded North America if he had time traveling space aliens.

5: Sun Tzu. The first post didn't say that the military leaders had to be direct leaders. Sun Tzu wrote the Code of War, which still affects training today. He also built an academy that trained the best of the best.

From what we know of Sun Tzu, he was probably actually quite a horrible general, if he even was one at all.

4: Spartacus. He led a rebellion of slaves and gladiators and was really hard to take down. Even after Roman Soldiers were sent, he was still gaining victories, when the best of the best was sent, he then lost.

3: Julius Caesar. He was not only the Consul of Rome, he also led the army against the Gallic tribes and later against other Romans, to victory.

Probably worthy mentions.

2: Shaka Zulu. He was the leader of a unified Zulu nation that would later gain victories against the British Empire with Bronze Age weapons. Isandlwhana is an especially well known example of Tank vs. Spearman.

Isandlwana was not fought by Shaka.

1: Alexander the Great. When you have a leader with the word 'Great' in his name, capitalized, then he was good. He was the leader of the Macedonian Empire and the general of the Macedonian armies. He led the Macedonians against the Persians with many victories despite overwhelming odds.

Really? I can think of one.

It has also been theorized that Alexander the Great's army could have defeated early Gunpowder era armies of the same size.

Depends on if they are commanded by Zheng He or not.
 
Well it is true some historian did come up with a theory that Alexander Army could beat Napoleons Grande Armée but this is talking more about the way the armies fought not the leadership.

Napoleon > Alexander
 
That list makes me so mad

Any list without hannibal in a list of greatest military leaders makes me cry.
 
I'm hard pressed to say Eisenhower was mediocre. Marshall, Eisenhower and Smith worked extremely well together, of whose fruits we see in Overlord, an operation whose scope and complexity are often taken for granted. They obviously weren't as innovative as the Manstein/Rundstedt/Guderian team; even on the American side, I would have to concede that Bradley, Spaatz, Spruance and Nimitz are more deserving of a top ranking than anybody else.

Well it is true some historian did come up with a theory that Alexander Army could beat Napoleons Grande Armée but this is talking more about the way the armies fought not the leadership.

It might just be because it's 1am, but this post makes literally no sense to me whatsoever. Who is "some historian," and what crack was he on?
 
He's claiming that some historian "theorized" that if you removed Napoleon and Alexander from the equation, the Macedonian Army would be a match for the Army of Napoleon.
 
I am not saying they would be a match but the a historian did make that claim.

Will try and find his name.
 
The Hundred Days was an utterly insane idea from the get-go. Napoleon's plan was to use his two armies to defeat five separate armies before they could link up and overwhelm him with sheer numbers. Not only had he never accomplished such a feat before (the greatest he had ever done was the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign, which was three armies), but this was after the Allies' military reforms that put them on equal footing with the French, after they had weeded out all their incompetent commanders and learned from their blunders, and after they had denied France of any possible resource advantage she could've summoned.

I maintain that Napoleon is the greatest military commander to ever live, but it's almost undeniable that he became sloppy and overconfident after Austerlitz. (Though even then, he was still highly formidable.) I've also heard other reasons why his skill peaked at 1805. His workaholic attitude allowed him to micromanage everything, but that dwindled as he got older and had a son. Also, the size of the campaigns he was managing had grown so large that his personal decisions started to have a lesser effect on the grand picture.

Which is to not even consider the times when his subordinates failed; especially Soult (of whom Wellington said, "he never seems to me to know how to handle troops after the battle had begun") and Ney (who failed to capture the routed Allies at Bautzen), who although weren't terrible commanders, often made critical blunders that ended up losing the campaign for the French.

Today is also the 195th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, by the way.

The 100 Days was certainly an insane venture, yet I can't imagine Napoleon doing anything else. Really, the problem at this point was no matter how superior Napoleon was as a commander, which I believe (he still was superior), the size of the forces against him were such that even if his armies inflicted horrible defeats upon larger forces, there was practically an infinite number of them in comparison. And as you said, which I bolded, although Napoleon had some very capable subordinates who had served him well for many years, the situations had grown so large in scale that the only way for Napoleon's forces to have strategic success was for his subordinates to execute his plans, which they sometimes failed to implement properly whereas Napoleon would have been able to.

From what I've heard, one of Napoleon's weaknesses was that he was so brilliant and always had such a clear idea of what he wanted/needed to do on the battlefield, that he sometimes failed to clearly outline what he needed his subordinates to do. It did not occur to him that they weren't grasping all the things he was, and his orders themselves could be somewhat vague while he knew in his head exactly what was needed. When he was facing practical incompetence, such as in the Third Coalition (except for maybe Kutuzov who still went along with the coalition battleplan at Austerlitz although he seemed to find it uninspiring), the superiority of his generals was clear, so that even when they failed to execute exactly what Napoleon wanted, they still had success and there was no great strategist against them to take advantage of small mistakes. Once the enemy gained competent leadership, a fighting cause stronger than the French, and vast superiority in numbers, the smallest failure to execute the complex battleplan that was needed for French victory instantly became its undoing.
 
I wouldn't say anybody in the Third Coalition was outright incompetent. There's no way without hindsight Mack could've possibly foreseen the insane marching speed the French exhibited in Ulm. Arguably the Tsar was, because Austerlitz seemed like an obvious trap (why exactly did he think Napoleon exited his cozy high ground in favor of one where the Allies would have to move their entire left flank through a corridor?), but I chalk that up to the fact that it was only after Austerlitz that commanders began to expect to be attacked in every time and direction.
 
say1988 said:
Wellesley? Suvorov? They may not have been the richest, but they weren't exactly poor.

Its telling that you can only name two both of whom started relatively low (ensign and private respectively) and built themselves up on the basis of their respective personal skills in fairly tumultuous times. The former had to have his father personally intercede with a friend to secure a commission from him because the family was short of money, while the second joined as a private. This is notwithstanding the simple point that Wellesley was the fourth son as well.

say1988 said:
In fact the poor nobles rarely got to higher ranks in, at least, Britain since they couldn't afford to purchase the rank. And as far as I am aware this existed for all European powers except (possibly) Russia and Prussia prior to the French Revolution.

Officers aren't limited to generals and above you know?
 
Its telling that you can only name two both of whom started relatively low (ensign and private respectively) and built themselves up on the basis of their respective personal skills in fairly tumultuous times.
Every British officer started at ensign (or the equivalent). And Wellesley purchased his way up a Lieutenant-Colonel before his first battle (where he definitely didn't prove anything) and was a Colonel for the first campaign where his skill began to shine through.

This is notwithstanding the simple point that Wellesley was the fourth son as well.
One of whom died in infancy. And what does this even have to do with anything?

Then how about Cardigan? Cornwallis? And many later Dukes of Wellington?

And the reason I can't give examples of more junior officers, is that I simply don't know any let alone am I capable of finding their lineage. And to counter an argument that only desperate nobility joined the military, it shouldn't be necessary.
 
I don't get what your trying to argue. I pointed out that it was predominately the nobility who made up the officer corps of pre-Revolutionary France. That the bulk of those came from modest financial means and that they tended to be the 'spares' that is, not the heir. Napoleon fits into this description. He was of noble stock, was of relatively modest means and didn't expect (baring an accident) to inherit a title. Presumably, the French civil service which had a higher cost to enter and advance in was probably closed to him for just that reason. The military was cheaper to enter by comparison and offered more in financial terms that he would have got in other circumstances. The possibility of acquiring a title and all the antecedent glory that went long with a military victory was probably attractive as well but from a realistic perspective that chances of that actually happening were relatively slim.

Simply put, for every man of noble birth with money entering and moving rapidly up the ranks there were probably a dozen men of noble birth entering and stopping at the point at which there financial couldn't cope. And even then, those with the blood and the money were likely a-typical in some respect. The civil service in France, or the Parliament in Great Britain were the better choices for men of leisure.

Its not like this is a novel feature. Heck, Orwell in his novel-cum-memoirs Burmese Days written in the thirties notes that the British Army in India had a preponderance of men with limited personal means but good names. Sure, some were wealthy and had the name as well. Sure, some of were from bourgeois backgrounds. Sure, some of them did it because they liked the lifestyle, the guns, the uniforms, the sado-masochistic pleasure in riding down coolies or whatever. But there was still a discernible trend that a substantial number of officers were of the type I described earlier. The civil service by contrast was almost exclusively the preserve of the bourgeois in the lower ranks up to say, district heads. Once you moved past that point you find that the nobility of the same type predominated and above them were people like Lord Curzon. This is how I understand your argument works. If a person like Lord Curzon is at the top it stands therefore that those below him were of comparable wealth, standing and nobility. Certainly, the latter might be correct at least in part as I've suggested. But the former just don't follow in the least.

Every British officer started at ensign (or the equivalent). And Wellesley purchased his way up a Lieutenant-Colonel before his first battle (where he definitely didn't prove anything) and was a Colonel for the first campaign where his skill began to shine through.

Great, and what does a Lieutenant-Colonel command, how typical was his movement up the ranks and how was it funded.

One of whom died in infancy. And what does this even have to do with anything?

I suggest you re-read what I said.

Then how about Cardigan? Cornwallis? And many later Dukes of Wellington?

Exceptions to the rule. For every one of them there were a dozen men without the means to pay there way up the ladder.

And the reason I can't give examples of more junior officers, is that I simply don't know any let alone am I capable of finding their lineage. And to counter an argument that only desperate nobility joined the military, it shouldn't be necessary.

Well then, who joined the military and made up the lower ranks? It wasn't the guys who could flash the cash and buy there way up the ladder.
 
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